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ABSTRACT 
The concept of corporate governance dates back to the emergence of capitalism and modern stock 
organizations, development of global trade, and enormous growth  of multinational firms during the 
‘industrial revolution’ in the early part of the nineteenth century (Erismann-Peyer, Steger & Salzman, 
2008). It has recently received much attention as a result of the incidence of corporate frauds, accounting 
scandals, excessive compensation packages, insider trading, self-dealing, misleading disclosures, and 
possible civil and criminal liabilities of corporate organizations. Internal and external stakeholders of 
corporations are striving to strengthen their assessment of the soundness of corporate governance 
practices within corporate bodies (Mark, 2011).  Also, many economies are increasingly designing 
reforms to corporate governance practices to enhance the entire standards of corporate governance and to 
provide corporate entities possible financial and investment benefits (Grimminger & Benedetta, 2013). 
However, there has been a spate of arguments about the ‘essential’ principles of effective corporate 
governance, in that this concept develops and expands, and it changes in accordance with new insights 
and challenges within the business community (Jacques du Plessis, Hargovan & Bagaric, 2011).       
Issues of corporate governance are relevant to developing, transition and emerging-market economies, in 
view of the assertion that these countries lack vibrant, long-established financial institutions to deal with 
issues related to corporate governance (McGee, 2009). The widespread existence of small companies that 
do not have their shares listed, and of large family-owned, foreign-owned and or state-owned enterprises 
whose stocks are also not widely listed locally, is argued to be the obvious logic behind the absence of 
corporate governance issues in these economies (Oman et al., 2003). However, the view that issues of 
corporate governance are less relevant to countries with insignificant amount of large corporate 
organizations with widely traded stocks is neither here nor there (McGee, 2009; Berglof and Claessens, 
2003; Oman, et al., 2003). Just as good public governance allows the citizenry to effectively ascertain 
whether their interests are being served, corporate organizations, irrespective of their sizes and locations, 
must also strive to strengthen their governance practices, so that their shareholders can make reasonable 
investment decisions. Currently, virtually all developing, transition and emerging-market economies are 
faced with one pressing concern; how to establish the groundwork for long-term economic performance 
and competitiveness in diverse ways. But the setting up of such foundation to embark on such tasks 
cannot be materialized without the existence of good corporate governance in these economies. This has 
currently, prompted governments, directors, corporate owners, corporate managers and other stakeholders 
in these economies to realize the relevance of effective corporate governance practice. 
The significance of corporate governance for socio-economic development of Ghana is rapidly being 
favorably noticed by academics, business professionals, policymakers and regulators. The transfer of 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to private individuals mirrors this favorable notification. The 
recommendations of the companies code 1963 (Act 179), Securities Industry Laws, 1993 (PNDCL 333) 
as amended by the Securities Industry Act, 2000 (Act 590) as well as the listing regulations, 1990 (L.I. 
1509) of Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE), all point to the fact that corporate governance is incrementally 
receiving the necessary attention in Ghana. Academics, policymakers, business professionals as well as 
regulators have the notion that the adoption of the recommended guidelines would serve as a significant 
step in influencing management and director behavior in regards to effective and efficient discharge of 
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their duties and responsibilities in enhancing shareholder interest (Moscu, 2013; Okpara, 2010; Ward, 
2003).  
The purpose of this study was to examine the driving forces of effective corporate governance practices 
within the context of Ghana. In order to retain theoretical flexibility, limit extraneous variation and 
sharpen external validity, the criterion-based sampling technique was employed to select four large 
corporate organizations listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Subsequently, in order to maximize a series 
of available information to the researcher, enhance data credibility and to offer a source of triangulation, a 
multi-method data gathering technique was applied in this study-archival record, interviews and 
observations. This study relied on theoretical propositions and the development of a case description for 
its analyses. With this, there was a descriptive framework for organizing the case study while following 
the theoretical propositions.  
The findings obtained from this study reveal that large shareholders play significant role in determining 
effective corporate governance in Ghana.  Even though major shareholders are effective in addressing 
incentive problems; this situation tends to create problems with regards to the interests of small equity 
holders. One of the findings of this study has indicated that a vital issue that arises regarding corporate 
governance is the one of the weak small shareholders vis-à-vis major ones. This is consistent with the 
existing body of knowledge in the sense that, in developing economies, the matter of corporate 
governance typically involves the expropriation of small equity holders by major equity holders. Also, the 
findings highlight that an effective and efficient board is a vital driver in determining good corporate 
governance in Ghana. But this usually happens when controlling equity holders do not deal with aspects 
of control, which are vested in the board. In other words, when major equity holders fully involve 
themselves in corporate decision-making processes, boards appear to be mere counselors or advisors to 
management. 
Further, the findings divulge that, at times, compliance with the various principles of corporate 
governance that have been prescribed regarding board composition does not certainly result in effective 
and efficient board with respect to board control function. However, evidence shows that with an absence 
of large shareholders who closely monitor and control the activities of management, a large number of 
independent NEDs on boards is useful in their control and monitoring role. Moreover, the findings 
regarding director independence bring about some challenges to the various principles of corporate 
governance, which recommend that NEDs must be independent. In circumstances where the controlling 
shareholder appoints the majority of directors, independence remains a problem or huge challenge. Also, 
director appointment by large shareholders also brings about a challenge in that; it raises the issue 
pertaining to criteria for appointments. This finding overtly demonstrates that the appointment procedure 
of directors is not guided by clear criteria. More so, it has been established that although Ghana has 
sufficient laws and regulations with respect to corporate governance, the major challenge is the absence of 
active devices for their effective enforcement. 
On the basis of these findings, the study recommends auxiliary measures that can help enhance corporate 
governance practice in Ghana. First, measures should be put in place to safeguard minority shareholders. 
La Porta et al. (2000) have suggested six (6) legal protection forms termed as anti-director rights 
measured by the ‘anti-director rights index’. These are: 1) Permitting equity holders to mail their proxy 
votes to the company; 2) not requiring equity holders to deposit their shares before the annual general 
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meeting; 3) cumulative voting; 4) ensuring proportional representation of small/minority equity holders 
on boards; 5) the presence of a mechanism for oppressed small equity holders; and 6) allowing small 
equity holders to organize an extraordinary shareholders meeting. Second, the essence of considering the 
consequences of privatization on corporate governance, and the eventual position of large shareholders in 
the decision-making processes of organizations, call for a revision of Ghana’s principles of corporate 
governance to protect minority shareholders. It has been deduced that instead of privatization through 
strategic investors/capital providers to empower local shareholders, it undermines them, and eventually 
makes them vulnerable to the expropriation problem. The study recommends that future divestitures 
should also address the concerns of local shareholders.  
Further, the issue of director independence has been identified as a pressing issue in Ghana. In order to 
curb this, the positions should be announced in public with all the requirements so that a person who 
considers him/herself qualified would tender his/her application. This means that directors will be 
recruited from the market by applying a free and fair mechanism of inviting applications from well-
qualified people. This can be achieved through the establishment of a board nomination committee. The 
role of this committee is to select and nominate well-qualified individuals for directorship positions. This 
calls for a critical assessment of the expertise and competence of the individual. After the selections have 
been done, the candidates should be subject to shareholder-elections. This will ensure transparency in the 
selection of board directors.  
Finally, without  an effective enforcement of the rules and regulations in regards to corporate governance, 
it would be very difficult for developing and transition economies to develop strong and vibrant capital 
markets, which are currently regarded as important for sustainable economic development for countries 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Berglof & Claessens, 2004). On the basis of this issue, the recommended 
strategy to ensuring effective enforcement of existing laws and regulations is by recognizing that the 
structure and capacity of the laws, and legal and regulatory framework are essential components of the 
corporate governance structure. In achieving this, the following mechanisms have been suggested by this 
study: Improving the regulatory framework by making the laws accessible to all equity holders and the 
populace; fashioning out effective mechanisms for law enforcement  as well as strengthening enforcement 
mechanisms (by providing training, logistics, equipments and so on); taking on alternative dispute 
resolution strategies; creating a conducive environment by keeping up the possible will to execute 
policies; creating an independent and intrepid judiciary; and encouraging the media to report issues of 
corporate governance and   become more critical/judicious on issues of corporate governance. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, developing countries, shareholder control, board control, Ghana 
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Riassunto 
Il concetto di corporate governance risale alla nascita del capitalismo e moderne organizzazioni, 
lo sviluppo del commercio mondiale , e l'enorme crescita delle imprese multinazionali durante la 
“rivoluzione industrial”  nella prima parte del XIX secolo ( Erismann - Peyer , Steger & Salzman 
, 2008) . Recentemente ha ricevuto molta attenzione a causa dell'incidenza delle frodi aziendali, 
scandali contabili, pacchetti di compensazione eccessiva , insider trading , self- dealing , 
informazioni fuorvianti , e le eventuale responsabilità civile e penale di organizzazioni aziendali . 
Stakeholder interni ed esterni di aziende stanno cercando di rafforzare la loro valutazione della 
solidità delle pratiche di governo societario in seno agli organi societari (Marco, 2011 ). Inoltre , 
molte economie sono sempre più progettando riforme per pratiche di corporate governance per 
migliorare l'intero standard di corporate governance e per fornire entità aziendali possibili 
benefici finanziari e d'investimento ( Grimminger e Benedetta , 2013 ) . Tuttavia, c'è stata una 
ondata di argomenti sui principi " fondamentali " di un efficace governo societario , in quanto 
questo concetto si sviluppa e si espande , e cambia in conformità con nuove intuizioni e sfide 
all'interno della comunità imprenditoriale ( Jacques du Plessis , Hargovan & Bagaric , 2011) . 
Le questioni di corporate governance sono rilevanti per lo sviluppo , transizione e le economie 
emergenti , in vista della affermazione che questi paesi mancano vivaci , a lungo consolidate 
istituzioni finanziarie per affrontare le questioni relative alla corporate governance ( McGee , 
2009) . La diffusa presenza di piccole imprese che non dispongono di proprie azioni elencate e di 
grandi dimensioni a conduzione familiare , di proprietà straniera e o imprese di proprietà statale i 
cui titoli sono anche non molto presente a livello locale , si sostiene di essere la logica evidente 
dietro l'assenza di questioni di corporate governance in tali economie ( Oman et al. , 2003) . 
Tuttavia, la vista che le questioni di corporate governance sono meno rilevanti per i paesi con 
importo non irrilevante di grandi organizzazioni professionali attraverso titoli diffusamente 
negoziati non è, né qui né là (McGee , 2009; Berglöf e Claessens , 2003 . Oman, et al , 2003) . 
Proprio come il buon governo pubblico consente la cittadinanza di verificare efficacemente se i 
loro interessi vengono serviti , organizzazioni aziendali , indipendentemente dalle loro 
dimensioni e posizioni , devono anche cercare di rafforzare le loro pratiche di governo , in modo 
che i loro azionisti possono prendere decisioni di investimento ragionevoli. Attualmente , quasi 
tutti in via di sviluppo , di transizione e dei mercati emergenti economie si trovano ad affrontare 
una crescente preoccupazione , come stabilire le basi per la prestazione economica a lungo 
termine e la competitività in diversi modi . Ma l'istituzione di tale fondazione per intraprendere 
tali attività non può essere concretizzata senza l'esistenza di una buona corporate governance in 
queste economie . Ciò ha attualmente spinto i governi , amministratori, proprietari aziendali, 
manager aziendali e altre parti interessate in queste economie a realizzare l'importanza di efficaci 
pratiche di corporate governance . 
Il significato di corporate governance per lo sviluppo socio - economico del Ghana viene 
rapidamente e favorevolmente notato da accademici, professionisti , politici e regolatori . Il 
trasferimento di aziende statale (SOE) in privati rispecchia questa notifica favorevole. Le 
raccomandazioni del codice società 1963 ( legge 179 ) , leggi Securities Industry , 1993 ( 
PNDCL 333 ), come modificato dalla legge Securities Industry , 2000 ( legge 590 ), così come i 
regolamenti di quotazione , 1990 ( LI 1509) del Ghana Borsa (GSE ) , tutti sottolineano il fatto 
che il governo societario è incrementale ricevendo la necessaria attenzione in Ghana . 
Accademici , politici, professionisti nonché i regolatori hanno l'idea che l'adozione delle linee 
guida raccomandate servirebbe come un passo significativo nell'influenzare la gestione e il 
comportamento regista con riferimento a scarico efficace ed efficiente delle proprie funzioni e 
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responsabilità nel migliorare l'interesse degli azionisti ( Moscu , 2013; Okpara , 2010; Ward , 
2003) . 
Lo scopo di questo studio era di esaminare le forze motrici di pratiche di corporate governance 
efficaci nel contesto del Ghana. Al fine di mantenere la flessibilità teorica, limitare la variazione 
estraneo e affinare la validità esterna, la tecnica di campionamento criterio-base di stato 
impiegato per selezionare quattro grandi organizzazioni aziendali quotati alla Borsa del Ghana. 
Successivamente, al fine di massimizzare una serie di informazioni a disposizione del 
ricercatore, rafforzare la credibilità dei dati e per offrire una fonte della triangolazione, una 
tecnica di raccolta dati multi-metodo è stata applicata in questo record studio-archivio, interviste 
e osservazioni. Questo studio è stato basato su proposizioni teoriche e lo sviluppo di una 
descrizione del caso di studio. Con questo, e sttato delimitato un  quadro descrittivo per 
l'organizzazione del caso di studio seguendo le proposizioni teoriche. 
I risultati ottenuti da questo studio rivelano che i grandi azionisti svolgono un ruolo significativo 
nel determinare un efficace governo societario in Ghana . Anche se i principali azionisti sono 
efficaci per affrontare problemi di incentivo, questa situazione tende a creare problemi per 
quanto riguarda gli interessi dei piccoli azionisti . Uno dei risultati di questo studio ha indicato 
che una questione fondamentale che si pone per quanto riguarda la corporate governance è uno 
dei deboli piccoli azionisti vis-à- vis quelli principali . Ciò è coerente con l'attuale corpus di 
conoscenze , nel senso che , nelle economie in via di sviluppo , la questione della corporate 
governance in genere comporta l'espropriazione dei piccoli azionisti dai principali azionisti . 
Inoltre, i risultati evidenziano che una scheda efficace ed efficiente è un fattore fondamentale nel 
determinare una buona corporate governance in Ghana . Ma questo di solito accade quando 
azionisti di controllo non trattano gli aspetti del controllo , che sono maturate nel consiglio . In 
altre parole, quando i principali azionisti si comportano pienamente nei processi decisionali 
aziendali , tavole sembrano essere semplici consulenti o consiglieri di gestione. 
Inoltre, i risultati divulgano che, a volte , il rispetto dei vari principi di corporate governance che 
sono stati prescritti in materia di composizione del consiglio non certo risultato in pensione 
efficace ed efficiente rispetto al bordo funzione di controllo . Tuttavia , le prove dimostrano che 
con l'assenza di grandi azionisti che strettamente monitorare e controllare le attività di gestione , 
un gran numero di NED indipendenti nei consigli di amministrazione è utile per il loro controllo 
e il ruolo di controllo . Inoltre , i risultati in materia dell’indipendenza dei amministrazione ha 
apportato alcune sfide per i vari principi di corporate governance , che raccomandano che il NED 
devono essere indipendenti . Nei casi in cui l'azionista di controllo nomina della maggioranza 
degli amministratori , l’indipendenza resta un problema o una sfida enorme . Inoltre , il direttore 
nomina da grandi azionisti comporta anche una sfida in quanto , solleva la questione dei criteri 
per le nomine . Questa scoperta dimostra apertamente che la procedura di nomina degli 
amministratori non è guidata da criteri chiari . Ulteriormente, è stato stabilito che, anche se il 
Ghana ha leggi e regolamenti sufficienti per quanto riguarda la corporate governance , la sfida 
principale è l'assenza di dispositivi attivi per la loro effettiva applicazione . 
Sulla base di questi risultati , lo studio raccomanda misure ausiliarie che possono contribuire a 
migliorare la pratica di corporate governance in Ghana . In primo luogo , le misure dovrebbero 
essere messe in atto per tutelare gli azionisti di minoranza . La Porta et al. (2000) hanno 
suggerito sei ( 6 ) forme di protezione giuridica definiti come diritti anti- regista misurati dal 
“indice diritti anti- regista” . Questi sono : 1 ) Consentire azionisti per posta i loro deleghe di 
voto alla società; 2) non chiedere ai azionisti di depositare le proprie azioni prima dell'assemblea 
generale annuale; 3) il voto cumulativo , 4 ) assicurare la rappresentanza proporzionale di 
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azionisti piccoli / minoranza sul tavole; 5) la presenza di un meccanismo per i titolari di piccole 
partecipazioni oppressi  e 6) permettere ai piccoli azionisti di organizzare una riunione 
straordinaria degli azionisti . In secondo luogo , l'essenza di considerare le conseguenze della 
privatizzazione sul governo societario , e l'eventuale posizione dei grandi azionisti nei processi 
decisionali delle organizzazioni , richiedono una revisione dei principi del Ghana di corporate 
governance per tutelare gli azionisti di minoranza . Si è dedotto che invece di privatizzazione 
attraverso fornitori strategici investitori / capitale per potenziare azionisti locali , li indebolisce, e 
alla fine li rende vulnerabili al problema esproprio. Lo studio raccomanda che le cessioni future 
dovrebbero anche affrontare le preoccupazioni degli azionisti locali. 
Inoltre, la questione dell'indipendenza regista è stato identificato come un problema urgente in 
Ghana. Per arginare questo, le posizioni dovrebbero essere annunciati in pubblico con tutti i 
requisiti in modo che una persona che considera lui / lei avrebbe qualificato gara il suo / la sua 
domanda. Questo significa che gli amministratori saranno reclutati dal mercato applicando un 
meccanismo di libera e leale di invitare domande da parte di persone qualificate. Ciò può essere 
ottenuto attraverso l'istituzione di un comitato consiliare di nomina. Il ruolo di questo comitato è 
quello di selezionare e nominare i soggetti qualificati per le posizioni dirigenziali. Ciò richiede 
una valutazione critica della competenza di persone. Dopo le selezioni sono state fatte, i 
candidati dovrebbero essere oggetto di azionisti-elezioni. Ciò garantirà trasparenza nella 
selezione dei consiglieri di amministrazione. 
Infine , senza un effettiva applicazione delle norme e dei regolamenti in materia di corporate 
governance , sarebbe molto difficile per lo sviluppo e la transizione delle economie di sviluppare 
i mercati dei capitali forti e vibranti , che sono attualmente considerate importanti per lo sviluppo 
economico sostenibile per i paesi ( Shleifer & Vishny , 1986; Berglöf & Claessens , 2004) . Sulla 
base di questo problema, la strategia raccomandata per assicurare l'efficace applicazione delle 
leggi e dei regolamenti esistenti è da riconoscere che la struttura e la capacità delle leggi e il 
quadro giuridico e normativo sono componenti essenziali della struttura di corporate governance 
. Nel raggiungimento di questo , i seguenti meccanismi sono stati suggeriti da questo studio : 
miglioramento del quadro normativo , rendendo le leggi accessibili a tutti i detentori di capitale e 
la popolazione ; modellare su meccanismi efficaci per l'applicazione della legge , nonché il 
rafforzamento dei meccanismi di attuazione ( attraverso la formazione , la logistica , attrezzature 
e così via) , che assumono strategie alternative di risoluzione delle controversie , creando un 
ambiente favorevole mantenendo la possibile volontà di eseguire politiche; creazione di un 
sistema giudiziario indipendente e intrepido e incoraggiare i media a segnalare problemi di 
corporate governance e diventata più critica / giudizioso su temi di corporate governance . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
  
It is worth mentioning that currently, the available empirical studies on corporate governance 
practice in Ghana are scant. This study therefore, seeks to examine the practice of corporate 
governance at firm level by highlighting the driving forces of corporate governance effectiveness 
within the Ghanaian context. The present chapter provides an introduction to the study and seeks to 
outline the fundamental themes that guide the study. It brings out the background of the study, a 
brief description of corporate governance in Ghana, statement of problem, research objectives, 
research questions and the significance of the study. It further presents a gist of the study’s research 
methods and the structure of the study. Finally, a summary of this chapter is provided.  
1.1 Background to the study 
“Travelling the road of corporate governance [will not] 
guarantee success, but not travelling upon it, will almost 
certainly guarantee failure” (Senator Eric Abetz, 2003, p. 11). 
 
If this observation by the Australian Senator, Abetz is anything to go by, then it is worth 
emphasizing that the relevance of effective corporate management cannot be overemphasized. 
Corporate organizations possess significant economic power, which eventually makes them 
politically powerful, but the manner in which this power is steered or harnessed for the welfare of 
individuals, firms, industry and society depends on effective corporate governance (Judge & 
Zattoni, 2012). The term, corporate governance has its origins from the emergence of capitalism 
and modern stock organizations, development of international trade, and enormous growth  of 
multinational corporations during the ‘industrial revolution’ in the early part of the nineteenth 
century (Erismann-Peyer, Steger & Salzman, 2008). It has recently received much attention as a 
result of the incidence of corporate frauds, accounting scandals, excessive compensation packages, 
insider trading, self-dealing, misleading disclosures, and possible civil and criminal liabilities of 
corporate organizations. Accordingly, these have alerted both internal and external stakeholders to 
intensify their inspection of the unassailability of corporate governance practices within 
corporations (Mark, 2011).  Also, many economies are incrementally making reforms to corporate 
governance practices to raise the entire standards of corporate governance and to offer corporate 
organizations possible financial and investment benefits (Grimminger & Benedetta, 2013). 
However, there has been a spate of arguments about the ‘essential’ principles of effective corporate 
governance, in the sense that this concept develops and expands, and it changes in accordance with 
new insights and challenges in the world of business (Jacques du Plessis, Hargovan & Bagaric, 
2011).       
The acknowledgment of the role of major corporations in the allotment of corporate resources in 
economies (be it a developed or developing economy) underscores contemporary debates on 
corporate governance (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013a). The discussion on sound and unsound 
corporate governance practice has been going on for many years among academics, professionals, 
policy-makers and so on. This sort of discussion on corporate governance is influenced by the 
manner in which corporate organizations are recognized. The foremost conceptualization of 
corporate organizations focused on a belief, which treated companies as properties of shareholders 
for the pursuit of their interests economically. However, a fundamental characteristic of a corporate 
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organization is its knack to possess a separate existence from its equity holders. As soon as a 
corporate organization gains its own separate existence, the matter of control comes to the fore.    
In times passed by, control of a corporate organization was wielded by its capital providers in a 
direct form or administratively (Mintzberg, 1983). However, when ownership and management are 
split, as and when ownership turns out to be dispersed, control of the corporate organization poses a 
major test. The matter of the split of ownership from management that arises in the transfer of 
control of corporate organizations from capital providers to professional managers (Bijalwan & 
Madan, 2013; Scott, 1997) picked up a noticeable quality following Berle and Means work in 1932. 
The authors observed that: 
[I]n the modern corporation, these two attributes of ownership (control and 
economic rights) no longer attach to the same individual or group. The 
stockholder has surrendered control over his wealth. He has become a 
supplier of capital, and a risk taker pure and simple, while ultimate 
responsibility and authority of ownership is attached to the stock 
ownership, the other attribute is attached to corporate control. Must we not, 
therefore recognize that we are no longer dealing with property in the old 
sense? Does the traditional logic of property still apply? Because an owner 
who also exercises control over his wealth is protected in the full receipt of 
the advantages derived from it, must it necessarily follow that an owner 
who has surrendered control of his wealth should likewise be protected to 
the full?  
Berle and Means opine that the idea of ownership of property when put to work in a corporate 
organization particularly, large ones is not a clear-cut. Corollary to this, Mintzberg (1983) advances 
the inquiry as to who ought to control the corporate organization, and in the quest of what goals? 
The author contends that ownership has become fragmented and indeed, owner-control has 
weakened and corporate organizations have been verifiably controlled by their management. This 
subject matter has fascinated corporate governance experts globally, but the present kind of 
deliberation is in any case, molded by the Berle and Means thesis (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013; Stiles 
& Taylor; 2001).   
The thought of who ought to control the affairs of a corporate organization is still receiving 
attention among corporate governance experts. Control, in this context, refers to the ability to settle 
on decisions by fashioning out good corporate strategies for the development of a corporate 
organization (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013a). Corporate strategies include the insistence of the 
fundamental long-term goals and targets of a company and the allotment of corporate assets that is 
fundamental and in addition, sufficient for the pursuance of such goals and targets. The board, in all 
facets of corporate governance discourse, has been acknowledged as a major controlling force in a 
firm, which through its activities, can make or unmake a corporate organization (Agyemang & 
Aboagye, 2013; Harris & Raviv, 2008; Stout, 2007). The board of directors is responsible for 
managing and controlling risks to the corporation’s resources and future trading (Calder, 2008). 
Control by the board stems from its powers to agree on its own direction as well as the policies of 
the firm. When board control comes to light, the degree to which management could pursue their 
selfish interests would extensively be diminished. Consequently, management will be slanted to 
take decisions that will meet the long-term goals and targets that have been set by the board for the 
welfare of all stakeholders (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013a; Larcker & Tayan, 2011; Marnet, 
2008).  
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The notion of shareholder control has also picked up grounds recently in corporate governance 
debate (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013b; Agyemang & Aboagye, 2013; Okpara, 2010; Berglof & 
Claessens, 2004; Carlsson, 2003; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
concept mirrors the sort of control wielded by equity holders, either directly or indirectly through 
the board of directors. Denis and McConnell (2003) put out that equity holders can wield control 
over a corporate organization via their influence on the choice of key personalities in the firm. For 
example, equity holders particularly, large ones regularly influence the selection of the board’s 
chairperson, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as well as other directors of a corporate 
organization. Herman (1981) asserts that, the fundamental question in relation to who has an 
absolute power over key decisions gyrates ultimately around the strength of mind of a person or a 
group that has the power to name/select the top executives of a corporate organization. Therefore, if 
specific equity holders have the ability to appoint or influence the appointment of these prominent 
people within a company, then there is little or no doubt that they can wield control over both the 
board and management, and consequently control the company as well (Agyemang & Castellini, 
2013a; Castellini & Agyemang, 2012; Berglof & Claessens, 2004; Carlsson, 2003; Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the question of whether specific 
shareholders have the ability to control corporate organizations is fundamentally empirical. The 
next section of this chapter addresses the question of why the concept of corporate governance has 
until recently, become the teething and indispensable issue of discussion of corporate boards, 
corporate managers, policy-makers and academics.    
1.2 Why corporate governance? 
Corporate governance has enjoyed a long tradition in the management sciences since the 1990s. 
Following its traditional understanding, corporate governance is defined as the application of a set 
of powerful micro-policy instruments in an organization to ensure an efficient and effective use of 
resources in achieving the main objectives of its capital providers, succeed in the competitive 
market, as well as maximizing its positive influence on other stakeholders and at the same time, 
minimizing its negative impacts on them (Castellini & Agyemang, 2012). Recent business 
scandals, financial crises, insider trading, accounting frauds and excessive compensation plans 
continue to provide abundant cause for worry and have fuelled the interest of corporate governance 
around the globe. Governments and economies are warned, global accounting and auditing 
companies are crushed, board directors are jailed and corporate organizations are ruined because of 
poor corporate governance practice (Tricker, 2003). 
In the UK, corporate governance became a prominent issue after the failures of Coloroll and Polly 
Peck and this led to the establishment of the Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate 
Governance in May 1991. The failures of Coloroll and Polly Peck were as a result of irrational 
behavior in the UK in the 1980s, when investors were prevented from getting important 
information in the accounts of these corporations, pertaining to titanic contingent liabilities. This 
lack of transparency in accounting principles led to poor financial reporting and distortion in 
compensation packages as well as the lessening of shareholders and other stakeholders’ 
effectiveness in having oversight responsibility (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). Immediately this 
information came to light, both organizations collapsed. In consequence of these failures, the UK 
started ensuring that, these possible black holes in accounting were addressed (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2005). In 1992, the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
published its report, and it became commonly known as the Cadbury Report, named after its Chair, 
Sir Adrian Cadbury. This report is generally considered as the one that sets the foundation for a 
‘best practice’ structure of corporate governance in the UK and many countries across the globe 
(Mallin, 2011; Solomon & Solomon, 2005). It was voluntary in nature and the basic principle 
embedded in it was the power bestowed upon equity holders on the basis of getting rid of or 
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minimizing information asymmetry as well as structural modifications in the manner in which 
boards of directors of corporate organizations are run to ensure greater accountability of corporate 
managers (Leech, 2013). The report also paved the way for equity holders to exercise their 
ownership responsibilities by actively partaking in corporate management through voting rights.   
Other reports purposely to elaborate on the Cadbury report followed:  Greenbury report in 1995 
focused on director’s remuneration package; Hampel report on the important role that institutional 
investors can play in 1998; Combined code in 1998 focused on how directors could carry out a 
review of the effectiveness of the internal control systems; Turnbull on the implementation of the 
internal control requirements in 1999; Higgs in January 2003 focused on the role of non-executive 
directors; Smith on audit committee in January 2003; UK Director’s Remuneration report 
regulations on director’s remuneration in 2002; Combined code in 2003 built on the earlier reports; 
Turnbull guidance revised the earlier guidance in 2005; Combined code in 2006 tackled three main 
changes- allowing the company chair to sit on the remuneration committee, providing a ‘vote 
withheld’ option on proxy appointment forms and recommending companies to publish on their 
websites proxy details; Combined code in 2008 also made two main changes- removing restrictions 
on an individual chairing and allowing companies chairs to sit on the audit committee; Smith in 
2008 on audit committee; Companies Act on the codification of the duties of directors; and the UK 
Corporate governance code in 2010 that reviewed the combined code.  
The economies of the Southeast Asian countries were severely affected by the Asian financial crisis 
and this has been mainly attributed to poor corporate governance. The whole crisis originated from 
Thailand. In 1997, the Thai baht was devalued, following a collapse of the property market. Even 
before the crisis, there was, as in many other Asian countries, substantial minority shareholder 
wealth expropriation. In Thailand, management of Bangkok Bank of Commerce diverted 
gargantuan funds offshore to organizations under their control. In the case of Indonesia, between 
1997 and 1998, managers diverted funds to sponsor a political party in the Indonesian PT Bank 
Bali (Solomon & Solomon, 2005). These cases offered an obvious mandate for the development of 
corporate governance in the Southeast Asian economies. In Indonesia, code for good corporate 
governance was released in March, 2001, which was updated in January, 2007. Currently, the 
Financial Services Authority of Indonesia has considered publishing scorecards to rate corporate 
organizations on the quality of their corporate governance practices as it begins administering 
Indonesian capital market. The criteria for the ratings will be based on how corporate organizations 
treat minority shareholders, the roles performed by board directors and so on. In order to enforce 
this, the Financial Services Authority has established Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) to improve its 
information-gathering capability to enhance corporate governance practices in Indonesia. In the 
case of Thailand, authorities have been able to revise the stock exchange code of best practices for 
directors of listed organizations. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand has 
recently delegated 40 Thai Investors Association (TIA) to safeguard the rights of shareholders at 
annual general meetings of listing corporate organizations, as part of the checklist campaign of the 
annual general meeting.   
In the US, the significance of corporate governance became obvious in 2002, as a series of 
corporate scandals, frauds, meltdowns and other irregularities resulted in the destruction of billions 
of dollars of shareholder wealth, loss of jobs, investigation of many executives and the record-
breaking bankruptcy filings (Monks & Minow, 2004).  In 2002, seven of the twelve major 
bankruptcies in the history of America were filed. Enron (through the application of special-
purpose entities and destructive accounting methods to twist its financial situation), Tyco (through 
the funding of a $2.1 million birthday party for the wife of the CEO of the corporate organization in 
2002), Adelphia, WorldCom, Global Crossing, HealthSouth, Bear Stearns and American 
International Group were among those corporate organizations that filed for bankruptcies. Solomon 
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and Solomon (2004) put forth that no one can ponder on corporate governance without recalling the 
corporate scandals and accounting frauds that emanated from these companies. The most 
significant reason these corporate scandals spread rapidly throughout the world was the systemic 
failure of every one of the mechanisms set up to provide checks and balances (Monks & Minow, 
2004). Surprisingly, every single individual became interested in corporate governance. 
Consequently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was rapidly passed by Congress and was signed into law by 
President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
NASDAQ recommended new listing regulations that directed organizations to improve their 
corporate governance practices or else they would not be allowed to trade their securities. Rating 
agencies such as Standard and Poor (S&P) and Moody’s publicly declared that corporate 
governance would be factored in their future analyzes. 
In Japan, a more recent case is the financial scandal that happened in Olympus. The company’s 
former chairperson, his trusted deputy, the corporate auditor and four outsiders used accounting and 
auditing tricks to hide losses on investments dating from the 1990s (KNC, 2012). It only came to 
light after the company had appointed the first non-Japanese boss to head its operations. 
Consequently, the former chairperson and his accomplices were found guilty and in lieu of this, 
they filed a guilty plea in Tokyo District Court. Issues like this, calls for the development of 
corporate governance outside the western world. 
Apart from the aforementioned proliferation of scandals and crises that occurred across the globe, 
Claessens (2003) stipulates additional reasons that have led to the vast attention of corporate 
governance issues. The private, market-based investment process is now vitally important for most 
economies across the globe than before. The issue of privatization has raised pressing concerns 
about corporate governance in sectors that were previously state-owned. Currently, corporate 
organizations are seeking capital from the public market, and partnerships and mutual societies 
have transmogrified themselves into listed corporate organizations. Also, issues of corporate 
governance have become much more important as a result of technological advancement, 
liberalization of financial markets, trade liberalization as well as other structural reforms (such as 
price deregulation and the withdrawal of restrictions on ownership and products).    
Furthermore, given the increasing size of corporate organizations coupled with the increasing role 
of financial intermediaries, capital mobilization is increasingly one-step removed from the 
principal-owner, given the incremental size of corporations and the increasing responsibility of 
financial intermediaries. Institutional roles are rapidly increasing in many economies and as a 
result, many economies are shifting from the ‘pay as you go’ retirement structures. This has also 
raised the need for corporate governance issues. Moreover, the programs of deregulation and 
reforms have restructured the local and international financial structures. Currently, longstanding 
institutional frameworks of corporate governance are being substituted with new ones. Lastly, 
global financial integration, and trade and investment flows are rapidly increasing and as result, 
concerns on corporate governance have been incrementally fomented. 
The pressing concerns that have been raised above, formed the basis for a number of plans, at both 
local and global levels, aimed at enhancing corporate governance practices. International 
organizations have dedicated increasing attention to corporate governance issues. For example, in 
1999, the Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (CACG) and the Organization of 
Economic Development for Cooperation and Development (OECD) released separate, but related 
principles for good corporate governance. The principles of OECD were revised in 2004. In 1999, 
another vital step to harmonize guidelines of corporate governance was taken by the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) in the USA. CalPERS released a set of corporate 
governance guidelines that it regarded as a minimum set of guidelines with which all markets 
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across the globe should strive to comply. The aim was allowing markets throughout the world to 
function liberally and equitably for all capital providers. Meanwhile, a substantial number of 
countries around the globe has put together country-specific guidelines aimed at enhancing 
corporate governance practices. Table 1.1.0 shows the practices that are considered to enhance 
good corporate governance if adopted. 
Table 1.1: Principles of corporate governance across the world 
Name of Principle Country/Organization Year 
OECD principles/ Millstein report Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) 
1999 updated in 
2004 
Commonwealth Association guidelines Commonwealth Association for Corporate 
Governance 
1999 
CalPERS principles California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System 
1999 
APEC/PECC guidelines  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 2001 
Institute of International Finance code Institute of International Finance 2002 
CVM (securities commission) code Brazil 2002 edited in 2009 
CSRC (securities commission)code China 2002 
Stock Exchange code/Guide Hong Kong 1989 updated in 
2011 
Kumar Mangalan Birla Report India 2000 updated in 
2009 
Stock Exchange Code Republic of Korea 1999 updated in 
2003 
High Level Finance Committee code Malaysia 2000 updated in 
2012 
CCE/CNBV code Mexico 1999 updated in 
2010 
SEC code Pakistan 2002 updated in 
2012 
The Russian code of corporate conduct Russia Federation 2002 
GIME/Polish Governance Forum code Poland 2002 updated in 
2010 
Institute of Directors code Singapore 2001 updated in 
2012 
King code of governance South Africa 2009 
Stock Exchange code Thailand 1997 updated in 
1998 
Codice di Autodisciplina/ the 
corporate governance code 
Italy 2006 updated in 
2011 
German Panel of Corporate 
Governance 
Germany 2000 amended in 
2012 
Unified good governance code  Spain  1996 updated in 
2006 
Corporate governance-
recommendations 
Belgium 1998 updated in 
2009 
Code of Corporate Governance Nigeria 2003 updated in 
2011 
Source: European Corporate Governance Institute (Index of all codes) 
1.3 Corporate Governance in Ghana 
Issues of corporate governance are germane to emerging countries, in view of the assertion that 
these economies lack vibrant, long-established financial institutions to address matters pertaining to 
corporate governance (McGee, 2009). The widespread existence of small enterprises that do not 
have their shares listed, and of large family-owned, foreign-owned and or state-owned enterprises 
whose stocks are also not widely listed locally, is argued to be the obvious logic behind the absence 
of corporate governance issues in these economies (Oman et al., 2003). However, the view that 
issues of corporate governance are less relevant to countries with insignificant amount of large 
corporate organizations with widely traded stocks is flawed (McGee, 2009; Berglof and Claessens, 
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2003; Oman, et al., 2003). Just as good public governance allows the citizenry to effectively 
ascertain whether their interests are being served, corporate organisations, irrespective of their sizes 
and locations, must also strive to strengthen their governance practices so that their shareholders 
can make reasonable investment decisions. Currently, virtually all developing, transition and 
emerging-market economies are faced with one pressing concern; how to establish the groundwork 
for long-term economic performance and competitiveness in diverse ways. But the setting up of 
such foundation to embark on such tasks cannot be materialized without the existence of good 
corporate governance in these economies. This has currently, prompted governments, directors, 
corporate owners, corporate managers and other stakeholders in these economies to realize the 
indispensability of effective corporate governance practice.    
In Ghana, more and more corporate organizations are being encouraged to apply good corporate 
governance in order to effectively and efficiently compete on the international market. The 
recommendations of the companies code 1963 (Act 179), Securities Industry Laws 1993 (PNDCL 
333) as amended by the Securities Industry Act, 2000 (Act 590) as well as the listing regulations 
1990 (L.I. 1509) of Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE), outline the roles of the board, directors and 
auditors.  They also provide shareholders’ rights and regulatory framework for the setting up, and 
operations of corporate organizations in corporate governance practice. The Institute of Directors 
(IoD-Ghana), the Private Enterprise Foundation and the State Enterprises Commission are all 
involved in the enhancement of effective corporate governance practice in Ghana.   
There has been quite a number of programs to addressing corporate governance issues in Ghana. In 
1999 and 2000, several seminars on issues of corporate governance were hosted by the Ghana 
Institute of Directors, in partnership with the Commonwealth Association of Governance. A report 
on Ghana’s top 100 corporate organizations and some state-owned enterprises was presented 
during those conferences. The aim of the survey was to examine the prevailing situation in regards 
to corporate governance practice in both privately-owned and state-owned enterprises. The report 
revealed that good corporate governance practice was gaining roots in the operations of corporate 
organizations in Ghana. Nonetheless, the IoD recommended some measures for enhancing 
corporate governance practice in Ghana. These are; the strengthening of existing legal and 
regulatory frameworks that demand more transparency to back solid and stable corporate 
governance practice; and the clarification of governance roles and responsibilities. With the 
absence of transparency, there will not be any fundamental ingredients upon which good judgment 
can be attained. In 2001, a conference sponsored by the Center for International Private Enterprise 
(CIPE) was held in Accra to discuss issues pertaining to the significance of effective corporate 
governance for sustainable growth in West African economies. 
The report of this conference pointed out the main constraint confronting corporate governance 
practice in state-owned enterprises in Ghana. Government interference in the affairs of these 
corporate organizations raises a lot of teething concerns in terms of corporate governance. This 
kind of interference leads to rarity of effective corporate governance practice in these corporate 
organizations. Etukudo (1999) in a report notes that this rarity of corporate governance practice in 
sub-Saharan African economies mostly arises from the unclear relationship among the state, as the 
owner of the corporate organizations, the board and senior management. The seldomness of 
effective corporate governance in state-owned enterprises in Ghana has led to abysmal performance 
and the failure of these corporate organizations (For example, Ghana International Airline, 
Merchant Bank, State Transport Corporation, Social Security Bank, Nsawam Cannery and so on). 
Lack of institutional and legal reforms in order to ensure that state-owned corporate organization 
managers are independent in carrying out their mundane activities as well as to strengthen their 
accountability in regard to finance, performance and fairness, resulted in poor performance of these 
corporate organizations.  
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In 1983, the government of Ghana considered the germaneness of undertaking comprehensive 
reforms of state-owned corporate organizations in Ghana by introducing the Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP). These reforms included: a) A policy reform to ensure that state-owned corporate 
organizations operate in a commercial way; b) institutional and legal reforms; c) rationalization of 
state-owned corporate organizations via divestiture and mergers; d) rehabilitation of selected 
profitable state-owned corporations e) improvement in the management of state-owned corporate 
organizations; and f) restoring financial solvency and discipline. With the establishment of the 
State Enterprises Commission law, 1987 (PNDCL 170) in 1987, these reforms were validated. To 
complement these reforms, the divestiture implementation program was launched in 1987, aimed at 
encouraging private sector growth by limiting the role of the state in the economy as well as to 
relieve the state of the drain on its scarce resources. Following these reforms, several state-owned 
corporate organizations have been divested. Some of them have been successful in their 
performance. Although not all have been successful, privatization of state-owned enterprises is 
vital to effective corporate governance practice in that, most state-owned corporate organizations 
do not comply with the existing rules and regulations in relation to corporate governance, and this 
eventually affects their performance. 
Socio-Economic development of Africa and the world in general, raises alarm for the need to create 
an atmosphere to appreciate the intricacies and dynamics of corporate governance practice in 
developing countries. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is a vision that was 
adopted by African leaders to create a new partnership between the Western countries and African 
countries in achieving socio-economic development of the African region. This initiative considers 
good corporate governance as one of the germane issues for poverty reduction through investment-
driven economic growth and economic governance. The initiative highlights the fact that in order to 
reduce poverty in an economy, effective corporate governance practice should be the bedrock since 
it helps allocate resources efficiently and effectively. This implies that there is an overt correlation 
between good corporate governance and poverty alleviation.   
Transcending the borders of Africa, Ghana as a commonwealth country is required to develop good 
corporate governance structures. In 1999, the CACG made available some sets of principles to 
ensuring effective corporate governance practices throughout the commonwealth (CACG, 1999). 
The principle is concerned with: The profitability and efficiency of Commonwealth corporate 
businesses, and their ability to create wealth and employment; the long-term competitiveness of 
Commonwealth nations in the global market; the stability and credibility of the Commonwealth 
financial sectors, both nationally and internationally; and the relationship between corporate 
businesses within an economy and their sustained capacity to partake in the global economy 
(CACG, 1999). This beefs up the call for understanding the prevailing situation in regards to 
corporate governance practice and make such understanding the heart for additional enhancement 
strategies in the Ghanaian setting.     
1.4 Statement of problem   
The significance of corporate governance for socio-economic development of Ghana is rapidly 
being favorably noticed by academics, business professionals, policymakers as well as regulatory 
bodies. The transfer of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to private individuals mirrors this 
favorable notification. The recommendations of the companies code 1963 (Act 179), Securities 
Industry Laws, 1993 (PNDCL 333) as amended by the Securities Industry Act, 2000 (Act 590) as 
well as the listing regulations, 1990 (L.I. 1509) of Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE), all point to the 
fact that corporate governance is incrementally receiving the necessary attention in Ghana. 
Academics, policymakers, business professionals as well as regulators have the notion that the 
adoption of the recommended guidelines would serve as a significant step in influencing 
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management and director behavior in regards to effective and efficient discharge of their duties and 
responsibilities in enhancing shareholder interest (Moscu, 2013; Okpara, 2010; Ward, 2003)   
The promotion of the guidelines of good corporate governance and the transfer of SOEs to 
individual shareholders are important developments. However, for an effective and efficient system 
of corporate governance to prevail, knowledge on corporate governance is needed to serve as the 
basis for decisions. Unfortunately, research on understanding the driving forces of effective 
corporate governance in Ghana is scant. Mensah, Aboagye, Addo and Buasti (2003) in their study 
in Ghana found that corporate governance practice influences efficient and effective mobilization 
of investible funds. Also, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) examined the impact of board 
characteristics on firm performance of non-financial listed corporate organizations on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange and found some relationships between board characteristics and firm performance. 
McGee (2009) in a study on corporate governance in transition and developing countries made an 
attempt to highlight the main attributes of corporate governance in Ghana.  
However, it is worth mentioning that these limited studies on corporate governance in Ghana have 
concentrated on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms or board 
characteristics and firm performance using available data from annual surrogate statements and 
other archival reports of companies. Hence most studies of such nature are impeded in the sense 
that they are limited to employing company financial and market performance as surrogate 
measures to effective corporate governance (Payne, Benson & Finegold, 2009). They have revealed 
inconclusive results and have not painstakingly covered the elements that drive the effectiveness of 
corporate governance practices in corporate organizations. Studies that have combined interviews, 
observations and archival records to enrich conventional data sources to explore the dynamics and 
intricacies of corporate governance practices  have, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, not 
been conducted within the Ghanaian context. Therefore, it is against this backdrop that this study 
sought to examine the driving forces of effective corporate governance within the context of 
Ghana. 
1.5 Objective of the study 
The main objective of the study was to examine the driving forces of effective corporate 
governance in Ghana. Dul and Hak (2008) opine that there are two kinds of research objectives; 
theory-oriented objective and practice-oriented objective. Whilst theory-oriented research objective 
aims at contributing to the development of theory, practice-oriented research objective aims at 
contributing to the knowledge of particular professionals responsible for a specific task. 
Consequently, this study combined the two elements by contributing to the development of theory 
as well as to the knowledge of business practitioners. This objective was divided into three sub-
divisions. These were: 
 to explore the concepts currently in the literature that are suitable for evaluating effective 
corporate governance; 
 to assess the prevailing situation in regards to the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
Ghana, and the elements that drive this effectiveness; and 
 to recommend auxiliary issues for further improvement of corporate governance in Ghana.  
1.6 Research question  
Given the importance of corporate governance in Ghana, the principal research question of this 
study was: What are the driving forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana? This principal 
research question mirrors two important aspects: The need to appreciate corporate governance in 
the context of Ghana as well as the existing corporate governance practices in Ghana; and the 
functional objective of corporate governance.   
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1.6.1 Specific research questions 
In addressing the principal research question, a division into three (3) specific questions was made: 
 What are the concepts available in the extant literature that are suitable for evaluating the 
effectiveness of corporate governance? This specific research question was answered by 
reviewing the extant body of knowledge. This helped in fashioning out the genesis for 
acquiring an understanding into the study in hand. Also, the concepts that were employed 
to exploring effective corporate governance were uncovered.  
 What is the prevailing condition in regards to corporate governance effectiveness in Ghana, 
and the elements that drive this effectiveness? This question addressed the issue of 
corporate governance effectiveness in Ghana. It assessed the prevailing corporate 
governance practices in Ghana. The concepts that were uncovered in addressing the first 
specific question were applied in this assessment.   
 What significant issues could be suggested as auxiliary for further development of 
corporate governance in Ghana? This contributed by highlighting those concerns that are 
needed to be looked at to further enhance the practice of corporate governance in Ghana. 
1.7 Significance of the study 
The significance of a research can be evaluated on two main aspects: Scientific significance and 
social significance. The scientific significance of a research has to do with the importance of the 
study to the extant body of knowledge. In the context of this study, the social significance is 
explicitly connected to the importance of the empirical observations of corporate governance in 
general and specifically, Ghana. The significance of corporate governance arises from its influence 
on a corporation’s capability to attract capital providers, allocate resources in a more efficient and 
effective manner, and achieve long-term sustainability (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013; Leech, 2013; 
Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni & Vigano, 2011; Larcker & Tayan, 2011, Lamm, 2010; Okpara, 2010; 
McGee, 2009; Huse, 2007; Knell, 2006; Hilb, 2006; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006). 
To add up to the general significance of corporate governance, Ghana is supposed to improve good 
corporate governance practice as a vital measure for tackling issues of poverty alleviation. 
Corporate governance plays an important role to the development of the private sector, which is 
considered as the ‘engine of growth’.  Therefore, it is imperative for a country to develop good 
corporate governance structures since the growth of a country’s private sector, inter alia depends 
on an incessant availability of long-term capital (OECD, 1999; World Bank, 2000). Emergent 
economies like Ghana, are more often than not, confronted with the challenge of attracting the 
required foreign capital to stimulate growth.  By improving corporate governance, a country’s 
competitiveness will be enhanced in attracting foreign capital (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013; McGee, 
2009; Rubach & Sebora, 1998).  
In order to sustain and encourage more foreign direct investment inflows into the Ghanaian 
economy, issues of corporate governance are needed to be looked at. This is because good 
corporate governance practice helps in preventing corporate scandals, accounting fraud, insider 
trading, misleading disclosures, self-dealing, excessive compensation packages and possible civil 
and criminal liabilities of corporations (Larcker & Tayan, 2011; Lipman & Lipman, 2006).  
Holding other things constant, corporate organizations can improve their performance and get easy 
access to capital by improving the quality of corporate governance. This stems from the assertion 
that “[g]ood corporate governance regime can absolve the harm that emanates from corporate 
deficiencies and address issues such as poor business leadership, unrelenting poor firm 
performance and a common wearing away of confidence in and around corporate organizations” 
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(Agyemang, Aboagye & Ahali, 2013, p.4). By accruing knowledge of, and suggesting measures 
that are needed for the improvement of quality corporate governance practices in Ghana, this study 
will assist in improving Ghana’s competitiveness in attracting foreign capital as well as motivating 
local businessmen/businesswomen to invest without any doubts.  
Corporate governance is dependent on the effectiveness and efficiency with which resources are 
allocated within an economy (OECD, 2004; World Bank, 2000; OECD, 1999; Clarke & Clegg, 
1998). Investment decisions made by corporate organizations are driven by the framework of their 
corporate governance structures. This means that, to the extent that corporate organizations allocate 
resources in an economy, the effectiveness and efficiency of allocation of these resources depend 
on the efficacy of their corporate governance structures. Conducting research on corporate 
governance in Ghana, and suggesting measures for its improvement will assist in enhancing the 
allocation of resources in the Ghanaian economy and consequently, contributes to the socio-
economic development of Ghana.  
Even though globalization has been inclined to standardize specific features of corporate 
governance practices (such as board independence), global corporate governance structures in 
general, have widely remained diverse. These differences mirror exclusive combination of legal, 
economic, societal, cultural and other factors that have evolved over time (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). 
Therefore, conducting research on a national context is vitally important to get an in-depth 
understanding of how corporate governance structures work and to sketch out the behaviors of 
corporate managers.  
A significant amount of research has been conducted on corporate governance. However, most of 
these works have been carried out on developed economies. It is worth considering that issues of 
corporate governance are vital for developing and transition economies (Okpara, 2010) like Ghana 
in that, developing economies are characterized by concentrated ownership and inefficient capital 
market. There is an absence of the long-established financial institution infrastructure in developing 
and transition economies to address the issues of corporate governance. McGee (2009, p. 10) put 
forth that studies on corporate governance in transition and emergent economies are important in 
that “the subject of corporate governance is new for them and even their top government and 
private sector leaders have little or no experience governing market oriented private firms that have 
a public constituency …”. This research in hand contributes in partially bridging the research 
lacuna on corporate governance issues and highlights the barriers and hindrances preventing the 
development of good corporate governance practice in developing countries particularly, Ghana.     
1.8 Research methods  
Although chapter five provides the methodology and research methods employed in this study, this 
section presents a gist of it. In addressing the study’s goal, objective and research sub-questions, 
the strategy for this research needed to back both corporate governance practice in Ghana, and the 
meaning and insight of its development. The application of a qualitative approach in carrying out 
research on corporate governance has increased recently. Yin (2011) argues that, qualitative 
research approach has recently become a pleasing, if not the mainstream, kind of research in both 
academic and professional fields of operation. In their study, McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) 
revealed that qualitative studies on corporate governance have increased in absolute figures since 
the 1990s, but still remain a small proportion of works on corporate governance. Since corporate 
governance is considered as an “evolving, complex, global, multi-level phenomenon” (McNulty et 
al., 2013, p.184), it requires an enquiry that can be explored and examined using a qualitative 
research approach. In line with this, this study aspired to use qualitative case study approach to 
explore and examine corporate governance practices in Ghana in a real empirical context. The 
research approach provided the researcher an opportunity to access and generate a comprehensive 
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or detailed as well as sufficient data essential for answering the research sub-questions put forth by 
the study. 
This study was conducted in the following four stages: An extensive review of the extant body of 
knowledge in relation to corporate governance, case selection, data collection and analysis of data.  
1.8.1 Extensive review of literature 
A vast number of books and articles explains corporate governance in regards to its significance, 
challenges and implementation. This stage of the study began with a painstaking quest of all 
relevant literature on corporate governance. It proceeded to examining the mechanisms that could 
be applied to mitigate the principal-agent problem in a corporate organization. Based on this 
examination, the general model of corporate governance was developed, that served as a guiding 
framework for this study. After the development of this model (See figure. 4.2), the researcher 
reviewed the practice of corporate governance in the context of developing countries and for that 
matter, Ghana vis-a-vis the various corporate governance mechanisms found in the extant 
literature. Thereafter, a pilot study (See section 4.6) was carried out to verify the conclusions that 
were drawn from the review that the researcher conducted by comparing corporate governance 
practice in Ghana and that of the various mechanisms of corporate governance. The pilot study 
supported the researcher’s conclusion that, only two mechanisms namely, the ownership structure 
and the board of directors work in the Ghanaian context. After the pilot study had corroborated the 
conclusions drawn from the extant literature by the researcher, the actual conceptual framework 
(See figure. 4.3) of the study was then developed. Finally, the study’s propositions that were to be 
tested against the study’s conceptual framework were formulated.  
1.8.2 Research propositions 
A proposition is a cautious and hypothetical association between abstract constructs that is 
formulated in a form of declaration (Bhattacherjee, 2012). This declarative statement does not 
necessarily have to be a fact, but must be empirically tested to establish whether it is true or false. 
With an absence of propositions, case studies will probably be difficult, in that an investigator 
would probably be fascinated to capture ‘everything’, which is not possible to carry out. 
Propositions limit the scope of the study. Yin (2003, p. 23) suggests that ‘the more a study contains 
specific propositions, the more it will stay within feasible limits’. Accordingly, five research 
propositions were formulated. These were: 
 
Proposition 1:  Shareholders with larger shares exert shareholder control in a company. This 
proposition addresses the ownership structure and how it leads to   shareholder 
control in a corporate organization.    
 
Proposition 2: Effective and efficient board meetings lead to a panoptic board control in a 
company. This proposition addresses how effective board meetings are and how 
they result in board control in a company.  
 
Proposition 3: The non-duality structure with independent chairperson results in a panoptic 
board control in a company..This proposition shows how board independence is 
linked to board control. In other words, how Chief Executive Officer-
Chairperson separation leads to board control 
 
Proposition 4a: Instituting a board audit committee with independent non-executive directors as 
its members leads to a panoptic board control in a company. This proposition 
addresses how the setting up of an independent board audit committee leads to 
board control. 
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Proposition 4b: Establishing a board remuneration committee with independent directors as its 
members leads to a panoptic board control in a company. This proposition 
addresses how the establishment of an independent remuneration committee 
leads to board control. 
 
1.8.3 Case selection 
Stake (1994) suggests three main types of case study: Intrinsic case study, collective case study and 
instrumental case study. The author describes an intrinsic case study as: 
[N]ot undertaken primarily because the case represents other cases or because it 
illustrates a particular trait or problem, but because in all its particularity and 
ordinariness, [the] case itself is of interest….The purpose is not to come to 
understand some abstract concept or generic phenomena…The researcher 
temporarily subordinates other curiosities so that the case may reveal its story 
(p.237).  
Collective case study is where a variety of cases is studied together in order to investigate the 
phenomena, population, or general setting. Instrumental case study is used to achieve something 
other than a specific situation (Baxter & Jack, 2008). It provides an insight into an issue or theory 
refinement. Stake (1994, p.237) contends that instrumental “… case is of secondary interest; it 
plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else”. It often looks at in-depth, 
its context scrutinized, its ordinary actions detailed, since it assists the researcher to pursue his/her 
external interest.  
Since this study was interested in gaining an insight and understanding of corporate governance 
practices in Ghana, the instrumental case was applied. Stiles and Taylor (2001) argue that corporate 
governance is an issue in listed corporate entities where the issue of ownership and control, which 
rest at the center of the corporate governance discourse, will surface. Listed corporate entities are 
likely to have widely fragmented ownership since they have the propensity to create capital from a 
very large number of capital providers. They also have the tendency to be large. In the context of 
this study, large corporate entities that are listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) based on 
Ghanaian standard were selected. The criteria for this selection are provided in chapter five (see 
section 5.3.1).  
1.8.4 Data collection 
Data gathering for qualitative study typically engages the researcher to relate with a phenomenon in 
its real-world context and the individuals in them (Yin, 2011). This study employed three sources 
of data collection techniques to gather data: Archival records, semi-structured interviews and 
observation (see section 5.6). All the three techniques complemented each other. Each technique 
gathered different forms of data and had helped the study in one way or the other. The main aim for 
data collection was to create a storehouse of information upon which the researcher could answer 
the research questions of the study, particularly specific research question two. This multi-approach 
system was used to maximize the series of available information to the researcher, enhance data 
credibility as well as to offer a source for triangulation among these methods. Each of these 
methods had its strengths and weaknesses, and by employing a combination of methods, 
weaknesses of one method were substituted by the strengths of the other. This combination also 
offered the researcher differing views about the subject matter. 
Even though archival records were first examined by the researcher, data collection was in actual 
sense an iterative and interactive method employing all three sources of data. For instance, the 
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archival records offered the researcher historical backgrounds of the companies, but these 
information gained weight through the introduction of other sources of data. During the interview 
session, relevant and interesting developments arose that helped the researcher. These 
developments were not available in the archival records. Also, interesting developments were 
highlighted during the observation session in that, some information that were gathered from the 
interviewees were in contradiction with what  prevailed during the annual general meetings.   
1.8.5 Data analysis 
Case study analysis typically involves detailed case write-ups for each case (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Those write-ups are often simply pure descriptions but they are central to the generation of insight 
(Gersick, 1988; Pettigrew, 1990). McNulty et al. (2013, p. 188) state that “corporate governance is 
a complex multi-level phenomenon and research can be developed along different levels of 
analyzes”.  This study relied on theoretical propositions and the development of a case description 
for its analyses. With this, there was a descriptive framework for organizing the case study while 
following the propositions. Descriptions included narratives of the companies’ histories, tabular 
presentation of the companies’ performance and the ownership structure. Shareholders’ identities 
were also provided. Finally, data were summarized qualitatively in that, data acquired from each 
case were compared with other cases, and that resulted in the creation of four studies in one and 
one study from four (See section 5.7 for explanation). Figure 1.2 below shows the study’s overall 
methodological framework. A detailed explanation of this figure has been presented in chapter five.  
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Figure 1.2: Methodological framework of the Study 
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1.8.6  Research quality 
In order to insure research quality, a conscious effort was made in regards to ensuring reliability 
and validity of this study (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Moore, 2010; Wicks, 2010; Yin, 2009) (see chapter 
5 for a catholic discussion of the procedures taken). Also, the findings were communicated to 
informants and professionals to engage them again to respond and comment on the collected data 
and findings in connection with their exactness and quality. This procedure added credibility to the 
study by given respondents the opportunity to act in response to both the data and the final analysis 
(Cresswell & Miller, 2000).  
In order to winnow out the logic from the errors, the concept of triangulation was extensively 
employed in this study. First, the application of data triangulation was attained through the use of 
multi-method approach of data collection. This technique helped the study to surmount the 
weaknesses associated with each of the data collection technique used in this study. Second, an 
experienced research assistant was contracted to assist the researcher during the period of data 
collection and analysis, this helped the study to achieve researcher triangulation (Bhattacherjee, 
2012). Finally, the study also strived to attain both theoretical and methodological triangulation 
(see chapter 5 for further explanation).      
1.8.7 Ethical matters 
Science has more often than not been stage-managed in unethical manner by people and 
organizations to convey or bolster their private agenda and engage in actions that are in stark 
contrast with the norms of scientific conduct (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Therefore, ethical issues in 
research are imperative. This study applied certain forms of ethical behavior that are universally 
accepted in the scientific society. First, before gathering the required data for the analyses of the 
study, respondents were informed that their participation in the study was voluntary, that they had 
the freedom to quit any time without any adverse effects, and that they were not going to be harmed 
in consequence of their partaking or non-partaking in the study. Also, prior to eliciting information 
from the respondents, the purpose, data collection techniques and significance of the research were 
communicated to them (see appendix 3).   
Second, since one of the data collection techniques of the study was face-to-face interview, 
anonymity was impossible. However, respondents were assured of confidentiality in that they were 
promised their identities would not be divulged in any report, paper, or public seminars. This study 
did not claim that the application of confidentiality is akin to the use of anonymity, but it could 
offer a relevant help to curb unethical issues in scientific community. Finally, science has been 
argued to progress through sincerity, credibility and honesty, and investigators can best contribute 
their quotas to the benefit of science and the science community by wholly highlighting the 
weaknesses associated with their works so that other investigators could be saved from similar 
issues (Bhattacherjee, 2012). In the course of carrying out this work, the investigator encountered 
some limitations and they have been unequivocally and consistently itemized throughout the entire 
write-up.  
1.8.8 Delimitations of scope  
As mentioned earlier that science progresses through sincerity and credibility on the part of the 
researcher, it was imperative for the researcher to divulge the entire limitations of the study that 
could influence its generalizability.  
This was a study to establish the driving forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana thus the 
observable facts do not apply to other developing and transition economies. Also, the sample does 
not represent all organizations in Ghana therefore, the empirical observations cannot be a pars pro 
toto in the sense that, they cannot be generalized to cover corporate organizations that have not 
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been included in this study. However, the empirical results can be applied to other similar corporate 
organizations in Ghana and other developing countries in an analytical sense. With the application 
of inductive reasoning, the results can be applied to provide important appreciation in an effort to 
understanding the structure of corporate governance practices in those organizations. The rationale 
behind the decision to concentrate on corporate organizations in Ghana was that these corporate 
bodies significantly affect several stakeholders in the Ghanaian economy. Accordingly, it is 
desirable to ensure good corporate governance in corporate organizations in the sense that 
‘effective corporate governance practices can help increase stock price and make it easier for 
corporate entities…to secure low-cost capital.’(Agyemang & Aboagye, 2013, p. 136). 
Notwithstanding the strengths of longitudinal case study research method, this study followed a 
cross-sectional case study method. The study therefore, presented cross-sectional and limited 
perspective of corporate governance practices in the selected corporate entities (Xiao, 2010). 
Although, the researcher was aware of the richer results this study could obtain from longitudinal 
case study design should he have adopted it, because of the limited time period of the entire 
doctorate studies, a cross-sectional design was employed to save time in order to meet the deadline 
of the programme (Shanahan, 2010).  
Further, as citizens, corporate organizations and governments are always constrained with time and 
money, the researcher was no different. It was the researcher’s strongest desire to conduct this 
study to cover all corporate organizations in Ghana, but because of the aforementioned constraints, 
the study was limited to only corporate organizations listed on the GSE. The researcher believed 
that if this study had taken into account all corporate organizations in Ghana, the study would have 
provided richer results. However, this step would have required more time and money to 
accomplish.    
Lastly, after the researcher had again got to know that he would be constrained with time and 
money should he have gone ahead to conduct a study to cover all corporate entities on the GSE, he 
decided to concentrate entirely on all large corporate organizations listed on the GSE. Accordingly, 
those large companies were contacted, but not all agreed to partake in this study. And since this 
study was voluntary in nature, the researcher decided to carry out the study on the companies that 
agreed to participate. Consequently, the study concentrated on only four firms.      
1.9 Outline of chapters  
The study consists of eight (8) chapters. Figure 1.3 below depicts the structure of the study. The 
present chapter is made up of the background of the study, the statement of problem, the research 
questions and objectives of the study, the significance of the study, a gist of the study’s research 
methodology and finally, the organization of the study. 
The second chapter addresses the various definitions of corporate governance, and the two 
contrasting theoretical perspectives of corporate governance: Shareholder perspective and 
Stakeholder perspective. It then proceeds to elaborate on the various corporate governance systems 
around the world namely, the Anglo-American model, Germanic model and Japanese model. It 
further highlights the debate on the possible convergence of the various systems of corporate 
governance, and ends with a discussion of the various principles and guidelines of corporate 
governance of OECD, CACG and Ghana.  
The third chapter examines the theoretical foundation of the study. It begins with a review of the 
various theories of corporate governance. It then proceeds to bringing out the two main theories 
underpinning the study: Agency theory and Transaction Cost Economic theory. Finally, it examines 
the similarities and the differences between these two theories.   
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Chapter four examines the various mechanisms that could be employed to mitigate agency problem 
in an organization. It develops a general framework of effective corporate governance based on 
empirical evidence and proceeds to construct the conceptual framework of the study. It further 
formulates the study’s propositions and finally, operationalizes the various variables in the 
conceptual framework. 
The fifth chapter examines the philosophical assumptions, research methodology, rationales for 
selecting qualitative analysis and case study research design, role of theory in research design, 
strategies employed to ensure research quality, data collection technique and analysis, the overall 
methodological framework of the study,  ethical considerations and a summary.  
The sixth chapter addresses the individual-case reports and discusses the research finding of the 
four organizations studied. It brings out the history, performance and the corporate governance 
arrangements of these four organizations.  
Chapter seven deals with the cross-case report of the four organizations investigated. It then 
proceeds to compare the empirical evidence with the corporate governance principles of Ghana.  
Chapter eight covers the conclusion of the study, and assesses the implications and importance of 
the research findings to the academic and professional bodies. It then brings out the contributions 
and weaknesses of the study. It proceeds to suggest other areas related to corporate governance that 
need to be researched into in the future. Finally, a concluding remark of the study is made.     
Figure 1.3: Structure of the study, with chapter numbers and their interconnections  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s construct 
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1.10 Summary 
This chapter outlined the structure of the study. It introduced the background, statement of 
problem, research objectives as well as the research questions of the study. The background of the 
study addressed the rise of corporate governance in general and particularly, Ghana. This chapter 
also highlighted the significance of the study and a summary of the research methods. It finally 
provided the outline of the structure of the research.  
The next chapter presents the various definitions of corporate governance, and the two contrasting 
theoretical perspectives underlying the study: Shareholder perspective and Stakeholder perspective. 
It then proceeds to elaborate on the various corporate governance systems around the world, 
namely the Anglo-American model, Germanic model and Japanese model. It further highlights the 
debate on possible convergence of the various systems of corporate governance, and ends with a 
discussion of the various principles and guidelines of corporate governance of CACG, OECD and 
Ghana.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
PERSPECTIVES AND MODELS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Chapter one outlined the structure of this study; this next chapter examines the various definitions 
of corporate governance, and the two contrasting theoretical perspectives underlying the study: 
Shareholder perspective and Stakeholder perspective. It then proceeds to elaborate on the various 
corporate governance systems around the world, namely the Anglo-American model, Germanic 
model and Japanese model. It further highlights the debate on the possible convergence of the 
various systems of corporate governance, and ends with a discussion of the various principles and 
guidelines of corporate governance.  
2.1 Corporate Governance 
The term, Corporate Governance as a relatively new term has been in popular use for the past two 
decades to describe the general codes by which businesses are steered and controlled. Despite its 
newness, there is however, no single or universally accepted definition of this term by academic 
scholars or practicing managers. Fannon (2003) posits that corporate governance is multi-faceted 
with its debate raising more issues than have been resolved. However, two distinctive features can 
be noted among the various definitions of corporate governance. Firstly, the term is defined either 
too narrowly or broadly in its scope. Secondly, the various definitions reflect the two main 
perspectives of corporate governance. 
Definitions of Corporate Governance 
Cadbury (1992) suggests that corporate governance practices are there to boost an efficient and 
effective use of resources that require an accountability of the usage of those resources.  Monks and 
Minow (2004) define corporate governance as the connection among various participants (such as 
chief executives, shareholders, management and employees) in determining a corporation’s 
direction and performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) were also of the notion that corporate 
governance is the way capital providers (shareholders) are assured of receiving returns on their 
investments. Neubauer and Lank (1998) define corporate governance as structure and procedure to 
guide and control corporations.  
Corporate governance defines the changes that influence institutional procedures, comprising of 
those appointing the controllers and regulators involved in organizing the production and 
distribution of services (Turnbull, 1999). Sir Adrian Cadbury posits that corporate governance is 
concerned with ensuring a balance between social and economic ends, and between individuals and 
communal ends (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). Mathiesen (2002) defines corporate governance as a 
field of economics that examines how to secure or motivate efficient management of corporations 
by using incentive apparatus like contracts, organizational designs and legislation. Mathiesen 
further notes that, the term is often limited to the question of improvement in financial performance 
of a corporation (for instance, how corporate owners motivate corporate managers to deliver a 
competitive rate of return). Clarke (2004) opines corporate governance concept requires the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities amongst different participants in a corporation, be it the 
board, shareholders, managers and/or other stakeholders, and also brings out the rules and 
processes for making corporate decisions. Macey (2008) put forth that the whole idea of corporate 
governance is to safeguard the integrity of the promises, made by corporate businesses to capital 
providers. However, corporations are left on their own devices to define the content of the promises 
themselves. Lamm (2010) defines corporate governance as the use of formality, thoroughness and 
transparency to an amalgamated structure of corporate policy in order to ensure that only prudent 
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risks are taken by the corporate entity to achieve shareholder value as well as to succeed in the 
market. 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) defines corporate governance as a mechanism that frames 
corporation’s duties and powers to deliver benefits to investors and those who have been directly 
influenced by the actions of the corporation (Cooper, 2007). International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) also defines corporate governance as a link that narrows the gap among corporate managers, 
board of directors and capital providers or organizations that provide capital for investment to get a 
return.  It further notes corporate governance ensures that boards of directors are accountable to the 
set objectives of the corporation, and that the corporation ought to abide by the rules and 
regulations. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) describe 
corporate governance as the practice by which corporate businesses are directed and controlled 
(OECD, 2004). The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) describes 
corporate governance as essentially about leadership: Leadership with efficiency; leadership with 
probity; leadership with responsibility; and leadership with transparency and accountability (CACG 
guidelines, 1999).  The Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana (2010) defines corporate 
governance as the modus upon which corporate bodies are managed and operated.   
Although the above discussion talks or portrays the nature of corporate governance, it is doleful to 
note that all these definitions do not make any reference to ethical issues, which is the focal point of 
the current debate on reforms of corporate governance practice. Abusive behavior, accounting and 
auditing fraud, bribery, insider trading and harassment, and employee theft are all mentioned as 
evidence of declining ethical standards in corporations (Ferrell, Fraedrich & Ferrell, 2011). It is 
believed that as companies operate within communities, they should be subject to similar social and 
ethical standards that are applied to individual citizens. Instead of companies gearing their interests 
towards share price only, they should be accountable and answerable to the communities they 
operate within, the environment, their suppliers, their customers and the world in general. Whilst 
the board is responsible or accountable to shareholders (ie. the corporation’s owners), its operations 
with respect to business ethics might have an influence on stakeholders’ interests and thus 
influence the reputation and long-term interests of the corporate business (CACG, 1999). Hilb 
(2006) points out that for a world-class corporate entity to be innovative always and become more 
successful than its competitors, such company’s board has to methodically and sustainably pursue 
and frequently measure the satisfaction and voluntary loyalty of equity holders as well as other 
stakeholders such as customers, employees (including management) and the citizenry. Board of 
directors always become unaccountable if its members decide to use their expertise to serve their 
own interests without taking into account firm value maximization, firm’s strategic orientation and 
the interests of all stakeholders to which they are answerable to (Huse et al., 2011).         
Inferring from the above definitions or analyzes, one should be able to establish the role corporate 
governance plays in a corporate organization. In the context of this study, corporate governance can 
be understood as;  
[A]n application of a set of powerful micro-policy instruments or an effective 
lever in a corporate business to ensure an efficient and effective use of resources 
in achieving the main objective of its capital providers, succeed in the 
competitive market, as well as maximizing its positive influence on other 
stakeholders (for example. managers, employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, labor unions and the local community as a whole)  and to minimize 
its impacts considered as negative (Castellini & Agyemang, 2012).  
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Therefore, the concern of corporate governance is vested in the board and management, whose 
associations ought to be based on mutual reverence, trust and special uprightness. 
Figure 2.2: Corporate governance as defined within the context of the study 
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Source: Author’s construct 
Figure 2.2 above gives a clear picture of how corporate governance is defined in the context of this 
study. It highlights how corporate managers are supposed to efficiently and effectively utilize 
limited resources of corporations to achieve the main objective of their equity holders. It also 
depicts how corporate organizations have a societal and cultural obligation beyond meeting the 
objectives of their equity holders. Good corporate governance practice in corporate organizations 
ought to back policies that offer acceptable living standard to other stakeholders such as employees, 
lessen risk for holders of debt, and develop the communities and environments they reside.   
The figure also depicts a wide set of external driving forces that differ across countries. These 
forces have influence on a country’s corporate governance system. These include; legal and 
regulatory framework, legal enforcement, competitive market, and accounting and auditing 
standards. These are considered in corporate governance discourse as external disciplining 
mechanisms on how management behaves.    
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Governance 
The various definitions of corporate governance discussed above mirrors two theoretical 
perspectives of corporate governance. These are: The shareholder perspective, which fits into the 
narrow scope of the definition of corporate governance; and the stakeholder perspective, which also 
corresponds to the wider scope of the definition of corporate governance. These two perspectives 
compete to define and determine the objective of a corporate business, whose interest the firm 
should serve, and the corporate governance structure. 
The shareholder theory traces its origin to the works of Adam Smith (1776), Berle & Means (1932) 
and also the seminal paper by Jensen & Meckling (1976). This theory considers an organization as 
a device for shareholders to maximize their investment returns, on the basis that theoretically, 
shareholders are residual risk bearers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This means the objective task of 
Corporate Organization 
Maximizing the 
positive effect 
Minimizing the 
negative effect 
Other stakeholders 
Capital providers interests 
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a corporate business ought to focus only on those who have monetary share of the corporation. 
Other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, creditors and so on, who provide resources to the 
company do so on the basis of contracts that define the relation between their contributions to the 
firm’s productive processes and the returns they get from those contributions (Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan, 2000).The implication is that shareholders’ returns depend on the revenue (if any) that 
are left after the payment of all contractual claims.  
 Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, has gradually developed since the 1970s (Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004). One of the first demystifications of the stakeholder theory was exhibited by 
Freeman (1984), who proposed the general theory of the firm, integrating corporate accountability 
to a wider range of stakeholders. The fundamental issue of the stakeholder theory is that companies 
are too large, and their influence on society is ubiquitous that they should discharge accountability 
to many more sectors of society than just their shareholders (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 
2007; Brink, 2011).  In other words, an objective function of corporate businesses should not only 
be economically inclined, but also be socially accountable and efficient (Keasey et al. cited in 
Brink, 2011). This is because stakeholders are not only impacted or influenced by corporate 
businesses, but they in turn influence firms in some ways. In simple terms, they have a ‘stake’ 
rather than a ‘share’ in corporate businesses. Stakeholders herein include shareholders, managers, 
employees, suppliers, creditors, local communities, customers and the general public.  
The discussion above leads the study to the debate between the shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives, and the competing corporate governance structures around the world that are to be 
examined in the next section. For the purpose of this analysis, the shareholder perspective is 
defined as the maximization of a long-term market value of the firm, as characterized by its stock 
price, whereas the stakeholder context is described as the maximization of the total value of the 
firm, as distributed amongst all stakeholders such as shareholders, employees, customers, creditors, 
communities in the vicinity of the corporate businesses’ operations, and the general public (Jensen, 
2002).   
In the early days of the Great depression, a debate emanated between Professor Adolf Berle of 
Columbia Law School and Professor Merrick Dodd of Harvard University on the role of corporate 
directors as fiduciaries. Berle (1931) contends that since powers of management are drawn from 
shareholders, it is the duty of managers to maximize the corporate business’ value for the sole 
benefit of its equity holders. Dodd (1932) in response argues that opinions on the role and 
responsibilities of corporate entities would eventually get their way into the law books. His 
argument was that it is not only the duty of managers to maximize firm value to benefit its 
shareholders, but also to provide social benefits to other stakeholders.  In the preface to the 1968 
edition of his seminal work The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle interestingly 
accepted that successive events had confirmed Dodd’s argument. 
Jensen (2002) posits that even though stakeholder theory (that has its source from sociology and 
organizational behavior) is considered the major contender of shareholder theory, it is characterized 
by politics of special interest and managerial self-interest. The stakeholder theory has been popular 
and greatly acknowledged by numerous professional organizations, special interest groups and 
other organizational bodies, but it cannot be regarded as an appropriate competitor to value 
maximization since it fails to offer complete specification of the corporate objective function. 
Jensen (2002) argues that in addition to its incompleteness, the stakeholder theory serves the 
private interests of those who promote it, including outside managers, inside managers as well as 
directors of corporate businesses.  
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Danielson, Heck and Shaffer (2008) opine that if a corporate business is pressured to apportion 
some of its economic surplus to employees (ie.  Paying wages in excess of the employees’ marginal 
productivity) or by reducing prices to customers, they would benefit in the short-run. However, 
these policies might restrain future innovation, hurting shareholders and other stakeholders in the 
long-run. Hosmer (1995) suggests that in order to be considered as a stakeholder, it should be 
subject to how the individual or group at some point in the future can influence the achievements of 
the corporate business. This assertion has been buttressed by the Delaware Court, which ruled that 
the interest of other stakeholders ought to have thoughtful associations to the general interest of the 
shareholder (Walsh, 2002). Without this limitation, the stakeholder theory will become 
irreconcilable with corporate governance practice when the people who are considered as 
stakeholders increase significantly to the point where the concept “stakeholder” is no important for 
scrutiny. Stenberg (1997) argues that: 
Stakeholder theory provides no effective standard against which corporate 
agents can be judged. Balancing stakeholder interests is an ill-defined notion, 
which cannot serve as an objective performance measure; managers responsible 
for interpreting as well as implementing it are effectively left free to pursue their 
own arbitrary ends (p.5). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) justify the stakeholder theory in the management literature, both 
explicitly and implicitly, on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, normative validity and its 
instrumental power. The authors recapitulate that even though these three justifications are 
mutually supportive, the normative base of the theory (i.e. why some claims, whether moral, 
property-based, and some associations are legitimate and worthy) attracts the attention of 
management professionals. Mcvea and Freeman (2005) contend that the structure of the 
stakeholder theory which developed out of a series of clinical studies of management practitioners 
over a period of ten years by Freeman (1984) has recently been spotted that, it has more influence 
on theorists and academics than corporate managers and entrepreneurs. The stakeholder theory 
perspective which was originally suggested as a strategic management apparatus, has since been 
‘hijacked’ by management scholars to serve as a channel/conduit to make corporate businesses 
more ethical in the current debate of corporate governance. Therefore, it must be well-noted that to 
deal with situations that encompass business ethics and matters of conflict of interest that are more 
likely to raise public views, it would be more appropriate for boards of listed corporate 
organizations to accept the stakeholder point of view.   
Nevertheless, the traditional shareholder perspective (ie. the finance model) of corporate 
governance is still attracting attention from management scholars as well as practitioners in the 
present corporate governance discourse (Healy, 2003). Healy (2003) points out that shareholder 
value is very important in terms of a country’s economic development. In this line of argument, 
countries that apply the finance model in their corporate governance practices stand to benefit in 
terms of competition than countries that apply or adopt the stakeholder perspective (Healy, 2003). 
Jensen (2002) claims the main objective function of a corporate business in the finance model, as 
entrusted to its board of directors, is to maximize long term market value, which is primarily 
reflected in the company’s stock price. Charkman (1994) however, asserts that the fundamental 
flaw of the shareholder model is its excessive attention on short-term market value. The 
performance of a corporate business is attentively monitored on three-monthly basis and thus 
exerting pressure on corporate managers to only concentrate on the current stock price, which 
subsequently leads to a rejection of  the long-term market value of the corporate business. Jensen 
(2002, p.245) suggests that for corporate business managers to overcome this flaw there ought to be 
“a structure that will help them resist the temptation to maximize the short term financial 
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performance (usually profits, or sometimes even more silly, earnings per share) of the 
organization”.  
The bone of contention between the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives is also reflected in 
the current discourse on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The major question that arises is: 
What role should a corporate business play in terms of social responsibilities? Friedman (1970) 
states the only social responsibility of a corporate business is to use its resources to  partake in 
activities that are purposely designed to increase or maximize its profits as much as it  resides 
within the rules of the game. This means corporate businesses have to engage in activities that 
maximize shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, the only objective of a corporate business is to meet 
shareholders’ interests by maximizing their value, leaving the various social responsibilities to the 
government and other institutions. In simple terms, any corporate governance reforms ought to 
align management’s interests with that of shareholders, for example by aligning management’s 
incentive packages closely with firm profitability. This profit would benefit the entire corporation 
in that reinvested profits will assist in building up the corporation’s economic resources, thus 
allowing future capital investment and expenditure on valuable long-run ventures like research and 
development (Wearing, 2005). These activities will eventually help other stakeholders. For 
instance, the workforce will experience job security enhancement and the environment in which the 
firm situates will gain via huge efficient investment and a lesser amount of harmful industrial 
activities.         
However, it has also been argued that a corporate business focusing only on maximizing 
shareholders’ value without considering CSR role may weaken or undermine its shareholders’ long 
term interest (Ferrell et al., 2011). The environment of a business brings out numerous possible 
ethical conflicts. For instance: a) A corporate entity’s attempts to meet its goals may crash with 
workers efforts to accomplish their own goals; b) wishes of consumers for quality and safe produce 
may collide with a corporate entity’s goal to make sufficient returns, and c) top management’s aim 
to obtain considerable increases in remuneration may have a collision with shareholders’ desires to 
minimize costs and at the same time maximize the value of the firm (Ferrell et al., 2011). Collins 
and Porras (1998) in their study suggest that shareholder value maximization has not been a major 
objective of corporate businesses that make more money. The authors conclude that corporate 
businesses that concentrate only on maximizing shareholder value are more inclined to perform 
badly than their counterparts that focus differently (ie. not only concentrating on maximizing 
shareholder value).       
Therefore, the question that can be asked is: Is there any other way or approach to resolve the 
current debate between the shareholder perspective and the stakeholder viewpoint? Gamble and 
Kelly (2001) contend that changes are happening that will possibly make the traditional shareholder 
theory worthy of being accepted. They referred to these changes as “enlightened managerialism”. 
This is where corporations adopt non-legal binding codes in order to propagate best practice. Also, 
Gamble and Kelly observe the likelihood of an increasingly strong shareholder movement or 
‘shareholder activism’, for example shareholder advisory group PIRC of Britain, CalPERS of US, 
l’Association pour la Defense des Actionnaires Minoritaires (ADAM) of France, TIA of Thailand 
and TIAA-CREF. These movements will serve to empower shareholders to act vehemently and 
efficiently in monitoring firm performance. This can be achieved through the modification of 
existing laws of governments to ensure greater shareholder democracy and greater accountability of 
corporations’ boards of directors to shareholders. Nevertheless, they admitted that increasing share 
ownership via privatization has not instituted a wider share-owning culture. Also, the authors 
support corporate pluralism and a more proper acknowledgement in firm governance of the risks 
incurred by all stakeholders- including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and so on.   
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The corporate pluralism position on the company in the stakeholding 
debate proposes to acknowledge the pluralistic structure of the modern 
company by changing the legal framework to accommodate it. The 
strength of this perspective is that it offers a way to make the company 
both more efficient and more legitimate................. (Gamble & Kelly, 
2001, p. 115)         
Jensen (2002) argues for an adjusted approach to shareholder theory and emphasizes the 
significance of firm value maximization; “two hundred years of work in economics and finance 
implies that in the absence of externalities and monopoly (and when all goods are priced), social 
welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its total market value” (Jensen, 
2001, p. 297).  He admits that a corporate organization cannot maximize its value if it disregards 
other stakeholders’ interests. Therefore,   he proposed an “Enlightened Value Maximization”, 
which he considers as identical to “Enlightened Stakeholder theory” to fuse the two theoretical 
perspectives. With this, there is “no doubt advocates of stakeholder theory would find it hard to 
accept the mechanism whereby focusing on firm market-value maximization leads inevitably to 
social welfare maximization” (Wearing, 2005, p. 12). However, leaving this pressing issue to one 
side, it appears logical to admit that maximizing  more than one objective  at the same time means 
‘the absence of objective’.  
[T]elling a manager to maximize current profits, market share, future 
growth in profits, and anything else one pleases will leave that manager 
with no objective. The result will be confusion and lack of purpose that will 
fundamentally handicap the firm in its competition for survival (Jensen, 
2001,p.310).  
Jensen (2001) futher argues that stakeholder theory does not provide any criterion for what is 
better or otherwise, leaving corporate directors and managers with no criterion to solve corporate 
problems. He continues that if this is the case, why do corporate executives and directors  accept 
stakeholder theory? He interestingly, states that the answer lies in the self-centerd motive of 
managers of corporations.  
Because stakeholder theory provides no definition of ‘better’, it leaves 
managers and directors unaccountable for their stewardship of the firm’s 
resources. With no criteria for performance, managers cannot be evaluated in 
any principled way. Therefore, stakeholder theory plays into the hands of self-
intrested managers allowing them to pursue their own interests at the expense 
of society and the firm’s financial claimants........By expanding the power of 
managers in this unproductive way, stakeholder theory therefore increases 
agency costs in the economic system. Viewed in this way it is not surprising 
that many managers like it. (Jensen, 2001,p. 305). 
This argument leads Jensen to agree on enlightened value maximization and enlightened 
stakeholder theory. By ignoring or mistreating any important constituency, firms should not expect 
to maximize their long-run market value (Jensen, 2001). In simple terms, for a corporate 
organization to succeed in the competitive market, it has to address the concerns of all stakeholders.  
Jensen proposes this theory on a basis of finding a lasting solution to the bone of contention 
between the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives, but it is surprising to note that the term 
Enlightened Value Maximization can be changed into Enlightened Self-interest.  This is because:  
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Findings on attitudes of stakeholding suggest that boards consider the 
embracing of the idea of stakeholders as one of the enlightened self-interest, 
rather than adopting a stronger version of the principle. Details of how the 
boards factored in stakeholders to decision-making remained hazy, leaving a 
sense of ad-hoc, case by case assessment, rather than any considered approach 
to stakeholder groups (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.101).  
So far, this section has discussed shareholder and stakeholder perspectives of corporate governance. 
But the question is; is it possible for corporate governance to be enhanced by attempting to make 
some adjustments with regards to corporate ethical behavior? Many large corporate organizations 
have drafted a business code, but Kaptein (2004) put forth that the presence of a business code does 
not essentially mean that a corporate organization will stick to it, even though its contents at least, 
direct the corporate organization to the sort of business ethics it claims to endorse. However, 
Wearing (2005) contends that there are individuals who think corporate governance can be 
improved via extensive disclosure of a company’s ethical programs.  
It is obvious that the practical importance of shareholder and stakeholder perspectives of corporate 
governance will continue to be discussed for a very long period of time to come. Even though 
theoretically, it is important to highlight these two differing perspectives of corporate governance, 
it is worth noting that, in reality, the importance of corporate governance lies between these two 
distinctive standpoints.     
2.3 Models of Corporate Governance 
There are many regimes written and recognized in and with the emergence of corporate 
governance. These regimes are on the stages and evolution of corporate governance in various 
countries such as Canada, China, Italy, Argentina, South Africa, United States, United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, Germany, Japan and many others. Various dimensions have however, been applied 
to distinguish these regimes into three broad models of corporate governance which have also 
evolved within the broader framework of the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives.  These are 
the Anglo-American model, the Germanic model and the Japanese model (Weimer & Pape, 2000; 
Tricker, 1994). The discussion on corporate governance in this section will thus look at these three 
broad models. 
2.3.1 Anglo-American model          
The Anglo-American model reflects corporate governance practices in countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and other members of 
the Commonwealth including Ghana. These countries found under this model reflect the 
shareholder approach to corporate governance (Allen & Zhao, 2007; Solomon & Solomon, 2004; 
Bradley, Sundaram, & Malsh, 1999; Weimer, 1995; Tricker, 1994).  Solomon and Solomon (2004) 
assert the web of relationships found in this model is only between a company and its owners 
(shareholders). The shareholder perspective states corporate businesses legitimate goals  are to 
serve the interests of those who own  it (i.e. stockholders) and are only accountable to them, while 
the  legitimate claim of other stakeholders are principally satisfied by meeting the contractual terms 
between them and the corporation (Allen & Zhao, 2007; Solomon & Solomon, 2004). The 
shareholder perspective used by this model ensures that firms are run in the interests of 
shareholders with the aim to create wealth for them (Allen & Zhao, 2007).  Shareholders’ interest 
and sovereignty are mainly highlighted in the decision-making processes of a corporate 
organization.  
Fisher and Lovell (2009) also view shareholders as only stakeholders who exert influence over the 
managerial-decision making processes as these managers, are viewed as the agents of shareholders 
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with the required objective of maximizing shareholder value. Scott (2001) indicates this arises from 
the perception that a firm is a property of those who have invested capital and it (firm) is required 
to pursue their (ie. shareholders) economic interests.  With the objective to maximize shareholders 
wealth in a corporation, the Anglo-American model has further being found to measure the success 
of a corporation, for the most part, by its returns on invested financial capital. To achieve this, 
various approaches to suit this model are adopted to encourage managers of corporations to 
maximize the interests of shareholders. These are performance-related compensation schemes, 
transparent accounting standards and development of effective boards of directors (Roe, 2003). 
With corporations accepted as properties of shareholders under the Anglo- American model, one 
may be tempted to lump up the idea of shareholders as one unit. This however, is clarified by Roe 
(2003) and, Weimer and Pape (2000). The authors argue that ownership of corporations under the 
Anglo-American however, have different shareholders being apportioned different level of stock or 
sovereignty towards decision-making. The united Kingdom for instance though with increasing 
changes in share ownership, foreign investors own twelve percent (12percent) of companies, 
followed by private individuals owning over twenty-one percent (21percent) of companies shares,  
while institutional shareholders hold about sixty-seven percent (67percent) of equity in 
corporations (Monks & Minow, 2002). In accordance with the data released by the Office of 
National Statistics in 2010, at the last quarter of 2008, institutional investors own virtually 
40percent of UK equity, foreign investors own 41.5percent and individual shareholders own 
something over 10percent (Mallin, 2011). Denis and McConnell (2003) indicate these wide 
changing of shareholder ownership in this model results from existing laws to protecting minority 
shareholders. Grant (2003) put forward that the importance of this form of protection to countries 
under this model arose out of the United States market crash of 1929.  
While there is existence of fragmented shareholding or ownership of companies under this model, 
the nature of board system is one-tier. The aim of firms is to be successful and for this to thrive, 
there ought to be the need for effective corporate governance. To ensure good corporate 
governance, an effectual and well-functioning management board is the most desired by all striving 
corporate organizations (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007). Solomon and Solomon 
(2004) suggest a firm’s board is the heart of the company, and it needs to be in good physical 
shape, fit and carefully nurtured for the company to run effectively. Management decisions and 
control roles in this model are combined while executive and non-executive directors sit on the 
same board (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007; Maassen, 1999).  This combination 
mirrors the original concept of the corporation founded by the entrepreneurial flair of the founder, 
hence imbibing decision-making as well as decision implementation role in the same person. 
Clarke (1993) argues this formation is viewed as advantageous as a result of its flexibility and 
quick adaptation it attains via speedy decision-making. Solomon and Solomon (2004) posit a 
company with ‘good’ corporate governance mechanisms, such as split roles or the best balance of 
executive and non-executive directors is apt to demonstrate more efficient monitoring of its board 
of directors. 
However, recent developments of the folding up of corporations, viewed as failure in proper 
decision making has prompted changes to this form of board system. Changes advocated include 
increasing the number of non-executive directors to strengthen control over management, splitting 
the positions of board chairpersons and Chief Executive Officers (CEO), as well as formation of 
various board committees (Hopt & Leyens, 2004; Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007). 
Currently, in the UK, there is a balance of executive and independent Non-executive directors (ie. 
at least 50percent of the board should be made up of independent Non-executive directors) for large 
companies, whilst smaller firms have at least two independent Non-executive directors (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010). Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) are anticipated to be able to influence 
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management’s decisions and  offer autonomous views on firms’ policies, performances, resources, 
appointments and standards of conduct. Majority of the NEDs are also expected to be independent 
of the board and free from any possible relationships which could affect their autonomy except 
those which concern their remuneration and shareholdings (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 
2007). 
Appointments of NEDs are carried out through a formal selection process by using a nomination 
committee to strengthen their independence. From the agency theory perspective, NEDs can be 
perceived as players who carry out a monitoring role on the rest of the board. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) point out that without the monitoring function of these NEDs; there are possibilities 
for executive directors to manipulate their position via gaining absolute control over their own 
payment packages and securing their jobs. However, there are perceptions among some academics 
and practitioners that the involvement of NEDs as outside directors on boards can damage 
corporate governance by reducing entrepreneurship in the business as well as weakening board 
unity (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007). 
In 2008, the Combined Code of UK was amended in regards to the findings of a careful assessment 
of document presented by Financial Reporting Council (FRC). Two changes were made: 1) To get 
rid of limitations on a person chairing more than one FTSE 100 firm; and 2) for listed firms outside 
the FTSE 350, to permit the firm’s chair to sit on the audit committee in case he/she is regarded 
independent on appointment (FRC, 2008). Smith review of audit committee contracted by FRC in 
2008 also made the following recommendation: 
[A]udit committees are encouraged to consider the need to include the risk of 
the withdrawal of their auditor from the market in their risk evaluation and 
planning [and that ]companies are encouraged to include in the audit 
committee’s report information on the appointment, reappointment or removal 
of the auditor, including supporting information on tendering frequency, the 
tenure of the incumbent auditor and any contractual obligations that acted to 
restrict the committee’s choice of auditor (Linklaters, 2008, p.4)  
2.3.2 Germanic model 
Pape (1999) opines that countries that adopt the Germanic model of corporate governance, consider 
firms as institutions. These institutions are regarded as autonomous social units, encompassing 
shareholders’ interests as well as other stakeholders’ interests (Moerland, 1995a cited in Pape, 
1999). This implies that Germanic model of corporate governance adheres to the stakeholder 
perspective. Stakeholders such as employees, lenders and shareholders influence managerial 
decisions in the Germanic model (Rubach & Sebora, 1998; Monks & Minow, 2002; 2008). The 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Germanic model depend mainly on returns on social capital 
(Rubach & Sebora, 1998; Roe, 2003).  
Contrary to the Anglo-American one-tier board structure, the Germanic model is characterized by a 
two-tier board system (Sadowski Junkes & Lindenthal, 2005). The board system consists of the 
management board (Vorsand) and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Whilst the management 
board carries out the day-to-day operations of the corporate organization on issues such as 
manufacturing, finance, marketing, product development, strategy, distribution and supply chain, 
the supervisory board’s duty is to approve financial statements, make decisions pertaining to major 
capital investment, mergers and acquisitions, pay dividends, and select and appoint the 
management board, supervise its activities and, if the need arises, fire its members (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2011; Sadowski et al, 2005).  
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The supervisory board represents employees. Firms with at least 2000 employees ought to have 
half of their seats of supervisory board reserved for employees, whereas in smaller firms, one-third 
of their supervisory board seats are to be set aside for employees (Larcker & Tayan, 2011; Mülbert, 
1998; Hopt & Leyens, 2004). These requirements for employee representation are lawful 
obligations that can never be altered via bylaw alterations. Consequently, the Germanic model of 
corporate governance unreservedly considers jobs preservation, as in contrast to the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance, which places emphasis on shareholder interests. This 
representation establishes harmony between capital providers and labor in wealth creation (Sebora 
& Rubach, 1998). The power given to employees is described as co-determination, and it is further 
spread out by the role of work councils as well as trade unions. Gilpin (2001) affirms that co-
determination at the level of corporations has made labor a partner in corporate governance 
practices in Germany. Employees partaking in the decision-making processes of corporations make 
it possible for corporations to inform them when germane decisions are to be taken. Corporations 
also consult employees in making personal decisions. This consultation is law-determined via 
representation of employees on the supervisory board, national work councils as well as trade 
unions (Oxford Analytica cited in Monks and Minow, 2002). The national work councils have 
wider information and consultation rights as well as in possession of certain co-determination 
rights. 
Information and consultation rights are embedded in personnel planning, changes in work 
procedures, the working environment, new technology as well as job content. However, this co-
determination mainly exist in “social” matters such as the introduction of new payment procedures, 
rates of bonuses, performance-based pay, daily and weekly work schedules, overtime, short time 
working holidays, personal issues (recruitment, transfer and dismissal) and technical working 
devices (Sadowski et al., 2005). Unlike collective bargaining, where lockouts and strikes are 
considered to be the main mechanism of solving industrial conflicts or disagreements, only 
diplomatic or non-violent negotiations are endorsed in the exercise of participating rights by 
national work councils (Sadowski et al., 2005). Management and Work councils can reach a 
company-level agreement, which is known as work agreement (Betriebsvereinbarungen) 
(Bernhard, 1996 cited in Sadowski et al, 2005).  
In spite of the co-determination in the Germanic model, stockholders have a slight advantage in the 
decision-making processes when it comes to the appointment of the chairperson of the supervisory 
board (‘neutral’ person), who has a casting vote in times of tie in the vote. Stockholders can also 
fire supervisory board members with three quarters of a majority vote (Oxford Analytica cited in 
Monks and Minow, 2002). Yet, the power of shareholders in the Germanic model is different from 
that of the Anglo-American model in that, the principle of one-share-one vote is absent in the 
Germanic model. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the principle 
of one-share-one vote is absent in Germany and therefore, shareholders’ protection in the Germanic 
model is comparatively less. 
The degree of ownership concentration in the Germanic model is very high. Gorton and Schmid 
(1996) in a study, for instance, indicate that 80percent of listed firms in Germany have a non-
financial owner holding at least 25percent of stocks. Special attentions are given to financial 
institutions as owners of corporations. The existence of proxy voting allows banks to vote on behalf 
of other stockholders, particularly persons who deposit their stocks in these financial institutions 
(Edwards & Fischer, 1994). Accordingly, financial institutions have a large degree of control, even 
over widely held corporations (Franks & Mayer, 2001). Banks and insurance companies perform a 
very significant role as spiders in the web of cross-shareholdings, comprising both financial and 
non-financial companies (Wenger & Kaserer, 1998; Scheneider-Lenné, 1994). The significant role 
of banks and cross-holdings means that the role of portfolio investors like pension and investment 
31 
 
funds have been negligible (Davis & Steil, 2000; Blommenstein & Funke, 1998). Larcker and 
Tayan (2011) stipulate that given the significant role financial institutions play, German 
shareholders conventionally do not have much influence over board issues as compared to the 
influence their counterparts exert in countries that adhere to the Anglo-American model. This 
subjects minority shareholders in Germany to a risk since they always have to depend on other 
stakeholders in safeguarding their rights.      
Unlike the Anglo-American model, the role of stock market in the Germanic countries is minimal. 
Van der Elst (2000) argues the number of listed firms in Germany and their market capitalization 
are insignificant relative to the size of the economy. A minute number of corporations has share 
with high returns or turnover. In Germany, if large chunks of stocks change hands, it is done as a 
result of trade in block of stocks amongst large stockholders outside the stock market, resulting in 
price discrimination against minority shareholders (Franks & Mayer, 2001; Jenkinson & 
Ljungqvist, 2001; Koke, 2001). There is also an absence of hostile takeovers in Germanic countries 
(Bauman, 1998; Bernhadt, 2000; Walter & Smith, 1997). Contrary to the Anglo-American 
countries, a number of mechanisms has been developed to discourage takeovers in Germanic 
countries (KPMG, 1995, cited in Pape, 1999). For instance, takeovers are considered in Germany 
as destabilizers of businesses and therefore, discouraged (Gilpin, 2001). The exchange market’s 
weakness is also compounded by negligent disclosure obligations coupled with auditing standards 
which serve the interests of tax authorities better than shareholders’ interests (Fox, 1998; Nobes & 
Parker, 2000; Schmidt, 1998).  
There are some changes that are occurring in the Germanic model. These changes are occurring as 
a result of pressures from market forces (Schilling, 2001). Solomon and Solomon (2004, p.168) 
opine “international institutional investments and increasingly open economies are forcing 
countries such as Germany to become more market-oriented”.  The current liberalization of capital 
markets and systematic movement from bank financing to financing via securities markets are 
starting to unknot certain characteristics of the Germanic model (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  There 
are also moves toward equity-oriented structure with the involvement of stockholders increasingly 
becoming relevant (schilling, 2001). Management has been reacting by substituting the financial 
institutions on the supervisory board with past management and by seeking out ‘anchor’ 
stockholders (Digman & Galanis, 2009). The effect of the availability of exit as a result of 
globalization of production has altered the nature of co-determination by waning labor influence 
and in turn encouraging management discretion (Digman & Galanis, 2009). For example, 
Germany’s code of corporate governance in 2000, involves some requirements for: Improved 
disclosure; encouraging performance-based pay, at ease voting as well as the enhancement of 
professionalism of the supervisory board; and making the board more accountable to stockholders. 
The creation of board committees is also gradually becoming relevant within the Germanic model 
of corporate governance (Hopt & Leyens, 2004).  
Conventionally, management of German companies always think of how to meet the interests of 
their customers and employees, but currently, there is now adequate facts of a transformation of 
attention for example, in moving industrial facilities to other countries (Charkman, 2005).  There is 
also a rule on management compensation and this forms the focal part of the legal amendments of 
the German Stock Corporation. The rule specifies that the overall compensation package of each 
member of the management board is to be disclosed by name and split into variable as well as fixed 
compensation constituents (Werder & Talaulicar, 2011). Digman and Galanis (2009), however, 
posit that despite recent changes in the Germanic model, its stakeholder orientation is not 
anticipated to vanish instantly. For example, corporate social responsibilities required from 
companies cannot stop, at least without substantial resistance from society (Monks and Minow, 
2002).   
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2.3.3 Japanese model 
The Japanese model considers corporate organizations as institutions. This model falls into the 
insider-dominated group (Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein, 1991), and has a “credit-oriented” 
financial structure (Zysman, 1983); characterized by inter-firm stockholdings, inter-firm 
directorships and regular involvement by financial institutions (for example, banks) (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007).  The economy of Japan, in spite of the reform after the World 
War II is  to some extent characterized by the Zaibatsu (i.e. a group of family-based companies that 
emerged in the early 17
th
 Century) (Bison, 1954 cited in Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Solomon 
and Solomon (2004) assert that these companies have since developed into the Keiretsu system, 
which is characterized by share ownership to one or more financial institutions (for instance, 
banks). 
After the invasion of Japan, American authorities liquidated the Zaibatsu corporations with the aim 
of avoiding the concentration of power in a few. The American authorities did not insist on 
liquidating these corporations because they did not know how the power and centrality of banks 
within the Zaibatsu system worked. This oversight resulted in the emergence of another grouping 
from the Zaibatsu called Keiretsu (Coffee, 1991; Roe, 1993). The introduction of American-styled 
public corporations which is characterized by ownership dispersion by the American authorities 
was unsuccessful; individual ownership of common stock in Japanese public companies decreased 
from 70percent in 1949 to 22percent in 1996 (Kaen, 2003). Financial institutions (banks) aided in 
the creation and development of the various Keiretsu corporate groups as a device to pool mutual 
strengths and reciprocal assistance (Charkman, 1994). It has been argued that Japanese companies 
do not perceive stockholding relevant in terms of relationship among corporate partners. Learmount 
(2002) suggests cross-shareholding and exchange of stocks among corporate partners in Japan are 
simply attributes that indicate the closeness of business associations, other than the share ownership 
per se. The goal of the Keiretsu is to maximize the relationship value and financial performance of 
the Keiretsu as a ‘family’ unit contrary to the usual goal of maximizing the market value under the 
Anglo-American model (Kaen, 2003). This grouping of Keiretsu as family unit guarantees that 
individual corporations are safeguarded from hostile takeovers. For instance, Mitsubishi and Mistui 
are typical examples of the Keiretsu. The Keiretsu system of governance is characterized by 
relational contracting (contrary to the ‘contracting’ under the Anglo-American structure) between 
member companies to assist each other’s businesses and as a means to redistribute profits within 
the group. The author further argues that such practices are thought to be detrimental to the 
minority public stockholders’ interests in each company. This is because there is an absence of 
legal tradition to protect minority shareholders like the Germanic model, which is characterized by 
relatively weak legal tradition 
The government of Japan also plays a significant role in the Keiretsu-bank system through its 
Central bank, Ministry of Finance and other ministries. The government acts as a monitoring agent 
to the Keiretsu via the formation of gyosei shido (an informal structure of ‘administrative guide’) 
for policy. This influence wielded by the government is done through the decision of the 
government to allow public servants who retire voluntarily at age 55, to join the private sector as 
managers. Rubach and Sebora (1998) consider it as part of the ‘old boy’ network that involves 
retired government servants to contribute directly in designing corporate strategies that are in 
accordance with policies of the government.  
Jackson and Moerke (2005) posit the board system of the Japanese model is one-tier, which is 
dominated by inside directors, with no clear roles for outside directors. The one-tier board system 
reflects that of the Anglo-American model. And it is in sharp contrast with the Germanic model 
where it is characterized by two-tier board system (as mentioned earlier). The Anglo-American 
model is also in contrast with the Japanese model in terms of the composition of the board. This is 
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because; the board’s composition within the Anglo-American model has majority independent 
outside directors. In the Japanese model, the legal duty or obligation of board of directors is such 
that they may be accountable to gross negligence in performance of their duty, including 
supervisory duty (Scott, 1996). The board is usually perceived to be representing employees rather 
than shareholders’ interests. Whilst the Anglo-American structure considers board of directors as a 
link between management and stockholders, the significant role of Japanese board of directors is to 
facilitate and ensure employee participation in firm issues. 
The system of governance of Japanese corporations consists of: The general assembly of 
stockholders; the board of directors; the offices of representative directors; and the office of 
auditors (Aoki, 1981 cited in Weimer, 1995). Corporate decisions are made by the board (Monks & 
Minow, 2002). The implementations of the decisions of the board are carried out by the office of 
representative directors. The supervisory role is also conducted by the office of auditors. The 
Commercial Code of Japan necessitate for the establishment of Kansayaku or a legal corporate 
auditors to monitor how the board complies with business laws and regulations (Ahmadjian & 
Okumura, 2011). The separation of the office of auditors from the board of directors and the office 
of representative directors reflects some of the characteristics of the Germanic model. It also partly 
mirrors some of the characteristics of the Anglo-American system in that, directors are elected and 
can be fired by the general assembly of stockholders. 
The significance of stock markets in the Japanese model is lower than that of UK or US, but higher 
than Germany. There is an absence of active corporate control. Solomon and Solomon (2004, 
p.171) argues that “there is little takeover activity and shares are not traded as frequently in market 
based economies”. In Japan, hostile takeovers are regarded as curse (Moerland, 1995a cited in 
Monks and Minow, 2005). The trend has been toward a more market-oriented Japanese system of 
corporate governance more recently (Cooke & Sawa, 1998 cited in Solomon & Solomon, 2004).  
Gilpin (2001) argues that the Japanese model of corporate governance is changing. Japan has 
issued guidelines on exerting voting rights (Pension Fund Corporate Governance Research, 1998) 
and a series of codes of best practices (Corporate Governance Committee, 1998). In 2002, 
significant amendments were made regarding the inclusion of independent directors. It permitted 
corporate organizations to decide whether they preferred a system that was commonly known as 
“Anglo-American style” board with three committees- audit, remuneration and compensation. 
These three committees are supposed to be dominated by Non-executive directors (Ahmadjian & 
Okumura, 2011). Meanwhile, companies that followed this system were not obligated to adopt the 
Kansayaku.  
2.4 Categorization of corporate governance systems 
Attempts have been made to group the various corporate governance systems around the world as 
discussed in the previous section. Solomon and Solomon (2004) however, argue that such 
groupings is at best loose, and at worst not correct, as it represents in some instances, 
oversimplification of extremely complicated financial structures. The authors further argue that 
trying to force a country’s corporate governance structure into a neat group is “reminiscent of the 
ugly sisters’ attempts to squeeze their unshapely feet into Cinderella’s shoe!” (p.148).  The 
grouping is also useful for analytical purposes and allows analysis of the way in which economies 
interact with each one, as well as providing researchers with a pivot, on which they can rest their 
empirical analysis (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). 
There are two widely accepted categorizations of corporate governance systems around the world. 
These are: The insider-dominated model; and the outsider dominated model. These groups are 
discussed in the next section. 
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2.4.1 Insider-dominated model 
The insider-dominated model refers to the corporate governance system in which a country’s 
publicly listed firms are owned and controlled by a small number of major stockholders (Solomon 
& Solomon, 2004). Those small numbers of major stockholders may be members of the firm’s 
founding family, banks, other firms (via cross-holding and pyramidal ownership structures) or the 
government. The insider model is relationship-based because of the predominant relationship 
between firms and their major stockholders. This model is characterized by ownership 
concentration, cross-holdings, cross-representation of managers and large shareholder associations 
in corporate decision-makings (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Both the Germanic model and the 
Japanese model mirror the insider-dominated model. 
There are problems that arise from the insider-dominated model. Solomon and Solomon (2004) 
argue that because of the close ties between stockholders and management, there is a reduced 
agency problem, which at first glance would be considered positive feature. The authors further 
argue that aligning the interests of stockholders with that of management is less difficult since they 
are the same people. Other problems are: Abuse of power because of low separation of ownership 
and control; limited information to minority shareholders; little transparency and regular abuse of 
firm’s operations; impervious financial transactions; and misappropriation of funds.      
2.4.2 Outsider-dominated model 
Solomon (2007) defines the outsider model as systems of finance and corporate governance where 
most large companies are controlled by their managers, but owned by outside stockholders such as 
banks or individual stockholders. The Anglo-American model reflects that of the Outsider-
dominated model. The outsider-dominated model is also called market-based (Zysman, 1983). The 
model is characterized by: A priority of market regulation; shareholders of companies tend to have 
a transitory interest in the company; an absence of close relationships between stockholders and 
management; ownership dispersion; an existence of active market for corporate control-hostile 
takeovers; a primacy of stockholders rights over those of other organizational groups; strong 
investor protection; and shareholders have voting rights. 
The existence of separation of ownership and control under the outsider-dominated model, results 
in agency problem. The agency problem is associated with costs to both management and 
stockholders (see chapter 3). The dominant characteristics of both the outsider and insider models 
are synopsized in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Insider and Outsider models 
Insider model Outsider model 
Firms owned predominantly by insider 
stockholders who also wield control over 
management. 
Large firms controlled by managers but owned predominantly 
by outside stockholders. 
System characterized by little separation of 
ownership and control such that agency problems 
are rare 
System characterized by separation of ownership and control 
which engenders significant agency problem 
Hostile takeovers activity is rare Frequent hostile takeovers acting as a disciplining mechanisms 
on company management 
Concentration of ownership in a small groups 
(founding family members, other companies 
through pyramidal structures, state ownership) 
Dispersed ownership 
Excessive control by small group of ‘insider’ 
shareholders 
Moderate control by large range of stockholders 
Wealth transfer from minority stockholders to 
majority stockholders 
No transfer of wealth from minority stockholders to majority 
stockholders 
Weak investor protection in company law Strong investor protection in company law 
Potential abuse of power by majority shareholders Potential for democracy 
Majority shareholders tend to have more ‘voice’ in 
their investee companies 
Shareholding characterized more by ‘exit’ than by ‘voice’ 
Source: Solomon (2007) 
2.5 Convergence of Corporate governance 
2.5.1 Globalization and Corporate governance models 
Bradley et al. (1999) are of the view that corporate governance practices are being shaped by 
globalization of industry. Globalization of industry as a growing trend of cross-border activities or 
actions of corporate businesses comprises trade, investments, and cooperation for the purpose of 
product development, production, sourcing and marketing (Clegg and Clarke, 1998). Clarke and 
Clegg (1998) state that these activities allow corporate organizations to venture into new markets, 
and utilize their technologies as well as organizational advantages to reduce risks and costs. World 
economies are increasingly becoming more amalgamated as corporate businesses expand their 
activities and assets beyond borders.  
Globalization comes with greater economic efficiency, productivity, well-being, intense 
competition, greater needs for modifications and a greater demand of both national and 
international policies. Globalization also makes national economies to become co-dependent in 
terms of finance, trade and macroeconomic policy (Gilpin, 1987). There are various dimensions of 
globalization: Internationalization of corporate designs; technology diffusion, internationalization 
of financial markets; internationalization of the regulatory potentials of national societies into the 
world’s political economy; and the diminished role of national governments in crafting the rule for 
global governance (Petrella cited in Clarke and Clegg, 1998). The other dimensions are research 
and development coupled with worldwide knowledge, and the alteration of the trends of 
consumption into cultured products with consumer markets worldwide.  
These dimensions have consequences on corporate governance. They affect the local environment 
where the activities of corporate businesses take place. Clarke and Clegg (1998) argue that 
globalization of product market comes with strong competition in the home country, thereby 
increasing the intensity of competition to which locally-produced products are subjected.     
Globalization of financial markets makes local corporate businesses to access finance or capital 
from foreign capital providers (investors). This is a laudable idea. However, this poses challenges 
to both the recipient economies and the capital providers. Whilst recipient economies are 
compelled to cope with the demands of international capital (for instance, by modifying their 
domestic system), capital providers would be confronted with monitoring and controlling 
challenges. Bradley et al. (1999) assert that increase in numbers of financial products, the 
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globalization of capital market as well as the increase in institutional capital providers (investors) 
makes it very difficult in terms of risk evaluation. Country to Country (cross-border) disclosure 
rules and regulations are underdeveloped and cannot serve as a reference point against which risk 
can be evaluated. Therefore, capital providers have to go through some complications in terms of 
assessment or evaluation since information that would be at their disposal is limited. This will also 
probably limit the extent to which management can be critically monitored by these investors. 
Globalization of capital also comes with challenges to governments’ capability to regulate 
corporate businesses. This stems from the fact that, transnational companies may block or influence 
the manner in which legislations are enacted in order to safeguard their interests (Bebchuck & Roe, 
1999).  
The impact of globalization is reflected in the discourse of the probable convergence of the various 
corporate governance models, which would be discussed in the next section.  In consequence of the 
growth of international trade and multinational corporate connections, the development of 
comparable international business ethics and standards are essentially increasing (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007).  The process of globalization of capital, financial and product 
markets requires the insider model-bank-centered corporate governance of Germany and to a lesser 
extent Japan to move towards the outsider model-shareholder-centered corporate governance model 
of Anglo-American. Corollary to this, it might be useful to discuss the extent to which the Insider 
model of Japan and Germany may converge with the outsider model of Anglo-American in the next 
section. 
2.5.2 The discourse on convergence         
The debate on convergence has brought about two main contrasting thoughts or viewpoints: 1) The 
perspective, which argues that the systems will never converge; and 2) the perspective that argues 
the system will slowly converge. Tricker (1994) contends that differences will always continue and 
that: 
[T]he one thing that seems certain is that the existing diversity and complexity 
of forms of corporate enterprise and patterns of corporate governance will 
continue, and very probably, increase. Alternative paradigms will be needed to 
improve the effectiveness of governance to influence the healthy development 
of corporate regulation and to understand the reality of the political process by 
which companies are governed, rather than the structures and mechanisms 
through which governance is exercised. In any development it will be important 
to avoid the polar extremities of governance based on an expensive bureaucracy 
or regulation and the adversarial class of vested interests. Governance powers 
and processes need to provide for the many different constitutional bases of 
modern enterprise and to reflect the reality of power over that entity, balancing 
independence and objectivity with executive commitment and motivation (p.8).    
Gilpin (2001) posits that each of these corporate governance systems has its weaknesses and 
strengths. The Anglo-American model of corporate governance is characterized by dynamic and 
market-centered; with heavily, fluid capital that seeks out business opportunities internationally, 
specifically in innovative and new industries with the potential of high returns (Clarke & Clegg, 
1999). The major shortcoming of the Anglo-American model is its volatility or unpredictability of 
finance leading to the focus on short-term benefits and disregarding long-term concerns of 
improving corporate businesses in industries, where returns are modest. On the other hand, the 
stakeholder models of Japan and Germany are more committed to long-term industrial strategies 
coupled with a stable capital investment arrangements as well as strong representative governance 
practices. Whilst the Japanese corporate governance system is more relationship-based, the US 
governance system is highly market-centered (Denis & McConnell, 2003). The stability and 
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security of the associations in the German corporate governance structure have led to a degree of 
rigidity in the face of new threats in competition. Clarke and Clegg (1998) contend that the 
speculative boom triggered by industrial wealth exposed the meagerness of secretive and most 
often, corrupt practices in Japan.  
Corporate governance effectiveness depends on a suitable legal protection of capital providers 
coupled with ownership concentration (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance structure 
in the US and the UK are based on strong legal tradition as well as effective board of directors than 
the German and Japanese corporate governance systems that are characterized by comparatively 
weak legal tradition with relatively weak investor protection and have more concentrated 
ownership in the hands of banks (Nanka-Bruce, 2009; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Roe, 2003; 
Guillén, 1999; Prowse, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Shleifer & Vishny (1997) contends most 
countries in the world lack the required legal tradition to develop governance practices. Denis and 
McConnell (2003) also point out that in spite of the variations in the legal tradition, there ought to 
be a reservation of some legal tradition for every country to achieve an effective corporate 
governance system- a reservation, which is not yet realized in many countries.  
Rajan and Zingales (as cited in Denis & McConnell, 2003) hypothesize that, whilst the 
relationship-based governance model can overcome some of the problems associated with the lack 
of investor protection, the long term capability of corporate businesses to raise capital and allocate 
it efficiently will be better served under the market-centered model. Bradley et al. (2000) argue that 
the shareholder corporate governance model, such as in the US, allows for a more flexible and thus 
allows corporate businesses to better adapt dramatic changes. Coffee (1999) hypothesizes that there 
is the likelihood that corporate evolution will follow the path of at least resistance, and that 
evolution in corporate laws and regulations faces too many hindrances to be forecasted or 
predicted. When this happens, controlling shareholders will fight to protect their interests. 
Bebchuck and Roe (1999) surmise that the controlling stockholders of the world will fight to 
safeguard the private gains or benefits of control that comes with their concentrated equity 
ownership. Efforts to improve laws safeguarding minority stockholders obviously threaten those 
private benefits or gains of control. This means it is unlikely for a convergence in the legal 
structures since controlling stockholders are influential within economies. Denis and McConnell 
(2003) point out that since the controlling stockholders within economies are more influential, it 
makes it difficult to protect minority stockholders, hence difficult to converge. 
The viewpoint of the possibility of convergence has raised two main ideas: Functional convergence 
(Coffee, 1999; La Porta La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000) and codes of best 
practices around the world (Denis & McConnell, 2003). Functional convergence happens when 
individual shareholders or/and corporate businesses adapt ways that develop strong governance in 
spite of an absence of legal traditions (Coffee, 1999; La porta et al., 2000). For instance, 
shareholders can choose to invest their capital in corporate businesses that are considered to be 
more investor-friendly. Also, corporate businesses in less protective systems can tie themselves 
with effective corporate governance by listing on stock exchanges in a more protective regime or 
by being acquired by corporate businesses in a more protective system (Denis & McConnell, 
2003).  
Hansman and Kraakman (cited in Denis and McConnell, 2003) contend that there is a strong 
likelihood of convergence towards a single model. They opine that the basic corporate form has 
achieved a great deal of uniformity. That is, world economies are moving towards an agreement or 
consensus that management ought to act towards achieving shareholders’ interests, and that this 
should involve all shareholders (i.e. whether large shareholders or minority shareholders). The 
authors identify three main factors that drive world economies towards a consensus: 1) The 
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competitive pressures of global commerce; 2) the failure of alternative models; and 3) the shift of 
interest group influence in favor of an emerging stockholders class.  
There are indications of convergence in some areas. For example, there has been a report that 
Germany, Japan and the US depict signs of movements towards each other (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1999; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000 cited in Denis & McConnell, 2003). Large stockholders are 
now present in the US corporate businesses, whilst board structures in Japan and Germany are 
converging towards the Anglo-American model of a one-tier board system. 
Denis and McConnell (2003) suggest that codes of best practices around the world are consistent 
with convergence towards an Anglo-American governance system. However, evidence from some 
countries is less favorable. Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006, p.84) opine that “globalization is not 
strong enough to overcome local vested interests. We conclude that globalization may have 
induced the adaption of some common corporate governance but that there is no evidence that these 
standards have been implemented”. Fiss and Zajac (2004) also conclude that many German 
corporate businesses engage in symbolic management by publicly adapting shareholder value 
orientation, but not implementing its practice.  
The changes in corporate governance systems depict that the structures are drifting away from their 
traditional forms. This means that there are some answerable forces for this convergence. These are 
corporate governance codes of best practice, securities regulations, standard accounting and 
auditing practices, globalization of corporations, raising capital on overseas stock exchanges, 
research publications, international conferences and journals (Tricker, 2009; Jacques du Plessis et 
al., 2011). On the other hand, there are also more than a few factors that will approximately ensure 
that there will be dissimilarities at all times. These factors are legal dissimilarities, standards in the 
legal procedure, stock market dissimilarities, ownership structures and history, and cultural and 
ethical groupings (Tricker, 2009; Jacques du Plessis et al., 2011).  
In wrapping up, McDonnell (2002) argues that: 
The universe of theoretical possibilities is much richer than a dominant strand of 
the literature suggests, and we are currently far short of the sort of empirical 
evidence that might help us sort out these possibilities. Most commentators have 
focused on efficiency to the exclusion of other values. Moreover, even if 
convergence occurs, there is a possibility that we will not converge on the best 
system. Even if we converge to the current best system, convergence still may 
not be desirable (p.342) 
2.6 Principles of corporate governance 
This section of the chapter addresses some of the principles for good corporate governance namely; 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development principles of corporate governance 
(1999; 2004), Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (1999) principles of 
corporate governance and the principles for good corporate governance of Ghana.   
2.6.1 OECD principles of corporate governance  
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles were endorsed 
by OECD ministers in 1999, and reviewed in 2004 to take account of recent developments and 
experiences in OECD member and non-member countries. These principles have since become an 
international benchmark for policy-makers, capital providers (investors), organizations as well as 
other stakeholders. The principles are: i) Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework; ii) the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; iii) the equitable treatment 
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of shareholders/stockholders; iv) the role of stakeholders; v) disclosure and transparency; and vi) 
the responsibilities of the board . These principles are discussed below. 
Principle i: ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
This principle requires countries to promote transparent and efficient markets coupled with rule of 
law, and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory 
and enforcement authorities (OECD, 2004). It requires a country’s corporate governance 
framework to impact on its overall economic performance, market integrity as well as creating 
incentives for market participants, and promoting transparent and efficient markets. The principle 
emphasizes largely on probity, accountability and transparency among institutions that revolve 
around corporate governance. Good dose of these three vitally important aspects to ensuring good 
corporate governance “might take the sting out of the fear of the abuse of power that underlies 
many protests” (Charkman, 2005, p. 19). A clearly articulated division of supervisory, regulatory, 
and enforcement authorities is needed to ensure that the interests of both the private and public 
sectors are met. In order to ensure this, the principle requires that those authorities ought to have 
the ability, integrity and resources to fulfill their duties and responsibilities in a more professional 
and objective way.   
Principle ii: rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
This principle requires a country’s corporate governance framework to safeguard and facilitate the 
rights of stockholders. These rights include: i) The right to secure methods of ownership 
registration; ii) the right to convey or transfer stocks or shares; iii) the right to obtain important and 
governance information on a timely and regular basis from the corporate business; iv) the right to 
partake and vote in general shareholder meetings; v) the voting right to elect and remove board 
members; and vi) the right to share profits of corporate businesses.   
The right to timely and regular information gives shareholders opportunity to partake effectively in 
the decision-making processes of corporate organizations. The buying and selling of stocks depicts 
the existence of the corporate control that can be exerted by shareholders through market for 
corporate control. This principle allows OECD member countries to take away barriers and 
restrictions that hinder the transfer of shares in the processes of market for corporate control. The 
Anglo-American view on corporate governance reflects this principle.  
Shareholders right to partake in the election of board of directors makes election processes more 
effective and brings on board, independent members who will safeguard their interests. In the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance, directors are elected by shareholders, and the 
members are regarded as agents of stockholders (principals). 
This principle reflects the shareholder perspective on corporate governance in which stockholders 
are regarded supreme and are permitted to exert definitive control over corporate businesses. 
Contrariwise, there is an inherent weakness in this principle in that, pointing out extensive rights of 
stockholders is different from effective corporate governance (Frederick, 1999). Extensive rights 
are made available in some world economies but the knack of stockholders to influence the 
corporate business is limited (OECD, 2003). This means that there are some mechanisms that are 
needed to facilitate this right. 
Principle iii: the equitable treatment of shareholders    
This principle requires that a country’s “corporate governance framework should ensure the 
equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of [their] rights” 
(OECD, 2004, p. 20). This principle calls for enactment of laws that will protect minority 
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shareholders. Denis and McConnell (2003) assert that any effort to improve laws to safeguard the 
rights of minority stockholders clearly threatens those private gains or benefits of control. The 
authors, further point out that those controlling stockholders are influential in corporate businesses; 
therefore, enacting laws to protect minority shareholders will be difficult. Zingales (as cited in 
Denis and McConnell, 2003) hypothesizes that the premium on voting shares in Italy is so much 
larger than any other nation of the world in that the law does not satisfactorily safeguard the rights 
of minority stockholders given whoever controls the corporate business scope to dilute minority 
stockholders. Bianchi and Enrique (1999) also assert that an effort by the government of Italy to 
increase the protection of minority stockholders was unsuccessful. These arguments point to the 
fact that, although the enactment of laws to protecting the rights of minority shareholders are 
categorically emphasized by this principle, it is very difficult to enact such laws in regards to the 
presence of controlling equity holders. 
Principle iv: the role of stakeholders          
This principle calls for the recognition of the rights of stakeholders via enactment of laws or mutual 
agreements as well as an encouragement of active collaboration between corporate businesses and 
stakeholders. This points to the fact that, not only should corporate businesses operate in the 
interests of shareholders, stakeholders’ rights also ought to be seen. Frederick (1999) point out that 
there were contentions on this principle in regards to the two perspectives of corporate governance: 
shareholder and stakeholder perspectives. However, a compromise was reached that the significant 
roles of stakeholders as providers of inputs should be considered since their collaboration is very 
significant for the very existence of the corporate business.   
The principle also requires a country’s corporate governance framework to ensure that stakeholders 
have the opportunity to seek redress for violation of their rights coupled with an accessibility of 
significant, adequate and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.  
Principle v: disclosure and transparency 
This principle focuses on the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent: 1) management and shareholders; 2) board of directors and shareholders; and 3) 
management and board of directors. The principle states that a “timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company” (OECD, 2004, p.22). This principle 
highlights on probity, transparency and accountability. The principle encourages insiders of a 
corporate business (management and directors) to disclose pertinent information that is necessary 
for the assessment of the performance of the company. The disclosure of such information by 
corporate insiders also helps the corporate outsiders (shareholders and other stakeholders) to 
partake in decision-making processes that determine the future of the corporate organization.  
The principle emphasizes on high-quality accounting standards as well as financial and non-
financial disclosure. It also highlights on the requirement of independent, competent and qualified 
auditors to conduct annual audits in order to provide an external and unbiased assurance to the 
board and shareholders. 
Principle vi: the responsibilities of the board  
The principles of corporate governance by OECD highlight on the duties and responsibilities of the 
board. Principle VI requires board of directors to be independent in that, a satisfactory number of 
board members needs to be independent of management. The principle further states that the 
separation of the positions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairperson of the board 
may be considered as the best practice. This can help attain an appropriate balance of power, 
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increase accountability and objectivity, and improve the ability of the board to make decisions, 
independent of management. 
Furthermore, the principle states that the board should act on a fully informed basis, with due 
diligence and care, and in the best interests of the corporate business and stockholders. The board 
should also treat all shareholders equally and take into account other stakeholders’ interests. The 
principle further states certain key functions of the board: 
1. reviewing and guiding strategies, key plans of operations, risk policy, annual budgets and 
business ideas; 
2. setting performance goals, monitoring implementation and company performance, 
supervising major capital expenditures as well as acquisitions and divestitures; 
3. monitoring the effectiveness of governance in a corporate business and making alterations 
when the need arises coupled with the supervision of disclosure and communications 
processes.  
4. selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when the need arises, replacing key executives 
and, supervising succession planning; 
5. aligning major executive and board remuneration with the long-term interests of the 
corporate business and stockholders; 
6. monitoring and managing possible conflicts amongst managers, board of directors and 
stockholders, including misappropriation or misuse of  the assets of the firm and abuse in 
related party transactions; and 
7. ensuring the integrity of the corporate business’ accounting and financial reporting 
structures: independent auditors, structures of risk management, operational and financial 
control, compliance with the law and important standards as well as required structures of 
control.   
The aforementioned principles of the OECD emphasize that there are various factors that can make 
board members to discharge their duties effectively (OECD, 2004). These factors include: CEO-
Chairperson separation, setting up of independent board committees and board independence.  
2.6.2 CACG Principles of Corporate Governance 
The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) was founded in 1998 in 
reaction to the Edinburgh Declaration of the Commonwealth heads of Government meeting in 1997 
to ensuring excellence in Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (CACG, 1999). There are 
two main or primary objectives of the CACG. These are; to promote good standards in corporate 
governance and business activities throughout Commonwealth, and to expedite actions on the 
development of the required institutions which will be able to advance, teach and disseminate such 
standards.  
In 1999, the CACG made available some sets of principles to ensure effective corporate 
governance practices throughout the commonwealth (CACG, 1999). The principle is concerned 
with: The profitability and efficiency of Commonwealth corporate businesses, and their ability to 
create wealth and employment; the long-term competitiveness of Commonwealth nations in the 
global market; the stability and credibility of the Commonwealth financial sectors, both national 
and international; and the relationship between corporate businesses within an economy and their 
sustained capacity to partake in the global economy (CACG, 1999). 
The principle is also concerned with the relationship between corporate businesses and their 
various stakeholders: Shareholders; managers: employees; customers; suppliers; labor unions; 
financial providers; and so on. The CACG principle focuses on the board of directors as the main 
mechanism to ensuring effective corporate governance. The principle states that: 
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 “it is the responsibility of the board of directors to ensure good corporate 
governance…….Accordingly, the board must agree on the corporations’ purpose 
(what it is for), its values (what it stands for), and the strategy to achieve its 
purpose. It must account to shareholders……..” (CACG, 1999, p.6).  
The principle also reflects the sovereign rights of shareholders, since boards of directors who are 
considered to be the principal mechanism for ensuring effective corporate governance have to 
account to shareholders. The principle follows a set of 15 sub-principles of corporate governance 
aimed primarily at how boards of directors of corporate organizations should function: 
Principle i 
Exercise leadership, enterprise, integrity and judgment in directing the corporate business for 
continual prosperity; 
Principle ii 
Ensure that through a managed and effective process; board appointments are done to provide a 
mix of proficient directors;  
Principle iii 
Determine the corporate business’ goal and values, the strategy to achieve its goal and to 
implement its values in order to ensure that it survives and thrives, and also to ensure that 
procedures and practices are in place that safeguard the corporate business’ assets and reputation. 
Principle IV 
Monitor and assess the implementation of strategies, policies, management performance criteria 
and business plan. 
Principle v  
Ensure that the corporate business complies with all important laws, regulations and codes of best 
practices. 
Principle VI 
Ensure that the corporate organization communicates effectively with stockholders and other 
stakeholders. 
Principle vii 
Serve the legitimate interests of stockholders of the corporate business and account fully to them. 
Principle viii 
Identify the corporate business’ internal and external stakeholders and agree on a policy or policies 
to determine how the corporate organization ought to relate to them. 
Principle ix 
Ensure that no one person or a block of individuals has unfettered or unregulated power and that 
there is an appropriate balance of power and authority on the board which is, inter alia, usually 
reflected by separating the roles of the CEO and chairperson, and by having a balance between 
executive and non-executive directors. 
Principle x 
Regularly or frequently review processes and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of its internal 
systems of control, so that the decision-making ability and the accuracy of its reporting and 
financial results are maintained at a higher level at all times. 
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Principle xi 
Frequently assess or evaluate its performance and effectiveness as a whole, and that of the 
individual directors, including the CEO. 
Principle xii 
Appoint the CEO and at least partake in the appointment of senior management, ensure motivation 
and protection of intellectual capital intrinsic to the corporate business, ensure that there is adequate 
training in the corporate business for management and employees, and a succession plan for senior 
management. 
Principle xiii 
Ensure that all technology and systems used in the corporate organization are adequate to properly 
run the business and for it to remain a meaningful competition. 
Principle xiv 
Identify key risk areas and key performance indicators of the corporate business and monitor these 
factors. 
Principle xv 
Ensure annually that the corporate business will continue as a going concern for its fiscal year. 
OECD and CACG principles of Corporate Governance: A reflection    
The aforementioned perspectives of corporate governance reflect in the two sets of principles of 
corporate governance being promulgated by the OECD and CACG. Most of the OECD principles 
of corporate governance have some similarities with the Cadbury Code (1992) of corporate 
governance, covering: Impartial treatment of all stockholders (Controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders), stockholder responsibilities, transparency and disclosure, functions of the 
board of directors and the significance of NEDs. The OECD principle takes a middle-of-the-road 
position in terms of not only focusing entirely on the interests of shareholders. This is depicted by 
its recognition of other stakeholders such as the board of directors in the governance structure. The 
principles encourage market-based approach to the management of corporate businesses. However, 
one of the problems with these principles is their relevance, as there is an absence of legislative 
power backing them. Nevertheless, their impacts have been significant since most countries are 
using them as a reference point for self-evaluation and for developing their own codes of best 
practices in corporate governance (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007). For instance, they 
form the basis in the development of corporate governance principles by the Commonwealth.     
The shareholder perspective is reflected in the CACG principles of effective corporate governance. 
The CACG principles emphasize on the traditional view where the board is considered as a 
representative of equity holders. These principles point out the functions of the board and the need 
for it to assume a leadership position in various ways. This reflects that the problems of corporate 
governance in the Commonwealth countries are largely linked to the failure of the board of 
directors to perform or undertake an effective monitoring, controlling and sleuthing mechanism. 
The CACG and OECD principles clearly point out the elements or factors that determine the 
effectiveness of the board as a mechanism for corporate control. These elements are the 
composition of the board, independence of the board, the leadership structure (CEO-Chairperson 
separation), board committees such as the audit committee and access to timely and regular 
information by directors. 
The impact of these two sets of principles around the world is significant. Solomon and Solomon 
(2004) assert that their impact is significant in that, countries have been using them as a reference-
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point for self-assessment and for developing their own codes of best practices. On the other hand, 
these principles pose challenges to countries, especially developing economies. Developing 
economies that are willing to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) run the risk of adopting 
these principles in a manner that may not effectively tackle the existing local circumstances. 
Turnbull (1999) also argues that the adoption may not automatically translate into effective 
corporate governance in such countries. Therefore, there is a need for these countries to adapt these 
principles based on the existing local circumstances. This argument then leads this discussion to the 
principles of corporate governance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Ghana.   
2.6.3 Principles of corporate governance of Ghana  
The regulatory framework for an effective corporate governance practice in Ghana is contained in 
the Companies code 1963 (Act 179), Securities Industry Law 1993 (PNDCL 333) as revised by the 
Securities Industry (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act 590) and the listing regulations, 1990 (L.I. 1509) 
of the Ghana Stock Exchange.    
In the context of this study, the regulatory framework of Ghana for effective corporate governance 
has been divided into six major sections, namely: 1) The mission, responsibilities and 
accountability of the board; 2) committees of the board; 3) relationship to shareholders and 
stakeholders, and the rights of shareholders; 4) financial affairs and auditing; 5) disclosures in 
annual reports; and 6) code of ethics. It may be useful now to proceed to discuss in detail the 
various sections of the regulatory framework of Ghana. 
Section i: The mission, responsibilities and accountability of the board of directors  
This section specifies the principal objective of the board of directors of a corporate entity. The 
board of directors is to ensure that the corporate entity is properly managed in order to safeguard 
and enhance stockholders value and to meet the corporate entity’s obligation to: 1) stockholders; 2) 
the industry in which it operates; and 3) the law. However, it also states that the interests of other 
stakeholders are significant as a derivative of the duty of stockholders. 
Furthermore, this section brings out the primary responsibility of the board of directors. That is, it 
is to ensure that good corporate governance prevail within its operation. This section also clearly 
states the principal duties of the board: 
1) The strategic guidance of the corporate entity in keeping its goals. 
2) Overseeing or supervising the management of the business. 
3) Identification of risk as well as the implementation of systems that manage risk. 
4) Succession planning and the appointments, training, remuneration and replacement of 
senior management. 
5) Supervision of internal control system. 
6) Maintenance of the corporate entity’s communications and information dissemination 
policy. 
The principle also reflects the sovereign rights of shareholders, since boards of directors, who are to 
ensure that effective corporate governance prevails, are accountable to shareholders.  
Again, this section of the principle brings out how the size of the board should be. It states that, the 
board’s size of every corporate entity ought to be arrived at with the belief of promoting the board’s 
effectiveness as well as ensuring appropriate representational needs. However, no specific number 
is set with regard to membership but goes on to mention between 8-16 members. The method of 
appointment to the board should be formal and transparent, and that shareholders should be 
provided with adequate information on all persons to be appointed. These information include: 
name, age and country of residence; whether appointment is executive and if so the specific area of 
responsibility; working experience; shareholding in the corporate entity as well as its subsidiaries; 
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family ties with any director and/or substantial stockholder of the corporate entity; and any conflict 
of interest. 
The leadership structure of the corporate organization is clearly stated in this section of the 
principle. It states that there should be a separation of the roles of the chairperson and the CEO. In 
addition, in the event of this separation, the relationship between the CEO and the Chairperson with 
their respective responsibilities should be formally defined or stated.  
The section, in addition, specifies the composition of the board. It states that the board should 
include a balance of executive directors and NEDs with a complement of independent NEDs being 
at least one third of the total membership of the board. The appointments of the NEDs should 
ordinarily be a matter for the board as a whole and the selection procedure ought to be based on 
merit.  It defines  the  independence of a director based on the following criteria, he/she: is not a 
substantial stockholder of the corporate entity; is not an employee of the corporate business,  is not 
a professional advisor or consultant to the corporate entity; is not a supplier or customer; no 
contractual connections with the corporate business; and free from any other relationships with the 
corporate entity, which may interfere with his or her ability to carry out his/her responsibilities 
independently. This section also specifies that all directors (i.e., Executive and NED) should have 
unrestricted access to all corporate business’ information, records and documents. 
In order for the board to discharge its duties effectively, this section states that the board should 
meet regularly and in the case of listed corporate entities, it should be at least six times a year. It 
further states that board committees are required to meet frequently in order to properly discharge 
their duties in an efficient and effective manner. However, the attendance of directors, particularly 
NEDs, at these meetings should be a major factor to let them continue to remain on the board.     
Section ii: Committees of the board 
The section directs the board to constitute committees as it may deem appropriate to help it in 
carrying out its duties. It further stipulates that the constitution of such committees may include 
non-members of the board on a condition that the responsibility for any decisions or 
recommendations made shall remain only with directors who are members of the committee. In 
addition, the board’s committees and their members should be published in the company’s annual 
report. 
The committees mentioned under this section are: the audit committee and remuneration 
committee. The audit committee should compose of at least three directors, of whom the majority 
should be NEDs. The membership of the committee should be those with adequate knowledge on 
finance, accounts and the basic elements of the laws under which the company operates. It further 
states that the chairperson of the audit committee should be a NED. 
Furthermore, this section points out the primary functions of the audit committee. These are to: 
1. recommend the appointment of the external auditors of the corporate organization; 
2. liaise with external auditors for the purposes of upholding and ensuring audit quality, 
effectiveness, risk assessment/evaluation, interaction with internal auditors and dealing 
with situations governing the resignation of an external auditor; 
3. review adequacy of systems of internal control and of the degree of compliance with 
material policies, laws and the code of ethics as well as business practices of the corporate 
organization; 
4. provide a direct conduit of communication between the board, and the external auditor, 
internal auditors,  accountants and compliance officers (if any) of the corporate 
organization; 
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5. report to the board of all issues of significant extraordinary financial transactions; and  
6. help the board in developing corporate strategies that would improve board control and 
operating structures of the corporate organization. 
More so, this section states that the audit committee: should have an authority to investigate any 
issue under its term of reference; be provided with the necessary apparatus to perform such 
investigation; and should have full access to regular and timely information. In addition, audit 
committee should also carry out an annual review of the corporate entity’s internal control over 
financial, operational and compliance issues and report on the same to shareholders in the annual 
report of the company. 
Section iii: relationship to shareholders and stakeholders 
This section stipulates that corporate governance structures employed by the board should not be 
geared towards stakeholders’ benefit at the expense of shareholders but should endeavor to increase 
shareholder value by monitoring and maintaining stakeholder relationships effectively and 
professionally.  
In addition, this section emphasizes the rights of shareholders. These include: secure methods of 
ownership registration; convey or transfer shares; obtain timely and regular information on the 
firm; partake in voting; elect board members; share in the profits of the corporate business. 
Furthermore, shareholders have the right to partake in, and to be satisfactorily informed about 
decisions concerning fundamental changes such as: amendments of the statutes, or articles of 
incorporation or similar governance documents of the firm; the authorization of additional shares; 
variation of class rights; and extraordinary transactions that in effect result in the sale of the 
corporate business.  
This section also points out the principle of equitable treatment of all shareholders. This principle: 
1) requires equity ownership over and above specified thresholds to be disclosed; 2) ensures that 
market for corporate control of listed firms functions in an efficient and transparent way; and 3) 
specifies the rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control with the goal of 
ensuring impartial treatment of all stockholders. In addition, minority stockholders are given the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. All shares issued unless 
otherwise specified rank pari passu (of equal step) with other share of the same class and in the 
case of ordinary shares, one share bears one vote. The section further forbids and punishes insider 
trading and self-dealing. 
Section iv: financial affairs and auditing 
This section deals with the financial governance, financial reporting and disclosure of price 
sensitivity information responsibilities of the board, duties of external auditors, audit report, 
departures or deviations from standards, rotation of audit personnel and removal or resignation of 
an auditor. 
The financial governance responsibilities of the board of directors under this section describe four 
main responsibilities, including: 
1. maintaining satisfactory records for protecting the assets of the corporate organization; 
2. making sure that the statutory payments payable by the corporate organization are executed 
on time; 
3. making sure that the structures of internal control are present for monitoring risk, 
adherence to financial governance structures and compliance with the law; and 
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4. ensuring that the financial statements of the company are audited at such regular intervals 
as described by law, regulations or internal policies of the company by experienced and 
well-qualified auditors.      
Also, the financial reporting responsibilities of the board of a company are defined in this section: 
1. the accurateness of information contained in financial statements; 
2. making sure required accounting policies have been consistently employed in the 
preparations of the financial statement; 
3. making sure the annual financial statements of the company are presented according to the 
financial standards of Ghana National Accounting Standards (GNAS) and other accounting 
standards; 
4. ensuring annual and interim financial statements of the company are dispersed to 
stockholders and regulators within the time frames described by law and regulation; 
5. making sure annual and interim financial statements are prepared effectively in a sense that 
it can facilitate comparability; 
6. making sure the report of auditors on financial statements are faithfully reproduced to the 
users of such statements; and 
7.  ensuring that a balanced and comprehensible evaluation is provided in the financial and 
operating results of the company in financial statements. 
Moreover, the disclosures of price sensitive responsibilities of board of directors of listed 
companies are also described in this section. These include: 1) disseminating price sensitive 
information to the market and stockholders in a timely way; 2) requesting a temporary suspension 
in the securities of the company where a disclosure may cause unpropitious price movements in the 
market for the company’s securities. 
The role of the external auditor of a company is also defined in this section. It states that the 
external auditor should be a primary source of an objective, independent and effective opinion on 
financial statements of the company. This section urges the auditor to apply diligence, 
objectiveness and independence in the execution of his or her duties. In addition, the external 
auditor is to make sure that the audit of the company is conducted in accordance with the one 
required by the Institute of Chartered Accountants, Ghana (ICAG). This section further asserts that, 
the external auditor is required to indicate in his or her report if financial statements audited have 
been prepared in accordance with the GNAS standards.  
Furthermore, the external auditor is required to specify any departures from accounting standards 
and should contain the auditors’ opinion as to whether or not the departure is not intentional and 
also give reasons for such departure. Meanwhile, in order to ensure a continued effectiveness of 
audit, personnel including the audit partner should be frequently rotated or changed in order to 
offer fresh procedures in regards to audit work. Finally, the section put forth that the withdrawal, 
resignation or refusal to stand for re-election by an auditor should be followed by an explanation, 
which the corporate organization ought to dispatch to stockholders. 
Section v: disclosures and annual report 
This section mandates the presentation of annual audited accounts of a corporate entity before its 
shareholders as specified in the principles. It requires shareholders to be provided with information 
on: 1) the financial and operating outcomes of the corporate business; 2) the objectives of the 
corporate business; 3) major share ownership and voting rights; 4) material predictable with 
factors; 4) material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders; and 5) board members and 
key executives, and their remuneration. 
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Also, this part of the code does not rule out the establishment of remuneration committee with 
NEDs as majority of its members. In addition, executive directors who serve on the remuneration 
committee must exclude themselves from matters concerning their own compensation packages. It 
goes on to declare the primary function of the remuneration committee. These are: 1) instituting an 
official and clear procedure for mounting policy on executive compensation; 2) making sure that a 
suitable structure is instituted to give performance-oriented incentives to managers; and 3) 
inspecting executive service contracts with an idea of  discovering any unwarranted losses the 
corporate organization may encounter in occasions of early service termination.  The membership 
of the remuneration committee and their policies should be disclosed during annual general 
meetings to shareholders in their annual report. The reports ought to contain at least the aggregate 
amount of fees, basic salaries, benefits in kind, allowances, pension contribution schemes, paid 
bonuses, paid compensations for office loss to directors and executive officers.          
Section vi: code of ethics  
The section on code of ethics points out that every corporate organization is directed to have its 
own code of ethics and statement of business practices, which should be implemented as part of the 
mechanisms that ensure effective corporate governance. Boards of directors are responsible for the 
formulation of such document. However, its content is applicable to the board and all employees. 
The board is also required to introduce a mechanism that monitors adherence and discipline 
deviations or breaches. 
Principles of corporate governance of Ghana: A Reflection 
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that the principles of corporate governance of Ghana 
reflect shareholder perspective of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. This is 
because the principles reflect the sovereign rights of shareholders, since boards of directors who are 
considered to be the principal mechanism to ensuring effective corporate governance have to 
account to shareholders. Also, the principles mirror the principles of corporate governance of 
CACG. Furthermore, the principles emphasize the traditional view where the board is regarded as 
representatives of shareholders. Finally, they obviously state the elements or factors that determine 
the effectiveness of the board as a mechanism for corporate control. These elements are the 
composition of the board, independence of the board, the leadership structure (CEO-Chairperson 
separation), board committees such as the audit committee and remuneration committee, and access 
to timely and regular information by directors. Table 2.2 below summarizes the characteristics of 
the OECD, CACG and Ghana’s principles of corporate governance. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of principles of OECD, CACG and Ghana 
 OECD CACG GHANA 
Board of Directors 
 
1. There should be a 
combination of both 
Executive and Non-
Executive directors. 
2.  The separation of 
the positions of the 
CEO and Chairperson. 
3. Instituting board 
committees such as 
Audit and 
remuneration 
committees. 
4.It clearly defines the 
responsibilities of the 
board 
 
1. Both executive and 
Non-executive 
directors 
2. The separation of 
the positions of the 
CEO and Chairperson 
3. Establishing board 
committees such as 
Audit and 
Remuneration 
committees. 
4. Responsibilities of 
the board are defined. 
1. The board should consist of both 
Executive and Non-Executive members. 
2. The positions of the CEO and Chairperson 
should be separated. 
3. There should be committees such as Audit 
and Remuneration committees. 
4. Responsibilities of the board are defines 
Shareholders 1. Safeguards and 
facilitates the rights of 
shareholders such as 
to secure methods of 
ownership, transfer 
stocks, obtain 
information on time, 
voting rights and to 
share profits. 
2. Equitable treatment 
of all shareholders 
irrespective of the size 
of equity held. 
 
1. Protects and 
facilitates 
shareholders’ rights in 
terms of obtaining 
information on time, 
voting rights, securing 
methods of ownership 
and profit sharing. 
 2. Equitable treatment 
of all shareholders 
irrespective of the size 
of equity held. 
1. Protects and facilitates shareholders’ rights 
with respect to profit sharing, voting rights, 
securing methods of ownership and obtaining 
timely information. 
2. Equal treatment of all shareholders 
irrespective of the size of equity held. 
Other 
Stakeholders 
Attention is given to 
other stakeholders 
since it calls for 
enactment of laws or 
mutual agreement.  
Less recognition is 
given to rights of other 
stakeholders 
Less attention is given to other stakeholders 
Source: OECD (2004), CACG (1999), Ghana Companies code, Act 179 (1963) 
2.10 Chapter summary 
The various definitions of corporate governance practices mirror two contrasting theoretical 
perspectives of corporate governance; the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives. Whilst the 
shareholder perspective proposes that agents (managers) should take strategic decisions to 
maximize shareholder wealth, the stakeholder perspective contends that agents should take into 
consideration other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, consumers and so on, when taking 
strategic decisions on the company.  
There are many regimes written and recognized in and with the emergence of corporate 
governance. These regimes evolved within the frameworks of the shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives of corporate governance. These are: The Anglo-American model, the Germanic model 
and the Japanese model. The Anglo-American model of corporate governance, which falls under 
the shareholder perspective of corporate governance, is characterized by ownership dispersion, 
primacy of shareholders’ right over those of other organizational groups and protection of 
shareholders. On the other hand, both the Germanic and the Japanese models, which fall under the 
stakeholder perspective of corporate governance, are characterized by ownership concentration in a 
small number of individuals (for instance, family members, other companies through pyramidal 
structures, state ownership).  
The Anglo-American model under the shareholder perspective of corporate governance is in stark 
contrast with the stakeholder-centred approach of the Germanic and Japanese models of corporate 
governance in that, whilst corporations are viewed as economic activities to maximize 
shareholders’ value under the Anglo-American model, they are considered as social entities to meet 
the needs of all stakeholders (for instance, shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and so 
on) in the case of stakeholder perspective of both the Germanic and the Japanese models.  
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Even though there have been calls for convergence of corporate governance practices as a result of 
competitive advantage, it must be noticed that each model has its own corporate governance values. 
Whilst the debate on convergence continues, there has been a proliferation of best practice codes 
across the globe (for example, the principles of corporate governance of the OECD, CACG and 
Ghana). Whilst the principles of the OECD takes the middle-of-the-road position in terms of not 
only focusing entirely on the interests of shareholders, the CACG principles fall under the 
shareholder perspective and view the board as a representative of shareholders. The principles of 
corporate governance of Ghana reflect shareholder perspective of the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance. This is because the principles reflect the sovereign rights of shareholders, 
since boards of directors who are considered to be the principal mechanism for ensuring effective 
corporate governance have to account to shareholders. In the next chapter, the theoretical 
foundation of the study is presented. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The previous chapter discussed the two main theoretical perspectives of corporate governance and 
their associated models, and the principles of corporate governance of the OECD, CACG and 
Ghana. This chapter examines the theoretical foundation of the study. It begins with a review of the 
various theories of corporate governance. It then proceeds to bringing out the two main theories 
underpinning the study: Agency theory and Transaction Cost Economic theory. Finally, it examines 
the similarities and the differences between these two theories.  
3.1 Corporate Governance theories 
Stiles and Taylor (2001) pinpoint seven main theoretical viewpoints that can be employed to 
examine corporate governance phenomenon. These are: a) Transaction cost economics theory; b) 
agency theory; c) resource dependency theory; d) stewardship theory; e) stakeholder theory (see 
chapter 2 for explanation); f) managerial hegemony theory; and g) class hegemony theory. These 
seven theories can also be categorized under the perspectives of both shareholder and stakeholder. 
The transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theories mirrors the viewpoint of the shareholder 
perspective in examining corporate governance phenomenon. Williamson (1981) contends 
transaction cost economics and agency theories are considered to be compliments. There has been a 
difficulty in separating agency theory and transaction cost economics theory (Solomon & Solomon, 
2004), and has been acknowledged in the literature (Gilson & Mnookin, 1985).  The various 
theories are discussed below.  
3.1.1 Resource dependency theory 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) deals with the relations among the 
environment, a corporate organization and other corporate organizations. Cornforth (2003) 
specifies that the existence of corporations significantly depend on other corporations as well as 
actors of resources. The central assertion of this theory is that corporate organizations must connect 
and “interlock” with both the outside environment and other corporations as they (corporate 
organizations) rely on them (ie. the outside environment and other corporations) for their existence. 
In view of this, directors of a particular corporate entity may participate or sit on the boards of other 
corporations for a variety of reasons. For instance, directors can serve as a connection between the 
outside environments, and/or to deepen and safeguard the corporation from alleged environmental 
menace. With this connection, costs resulting from uncertainty and search are significantly reduced 
(Huse, 2007).  
Zahra and Pearce (1989) opine that the theory has both economic and sociological origins, and has 
been emphasizing on the distribution of power within a corporate organization. This theory, for 
many years, has been a dominant approach in sociology, strategy and organization theory, which is 
employed to induce the existence of active boards (Huse, 2007). A study conducted by Pfeffer 
(1973) on connections between corporations and their outside environment in fifty-seven (57) 
hospitals in the United States concludes that: 
Organizations, as open social systems, are inextricably bound up with the 
conditions of their environments. Organizations must obtain support, both in the 
form of resources and in social legitimacy from their social context….It has been 
suggested that the board of directors is one vehicle for co-opting important 
segments of the environment (p. 326). 
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This connection brings out the significance of board composition that is normally recommended to 
comprise individuals who are well-informed and properly networked. For instance, Hilman, 
Canella and Paetzold (2000) assert that directors convey resources to the corporation, which 
include information, skills, and access to key elements such as buyers, public policy makers, 
suppliers, social groups and so on. Directors can be classified into four main groups: insiders; 
business experts; support specialists and influential people within communities (Abdullah and 
Valentine, 2009; Huse, 2007). The insiders are both present and past executives of a corporation 
who provide expertise in particular areas such as finance and law, general business strategies and 
directions. The business experts are present, past senior executives and directors of other 
corporations. They also provide technical know-how on corporate strategy, problem solving and 
decision making. The support experts are bankers, lawyers, insurance firm representatives and 
public relations specialists. They also support corporations with their technical know-how. Lastly, 
those who are influential in the community are the political leaders, academics, clergy, leaders of 
social or community organizations and so on. 
The relevant board tasks from this theory are those of networking, door-opening, legitimacy and 
communication in inter-organizational associations (Huse, 2007). The resource dependency theory 
reflects both the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives in that, it promises to maximize both 
shareholder and other stakeholders’ interests.  
3.1.2 Stewardship theory  
Sykes (1982) defines a steward as a person assigned to manage another person’s property. The idea 
of this theory has historic and religious origin in the Western society (Saltman & Ferroussier-Davis, 
2000). Its origin also stems from psychological and sociological perspective. Davis, Shoorman and 
Donaldson (1997) describe a steward as a person who safeguards and maximizes stockholders 
value through firm performance, because by so doing, the steward’s utility functions are 
maximized. This means that stewards are firm executives and managers working for stockholders 
through the makings of decisions that maximize shareholder wealth. This theory does not 
emphasize on the viewpoint of individualism, but rather on the responsibilities of top management 
who as stewards, are satisfied and encouraged when organizational success is achieved (Abdullah 
& Valentine, 2009; Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
The main difference between agency theory and stewardship theory is managerial incentive. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) pronounce that individualistic and self-centered ‘model of man’ who acts 
judiciously to secure financial advantage is the hub of agency theory. On the other hand, the 
stewardship model of man is based on a steward whose behavior is ordered such that pro-
organizational, collectivistic demeanors have a higher utility than individualistic, self-interested 
demeanors (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). Agyris (1973) contends that agency theory 
considers employee or people as an economic being, which represses a person’s own desires. On 
the contrary, stewardship theory appreciates the relevance of structures that endow the steward and 
make available maximum autonomy built on trust (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Huse (2007) argues 
that the importance of trust is also associated with the decision-making culture of the board. The 
author continues that trust in the boardroom is anticipated to invigorate cohesiveness, 
ingenuousness, openhandedness, creativeness and involvedness. 
Stewardship theory is also different from the agency theory in that, the roles of the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and that of the Chairperson of the board are held by one person. This kind of model 
reflects the American model of corporate governance. Donaldson and Davis (1991) contend that 
the CEO duality is very significant in terms of maximizing shareholder wealth. Huse (2007) posits 
that in the absence of opportunism, when the positions of both the CEO and the Chairperson are 
held by one individual, it leads to greater unity of direction, and strong command and control. The 
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choice between the agency theory and that of the stewardship theory is synopsized by Donaldson 
and Davis as: 
Ultimately, the question might not be whether agency theory or stewardship theory 
is more valid. Each might be valid for some phenomena but not for others (1991, 
p.60).The most valid theory of corporate governance may lie between the two 
extremes of stewardship and agency theory (1993, p.222).  
The stewardship theory seems to be suitable for explaining corporate governance within 
stakeholders’ perspective. It is also applied in the shareholder perspective in that, it promises to 
maximize shareholder value. Figure 3.1 below depicts the stewardship model. 
Figure 3.1: Stewardship model 
                                             Safeguard and maximize shareholder wealth 
 
  Intrinsic and 
Shareholder value  extrinsic motivation 
 
                                                                  Empower and trust 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Abdullah & Valentine (2009) 
 
3.1.3 Managerial-hegemony theory 
The roots of managerial-hegemony theory dates back to the work of Berle and Means (1932) on 
ownership and control of a corporation. With the growth of modern corporations in the 1930s, 
came an exodus from the traditional model of ownership to managerial control.  
The managerial-hegemony theory addresses a corporate board as de jure rather than de facto 
governing body of a corporation. Scott (1997) points out that corporate management take up the 
real responsibilities of administering and controlling the corporation. Drucker (1974) labeled the 
role of the board as a ‘legal fiction’. In addition Conforth (2004) named the role of the board as a 
‘rubber stamp’. Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.1) called the non-executive directors as “poodles, pet 
rocks, or parsley on the fish”. Mace (1971) argues that in the managerial-hegemony theory, boards 
are not effective mechanisms to supervise and exert control over management. This theory reflects 
the shareholder perspective of corporate governance in that, the self-interest propensity of 
managers is a reflection of the individual maximizing behavior. Demb and Neubauer (1992) posit 
that this theory points to the enigmatic position of the board in the sense that, the powers passed on 
to it by stockholders are in reality exerted by management. 
3.1.4 Class hegemony theory  
This theory extends managerial hegemony theory. Class hegemony theory points out that, 
executives within a specific corporation and executives of other corporations, share common 
interest. Gomez-Mejia (1994) argues that whilst managerial hegemony theory ceases at the 
boundaries of corporations, class hegemony theory spreads managerial views beyond these 
boundaries. Shared interests and purposes generate ties among executives that go beyond one 
corporation. These ties among them further generate into relationships resulting in class among 
different corporations. Because of this (shared) power, the executive then shield themselves against 
decisions that affect their opportunities and wealth. The Class hegemony theory reflects the 
shareholder perspective of corporate governance, since it concentrates on a particular class of 
people’s interest instead of the society at large. Table 3.1 below gives a summary of the various 
theories of corporate governance and their perspectives.  
Shareholder
s 
Stewards 
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Table 3.1: Summary of the various theories of corporate governance 
Dimension Theoretical Perspectives 
 Agency theory 
and TCE 
Managerial 
Hegemony 
Class 
hegemony 
Resource 
dependency 
Stewardship Stakeholder 
Board 
control 
Ensure a match 
between 
managers and 
stockholders 
Board as ‘a 
legal fiction’ 
Perpetuate 
ruling elite and 
class power 
Reduce 
environmental 
uncertainty; 
boundary 
spanning 
Ensure the 
stewardship 
relationship of 
firm’s assets 
Inclusive 
pursuit of 
stakeholder 
interests 
Theoretical 
foundation 
Economics and 
finance 
Organizationa
l theory 
Sociology Sociology Organizational 
theory 
Politics, law 
& 
management 
Underlying 
perspective 
Shareholder Shareholder Shareholder Shareholder/sta
keholder 
Mainly 
stakeholder 
with 
shareholder 
Stakeholder 
Literature  
Eisenhardt 
(1989b), Jensen 
and Meckling 
(1976), 
Williamson 
(1981) 
 
Berle and 
Means 
(1932), Scott 
(1997), Mace 
(1971) 
 
Gomez-Meija 
(1994) 
 
Pfeffer and 
Salancik 
(1978), 
Conforth 
(2003;2004) 
 
Donaldson and 
Davis (1991), 
Abdullah and 
Valentine 
(2009) 
 
Freeman 
and Evan 
(1984), 
Dodd (1932) 
Source: Adapted from Stiles and Taylor (2001) 
3.2 Theories underlying the study 
The shareholder perspective of corporate governance will provide an appropriate channel to 
examining and exploring driving forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana. Accordingly, 
the study will make use of both agency theory and transaction cost economic theory since the basic 
assumption of these theories, as will be discussed in the next section, reflects Ghana’s corporate 
governance practices. Also, the methods of promoting effective corporate governance that have 
been a debate all over the world are centered on these two theories. For instance, the CACG and 
OECD principles of corporate governance that were previously examined, largely center on these 
theories; despite the fact that these principles make mention of the stakeholder perspective (chapter 
2). The principles of corporate governance of Ghana examined earlier also center largely on these 
two theories (see chapter 2)  
3.2.1 Agency theory   
The emergence of agency theory is often traced back to Berle and Means (1932), despite the fact 
that some scholars consider its origin to Adam Smith in 1776. Letza, Sun and Kirkbride (2004) put 
forth that the agency problem was well highlighted by Adam Smith when he contended that 
directors of corporations were not likely to be as cautious with other people’s money as they would 
do to their own. Consequently, the corporation was considered as the means of contracting 
associations among people. Most vital among these contracting associations was the agency 
relationship, which has been defined as the ruling theory used in examining relationships in which 
one party (the principal) assigns a work, which the other party (agent) embarks on (Eisenhardt, 
1989b), and involves the transfer of some decision making authorities to the agent (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In other words, agency theory refers to a series of offers or plans in the 
governance of a corporate business which is naturally characterized by a large number of individual 
stockholders who allows other persons to administer and regulate the usage of their shared capital 
for an imminent benefit. The main assumptions and the background of agency theory have been 
recapitulated in table 3.2 below. 
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Table 3.2: Overview of Agency theory 
Key ideas                                            Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization 
information and Risk-bearing cost 
Unit of analysis Contract between Principal and Agent    
 
Human information Self-interest, Bounded rationality and Risk aversion 
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants, Efficiency as the effective 
criterion, Information asymmetry  between principal and Agent    
Information assumptions Information as a purchasable community   
Contracting problem Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection), Risk  Sharing  
 
Problem domain Relationship in which the principal and agent have Partly different goals 
and risk preferences (compensation regulation, leadership impression 
Management, whistle blowing, vertical integration and transfer)             
Source: Eisenhardt (1989b) 
Agency theory envisages that, bearing in mind adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
organizational interactions ought to reflect an efficient organization information and risk bearing 
cost. This theory has developed along two lines: The flexible positivist agency, which is principally 
used in examining mechanisms of corporate governance that solve the agency problem; and the 
principal-agent approach that draws in a more vigilant specification of assumptions, which are 
tailed by logical inference and mathematical evidence. 
The positive agency theory deliberates on the conflicts and congruencies between the principal and 
agent. The principal is the one who provides the capital whilst the agent is the one who manages 
the corporate business. This theory now encompasses the associations between sizeable capital 
providers (both internal and external) and small capital providers (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). It contends 
that a manager of a corporate business (agent) has hidden information and tends to make use of it to 
attain excess rents. In other words, a manager of a corporate entity tends to pursue his/her own 
utility rather than that of the stockholders. This brings up, inter alia, the possibility of self-dealing, 
carelessness and deceptively attracted accounts by management. The principal (capital providers) 
on the other hand, is also conscious of the hidden information and hence a conflict of interests 
arises between them. This conflict of interests in the end makes both of them worse-off than what 
they would have gotten if they had shared all available information (moral hazard). This deviation 
of interests may reveal itself, among other differences, in profligate or risky investment, 
unsatisfactory effort, entrenchment and self-dealing (Marnet, 2008). When this happens, the 
principal is likely to fall into an adverse selection problem, since he or she would not know the 
agent who is better and hence bringing upon him/her cost.  
As noted earlier, this agency relationship can possibly bring a problem since the agent will not 
perhaps act in the best interest of the principal always. Consequently, agency costs are then 
incurred, which includes bonding cost incurred by the agent, monitoring cost on the part of the 
principal, and minimization of welfare stemming from decisions taken by the agent that are not in 
line with the welfare maximization of the principal(Wearing, 2005). These aforementioned costs 
are the costs incurred in writing and administering contracts to guarantee harmony between the 
principal and the agent. Lee (2004) posits that agency costs have been a significant subject in most 
existing studies on corporate governance and performance. These costs do not only include costs 
that are directly incurred on reporting and putting out information, but also the costs that are 
indirectly incurred-such as verification and evaluation costs-in enforcing the accurateness of the 
information communicated (Gomez & Korine, 2008).      
Agency theory stresses on reducing or minimizing the problem of moral hazard between 
stockholders and management through corporate control. Since monitoring cost is relatively costly, 
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stockholders create incentive contracts that align their interests with the interests of management. 
Some opponents of agency theory believe that, the theory resides on opportunism rather than self-
interests. This assertion has been disputed by Gomez, Wiseman and Johnson (2005) that, agency 
theory dwells on the premise of self-interestedness instead of barefaced opportunism. These two 
assertions are analyzed in the next section. 
Opportunism and Self-interestedness   
Popov and Simonova (2006) categorize opportunism into five (5) groups based on different 
definitions they use. These are: a) That the relevant parties have distinct interests; b) that 
information is asymmetrical, which then gives the party whom information is at his/her disposal to 
have an unfair advantage to tap more of the economic rents; c) that the asymmetric information can 
be falsified or massaged so as to stop a disciplinary action that will be exercised by the affected 
party; d) that the other party might have the value of the information reduced; and e) that operations 
may be intentional and that the required information on the operational process would be biased in 
the process. Popov and Simonova perceive opportunism as an intentional hidden operation of the 
agent based on information asymmetry to attain personal interests at the expense of the other party. 
This assertion has been supported by Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) in their analysis about pay-
performance sensitivity. 
Gomez-Meija et al. (2005) in a reaction to some of the criticisms of Popov and Simonova contend 
that agency theory is underpinned by the self-interestedness of organizational player, which does 
not essentially point toward opportunism. They further go on to state that, self-interestedness can 
reflect opportunism under specific conditions. This theory does not take into consideration the 
sensitivity of the resultant associations that are developed on it, and does not also unequivocally 
make out exact contextual factors, hence generality and adaptation to the institutional context in 
which it is employed (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). For instance, compensation of agents for a 
demonstrable performance may not be associated with institutional performance. 
Gomez-Meija et al. (2005) describe opportunism as the adaptation of one’s activities to situations 
in order to pursue one’s immediate interests, regardless of basic principles or economic outcomes. 
This means that, opportunism is considered as illogical behavior in which agents immensely 
discount the future to instantaneous rewards. The Authors further posit that self-interest is logical 
and considers principles and consequences. Therefore, there is a cooperation and tolerance or 
broadmindedness factor in self-interest. Self-interest can result in cooperation in the long-term on a 
condition that, it optimizes performance, but opportunism does not frequently result in cooperation. 
Wright, Murkherji and Kroll (2001) describe agency theory as a theory that deals with a 
cooperative relationship between the agent and the principal by finding a balance between conflict 
and congruencies in terms of goal orientation, obligation and reciprocity, risk and self-interest. The 
more a company becomes larger, the more it gives rise to agency costs (Nanka-Bruce, 2009).  
Management also encounters agency costs in the firm from their minions, therefore all other things 
remaining constant, the larger the company, the more the possibility of agency costs and the less 
productive the company will be. The figure 3.2 below depicts the principal –agent relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
Figure 3.2: Principal-Agent Relationship 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Wright et al. (2001) 
Capital providers reduce the volume of the resources they provide when managerial self-interest 
sets in. Management enjoys huge sum of gratuities and private benefits at the expense of 
stockholders because of the hidden information they (management) are unwilling to disclose 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This diminution in capital by capital 
providers is the agency costs of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The increment of managerial 
ownership decreases projects that are not of benefit since management has to bear a certain level of 
risk as an outcome of their actions. Controlling the self-interests of shareholders through 
expropriation or misallocation of resources decreases the resource value that minority shareholders 
are able and willing to inject into the company (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In order to avoid ex-post 
misappropriation or embezzlement of funds by management, shareholders have to institute some 
control measures and hence management’s independence will be suppressed. 
 Brink (2011) point out that agency problem can be reduced in two main ways: In screening, where 
the shareholders investigate the organization, for instance, by running controls; and in signaling, 
where management gives signals to shareholders, either in accordance with the law (for instance, 
via reporting), voluntarily (for example, via codes of ethics) or a mixed form (via code of corporate 
governance).  This will then force management to undertake or embark on a more efficient project. 
However, management is not only to be blamed for the inefficiencies or non-performance of the 
corporate business. Minority stockholders also have to seek legal protection or good corporate 
governance practices by the corporate business before they pump in additional resources, unless the 
corporate business still performs satisfactorily (Nanka-Bruce, 2009).  
A number of mechanisms has been applied to address agency costs: Contracts, country laws and 
incentives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Contracts are employed to resolve ex-ante problem caused 
by non-alignment of principals’ interests with that of agents’ interests. These contracts can be 
between stockholders (principals) and management (agents), stockholders (principals) and directors 
(agents) and directors (principals) and management (agents). The contracts can be of two forms: 
Implicit and explicit. Implicit contracts are those established on unspoken mutual expectation, 
personal or individual roles, cultural norms and organizational common law or culture, whereas 
explicit contracts are centered on written representations that are lawfully binding, for instance, 
corporate by-laws, subscription agreements, stockholders agreements and employment contracts 
(Moldoveanu & Martin, 2001). Even though contracts can be used to settle the problem of ex-ante, 
it is not possible to write perfect contracts. This is in consequence to the fact that transaction costs 
are involved as well as bounded rationality.  
PRINCIPAL 
CONFLICT 
1. Goal orientation 
2. Obligation & Reciprocity 
3. Risk 
4. Self-interest 
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Monitoring mechanism by shareholders also plays a significant role in reducing agency costs and 
hence inducing management not to act in the best interests of shareholders. In situations where 
ownership is dispersed, the board of directors is considered effective monitoring mechanism 
(Jensen 1993; Denis, 2001; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Berglof & Claessens, 2004; Nanka-Bruce, 
2009). This means that the ownership structure determines shareholder’s monitoring mechanism 
(see chapter 4 for further explanation). Lenders also serve as effective monitoring tool by 
decreasing the conflicts between debt providers and management.  Incentives also serve as 
important mechanism to reducing agency costs by aligning the interests of shareholders with that of 
management. Furthermore, competitive markets (product, labor and capital) play a very significant 
role in disciplining management and encouraging them to take decisions that will serve 
shareholders’ interests (See chapter 4 for further explanation).  
3.2.2 Transaction cost economics theory    
Opponents of agency theory have called for an expansion of the orthodox method- where 
organizational researchers only apply agency theory in their studies- to incorporate other theoretical 
perspectives that serve to supplement and expand the theoretical context of their analysis. Even 
though agency theory is valid, the use of it alone to study an organization presents a fractional 
notion of the world, and it turns to ignore a good bit of the organization’s complexity (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). Also, the involvement of boards in studies pertaining to corporate governance practice calls 
for other theoretical perspective that can sufficiently capture a corporation’s entire governance 
practices.  
In the context of this study, the transaction cost economic theory has been fused with the agency 
theory to obtain a clear-cut picture of how corporations are governed.  The Transaction Cost 
Economic (TCE) theory traces its root from Ronald Coase’s (1960) work, ‘The Nature of the Firm’. 
Coase opines that the existence of an economic organization is to minimize or reduce transaction 
costs of trading in markets. This means, a corporation is considered as a governance structure for 
minimizing or reducing the cost of trading in markets (Stiles & Taylor, 2001).   Here, the decision 
in terms of organizing a transaction either via the market or hierarchy (firm) relies on the efficiency 
of both methods of coordination or direction in minimizing or reducing the cost of that specific 
transaction. TCE theory emphasizes on the transaction cost, which is described as the costs that 
arise when persons exchange rights of ownership to economic assets and enforce their exclusive 
rights (Eggertson, 1990).  
TCE theory is employed in the neo-institutional economics method to the study of organizations, 
and deviates from the traditional theory of the firm where perfect information and rationality are its 
main assumptions. It has been depicted by March and Simon (1958) that the assumption of 
rationality is invalid. However, Eggertson (1990) argues that although the TCE theory deviates 
from the assumptions of perfect market information, it holds on to the assumptions of rationality, 
and considers economic outcomes in organizations based on rational man model perspective where 
there is imperfect information.  
The implementation of TCE is well thought-out to be costly since it includes various activities: 1) 
The search for information about the distribution of price and quality of products and labor inputs, 
the search for potential buyers and sellers and for important information about their behavior and 
conditions; 2) the bargaining that is needed to find the true position of buyers and sellers when 
prices are endogenous; 3) the making of contracts, the monitoring of contractual partners to see 
whether they abide  by the terms of the contract; 4) the enforcement of a contract and  the 
collection of damages when partners are unable to observe their contractual obligations; and 5) the 
safeguarding of property rights against third-party encroachment (Eggertson, 1990).  
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The basis of TCE theory lies within two major assumptions: Bounded rationality and opportunism. 
The result of assuming opportunism and bounded rationality is that corporate organizations must, 
“….organize transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously 
safeguarding the transactions in question against the hazard of opportunism” (Williamson, 1996, 
p.48). The idea of bounded rationality was used by Simon and March (1958) to criticize the 
traditional economic theory of the firm and propose the behavioral theory. Simon and March define 
bounded rationality as; limited capacity of human beings to devise and resolve complex problems. 
In other words, bounded rationality is a behavior that is deliberately rational but only limitedly so. 
Cyert and March (1963) argue that the idea of a rational person could only be applied in 
circumstances where there is an availability of full information about all states of nature in order to 
make optimal decisions. Full information exterminates uncertainty which constrains the 
establishment of the ‘correct choice’ in a specific condition.  
Opportunism is defined as “self interest seeking with guile” also as “the active tendency of the 
human agent to take advantage, in any circumstances, of all available means to further his own 
privileges” (Crozier, 1964, p.265). This is because human agents’ keen interests are to maximize 
their own utility, and as a result, they involve themselves in behaviors that affect information, that 
is, falsifying the information they provide coupled with misrepresentation of intentions 
(Williamson, 1987). Solomon and Solomon (2004) posit that such opportunistic behavior has 
calamitous implications on corporate finance as it would shy potential investors from investing in 
corporate organizations.  
Transactions involving opportunistic individuals can be managed via perfectly written contracts. 
However, as a result of bounded rationality and transaction costs, writing complete contracts 
involving all states of nature is not possible as a result of the fact that, one has to search for 
information and hence incurs transaction costs (Williamson, 1987). Also, contracts cannot be 
perfectly written since the processing capacity of information of individuals is limited coupled with 
uncertainty emerging from lack of information about the future. Furthermore, contracts 
enforcements are costly since it requires state apparatus such as the police and law courts. In 
addition, Hart (1995) provides three justifications why contracts are not well-written: 1) It is hard 
for individuals to think in advance and strategize for all probable contingencies; 2) it is hard for the 
involving parties to bargain effectively, particularly where previous experience will perhaps not be 
a useful guide; and 3) it is difficult for a contact to be well-written in a manner in which outside 
authorities like the law court will find it easy to interpret and enforce it.     
Contractual disturbances or uncertainties are also a clear-cut assumption of TCE. With this 
assumption, information about the past, present and future state of the company is not perfectly 
known as a result of a number of reasons. With the absence of bounded rationality and 
opportunism, contractual disturbances will be much less of a problem since wide-ranging rules 
would generally occur (Williamson, 1993b). Since it is not easy to determine or uncover ex ante 
who will always be involved in an opportunistic behavior, writing contracts are costly and also 
difficult to enforce (Williamson, 1993b). Aghion and Bolton (1992) contend that, in consequence 
of this contractual imperfection and wealth constraint, it is highly impossible to resolve all possible 
conflicts between the two contracting parties-the principal and agent.  
In relation to corporate governance, the question of transaction arises from an investment that does 
not yield returns in the short run, but with a promise of future return (Dyck, 2001). The significance 
of TCE theory in corporate governance is associated with the limitations in the usage of contracts 
confronted by corporate stockholders if they want to bind management’s interests with theirs. To 
Williamson (1981), the board of directors would serve as a mechanism to resolve the problems that 
emerge in regards to the opportunistic behavior of management.  
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There is a limitation regarding the role boards of directors play in safeguarding the interests of 
capital providers in TCE theory, since it has been argued that the interests of other stakeholders are 
safeguarded by different contracts between the corporate business and them (other stakeholders), 
which leaves shareholders unprotected (Williamson, 1981). These contracts constitute the basis of 
the claims by these stakeholders in a situation where the corporate business is disbanded. As 
residual claimants, stockholders will stay unprotected if the corporate business falls into 
bankruptcy. Accordingly, it has been argued that the board of directors’ appropriate role is to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders. Although TCE is vital for corporate governance studies, it 
has some limitations in its application in corporate governance. For instance, the theory does not 
determine the way in which the board ought to be organized to effectively safeguard the interests of 
stockholders. 
3.2.3 Agency theory and Transaction Cost theory: A Reflection  
The similarities and dissimilarities between agency theory and transaction cost theory have been 
examined by Williamson (1987). These two theories are similar particularly, in managerial 
decisions and behavioral assumptions such as bounded rationality and opportunism. The term 
‘moral hazard’ which is used in agency theory is the same as the term ‘opportunism’ in transaction 
cost economic theory. Williamson (1987) describes the main purpose of a corporate business as 
crafting governance mechanisms that economize the bounded rationality whilst concurrently, 
protecting the transactions in question against moral hazards or opportunism.  
The transaction cost theory and agency theory attempt to tackle the same problem. For instance, 
‘how do we induce corporate managers to pursue the interests of shareholders and take decisions 
that maximize shareholders wealth?’ Both theories consider the board of directors as a control 
mechanism representing shareholders to safeguard their interests against the opportunistic behavior 
of managers.  
Despite their similarities, these two theories differ in some ways. Each one of them includes unique 
exogenous variables (Eisenhardt, 1989b). The unit of analysis under agency theory is the principal-
agent contractual relationship. The agency theory places special attention on economic incentives 
of the contracting actors or parties (individuals). On the other hand, the unit of analysis under the 
transaction cost economic theory is transaction- that is, the unitization contract. Transaction cost 
economic theory examines the choice of organizational form by matching up transactions that have 
particular transaction features with the suitable governance mechanism (Williamson, 1996). In 
regards to cost, the focal costs concerns of agency theory are: 1) The monitoring expenditures of 
the principal; 2) the bonding expenditures by the agent; and 3) the residual loss (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The first two costs are incurred to reinstate residual loss to pre-dilution of 
ownership (before the separation between ownership and control) level of agency cost (Kim & 
Mahoney, 2005).  
However, transaction cost economic theory emphasizes on ex post transaction costs:  1) The search 
for information about the distribution of price and quality of products and labor inputs, the search 
for potential buyers and sellers, and for important information about their behavior and conditions; 
2) the bargaining that is needed to finding the true position of buyers and sellers when prices are 
endogenous; 3) the making of contracts, the monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they 
abide  by the terms of the contract; 4) the enforcement of a contract and  the collection of damages 
when partners are unable to observe their contractual obligations; and 5) the safeguarding of 
property rights against third-party encroachment (Eggertson, 1990). 
Negative externalities occur when one does not face the consequences of his or her own activities 
or actions. Agents involve themselves in acts that principals would not benefit from, since they do 
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not take on the consequences of their acts. Agency theory examines the potential economic 
consequences using the concept of asymmetric information and non-observability. In picking the 
unit operator and to winnowing the best from the unit operator, the other residual claimants have to 
align incentives and to put up more suitable monitoring structures. From agency theory, since the 
assessment keeps on with unitization, the main source of   market friction will arise from the 
imperfect observability of the (lone) unit operator (i.e. hidden action), therefore the need for 
various governance structures under unitization (Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Notwithstanding such 
effort, there will be an existence of residual loss as a result of non-observability and information 
asymmetry. Kim & Mahoney (2005) suggest that the significant economic issue of reducing 
residual loss is further complicated by the differing risk attitudes of (risk-averse) agents and of 
(suggested risk neutral) principals. Transaction cost economic theory’s sources of friction also add 
asset specificity and opportunism. This means that, the sources of markets for transaction costs 
theory are bounded rationality, uncertainty, asymmetry of information, asset specificity and 
opportunism. 
Opposing positions have been raised in regards to the effectiveness of these two theories in 
resolving governance problems. These theories have been criticized for being too ‘narrow’ since 
they focus on the contract between the principal and agent, and the methods in which the contract 
can be made more efficient from the perspective of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Perrow, 
1986). This assertion is also supported by Wright et al. (2001) that their assumptions discount 
eventualities that may be more reflective of realities in economic relationships. However, despite 
these criticisms, the agency theory and transaction cost theory are still in use or used to examine 
and explore corporate governance practices. Some of the empirical studies that have applied these 
two theories are: Anderson (1985), Baysinger and Butler (1985); Stapledone (1995); John & Senbet 
(1998); Martins, Serra, Leite, Ferreira and Li (2010).  Table 3.3 shows a summary of the core 
concepts of agency and transaction cost theories. 
Table 3.3:  Summary of Agency theory and Transaction cost theory 
 Agency theory Transaction cost theory 
Unit of Analysis Principal-agent relationship Transaction 
Focal dimension Incentives Various types of asset specificity 
Focal cost concern Residual loss, monitoring, bonding 
cost 
Hold up problems 
Contractual focus Ex ante incentive alignment, 
monitoring mechanism 
Choice of (ex post) governance mechanism 
Theoretical orientation Constrained optimization Comparative assessment 
Strategic intent Shareholder perspective Shareholder perspective 
Sources of market friction Information asymmetry, non-
observability, risk aversion (by agents) 
Bounded rationality, uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, opportunism and asset specificity 
Source: Adapted from Mahoney and Kim (2005)  
3.4 Summary 
From a shareholder perspective, corporate performance is closely linked to good corporate 
governance. The application of effective corporate governance is to enhance a company’s 
capability to access finance at a lower cost and generally, improve its performance by ensuring 
efficiency with which resources are allocated within the company (Larcker & Tayan, 2011; OECD, 
1999; Iskander & Chamlou, 2000; Claessens, 2004). The subjects of information asymmetry and 
the incentive problem, which are teething concerns in regards to effective corporate governance, 
are interconnected. The need for information is vital to addressing incentive problem-considered as 
the lack of inducement on the part of management to take decisions for value maximization.   
The capability of a corporate organization to entice or attract capital providers is subject to how 
effective its corporate governance practice is, since this will induce capital providers to invest with 
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the hope that, they are investing in a credible company that will safeguard their investments, and in 
the end reward them appropriately. By all, not to be rewarded today or tomorrow, but also to be 
rewarded in five, ten, twenty, or fifty years later. In addition, an effective corporate governance 
practice improves the reputation of a corporate business by making it more attractive to customers 
and suppliers (Lipman & Lipman, 2006). A survey in 2002 by Mckinsey & Company, highlights 
that close to 80percent of institutional investors would definitely pay a premium for properly-
governed corporate organizations (Watson & Coombes, 2002).  
Kaen (2003) posits that the actual value of a corporate business is what capital providers or 
investors will make available to the corporate business on the basis of its anticipated returns to its 
owners. This is also subject to incentives that are provided to those who have been assigned to 
efficiently allocate resources and to accomplish specific goals of corporate governance. The 
incentive problem is a key issue in a company and thus the efficiency, by which corporate 
governance practice deals with this problem, is very important measure in assessing its (corporate 
governance) effectiveness. The TCE and Agency theory that underpin this study suggest both 
internal and external mechanisms that can be applied when dealing with incentive problems. In the 
next chapter, both the internal and external structures of corporate governance are discussed. 
Thereafter, the conceptual framework of the study is presented. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BOARD AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES TO ENSURING 
EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Chapter three discussed the seven main theoretical perspectives of corporate governance. It further 
discussed the two main theories underpinning this study. This chapter examines the various 
mechanisms that can be employed to mitigate agency problem in a corporate organization. It 
develops a general framework of effective corporate governance based on empirical evidence and 
proceeds to construct the conceptual framework of the study. It further formulates the study’s 
propositions and finally, operationalizes the various variables in the conceptual framework.  
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance mechanisms can take both internal and external forms to mitigate related 
problems in a corporate business (Gillan, 2006). These mechanisms are employed within corporate 
governance models around the world to encourage corporate managers to undertake the purposes 
considered within these models as discussed earlier (See chapter 2). The mechanisms can assist in 
mitigating related problems between management and ownership. The external mechanisms are 
those that operate outside the corporate organization: Legal and regulatory framework and 
competitive market comprising product market, capital market and managerial labor market. These 
external mechanisms are taken by corporate businesses since they are quite difficult to influence 
(Dyck, 2001).   
On the other hand, the internal operating mechanisms of good corporate governance are board of 
directors, the ownership structure, compensation packages, bonding and debt policy (Denis, 2001; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These are mechanisms that operate within corporate organizations, 
and can be altered to harmonize situations of every corporate business (Dyck, 2001). The internal 
mechanisms are more flexible than the external mechanisms and can be altered by shareholders as 
situations demand. These broad categories (ie. internal and external mechanisms) are elaborated in 
the next section.  
4.2 Internal Mechanisms   
4.2.1 Board of directors 
Corporate governance is about maximizing corporate business’ value subject to corporate business’ 
financial, and other legal and contractual obligations (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). In order to 
combat imbalances between shareholders’ interests and other stakeholders’ interests, there is a need 
for board of directors (board) to ensure effective corporate governance through long-term sustained 
value of the firm. This mechanism will be analyzed based on three issues: The composition of the 
board, size of the board, and a split of the positions of the CEO and board chair.  
The secret of any efficient and effective board depends on the quality and competencies of the 
people who constitute it. This means that the quality of the board is subject to the quality of its 
members. Whilst board members role is to monitor management decisions, the effectiveness of this 
monitoring operation depends on their experiences and affiliations. Mace (1986) argues that a 
board that comprises inside directors has valuable knowledge when it comes to the operations of 
the firm, and that each advice it gives is valuable to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
corporate business as a whole.  This assertion is also supported by Pease and McMillan (1993) that 
for a board to be effective, its composition should be individuals with varied skills and 
backgrounds that are appropriate for the needs of the company. Studies have confirmed a positive 
relation between insider representation on the board and firm value (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 
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2008; Klein, 1998; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1997). However, it has been argued that a board consisting 
of inside directors may be hesitant to point out issues or criticize the CEO when he or she is acting 
contrary to the firm’s goals. This may arise when board members fear losing their jobs and 
therefore, are less likely to be effective monitors.  
In order to avoid these autocracies, a number of well-qualified and independent NEDs are supposed 
to be on the board in order to foster well-informed and impartial debate. Arguden (2009) points out 
that in order to make sure that each NED proactively partake in board’s discussion and debate, he 
or she has to have an established track record that lay bare his or her veracity and high ethical 
values; financial literacy; an understanding of fiduciary duty
1
; and high listening, communication 
and persuasive skills.  There are a number of studies that indicates that outside directors (NEDs), 
on a condition that they are independent can maintain a series of checks and balances than inside 
directors. Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) point out that the larger the proportion of outside 
directors (NEDs) on boards, the likelihood that:  a) The appointment of an outside executive as 
Chief Executive Officer; b) a non-performing CEO to be dismissed; and c) significant positive 
share relations. Mace (2002) also puts forward that in order to ensure effective board, all insiders 
should be removed from the corporate board with an exception of the CEO, and a criterion should 
be established by the board to assess the CEO’s annual performance.  
Kaplan and Minton (1994) conducted a study on the effectiveness of outside directors on Japanese 
boards. This study was conducted after a poor stock performance and earning losses in Japanese 
firms, and was found that outside directors are better monitors of management.  They conclude that 
such appointments, on average, stabilized and consequently, improved corporate performance in 
Japan.  Weisbach (1988) hypothesizes that outside directors are effective monitors to management 
by analyzing the correlation between firm performance and the probability of CEO turnover in 
firms whose boards are mostly dominated by outside directors, and firms that are otherwise. The 
author’s analysis is consistent with the hypothesis that firms whose boards are mostly made up of 
outside directors add to firm value through effective monitoring of CEOs.   
Having discussed the board composition as one of the essential components of an effective board, 
the next essential component is the board’s size. Arguments have been raised on the size of board 
of directors. Some argue that regulating or limiting the size of the board will enhance board 
effectiveness, which will eventually reflect in firm value. Murali (1996) contends that while extra 
directors could probably improve upon board’s checks and balances, they may as well delay 
decision making processes. This is because, while a large and varied board of directors may 
increase the performance of the board in terms of knowledge and skills, the board may also face 
group subtleties, which will in turn make the board less effective in taking strategic decisions (Liao 
& Hsu, 2013; Van den Berghe & Levrau , 2004; Lipman & Lipman, 2006). It may also bring extra 
costs to the company in relation to director compensation and the coordination of agendas, 
sluggish/slacking decision making, less honest deliberation, diffusion of function and risk aversion 
(Larcker & Tayan, 2011).      
Lorsch (2009) contends that it is a psychological fact that the fewer members a board has the easier 
it is for board members to deliberate on issues and to reaching a consensus. However, even a small 
board consisting of say nine or ten directors, who expect to be considered as peers, cannot be easily 
led.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) reviewing related literature argue that the correlation between 
board size and firm value displays consistent outcomes, which is inversely related. Yermack (1996) 
examines a sample of 452 large firms between 1984 and 1991, and the result is consistent with the 
observation that smaller boards perform effectively than larger boards. In addition, the author 
                                                 
1
 Fiduciary duty includes a duty of guardianship, a duty of fidelity and a duty of impartiality 
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establishes a negative correlation between board size and firm value. DeAndrea, Azofra and Lopez 
(2005) also establish that there is a negative correlation between board size and firm value by 
conducting a study on OECD countries about the relationship between the board size and firm 
value. This negative association was established after carrying out a test for robustness by 
controlling the variables such as internal functioning, board constitution, industry and country 
effects, and market performance measurements. Also, a study by Shukeri, Shin & Shaari (2012) on 
300 Malaysian publicly-quoted firms depicts a negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance.  
However, there is an assertion that supports a positive association between board size and firm 
performance in certain types of companies (Cole et al., 2008; Adams & Mehran, 2003). Cole et al. 
(2008) using similar estimated performance-on-structure regression employed by Yermack (1996) 
on 8,165 firm-year observation from Compact Disclosure Investor Responsibility Research (IRRC) 
over the period 1992-2001 find that the widely accepted negative correlation between board size 
and firm performance does not hold for some large complex organizations that need extensive 
counseling needs.  This implies that larger boards do help in increasing firm value in certain types 
of companies (such as large firms, diversified firms and high-debt firms). Also, other studies have 
shown that large boards are more effective, expedient and flexible in executing their 
responsibilities in that board members are always assigned to fewer committees, which provides 
them the fertile ground to specialize in their monitoring, sleuthing and controlling roles (Liao & 
Hsu, 2013; Coles et al., 2008; Klein, 2002a).  
Nevertheless, there are several studies that have been conducted across the globe and have 
illuminated an insignificant relationship between board size and firm performance. Ghabayen 
(2012) examines the association between board size and firm performance by using a sample of 
102 corporate organizations in Saudi Arabia and finds no significant relationship between them. 
Also, a study conducted by Chaghadari (2011) on selected listed corporate organizations in 
Malaysia reveals an insignificant relationship between board size and firm performance. Similar 
study has also been conducted by Topak (2011) on quoted corporate organizations in Turkey and 
the study highlights an insignificant relationship between board size and firm performance.   
Finally, one of the essential components of an effective board is the CEO-Chairperson separation. 
In theory, the Chief Executive Officer of a corporate business has been given power to make 
decisions on investment, whereas the board with the chairperson as the head is responsible when it 
comes to CEO monitoring, by putting in place goals, designing suitable compensation packages 
and evaluating the performance of management. From legal perspective the board chairperson is 
expected to insure that all formal rules and regulations are met in relation to board process (Huse et 
al., 2011). There are numerous arguments that the principal-agent problem is intensified when one 
person undertakes these roles and responsibilities. Jensen (1993) notes that with an absence of an 
independent leader, it would be challenging for the board of directors to effectively carry out their 
fiduciary duties. Pease and McMillan (1993) postulate that in order to ensure objectivity by 
avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of one individual, there is a need to separate the 
roles of the chairperson and the CEO. The combination of the roles of the chairperson and CEO 
will lead to a compromise (finding the middle ground) between them, but their separation will 
enrich the board’s independence while monitoring the CEO. Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) 
also support the argument that agency theory endorses this separation and thus reduce the 
supremacy of management on the board.   
However, it has also been argued that such a separation produces a new stratum of agency cost and 
raises information transfer cost from the CEO to the Chairperson (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1994). 
As long as the CEO controls the quality, quantity and timing of available information to directors, 
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it is quite difficult for directors to be sure of getting what they need for true independent 
supervision. Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996), and Daily and Dalton (1997) argue that there are no 
disparities in regard to the financial performance between corporations with and without combined 
positions, describing them as either ‘fussing about’ or ‘much ado about nothing’. Dalton and 
Dalton (2009) contend that the separation of these two roles does not necessarily indicate 
independence of the leadership structure. Their argument stems from the assertion that in most 
cases the person who is the ‘separate’ board chairperson is the former CEO of the firm. In some 
cases too this separate board chairperson is either the founder of the firm or former CEO of 
acquired or merged companies. The authors further argue that a single voice directing the company 
at the board level is the most efficient and effective form of leadership. In this situation, “there will 
be no parties and constituencies-internal and external- who will question who is in charge and who 
is accountable” (p. 83). The fundamental idea is that any subordinate or minor must be supervised 
by a single and clear-cut authority. For instance Mathew 6:24 state “no one can be a subordinate to 
two masters…..” (Good News Bible, 2007).  
Prior studies on CEO duality structure and firm performance have revealed conflicting results. A 
study by Shukeri, Shin & Shaari (2012) on 300 publicly-quoted organizations in Malaysia reveals 
an insignificant relationship between the duality structure and firm performance. Also, in their 
study on duality leadership structure and firm performance by using S&P ExecuComp Database 
from 1999 to 2003, Chen, Lin & Yi (2008) reveal that there is no evidence that CEO duality 
leadership structure has a significant positive effect on firm performance. Moscu (2013) conducted 
a similar study using 62 firms quoted on Bucharest Stock Exchange and revealed an insignificant 
negative relationship between the dual leadership structure and firm performance. However, a 
research conducted by Amaral-Baptista, Klotzle and Campelo de Melo (2011) on CEO duality and 
firm performance in 121 publicly-traded corporate organizations on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange 
(BOVESPA) highlights that those companies with CEO dual leadership structure, exhibited 
superior returns on equity in 2008 than their counterparts.  In their study on CEO duality and firm 
performance in 128 publicly-listed firms in Hong Kong, Lam and Lee (2008) reveal that neither 
agency theory nor stewardship theory can appropriately demystify the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. However, based on their study, the authors suggest that CEO duality 
structure is suitable for non-family firms while non-duality structure is appropriate for family-
controlled firms.       
Having discussed these three essential components, the following conclusions are drawn: 1) That a 
perfect or ideal board ought to be the one that consists of both inside and outside directors. The 
inside directors (such as the CEO) will bring their technical know-how to board meetings whilst 
outside directors provide relevant monitoring and sleuthing functions; 2) that the size of a board of 
an organization should be dependent on how large and complex the corporate organization is;  in 
the sense that, large complex corporations are more inclined to establish large boards whilst non-
complex or small corporate organizations practice otherwise; and 3) that it has not been concretely 
established that CEO-Chairperson separation leads to effective board based on  the limited 
evidence in the extant body of knowledge. 
4.2.2 Ownership Structure 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) posit that ownership structure refers to the equity holders’ identities and 
the size of their holdings. Ownership structure is also typically defined by the size of equity that is 
held by corporate entity’s CEO, employees (possibly, as fraction of an Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan), other corporate insiders (comprising top managers and members of the board), large outside 
stockholders, institutions and the populace (Hirschey, 2003). It is considered as one of the major 
internal mechanisms that drive effective corporate governance. This section centers on managerial 
ownership and ownership concentration of outside shareholders.  
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Murali (1996) suggests that managerial ownership produces two opposing forces in governing 
managerial behavior. On the one hand, a larger fractional ownership by management guarantees a 
greater alignment of the interests of managers and stockholders, as management’s higher share in 
their businesses mean they bear more of the wealth consequences of their acts.  Murali (1996) 
further notes that this ‘convergence of interest’ suggests that larger managerial stakes will be 
correlated with high shareholder value. This means that management with considerable share 
interest in a corporation has significant incentive to administer the corporation in a value-
maximizing way. On the other hand, ‘managerial entrenchment’ suggests that higher management 
ownership upsurges their ability to pursue non-firm-value decisions that improve their own wealth 
without fear of punishment. Denis and McConnell (2003) suggest that the crucial consequence of 
managerial ownership on firm value depends on the trade-off between management alignment with 
stockholders and the entrenchment outcome.  
The correlation between managerial ownership and stockholder value is inconsistent. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) suggest certain levels of managerial ownership induce managers to 
make good decisions in order to maximize stockholder value. Yet, beyond that level, diminishing 
returns on managerial level set in. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1995) find that there is no correlation 
between performance and turnover in firms in which insiders own 5percent to 25percent of the 
firm, signifying that managers may turn out to be entrenched at quite low levels of ownership. 
Another significant aspect of ownership structure is featured by ownership concentration by 
stockholders from outside. Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) suggest that ownership concentration is 
another procedure of mitigating agency problems. They note; 
[T]he free-rider problem is minimized and internal constraints on managerial 
discretion can probably be imposed if ownership is concentrated in the hand of 
a large block of shareholders irrespective of whether they are individuals, 
organizations or investment funds. …, the returns to monitoring will increase 
monitoring activity………… (P. 336).  
This argument has been supported by Carlsson (2003) that when large chunks of stock are in the 
hands of a single or small number of stockholders, it induces the owners to change managers when 
the need arises, and match the corporation with the existing competitive environment. Denis and 
McConnell (2003) affirm that block holders can use their influence in a way that is likely to make 
management to take decisions to maximize shareholder value. Majority shareholdings play a 
significant role in management, and it is mirrored by the management board turnover following 
majority-block trading. Demsertz and Lehn (1985) also describe the ownership structure of a firm 
as being cooperatively decided by stockholders resulting in maximization of firm value. Franks and 
Mayer (1994) in a study on German Private Enterprises find that clustered share ownership is 
correlated with high rates of firm value. Similarly, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) assessed the 
correlation between ownership structure and financial performance for 334 firms in Japan between 
1986 and 1991. Even though corporate governance mechanisms in Japan are heavily frustrated by 
convention and fiat of government, a direct correlation exists between concentration of ownership 
and financial performance. Kaplan and Minton (1994) also suggest that the presence of large 
stockholder increases the probability that managers who are in corporate businesses that perform 
poorly would be booted out and replaced. 
However, an important question is whether the presence of larger shareholders in a firm would 
always ensure effective corporate governance? Konijn, Kraussl and Lucas (2011) argue that 
shifting the balance of power towards shareholders who are considered as one of the stakeholders 
of a company could amount to agency conflicts among different stakeholders. Large stockholders 
might simply try to shield their private gains by abusing their increased power to favor themselves 
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at the expense of other stakeholders’ interests. Empirical studies of Barclay and Holderness (1989), 
Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) corroborate the possibility of such personal benefits 
of control by large shareholders. A study by Konijn et al. (2011) using a large dataset of US firms 
find that a large fraction of aggregated block ownership negatively affects firm performance, but 
the negative impact is larger if shareholders are dispersed. The implication is that the presence of 
large shareholders does not automatically lead to good corporate governance, but when ownership 
is fragmented to an extent that there is no single large shareholder in a corporate organization, 
corporate management tends to take decisions to enrich themselves to the detriment of 
shareholders. In simple terms, the existence of a large shareholder in a corporate organization will 
reduce principal-agent problem since this large shareholder will serve as an effective mechanism to 
monitor and scrutinize management’s performance rather than depending on independent non-
executive directors to stand in for its interests.  
There is an argument that large shareholders are effective corporate governance mechanism in 
developing countries and as a result they are more likely to monitor and control management 
without relying on outside directors (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013; Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009; 
Berglof & Claessens, 2004). A study by Attig, Ghoul & Guedhami (2009) on the role multiple 
shareholders play in ensuring good corporate governance in 1,252 publicly-traded corporate 
organizations in East Asia reveals a positive and statistically significant association between the 
presence of multiple large shareholders and firm valuation. This implies that increasing the number 
of large shareholders enhances good corporate governance and consequently, improves corporate 
value in corporate organizations. In this case, the other stakeholders will perhaps rely on larger 
shareholders to restrict the discretionary purview of management.  
4.2.3 Chief Executive Officer Compensation  
The application of the performance-based director incentives can mitigate the conflict of interests 
between equity holders and management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McColgan, 2001). Agency 
theory posits that, binding management’s compensation to stock performance induces management 
to take decisions that will be logically coherent with firm value maximization. The firm can set up 
performance-based director incentive scheme that binds the interests of stockholders with those of 
management to make them think like owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Roe, 2003). McColgan 
(2001) argues that this form of executive compensation contracts can have a large impact on 
aligning shareholders’ interests with that of management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend 
higher incentive packages should lead to a firm’s value maximization. Ooghe and De Langhe 
(2002) also suggest that higher compensation packages to managers will lead to effective corporate 
governance and consequently, maximize shareholder value.  
Mehran (1995) examines the correlation between the structure of compensation and firm value 
using data from 153 corporate businesses between 1979 and 1980. The author finds that firm value 
is directly correlated to the proportion of executive compensation, and to the proportion of equity 
held by managers. Jensen and Murphy (1990) report on economic meanings of the pay-
performance relation by estimating the change in Chief Executive Officer Wealth in relation to a 
given change in stockholder wealth. They studied 2,213 Chief Executive Officers listed in the 
Executive Compensation Surveys (ECS) published by Forbes between 1974 and 1986. Their study 
highlights that the average CEO’s wealth from salaries, stock-option grants, bonuses, stock 
ownership and potential losses in the event of dismissal changes by $3.25 for every $1,000 change 
in stockholder wealth, of this $2.50 is as a result of stock ownership by CEO. The authors argue 
that, whereas there is a significant correlation between pay and performance, its economic meaning 
is too small to be consistent with optimal contracting.  
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There are four main forms of compensation: Basic salary, accounting-based-performance bonuses, 
executive stock options and long-term incentives (McColgan, 2001). These compensations 
determine the workplace of management as well as the amount of effort they exert in their work. 
Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) argue that the level of pay determines where management work, 
but the compensation contract structure determines how hard they work. In practicing effective 
corporate governance, effective compensation contracts ought to provide management with 
satisfactory incentive to make decisions that will maximize firm value. 
Executive salary will probably be determined by the labor market, in tandem with other elements 
such as the firm size and the manager’s position in the company (McColgan, 2001). Basic salaries 
are generally considered to be inefficient to induce managers to make shareholder-wealth 
maximizing decisions. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that equilibrium in managerial labor 
markets will obviate large salary cuts for executives who perform abysmally. This is in regards to 
the assertion that salary cuts below a certain minimum which is provided in the market are 
impossible. There are also likely to be equilibrium salary levels for executives in different 
industries, which most companies will wish to stay in line with. In conclusion, basic salaries are 
less likely to serve as an appropriate measure to induce managers to take decisions that maximize 
firm value.  
Accounting-based performance bonuses serve as a mechanism for aligning managers’ interests with 
that of the firms’ stockholders. But reliance on accounting variables to pay executives can overtly 
offer a room for them to rejig the accounting system and undertake projects with short-run 
accounting returns by abandoning long-term positive Net Present Value (NPV) project (Wearing, 
2005; Healy, 1985 cited in McColgan, 2001; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  For instance, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) was forced to pay $97.5 million to patch up a class of action 
lawsuit for associating itself with American Insurance Group (AIG) in overstating their profit 
margin (Ferrell et al., 2011). Also, civil charges were filed against Fannie Mae’s CEO, CFO and 
the ex-controller, who supposedly rejigged earnings in order to boost their additional benefits. This 
shows that managers can manipulate the accounting system to project better performance.  
Another typical example is the case of Enron, when management manipulated the accounting 
records by classifying expenses as capital expenditure. DeChow and Sloan (cited in McColgan, 
2001) report that research and development expenditures decline following the retirement of the 
CEO. This points to the fact that, bonuses based on accounting system is less likely to be an 
incentive to induce management to take decisions that will maximize shareholder value since they 
(management) will always be interested in manipulating accounting records to look good in the 
short-term at the expense of long-term positive projects. Wearing (2005, p.8) argues that it is vital 
that, “in achieving high share valuation, the managers do not focus on short-term objectives, since 
such policy could be inconsistent with achieving a high share valuation in the longer term”. 
Corporate organizations which stick to short-term goals rather than long term goals would perhaps 
place much attention to specific financial indicators such as earnings per share or short term profits.  
A more recent case is the financial scandal that happened in Olympus. The company’s former 
chairperson, his trusted deputy, the corporate auditor and four outsiders used accounting and 
auditing tricks to hide losses on investments dating from the 1990s (KNC, 2012). It only came to 
light after the company had appointed the first non-Japanese boss to head its operations. 
Consequently, the former chairperson and his accomplices were found guilty and in lieu of this, 
they filed a guilty plea in Tokyo District Court.     
The executive stock option is considered as one of the effective means of aligning management’s 
interests with that of equity holders. This mechanism allows company executives to acquire 
company shares at a particular price at specific periods in the future. It is regarded the best 
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surrogate for managerial shareholdings in that the higher the value of the corporate organization, 
the higher the value of the options and the profit executives can chalk upon implementing them 
(McColgan, 2001). The value of such stock options will rise concurrently with the firm’s 
underlying assets risk. Stock options induce managers to make decisions to ensure value 
maximization. This means company executives have to take decisions to maximize firm value since 
they (managers) too benefit from doing so. However, stock options can be abused by creating 
mega-profits to management or executive concerned. For instance, in case an individual is granted 
a $15 stock option and the actual stock price on market gets to $45, ‘exerting’ that choice to 
purchase a stock costs $15, amid an instant sale value of $45, would result in an immediate profit 
of $30. With 200,000 stock options would give an individual $6 million profit, typically paid by 
shareholders.         
Long-term Incentive Plans (LTIP) is the last mechanism to be discussed in this section. McColgan 
(2001) posits that the LTIP take different forms such as an award of stock in the corporate business 
on the achievement of long-term performance criteria such as Earnings per Share (EPS) growth 
above a given percentage after a certain number of years (UK) and restricted stock or multi-year 
bonus plans (US). It is similar to stock options and usually, termed under the classification of 
equity-based compensation. 
One major criticism of both LTIP and Stock options arises from the problem of managerial risk 
aversion, since management is risk-averse as compared to shareholders to undertake dicey but firm-
value maximizing projects (McColgan, 2001). McColgan (2001) contends that the cost associated 
with such compensation is higher to the corporate organization than the value gained by corporate 
executives, as risk aversion drives them to mark down the actual value of such forms of 
compensation. 
The performance-based incentive mechanism is associated with the problem of hidden information 
(Hart, 1995). This hidden information is only known to management (agent). This information can 
be portrayed as better in the short-term at the expense of long-term. The use of performance-based 
compensation is higher in the shareholder models of corporate governance (that is the Anglo-
American model) that are associated with more efficient markets and broadly fragmented 
ownership than in the stakeholder models (Germanic and Japanese models). In the Ghanaian 
context, the performance-based incentive mechanism must determine the extent to which it induces 
management to take decisions that maximize shareholder value. This mechanism may not be 
effective in Ghana; since this has the propensity to be applied in situations where ownership is 
fragmented and active markets for corporate control exists. Berglof and Claessens (2004) suggest 
that performance-based mechanisms in developing countries are ineffective as a result of the fact 
that large shareholders exist who can easily hire and fire management when they perform poorly.   
4.2.4 Debt financing 
Financial policies toward capital structure could also be a measure to control agency problem. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the existence of debt decreases the percentage of equity and 
thus enables higher levels of insider ownership. Jensen (1986) further argues that the existence of 
debt in the capital structure of the firm acts as a bonding mechanism for corporate business 
managers. Issuance of debt, rather than paying dividends, management contractually bind 
themselves to pay out future cash flows in a way not achievable via dividends. External capital 
market monitoring brought to firms in consequence of debt financing, forces management to take 
decisions for value maximization, instead of maximizing their personal interest (Easterbrook, 
1984). Brennan (1995b) also argues that the role of a capital structure of a corporate business ought 
to ensure its socially optimal liquidation.  
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McColgan (2001) contends that bankruptcy cost of debt and the personal embarrassment coming 
from bankruptcy serve as effective incentive mechanisms in encouraging managers to be more 
efficient. Harris and Raviv (1991) suggest that higher levels of debt increase the decision on 
liquidation by making default more likely. In their study on corporate organizations in the UK, 
Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) highlight that companies that are associated with low interest 
coverage and high leverage are more inclined to undergo forced turnover of top executives. This 
implies that debt can be an effective control measure to monitoring inefficient management.  
However, how much debt is appropriate is a problem on the other side. The optimal capital 
structure should be at the point where marginal costs of debt are equal to a firm’s marginal benefits. 
This point is called the value maximizing point. Nonetheless, issuance of debt beyond that optimal 
point will increase risk and decrease firm value. Stultz (1990) contends that debts could be applied 
to minimize the risk associated to over-investment, but this application could also result in under-
investment in regards to the costs related to raising new funds.  
The use of long-term debt by corporate businesses in Ghana and its impact on corporate 
governance is far from reach as a result of lack of research on this subject.  
4.2.5 Bonding 
Denis (2001) defines bonding as a contract between managers and shareholders that aims at 
enticing managers to take all decisions that favor shareholders’ interests. Contracts are made 
through a construction of a system that would ensure that managers act in the interest of 
shareholders’ benefits. Bonding involves arrangements that punish agents (managers) for acting in 
ways believed to be detrimental to the interests of shareholders (principal) or reward them (agent) 
for co-aligning their interests with that of the principal. However, Denis (2001) argues that this 
approach is not adequate for eliminating incentive problems, and hence not effective to inducing 
managers to take decisions that meet shareholders’ interest. The author further notes that bounded 
rationality and transaction costs make writing catholic contracts that specify every possible event 
challenging. Berglof and Claessens (2004) posit that contracts rely on the existence of laws and 
regulations as well as the effectiveness in which such laws and regulations are enforced. It can be 
deduced that, if laws are not enforced, as in the case of developing and transition countries of 
which Ghana is no exception, contracts can certainly not compel corporate executives to effectively 
and efficiently strategize to enhance shareholder value.  
4.3 External mechanisms of corporate governance 
4.3.1 Laws and regulations 
Laws and regulations not only serve to correct market failures, reduce agency and transaction costs, 
and attain social goals, but in addition to haul out bribery and corruption. These are imposed on the 
corporate entity to address concerns beyond the penumbra of interests the corporate business 
impacts directly, and include rules about competition and antitrust, normal trade and security 
(Cunningham, 1999). Denis (2001) posits that these laws and regulations govern the set up and 
cessation of firms, and their operations in a country. These play a crucial role in creating effective 
corporate governance in a country as well as protecting the rights of investors and creditors. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that the legal protection for investors and ownership 
concentration are key factors to judging effective corporate governance.  This framework includes 
laws relating to minority shareholders’ rights, stock exchange rights and laws against corruption. 
Scott (1997) argues that these regulations define the association between managers and other 
stakeholders. It also affects how other mechanisms operate effectively particularly the way they 
evolve. Berglof and Claessens (2004) posit that ownership structure reacts to effectiveness of legal 
and regulatory framework.  
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The legal environment encompasses two main relevant aspects: a) The protection offered in the 
laws (de jure protection) and to what extent the laws are enforced in real life (de facto protection). 
These two aspects play a very significant role in determining effective corporate governance in 
Ghana. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that the variations in corporate governance systems 
around the world stem from the fact that there are differences in the nature of legal obligations 
between management and their financiers, as well as the disparities in the interpretation and 
enforcement of these legal obligations by courts of competent jurisdictions. The national 
differences in ownership structure, financing, dividend policies and development of market 
structure are associated with how far financiers are legally protected from being expropriated by 
insiders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) further 
argue that the main reason investors provide external financing to corporate businesses is that they 
receive control rights in exchange. Hart (1995) describes external financing as a contract between 
financiers and the corporate business as a legal entity, which provides the former certain rights in 
relation to the assets of the firm. If this term of contract is violated by management, then the 
financial providers have the right to appeal to courts to make sure that their rights are enforced. 
The legislative practices address the incentive problem by ensuring that self-interest managers take 
decisions that will enhance shareholder value. For instance, Cadbury report makes 
recommendations by which listed companies in the UK are encouraged to conform, and they are 
obliged to provide clarifications if they do not conform. The existence of these recommendations 
induces management to take decisions to maximize shareholder value. The principles of OECD and 
CACG to ensuring effective corporate governance emphasize on the need to formulate corporate 
governance legal and regulatory framework to ensure the protection of shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  
It has been argued that the regime of laws and regulations do not automatically result in effective 
corporate governance. Jensen (1993, p. 850) contends that the legal and regulatory framework “is 
far too blunt an instrument to handle problems of wasteful managerial behavior effectively as 
courts do not as a matter of practice question the judgment of management”. Jensen further argues 
that the legal and regulatory apparatus is entangled to the political system and as a result, 
depending on the relative impact of various constituencies, the law may serve to impair the agency 
problem between management and shareholders. The link between laws and regulations, and the 
political system (Jensen, 1993) creates rules and regulations in relation to managerial disciplines in 
countries particularly, developing and transition countries (Berglof & Claessens, 2004).  
Berglof and Claessens (2004) posit that private and public enforcements of rules and regulations of 
a country have an influential role to ensuring effective corporate governance practice in an 
economy. However, the legal and regulatory framework to ensuring effective corporate governance 
in Ghana is in general, considered to be weak because of its poor enforcement (Mensah et al., 
2003; McGee, 2009). Poor laws and regulations, and poor enforcement of existing laws and 
regulations, are problems in developing economies (Okpara, 2010; Cooper, 2007; Berglof & 
Claessens, 2004; Lin, 2000; World Bank, 2005). Immordino and Pagano (2010) in a study 
substantiate that unlike governments of developed economies, those (governments) in developing 
economies tend to logically assume lower standards in the sense that, they believe, the costs of law 
enforcement are somewhat higher. Consequently, the alacrity on the part of authorities, in 
supporting the implementation of effective corporate governance is weak in developing economies 
(Cooper, 2007).       
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4.3.2 Competitive Markets 
There are three (3) main competitive markets that help to align management’s interests with that of 
shareholders. These are managerial labor market, capital market and product market. The 
subsequent subsections will address these three issues.  
Managerial Labor Market 
Fama (1980, p. 295) argues that ‘…the primary disciplining of managers comes through managerial 
labor markets, both within and outside of the firm…’. He further contends that managerial labor 
market can decrease agency cost by resolving possible incentive problems associated with the 
separation of ownership and control of the corporate business.  
Managers of corporate businesses rent their human capital to the corporate business (Fama, 1980), 
and rates of their rents signaled by the managerial labor market are likely to depend on the success 
or failure of the corporate business (Hischey, 1986). Management has a very strong incentive to 
manage the corporate business efficiently and at the same time keep share prices high in 
consequence of the fact that compensations to management are generally directly associated with 
shareholder value (Lewellen, 1971). In the managerial labor market, the past performance of a 
corporate business provides information on the talents of managers. Baysinger and Henry (1985) 
argue that if a manager fails to perform efficiently at a level that is consistent with his or her 
compensation, the managerial labor market would put in place a new standard for future 
compensation in accordance with this information.  
This market provides good incentives and monitors management via two ways. First and foremost, 
Fama (1980, p. 292) suggests “[t]he outside managerial labor market exerts many direct pressures 
on the firm to sort and compensate managers according to performance”. The author further 
suggests that managerial labor market ought to attribute the talent of a manager to at least 
information about his or her current and past performance. Differently put, managerial labor market 
competiveness can give information about the past performance of a potential manager. The second 
aspect is that there is also an internal monitoring of managers themselves in that, managers at the 
top measure the productivity of lower managers.  
Management’s successes in the managerial labor market and job security depend upon how they 
use their human capital to take decisions that maximize shareholder value. Fama (1980) posits that 
during this process they promote those managers who perform well among them to higher 
positions, whilst those who perform poorly are identified, demoted or fired. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) also affirm that in managerial labor market, managers who perform poorly are punished. 
This means that competition in management provides a very strong incentive for managers to 
improve upon their performance thus taking decisions to meet shareholder value. 
An efficient capital market is very significant to the managerial labor market (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the prices of a firm in an efficient capital market can 
reflect the true value of that firm. Coffee Jr (1984) also suggests that the capital market provide 
relevant re-assessment of a firm’s management. Therefore, managerial labor market comparatively, 
provides low-cost for the selection and replacement of top managers. 
Competition in the managerial labor market is rare in developing countries (Lin, 2000). This is 
because corporate governance in developing countries is somewhat characterized by cronyism, 
nepotism and favoritism when it comes to appointment of managers. In their study on corporate 
governance and corruption in Ghana, Mensah et al. (2003) opine that these problems (ie. nepotism 
and favoritism) are faced by large number of African countries and therefore, creating challenges in 
relation to the applicability of managerial labor markets.  
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Capital market  
Capital markets are markets in which debt (bonds) and stocks (equity) are traded. These markets 
are categorized into two main types: The primary market and secondary market. The primary 
market is where securities that are new are issued. The secondary market includes deals with 
existing securities, and it includes stock exchange (example, Ghana Stock Exchange) and bond 
market. The secondary market is very critical market in relation to the fact that corporate 
governance can be exercised through exit. Exit happens when stockholders decide to sell their 
stocks to end their membership. The secondary market has the potential to providing a change in 
the ownership structure of a corporate entity coupled with a change in control.  
In the capital market, non-performing managers can be disciplined or punished (Larcker & Tayan, 
2011; Manne, 1965) in that, managers who fail to perform may risk takeover when outside 
investors envisage that the corporate business’ assets could produce higher earnings (Iskander & 
Chamlou, 2000). In addition, management members compete for the rights to manage the resources 
of the corporation (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Haque, Arun and Kirkpatrick (2008) argue that capital 
market can employ governance role in mitigating agency problems through penalizing managers as 
well as improving the overall governance of the firm. Gugler, Mueller and Burcin Yurtoglu (2003) 
contend that a country’s external capital market strength determines the degree of a corporate 
business’ investment performance irrespective of how closely managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests match. Aside working as a source of investment finance (Samuel, 1996), a capital market 
has both direct and indirect impacts on the processes of governance of listed companies (Singh, 
2003). On the one hand, the direct governance practices include tightening listing requirements, 
imposition of disclosure and accounting rules, ensuring minority shareholder protection, attracting 
reputable agents and controlling insider dealing arrangements (Claessens, 2003; Singh,  Weisse & 
Singh, 2002). On the other hand, capital market can put forth indirect impacts via pricing 
mechanisms, involving both disciplinary and allocation measures, and the takeover mechanisms 
(Haque et al., 2008; Singh, 2003; Samuel, 1996). Singh (2003) asserts that the firm basically 
performs its allocation role by pricing corporate securities. 
Tobin (1984 cited in Haque et al., 2008) distinguishes between the two concepts of efficiency of 
share price in stock market, namely, information arbitrage efficiency where all available 
information are incorporated into the share price and, fundamental valuation efficiency where stock 
prices rightly mirror the future discounted earnings of a corporate business. The stock market 
assisted by market for corporate control  namely, takeovers, management buy-outs and leverage 
buy-outs, can improve the efficiency and performance of a corporate business by replacing poorly 
performed management and transferring the assets of the corporate business to more effective and 
efficient management (Haque et al., 2008; Singh, 2003).    
Studies have observed that the effectiveness of pricing mechanism in developing countries is not 
fully developed as a result of poor corporate business practices related to transparency, 
accountability and poor financial development. Singh (2003) argues that takeover mechanisms 
have an inherent flaw in their operations, and are expensive to practice to solve corporate 
governance problem. Claessens and Berglof (2004) also contend that if a capital market is 
characterized by weak property rights environment, insider investors might get involved in the 
trading of private information before it is opened to the general public. Doidge, Andrew karolyi and 
Stulz (2007) in their study state that the utmost gains a firm can derive from practicing effective 
corporate governance is the easiness of access of capital by the firm on better terms, but these gains 
are of no value if the firm is domiciled in a country, which is characterized by poor financial 
development in the sense that the firm will unsubstantially gain from any governance-oriented 
mechanism that is aimed at minimizing the costs of funds.   Demirag and Serter (2003 cited in 
Haque et al., 2008) argue that majority of family-based corporate businesses in developing 
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countries tend to own and control banks via pyramidal or complex shareholding act as a substitute 
for external capital market. Corporate managers who do not rely solely on external finance are less 
unlikely to be disciplined by the capital market (Prowse, 1994). 
Haque et al. (2008) contend that institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension fund, 
non-pension banks and mutual funds, having been a significant portion of capital market, tend to 
manipulate the corporate governance system. These institutional investors are more likely to be 
efficient than individual investors in collecting, analyzing and performing on objective, corporate-
specific fundamental information, and consequently, influence a corporate business’ investment 
and other financial decisions (Haque et al., 2008; Samuel, 1996).   
There are several governance roles that are to be taken by these institutional investors to solve 
agency problem: a) Engaging in dialogue which centers on mutual understanding of objectives; b) 
evaluation of overall governance disclosures  in relation to board structure and composition; c) 
monitoring and evaluation of performance associated with shareholder value and activism; d) 
exercising voting power on all major corporate decisions; and 5) interventions where applicable 
especially, on issues such as decisions on investment, corporate and operational strategies, 
acquisitions or disposal strategy, internal control mechanism, and  board and management controls 
(Millan, 2004 cited in Haque et al.,2008). 
The presence of institutional investors tends to induce effective governance role of the capital 
market (with which the corporate business is valued and governed) (Haque et al., 2008). The 
establishment of monitoring and disciplinary acts by institutional investors may serve as a laudable 
substitute for debt financing as well as markets for corporate control (Samuel, 1996). This 
mechanism is very important for organizations in developing countries since they depend on debt 
and equity. 
Debt market can serve as a mitigating factor in solving agency problem by providing debt holders 
with incentives and power to control and monitor insiders’ expropriation (Haque et al., 2008; Gul 
& Tsui, 1998; stiglitz, 1985 cited in Prowse, 1994). When more debts are in the hands of a few 
creditors, it is more likely to help creditors in exercising significant cash flow as well as control 
rights, hence reducing agency cost (Vishny & Shleifer, 1997). This means creditors can liquidate a 
corporate business, acquire the assets used as collateral and partake in voting processes of relevant 
corporate decisions, on condition that, the corporate business is unable to pay its debt or run 
effectively. However, regardless of the rights of creditors, the effectiveness of a country’s legal and 
regulatory framework is fundamental. It has been argued that capital market role in developing 
countries is unlikely to be effective in solving agency problem (Okpara, 2010; Haque et al., 2008; 
Berglof & Claessens, 2004). Capital markets in developing economies give little incentive for 
effective corporate governance practices, because of the dominance of few large companies, low 
trading volumes and liquidity, absence of long-term debt instruments and inactiveness of 
institutional shareholders (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000; Haque et al., 2008). 
In the context of this study, the questions that arise are: Does market for corporate control serve as 
an effective mechanism to achieving effective corporate governance in Ghana? If it does; to what 
extent? The circumstances under which an effective competitive capital market can be developed 
are at early stages in Ghana. Therefore, the condition in which capital market serves as an external 
mechanism for corporate control is not functioning in Ghana. This is because, major corporate 
organizations currently in Ghana were owned by the state and thus the government provided capital 
and exercised control over their day-to-day activities. This implies that the market for corporate 
control was not in operation, because it was in stark contrast with the standpoints of the centrally 
system of government (Socialism). However, things have started to change because of the mixed 
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economic system the country is currently practicing. Consequently, there has been an establishment 
of a stock market to expedite actions on stockholders entry and exit through merging, acquisition 
and selling of stocks. 
Presently, there are twenty-four (24) brokerage firms that gather governance information in Ghana. 
This information forms a very significant constituent in the capital market for corporate control. 
Although, Ghana Stock Exchange has been adjudged the ‘Most Innovative African Stock 
Exchange’ at the African Investor (Ai) prestigious annual index series awards, its weak institutional 
foundation coupled with enforcement gaps pose a challenge.  Prowse (1998) points out that for a 
market to serve as an effective mechanism for corporate control; it needs an existence of an active 
capital market, which is not the situation in Ghana. Capital market development depends typically 
on the rules and regulatory framework that smoothens the progress of enforcement and the 
improvement of court dealings that permit a more efficient dispute resolution (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2003).  The World Bank assessment report on Ghana’s corporate 
governance rates the legal and regulatory framework materially not observed, meaning in view of 
its progress, inadequacies are sufficient to raise doubts about the authorities’ ability to achieving 
observance (World Bank, 2005).  
Product market 
Friedman (1953 cited in Singh et al., 2002) acknowledges perfect competitive market as an 
important mechanism in dealing with the problems of separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations or about the associated problem of corporate governance. This is because 
competitive market would ensure natural selection of corporate businesses that maximize profit 
with optimal ownership patterns and corporate governance to survive.  Jensen (1993) asserts that 
firms that do not supply the product that customers are yearning for, at a competitive price cannot 
survive. This is because these firms cannot sell their products to maximize profit and as a result, 
cannot survive. The major limitation on the behavior and governance structure of large corporate 
businesses is the keen competition in product markets (Singh et al., 2002).  
Porter (1990 cited in Jensen, 1993) finds that most prosperous economies in the world are those 
characterized by keen competition that brings about market efficiency via survival of the fittest. 
The product market makes available incentives to management to survive over a long-term, and 
mete out the ultimate disciplinary action of exit or bankruptcy as the last resort on corporate 
businesses that disregard the signals (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, the ultimate disciplinary action that 
could be meted out to a corporate business’ manager comes from a threat of bankruptcy when the 
company disregards the signals of product market. 
Gillan (2006) contends that theoretically, the connection between product market competition and 
different facets of corporate governance includes compensation structure and CEO turnover. 
Arguments are that competition alone cannot jettison these problems mentioned above. Singh et al. 
(2002) argue that both the capital market and product market suffer from imperfection and it is 
easier for a large profitable corporate business to takeover a small profitable corporate business 
than the other way round. The chances of survival of large unprofitable corporate businesses are 
relatively higher than those smaller, relatively profitable firms (Haque et al., 2008).  
Product market competition is perhaps the most powerful force towards economic efficiency in this 
world and as a result, its position as one of the mechanisms for effective corporate governance 
cannot be underestimated (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Kar, 2000 cited in Haque et al., 2008). 
However, in relation to this study, the use of product market mechanism in the context of Ghana is 
currently limited, but it is now growing as a result of the trade liberalization policies. This implies 
that, to a large extent, product market competition is likely to result from the external sector in 
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consequence of the relaxation of import restrictions. As Ghana’s markets are flooded with imported 
goods from other economies, product market competition will gradually develop and serve as a 
disciplining mechanism for poor managerial behavior in the long run. 
Product markets depend on rules and regulations such as anti-trust laws to function well. But due to 
poor law enforcement as discussed by Berglof & Claessens (2004), there have been challenges in 
relation to the discipline of product market in developing countries. To add up to the general 
challenges of product market in disciplining management (as discussed earlier), poor law 
enforcement also limits the full functionality of product market discipline currently in Ghana.   
4.4 Conclusion 
The above discussion points out that Ghana’s business landscape in respect of corporate 
governance is associated with weak legal and regulatory framework, less developed capital market 
and an uncompetitive managerial and product markets. This means that the use of external 
mechanisms as corporate control measures in achieving effective corporate governance in Ghana is 
not in existence. Therefore, effective corporate governance in Ghana can be attained and achieved 
via internal control mechanisms. However, some of the internal control mechanisms also rely on 
the legal and regulatory frameworks for their application. For instance, bonding and debt financing 
rely on an effective legal and regulatory framework of a country. As mentioned earlier, Ghana’s 
legal and regulatory framework is weak and as a result its recognition in this study as an effective 
control mechanism to ensuring effective corporate governance will be overlooked. On the other 
hand, as performance-based incentives also depend on competitive market, its application in this 
study is overlooked in relation to the fact that the capital market is less developed in Ghana. 
Further, the non-existence of active capital market basically limits the usefulness of performance-
based incentives (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).     
Berglof and Claessens (2004) argue that the mechanisms that are more likely to be effective in 
developing economies are those that rely less on these laws and regulations. The simple 
explanation is that there are some mechanisms that can work with or without the existence of laws 
and regulations. However, the study contends that for mechanisms of corporate governance to 
effectively work in an economy, the existence and effective enforcements of laws and regulations 
are imperative (Agyemang et al., 2013; Okpara, 2010; Djankov et al., 2003). As per the study’s 
discussion, it was highlighted that all the external mechanisms as well as certain internal 
mechanisms of corporate governance are not applicable within the Ghanaian context. Therefore, 
internal mechanisms such as the ownership structure and board of directors seem to be the only 
mechanisms in the Ghanaian setting. Accordingly, the study will be based on these two 
mechanisms to construct the study’s conceptual framework. However, before the construction of 
the conceptual framework, a pilot study was conducted to verify this inference (see section 4.6).    
4.5 General Corporate Governance framework         
The mechanisms mentioned above are employed in the general corporate governance model to 
induce managers to take decisions that match up with the goals in the various models addressed 
(see chapter 2). Accordingly, the study’s sub-question one (1) (see section 1.5) has been answered 
on the basis of the mechanisms that have been reviewed and portrayed in the model. The 
shareholder viewpoint of corporate governance has its objective of narrowing the differences 
between stockholders and managers. In the absence of reducing these differences, agency costs set 
in, hence reducing shareholder value. This means that mechanisms are considered to be effective if 
they are slanted to enhance shareholder value via strategic decisions by corporate managers.  
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The two categories of mechanisms for corporate control discussed above form the various 
components of the general model of corporate governance for this research are shown in figure 4.1 
below. The study is sentient about the construction of the conceptual framework in that: 
Models and frameworks are helpful for clarifying theories and abstract 
concepts or constructs. But to be useful in practice, a model or framework 
must be applicable to the conditions that it is attempting to describe, analyze, 
or predict (Clarkson, 1995, p. 94). 
Figure 4.1: General Framework of Corporate Governance 
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Key: the dashed lines depict how the external mechanisms affect the internal mechanisms, whilst the full lines depict how the two 
mechanisms (internal and external) serve as a determining factors of effective corporate governance. 
 
The above general model of corporate governance depicts how both external and internal 
mechanisms act as driving elements of effective corporate governance. As discussed above, the 
external mechanisms have a certain level of influence on the internal mechanisms. For instance, the 
legal and regulatory framework mechanism affects the operations of the internal mechanisms (such 
as debt financing and bonding). Berglof and Claessens (2004) point out that, contracts between 
managers and shareholders depend on the existence of laws and regulations as well as the 
effectiveness in which such laws and regulations are enforced. This means that if laws are 
improperly enforced, as in the case of developing countries, contracts cannot compel managers to 
take decisions that favor stockholders’ interest. Haque et al. (2008) also argue that, since 
companies depend on debt financing in order to meet their investment needs, the relationship 
between stockholders and creditors tends to be driven by agreements, which in turn depend on the 
legal and regulatory frameworks upon which companies operate. The legal and regulatory 
framework also affects the board of directors of a company in the sense that the duties and 
responsibilities of the board are enumerated in the various corporate governance codes around the 
world.  
Further, the performance-based incentive is influenced by the competitive market (external 
mechanism). This comes about when executive stock option is considered to be one of the effective 
measures of aligning management’s interests with that of stockholders. McColgan (2001) posits 
that, the higher the value of the firm, the higher the value of the executive stock option that 
managers can make upon exercising their duties effectively. This means stock options induce 
managers to take decisions that increase shareholder value. However, this study argues that in the 
absence of effective and efficient capital market, the application of performance-based incentive 
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mechanism to ensuring good corporate governance in an economy will be ineffective because of its 
reliance on the capital market.    
This study tends to concentrate on mechanisms that focus on the gap between shareholders’ 
interests and managers’ interests. This implies that any mechanism that focuses on narrowing this 
hiatus would be appropriate. Denis (2001) and Denis and McConnell (2003) point out that an 
effective mechanism can be measured based on two benchmarks: 1) The magnitude to which the 
mechanism focuses on bridging the gap between the interests of shareholders and that of 
management; and 2) the magnitude to which the mechanism increases company performance and 
value. As noted earlier, this study focuses on the first benchmark, since it is possibly acceptable 
from the viewpoint of agency theory that the real meaning of corporate governance is to induce 
managers to take decisions that favor shareholders’ interests via focusing on narrowing the gap 
between managers’ interests and those of shareholders’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995). It 
has been argued that corporate performance and firm value are products of effective corporate 
activity, which depends on effective corporate governance, and other factors such as the level of 
competition in a specific industry and overall economic performance of a country (Donaldson & 
Davis 1991, Denis, 2001). Therefore, the drawing of a direct link from corporate governance 
mechanisms to corporate performance is out of proportion and by far insufficient to measure 
corporate governance effectiveness (Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2013; Castellini & Agyemang, 
2012). This study further contends that the plausible way these mechanisms can come to play to 
enhance corporate performance is to focus on reducing the lacuna that exists between the interests 
of corporate managers and equity holders. Accordingly, this study will use the mechanisms that 
focus on narrowing the gap between the interests of shareholders and that of management in 
Ghana.      
4.6 Pilot Study 
In order to test the earlier conclusion (section 4.4) that internal mechanisms such as the ownership 
structure and board of directors appear to be the only effective corporate governance mechanisms 
within the Ghanaian setting, a pilot study was carried out. This was to confirm that the ownership 
structure and the board of directors are the main corporate governance mechanisms in driving 
effective corporate governance within the Ghanaian setting. The study employed three main criteria 
in selecting a corporate organization for the pilot study: 1) The company is supposed to operate 
under the companies code 1963 of Ghana; 2) the company has to have at least one major 
shareholder with control rights since large shareholders play vital roles in controlling agency 
problems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986); and 3) access to the corporate organization as well as its 
willingness to partake in the study when contacted (Yin, 2009). As a result of these three criteria, 
GoldMilk Ghana Ltd. was selected.  
Introduction 
The study was carried out in July 2011. Open interviews and internal documents were mainly 
employed as data collection techniques. Open interviews were applied since they offered the 
possibility of collecting a wide gamut of data on the corporate organization’s board of directors and 
ownership structure.  Both the chief executive officer and the board chairperson were involved in 
the interviews. Other employees were also involved in the interview to gain extra insight into the 
operations and activities of the company. 
Background and profile of GoldMilk Ghana Ltd. 
GoldMilk Ghana Ltd. was incorporated in 1960 as Ghana Milk Company by a group of 
Scandinavian investors purposely to provide milk to complement the protein requirements of the 
Ghanaian people. The company’s principal product was pasteurized milk. In 1962, two significant 
changes took place: 1) The company’s name was changed to the present name, GoldMilk Ghana 
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Ltd.; and 2) the company’s product portfolio was broadened to include yoghurt, ice cream and ice 
lollies (GoldMilk Ghana Ltd. annual report. 2011).  
In 1967, the company became the first foreign corporate organization to become Limited Liability 
Company. It was also among the first corporate organizations to be listed on the GSE in 1990. 
GoldMilk Ghana Ltd directly employs over 350 people. Aside this, it indirectly employs more than 
8,000 people across the length and breadth of Ghana.  
Corporate governance arrangement 
The company believes that full disclosures as well as transparency in its day-to-day activities are in 
the interests of ensuring good corporate governance practice. The company’s corporate governance 
framework has to reside within the framework of Ghana’s companies code 1963. This framework 
considers equity holders as active constituents of the corporate organization and therefore, they 
have the right to participate in the operations of the corporate organization. The company has a 
unitary board system, which oversees management’s activities. This board is the highest decision-
making body in the corporate organization and as a result, it has control rights. The company also 
has management body with the CEO, heading it. The management body is responsible for the day-
to-day activities of the company.  
Ownership structure and control 
The ownership structure of GoldMilk Ghana Ltd. started changing after it became publicly-limited 
liability company in 1967. In 1990, the company was listed on GSE and subsequently, its shares 
started to be actively traded on the stock exchange. Currently, the company has 5,330 shareholders 
holding a total of 116,207,288 shares. GoldMilk International A/S is the majority shareholder with 
56.64percent of the total shares of the company. Although GoldMilk International A/S is the 
majority shareholder, it does not consider the company as its subsidiary. This is because GoldMilk 
International A/S does not have absolute control over the board of GoldMilk Ghana Ltd.  
The board is required to report to all equity holders irrespective of their holdings during the 
company’s annual general meetings. Even though information on the company is supposed to be 
communicated by the board to all shareholders, GoldMilk International A/S always has access to 
significant information before they are conveyed to other shareholders. This implies that minority 
shareholders always rely on the annual general meetings’ reports to get hold of the statutory 
information required by the companies code 1963 and the listing regulations of GSE. Also, 
GoldMilk International A/S has access to key personalities such as the CEO and the board 
chairperson. In consequence of this easy access by GoldMilk International A/S to key individuals, 
all the intricacies with respect to the day-to-day activities of the company are influenced by 
GoldMilk International A/S.  
Board of directors 
The board of this company is made up of eight persons of whom seven are non-executive directors. 
The executive director is the CEO of the company. The non-executive directors are appointed by 
the company’s shareholders and are independent of management. They are free from any 
constraints that could materially get in the way they execute their independent duties and 
responsibilities.  
The topmost positions of the company are separated; the board chairperson and the CEO. The 
board chairperson is appointed by the shareholders but in real sense, majority shareholders in the 
company execute such an appointment. This is because, all decisions that are to be taken by the 
company are made known to majority shareholders for their approval before they are conveyed to 
the minority shareholders. The implication is that the voting processes that take place during the 
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company’s annual general meetings are just formalities to meeting the statutory requirement of the 
companies code 1963. Further, the CEO of the company reports to the board and the board, with 
assistance from the majority shareholder appoints/fires the CEO. The CEO executes management 
strategies and policies approved by the Board.   
The role of the board chairperson includes setting up meeting dates, meeting agendas, meeting 
venues as well as chairing board meetings. The board of the company meets at least four times a 
year. Information about board meetings are sent to board members two weeks before meetings are 
taken place. It has instituted a board audit committee to review and analyze external audit. It also 
ensures the independence and candor of the auditors. In addition, it reviews the internal financial 
controls of the company, compliance with the standard accounting and auditing laws, and the 
protection of assets of the company.  
Results from the pilot study 
The pilot study of GoldMilk Ghana Ltd. highlights some issues that are important to this study. It 
portrays that with the presence of large equity holders, the incentive problem can be dealt with. The 
involvement of large shareholders in the appointment/selection of key personalities such as the 
CEO overtly shows that in circumstances, where the CEO is accused of poor managerial behavior, 
he can be fired and replaced by large shareholders. This is in line with the assertion that large 
shareholders are credible threats to management and can deal with incentive problems by taking the 
necessary step when needed.  
The study also highlights that board effectiveness in regards to control is vital for addressing 
incentive problems because, through board discussions, it can establish whether management is 
undertaking measures to meeting shareholders’ interests or not. The board can also take steps to 
punish management for poor managerial behaviour. This is in line with the assertion of Morck, 
Stangeland and Yeung (1998) as discussed in chapter two (see section 2.3.1).  
Conclusion 
The findings of this pilot study do verify the study’s theoretical inference that the ownership 
structure and the board of directors are germane corporate governance mechanisms for addressing 
agency problems in corporate organizations within the context of Ghana. This implies that, the 
ownership and the board of directors are the main corporate governance mechanisms that have to 
be included in the conceptual framework of the main study. The study then turns its attention to the 
development of its conceptual framework as discussed in the next section.   
4.7 The conceptual framework    
The primary objective of this study is to examine the factors that drive effective corporate 
governance in Ghana using large listed corporate organizations on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
(GSE). As discussed earlier, the ownership structure and the board of directors seem to be the only 
internal mechanisms that ensure effective corporate governance practice in Ghana. This study’s 
framework makes use of these two mechanisms as depicted in figure 4.2 below.  The framework is 
made up of the elements in the general model of corporate governance depicted in figure 4.2 above, 
which have been established for an empirical research, based on the review of existing literature 
and the assessment of the Ghanaian setting. The framework has also been established on the basis 
of Ghana’s principles of corporate governance (see chapter 2). And as a consequence, some other 
concepts associated with ownership structure and boards of directors are looked at.  
In addition, the agency theory discussed (see chapter 3) suggests that good corporate governance 
practices reduce agency problems by narrowing the gap between the interests of shareholders and 
that of management. Macey (2008) opines that the objective of good corporate governance is to 
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persuade, compel, induce or encourage management to keep the promises they make to 
shareholders. Furthermore, the author points out that from an economic context, corporate 
governance mechanisms can be evaluated or assessed based on how effective they are in 
controlling corporate deviance (that is, any actions by corporate managers or directors that are not 
in support of the legitimate, investment-backed expectations of shareholders). The value of a firm 
does not depend only on its future economic potentials, or how resources are effectively and 
efficiently managed, but also on the effectiveness of control mechanisms, which aid guarantee that 
shareholders’ funds are not expropriated or wasted in value lessening ventures (Marnet, 2008; 
Jackson & Strange, 2008). Therefore, effectiveness is defined in this study as how the ownership 
structure and board of directors serve as internal control mechanisms to narrowing the gap between 
the interests of shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995). This then leads 
the study to its conceptual framework as illustrated below. 
Figure 4.2: The Conceptual framework of the study  
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Source: Castellini & Agyemang (2012) 
The above research framework evinces how the ownership structure and board of directors solve 
the incentive problem in Ghana. The ownership structure (Independent variable) determines 
ownership control whilst the board of directors (Independent variable) determines board control. 
The ownership structure looks at the size of equity held by shareholders and the shareholder’s 
identities. The board of directors also looks at the composition of the board, independence of 
directors, the non-duality structure, board meetings, and the board audit and remuneration 
committees. Effective corporate governance is achieved when there is a presence of ownership 
control and board control.  
The indicators of board control are reviewing and guiding firm strategy, ensuring compliance with 
the law, select and replace CEOs, reviewing CEO remuneration, credibility of independent audit 
and assessing CEO performance. The indicators of Ownership control are shareholder’s influence 
on corporate business’ activities such as election of board of directors, CEO as well as external 
auditors, obtaining timely and sufficient information, voting control (veto), and influence on the 
decisions of corporate organizations.   
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4.7.1 Ownership Structure 
There are two main essentials of ownership structure that provide incentives to actively monitor 
management and hence improve corporate governance. These are identities of shareholders and the 
size of equity held by shareholders.  
The first benchmark of ownership structure is the size of equity held by one person relative to the 
total number of remaining stocks of equity capital (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Roe, 2003). The 
presence of large equity holders in a corporate organization can either have a negative or positive 
impact on firm performance. The shared benefits hypothesis suggests that a large equity holder 
empowered with the required shareholder rights is advantageous to all stakeholders of a corporate 
organization as he/she/it mitigates the principal-agent problem between stakeholders as a group and 
management (Konijn et al., 2011). Roe (2003) posits that ownership structure determines 
shareholder control in relation to the fact that shareholding concentration creates strong and 
effective shareholders that can monitor, and inspect management. When large chunks of stocks are 
in the hands of a single or small number of shareholders, it induces the owners to change managers 
when the need arises, and match the corporation with the existing competitive environment 
(Carlsson, 2003). This assertion is also supported by Denis & McConnel (2003) that stockholders 
who hold a sizeable number of shares of equity capital regularly monitor management because they 
have the incentive and resources to pursue that. The systems of Japan and German depict that 
shareholders with a sizeable number of share of equity are actively involved in monitoring 
management and taking decisions when needed. 
A number of studies supports the suggestion of the agency cost literature in terms of the advantages 
linked to high concentration of ownership. Morck, Nakamura & Shivdasani (2000) in a study report 
that the value of firms in Japan has the propensity to rise with increased large block holders. 
Melyoki (2005) in a study on Tanzania-China Textile Company (FTC) Limited in Tanzania finds 
that large shareholders take corrective action by replacing management teams when they discover 
that incentive problems are in existence. Okpara (2010) examined the ownership structure and 
effective corporate governance for 100 firms listed on Nigerian Stock Exchange and Equity 
Securities. The study reveals that special treatment is always accorded to large block holders, 
whilst minority stockholders are not allowed to put across their views or are overlooked by 
chairpersons. The implication is that large block holders have the right to monitor board since 
special treatments are accorded them.  
On the contrary, the private benefits hypothesis contends that large equity holders can be 
disadvantageous to firm performance in that if they are in a hunt for their own objectives, they can 
expropriate value for their private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders. Therefore, the 
traditional principal-agent problem between equity holders and management is substituted by a 
principal-agent problem between influential large shareholders and other stakeholders of the 
corporate organization (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2002). Also, conflicts of 
interests will probably crop up both between equity holders with voting rights and those without 
any voting rights and are attracted to the assured dividend, as well as between blockholders and 
small equity holders with no possibility to monitor or inspect management (Melis, 2000). Konijn et 
al. (2011) in their study on the relation between blockholder concentration and firm value using a 
dataset consisting of about 3,500 US firms for the period 1996-2001 find out that the presence of 
blockholder concentration negatively affects firm performance. They further state that this negative 
influence implies that there may be space for private benefit of control, probably to the detriment of 
other stakeholders particularly, minority shareholders.  
The other benchmark of ownership structure mentioned in the related literature is the identities of 
stockholders. Banks and other financial institutions play more important roles in corporate 
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governance in Germany and Japan. Hirschey (2003) posits that concentration of ownership on the 
part of institutions results in effective monitoring incentives cum monitoring activity. For instance, 
the possibility that NEDs will be in a position to notice evidence or proof of managerial 
malpractices is increased when there is a substantial institutional ownership. Denis and McConnell 
(2003) affirm that German banks have more voting rights than their equity ownership would 
suggest by virtue of the fact that they vote the proxies of many individual stockholders. The authors 
further go on that these banks and other financial institutions have a large amount of control over 
firms in Germany. If a company is making profit, these banks and other financial institutions act as 
monitors, inspectors and guardians, but when it is performing abysmally, they intervene in its 
corporate governance practices.  
These interventions come to the fore when these banks and other financial institutions have an 
interest in the company. These banks and other financial institutions may also appoint board 
directors of companies in which they invest based on efficiency-related determinants of poor stock 
performance and low returns (Rubach & Sebora, 1998). John and Vasudevan (2003) carried out a 
study on voting results of 169 stockholder proposals over the period, 1990-1995. These proposals 
were about a situation under which shareholders sought to have annual general elections for all the 
members serving on the corporate board. They linked the voting results to a sequence of disparate 
ownership structure characteristics, including institutional ownership, insider ownership and 
outside block holders. The pattern of support reveals that proposals in general, are successful when 
they get their large support from institutions that hold a substantial fraction of a company’s shares.           
In wrapping up, it can be deduced that it is the degree of ownership that makes shareholders to 
exercise shareholder control instead of their identities. Ghana is characterized by large shareholders 
and it can be anticipated that large stockholders will engage in shareholder control through 
monitoring incentives and monitoring activities. 
4.7.2 Shareholder control 
Herman (1981, p. 17) defines control as a word “used in many disciplines as well as in common 
parlance. It relates to power- the capacity to initiate, constrain, circumscribe, or terminate action, 
either directly or by influence…..”.  Stock (1997, p. 35) also defines control in an exact viewpoint 
as a term that “designate a structural relation in which particular individual or collective actors have 
the de facto capacity to mobilize the powers that are legally vested in the corporation”. 
Conventionally, the role of equity holders has been painstakingly deliberated in regards to firm 
control, and this discussion is no different in that control involves a degree of power that is much 
easier to comprehend. Accordingly, for the purpose of this discussion, shareholder control refers to 
how shareholders directly or indirectly (influencing through board of directors) exercise control 
over the operations of a corporation. There is a contention that equity holders hunt for power in the 
form of influencing the activities of their companies instead of wielding control (Leech, 2013). 
Corollary to this, this discussion will make use of ‘shareholder’s hunt for power in the form of 
influence’ as a surrogate measure for control. Therefore, the idea of shareholder control is indicated 
by four main components: Influencing the corporate organization through election of board 
directors, CEO as well as external auditors; obtain timely and regular information; control of vote; 
and influencing corporate decisions. Shareholders can exert control over a corporation via 
influencing the appointments of ‘important’ personalities of the corporation: The chairperson of the 
board; the CEO; external auditors and others (Denis & McConnell, 2003).  
Bebchuk and Roe (1999) contend that corporate systems that are characterized or not characterized 
by a controlling shareholder are distinctively critical in some ways. In corporate entities where 
ownership is fragmented, shareholder control leads to a struggle for superiority or victory between 
rivals in that a rival can seek to usurp control forcibly from the incumbent contrary to its 
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(incumbent) will. Contrariwise, in corporations where ownership is concentrated, control is not 
contestable but instead it is ‘fixed’ in the sense that, it is confined and cannot be obtained contrary 
to the will of the incumbent but through only negotiation with the incumbent (Bebchuck & Roe 
1999). There are arguments that the presence of controlling shareholders will permit minority 
shareholders to play a lesser role on how the corporate organization is governed (Leech, 2013; 
Okpara, 2010). Nevertheless, the role minority shareholders could play is subject to the distribution 
of the remaining shares among them (Leech, 2013). To put differently, the power of large equity 
holder in controlling a corporate organization is dependent on the fragmentation of other equity 
holdings. For instance, if a person holds 10 percent of the total stocks of a corporate organization 
and the remainder is highly dispersed, it is pretty probable that he/she could exercise a certain level 
of influence in the corporate organization. However, if the remaining equity holders of the 
corporate organization include two block holders of say 40 per cent each, then with their collusion, 
the 10 percent he/she holds would not possibly give him/her the kind of influence he/she desires. It 
is also expected that small shareholders’ interests will be violated because of their role in the 
company. Berglof and Claessens (2004) in their study on corporate governance in developing 
economies found that large equity holders, with their control rights, are inclined to abuse minority 
equity holders in that there is a presence of weak legal protection to safeguard the interests of 
minority equity holders.  
However, with the role of large shareholders in controlling corporate organizations, all 
shareholders irrespective of their holdings, benefit. This is because shareholder control over the 
corporation’s management induces corporate managers to gear corporate decision-making 
processes towards shareholder wealth maximization. Although the presence of large shareholders 
in corporate organizations exposes minority shareholders to some disadvantages as mentioned 
above, minority shareholders also reap some advantages when corporate decision-making processes 
are geared towards shareholder value maximization. Carlsson (2003) argues that when large chunks 
of stocks fall in the hands of a single individual or a small group of equity holders, there is an 
incentive on the part of these equity holders to monitor and control management painstakingly and 
enhance corporate efficiency. If the ownership structure at the initial stages is widely fragmented, 
the rise of a large equity holder will perhaps overcome the free-rider problem in monitoring and 
controlling management, and the rights of the largest equity holder can minimize its urge for 
expropriation and maximize incentives to pay out corporate dividends (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Okpara (2010) also posits that equity holders who hold large number of stocks limit agency 
problem by having a sufficient number of stake to take a more active and effective interest in the 
corporate body. The implication is that these large equity holders have sufficient influence and 
ownership in dealing with their monitoring, sleuthing and controlling activities in a corporate body 
that will eventually serve shareholder interest. 
 4.7.3 Board of directors 
Corporate managers need to account effectively to some independent, competent, effective and 
well motivated board to ensure credibility and legitimacy (Marnet, 2008; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 
2005; Monks & Minow, 2004; Higgs, 2003). For instance, a corporation’s board of directors has 
the responsibility to supervise the corporation’s management, and if the board refuses to 
painstakingly supervise its management, it may not be difficult for management to conduct itself 
dishonorably. Also, through effective board mediation, the problems of extreme reliance on legal 
rights, proxy fights, the sale of stocks and other types of unhelpful resolution may be avoided 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Payne et al. (2009) in their study on corporate boards, team 
effectiveness and financial performance in Fortune 1000 companies find that more effective boards 
positively contribute significantly to their respective companies.  
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Forbes and Milliken (1999, p.492) define board performance as ‘the board’s ability to perform its 
control and service tasks effectively’. Jacques du Plessis et al. (2011) however, posits that for a 
board to act effectively, its functions of guiding, directing, monitoring, overseeing, supervising and 
complying ought to be distinguished from management’s function of administering the day to day 
activities of the firm. Cadbury report (1992) suggests some factors that establish an effective board: 
Board composition; director independence; the structure of the board leadership; meetings of the 
board; and board committee. The OECD, CACG and the recommended guidelines of Ghana stress 
on these factors as key issues in establishing an effective board.  
Composition of board 
Discussing the responsibilities of the board in a theory of corporate governance with no discussion 
on its composition is an unfortunate as discussing the theory of the firm without talking about the 
firm’s internal structure (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). The quest for competent and skillful directors 
to serve on boards of companies has currently become tougher, a fifty-fifty between opposite trends 
(Ward, 2003). Obviously, the board’s capability to conduct its responsibilities depends on the 
degree of its members’ affiliations as well as the proportional representation of its members. The 
principal aspects of board composition are: inside versus outside directors; the board size; and age 
of directors. 
Probably, the single most important debated issue in terms of board composition is the percentage 
of inside directors to outside directors on boards. In quite a few decades, there has been a histrionic 
shift from boards dominated by inside directors toward boards dominated by outside directors 
(Vance, 1983 cited in Lam, 1992).Suggestions under the corporate board reform have that 
corporations with boards having a larger number of outside directors will better serve the interests 
of shareholders than corporations with smaller number of outside directors. Mace (1986) however, 
argues that boards that include inside directors have valuable knowledge about the operations of the 
firm, and that each advise given is valuable to the CEO. On the contrary, Babatunde and Olaniran 
(2009) points out that the larger the proportion of outside directors on boards, the likelihood that:  
The appointment of the CEO will be an outsider; a non-performing CEO be fired; and significant 
positive share relation. The amalgamation of inside directors and outside directors has been 
advocated by the one-tier board system (Massen, 1999; OECD, 1999). The main issue is that inside 
directors are less likely to determinedly supervise the CEO. Therefore, with the inclusion of outside 
directors, the supervision of the CEO will be done in an aggressive way thus ensuring board 
effectiveness.  
Having boards that are made up mainly of strong non-executive directors is the best act of assuring 
that boards of such nature can and will live up to what is expected of them. So how do Non-
Executive directors serve as a nucleus of personnel around which boards can act as monitors and 
controllers and live up to the increasing demands being placed upon their shoulders? There is no 
clear-cut answer to this question! Non- executive directors must be selected based on the 
competencies this study discusses at the tail end of this paragraph. Although most companies today 
have nomination committees manning the affairs of nomination and selection procedures, there are 
some fundamental requirements they adhere to that seem to suffice their task. The questions that 
are needed to be asked to make sure whether the candidate is well-fit to be qualified as a member 
are as follows: 1) Does the candidate have the required finesse, knowledge and experience the 
company requires from the board as in accounting, auditing, marketing, technology and so on?; 2) 
is the candidate a person who adhere to a strict moral or ethical code?; 3) is the person someone 
who appears to be appealing and  is capable to take on constructive or productive discussions with 
other members of the board?; and 4) is the person a candidate who will fit into the group? 
Requiring answers to these questions demand not only interviewing the person, but information on 
him or her can be acquired from others who have seen him or her in action. Meanwhile, this 
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procedure is cumbersome in nature, but if companies need well-qualified candidates to be on their 
boards, it is considered appropriate for companies to adhere to such a process.  
Having discussed the inside versus outside directors, the next essential element of board 
composition is the size of the board. This constituent has been explored and examined by many 
researchers. A number of studies has find that larger corporations tend to have more directors 
(Koontz, 1967; Pfeffer, 1972; Juran & Louden, 1966 cited in Lam, 1992). This is as a result of the 
need for larger corporations to maintain more points of contact with the outside environment and 
the greater administrative burden of larger corporations. Board of directors has been described in 
some studies as ‘boundary spanning agents’, that is, persons who facilitate dealings between two or 
more organizations. Lam (1992) argues it is increasingly significant for corporations to maintain 
contacts with other stakeholders who are concerned with and influenced by the corporation’s 
actions. 
Larger corporations are complex organizations in that, it is considered not possible for all members 
to stay aware of all relevant and crucial aspects of operations of these corporations. Accordingly, 
corporations are putting in place specialized board committees to monitor specific issues. This has 
made corporations to establish boards with more members. But the question of optimal size of a 
board has still not been adequately addressed (Lam, 1992). Vance, and Juan and Louden (both cited 
in Lam, 1992) note that while larger corporations have larger boards, size is largely not relevant to 
corporate performance. 
Furthermore, other researchers have asserted that when boards become too large, they pave the way 
for individual members to avoid personal duty and responsibility as no one feels that he or she will 
have enough influence to make a significant investment of time and energy. Herman (1981) for 
instance, suggests that larger boards lead to weaker boards. Murali (1996) affirms that while extra 
directors could possibly improve upon board’s checks and balances, they may as well delay 
decision making processes. Gautschi III and Jones (1987) in a study on the relationship between 
corporate board structure and illegal corporate behavior find that corporations that have larger 
boards are more likely to engage in a more criminal activity than corporations with smaller boards. 
Other studies have confirmed a negative correlation between board size and firm value (DeAndrea, 
Azofra and Lopez, 2005; Yermack, 1996).  However, some researchers also contend that larger 
boards are important in that they would offer a larger pool of expertise and experience. For 
instance, Changanti et al. (1985 cited in Lam, 1992) in a study on the issue of board size in the 
retailing industry find that a smaller board size is significantly related with business failures.   
Pfeffer (1972) points out that board size is a function of the corporation’s need in dealing with 
relevant outside constituencies. His empirical findings explain partially by firm size (in relation to 
sales volume), need to access capital markets (in relation to debt/equity ratio) and whether or not 
the firm is locally regulated. Meanwhile, Koontz (1967) has suggested an optimal board size, which 
ranges between five and thirteen board members. Less than five is not adequate or sufficient to 
cover all the legal board responsibilities, whereas more than thirteen becomes unwieldy with not 
every member getting an adequate chance to participate. But empirical evidence seems to suggest 
that the optimal board size is more difficult to assess. Colley, Doyle, Logan & Stettinius (2005) put 
forth that both smaller and larger boards are associated with advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one hand, smaller boards are inclined to be more concerned and focused, and their members 
frequently find it easier to build trust among each other and work jointly.  However, smaller boards 
are vulnerable to the controlling prowess of preponderant clique/personality.  On the other hand, as 
boards turn out to be larger, they create talents of pool that could perhaps assist boards’ monitoring 
and controlling roles. But keeping such larger number of individuals to work together effectively 
and efficiently as a team is difficult. In lieu of this, a larger board can waste resources and reduce 
88 
 
individual productivity (Anand, 2008).  It can therefore, be concluded that board size is not a 
significant determinant of board effectiveness since this depends on corporate organization’s 
specific situations. 
Another significant aspect that determines the composition of a board is the ages of board 
members. Koontz (1967) recognizes and approves of a solid trend towards more mandatory 
retirement for directors of board. It is on a view that, most boards are made up of older people who 
are less productive. This is confirmed by Cochran, Wartick and Wood (1984) in their study on 
average age of boards of directors and firm performance. They find out that there is a weak, 
negative relationship between board age and financial performance, that is, younger boards tend to 
be more associated with profitable corporations. However, Lam (1992) concludes that though the 
trend is statistically significant, it is not meaningful in determining board effectiveness with respect 
to control. Therefore, this study will overlook the impact of board members’ ages on board 
effectiveness.   
Board/Director Independence 
Director independence is vitally important for both counseling and supervisory roles of the board. 
This stems from the assertion that in order for board directors to effectively and efficiently carry 
out their advisory and oversight responsibilities, they are expected to portray independence. 
Director independence empowers directors to impartially assess the performances of top 
executives, firm strategies, business models, and risk-management measures put forward by 
management (Larcker, & Tayan, 2011). Monks and Minow (2002) point out that the existence of 
non-executive Directors (NED) is more and more viewed as an unnecessary condition to ensure 
inefficiency of board in exercising decision control and protecting stockholders’ interests. The 
underlying argument is that if a director is a close ally of the CEO, it is just as difficult for him or 
her to be objective as it would be for an employee when it comes to assessing management 
performance (Lorsh & Maclver, 1989). This raises the question of director-credibility. Reforms of 
corporate governance at all stages of hard and soft law as well as company’s value statements are 
worthless if board members lack credibility (Hilb, 2006).  
The idea that directors are trustworthy or credible persons who can monitor management on behalf 
of stockholders depends on directors being able to bring independent judgment to bear on the 
decision of the board (Denis & McConnell, 2003). This is because a fervent board needs veracity 
cum action in the sense that, veracity without action is equal to mediocrity. Just being morally 
upright does not suffice a board member’s capability to handle ethical matters that crop up in a 
corporate entity. This is because, board members should be able to contribute effectively in 
ensuring effective governance via using the information and expertise they possess to enhance 
creativity as well as logical coherence in the decision-making processes and control over company 
resources. They are to bring to the fore differing interests, perspectives and backgrounds into the 
boardroom that will help the company in its quest for value maximization (Huse et al., 2011). In 
addition, they should mercilessly pursue objectivity, accountability, openness and independence.    
The issue of director independence can be traced back to the 1970s when information about high-
profile corporate crimes arose. The Waltergate issue brought about a number of illegal corporate 
campaign contributions to light. These contributions were regarded as notices of purchasing 
influence and favor from the US political system. A number of campaign finance reforms laws was 
introduced following this scandal. Monks and Minow (2002) add up that at the international level, 
corrupt activities where bribes were given to foreign officials in order to exclude competition were 
also highlighted. 
89 
 
Analysts were surprised as to why board of directors whose work was to elude such gargantuan 
crimes had failed in controlling managers. Monks and Minow (2002) argue that such illegal acts 
have come to be linked to lack of independence on the part of board of directors and thus their 
inability to stop management from such illegal acts. This has had the consequence of incremental 
awareness of the relevance of independent directors. The OECD and CACG principles as well as 
the companies code 1963 (Act 179) of Ghana address the issue of independent directors. These 
principles call for an inclusion of independent board members. But the multi-million dollar 
question that arises is; who should we refer as an independent director? 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) explain that director independence involves both economic and 
psychological facets. Socioeconomic independence refers to absence of significant ties to directors-
economically and socially-that might cause bias on their thinking on the board and thus influence 
their capability to knowledgeably assess and control management. Director independence is also 
affected by the way board directors are selected be it on elections or appointments. John and Senbet 
(1998), emphasizing on the Anglo-American viewpoint where ownership is fragmented argue that, 
the CEO proposes those to be voted as directors, a practice that will definitely lead to poor 
corporate governance through board’s ineffectiveness. Corollary to this, psychological, social or 
economic ties may develop between the CEO and a director. This situation can mar the capability 
of directors to determinedly or aggressively assess management performance. This is because, 
when replacements and choice of board members are influenced by CEOs, they (board members) 
are likely to avoid being critical on the CEO (Huse, 2007).  
Several factors come to play when evaluating director socioeconomic independence. One stance, 
points to the assertion that it should be narrowed down to the relationship with the CEO and the 
corporation. Eisenberg (1976 cited in Baysinger and Butler, 1985) suggests that for directors to be 
independent, they must not be currently employed by the corporation or have any significant 
psychological or economic dependence on management. The author continues that a board member 
who depends on management for his or her position, related to senior managers by blood or 
marriage, or represents organizations that do a significant amount of business with the corporation 
cannot determinedly monitor management.        
The 2010 Code of best practices of Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana suggests that 
director independence requires that sufficient number of board directors should not be employed by 
the corporation or be closely related to the corporation or its management via tight economic, 
family and so on. The Code further states that independent directors or NEDs can contribute 
significantly to the decision-making processes of the board by bringing an objective and fair views 
to bare on the assessment of management’s performance. Baysinger and Butler (1985) states that: 
It appears, however, that over the 1970-80 interval those firms which “got out in 
front” of the evolutionary process of developing more independent boards 
reaped measurable performance dividends, later on, as a result………This 
suggests that while the board is only one of many corporate control devices, it 
may be one of the most important (p.120). 
In the context of this study, independence of directors is indicated by: An absence of social (family) 
ties with the CEO; the absence of business associations with the corporation other than the 
directorship; and not being a representative of, or elected/appointed by a major stockholder. From 
an agency theory viewpoint, establishment of an independent NEDs on corporate boards should 
assist to reduce the conflict of interests between stockholders and management as they perform a 
monitoring function by introducing an independent voice on board (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). 
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Therefore, this section concludes that director independence is one of the significant determinants 
of board control via board effectiveness.    
Board leadership structure 
Lorsch (2009) argues that the emergence of leadership structure of a board has influence on how 
well the board is able to demonstrate its monitoring, sleuthing and controlling functions over its 
management and the corporate body in general. In theory, the Chief Executive Officer of a 
corporate business has been given power to take decisions on investment, whereas the board with 
the chairperson as the head is responsible when it comes to CEO monitoring by putting in place 
goals, designing suitable compensation packages and evaluating the performance of management. 
There are numerous arguments that the principal-agent problem is intensified when one person 
takes on these roles and responsibilities. Jensen (1993) notes without an independent leader, it is 
difficult for the board to carry out its functions effectively. Millstein and McAVoy (2003) advocate 
that the separation of the two positions with an independent director as chairperson is vital to 
position the board as an objective monitoring and controlling mechanism. Pease and McMillan 
(1993) postulate that in order to ensure objectivity by avoiding the concentration of power in the 
hands of one individual, there is the need to separate the roles of the board chairperson and the 
CEO. The combination of the roles of the chairperson and CEO will lead to a compromise (finding 
the middle ground) between them, but their separations will enrich the board’s independence while 
monitoring the CEO. Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) also support the argument that agency 
theory endorses this separation thus reducing the supremacy of management on the board. 
Even though the concept of a non-duality structure has been discussed for decades, it is only in 
recent times that it received attention as a practice from many countries. For instance, most 
companies in the US such as Aon, intercontinental hotels, Tenet Healthcare and Walt Disney 
Company have non-executive chairpersons. As discussed earlier on, the major arguments in favor 
of this idea stem from the assertion that separating the two positions and selecting a non-executive 
chairperson will heighten the capability of the board to monitor and control the actions of the CEO 
as well as to function independently. Also, with the separation of these two positions, the board has 
a leader who is free from any interference that is considered to mar its solitary mandate to act 
effectively. This idea makes directors to feel more comfortable to act boldly to challenge the CEO 
on some decisions that are likely to affect the company. Furthermore, more often than not, capital 
providers prefer investing in companies with non-executive chairperson, and because of that, 
companies that have this type of system attract a lot of investors.  Countries such as Germany, 
Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries have these two positions (CEO and 
chairperson) separated by law. 
Advocates for the separation of the CEO/Chairperson roles have raised issues about the leadership 
qualities of the board chairperson. An effective non-executive chairperson ought to be a person 
who adheres to moral principles and has logical coherence among decisions. Also, he/she should be 
of pleasing appearance and adhere to corporate governance principles. Non-executive chair is 
expected to promote effective and efficient distribution of information and prospects; have the 
required respect from his or her cohorts and management; and communicates in an effective and 
efficient manner. The chairperson has to have appropriate experience and required skills to 
appreciate the bolts and nuts of the competitive market. He or she should be able to deal with 
uncertainty as well as to lead and superintend the board to take decisions on time. In addition, the 
chair ought to be adept in recognizing, developing and encouraging his or her cohorts; lead by 
example; manage the dissimilarities among his or her cohorts; take necessary steps to develop his 
or her cohorts and so on. The chair should also be able to understand the concerns of the company’s 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
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Pick (2009) argues that beside the relatively well-tailored duties of board chairpersons, they have 
the role of essentially leading the group of their compatriots and organizing efficient and effective 
discussions among them. The author points out four main roles that chairpersons must adhere to. 
First and foremost, chairpersons have to develop a mechanism that will be able to manage the 
“status dilemma” that is prevalent on boards. The status dilemma occurs since boards are made up 
of a group of equals. In this case, board members build up a sense  of who is more competent, 
powerful and influential, usually stemming from the external status that their compatriots possess 
(for example, sex, age, race, ethnicity, and so on) (Berger, Cohen & Zeldith, 1972). Pick further 
contends that this problem can lead to a more dependence on the most visible status characteristics 
members possess (that is, their external profession, competence and expertise). The author furthers 
that this can lead to non-productive contributions or involvements in key issues, pomposity and 
jockeying among members. Also, members become still when they are not sure of how a specific 
comment would mirror on their status within their compatriots. In times like these, it is a challenge 
to chairpersons to keep these status dynamics from hurting the excellence of members (Pick, 2009).  
The second important role of the chairperson is by managing “role tensions”. This kind of role 
assists boards to manage the multiple responsibilities they play with management. This task allows 
boards to advise management, and offer their experience and expertise to direct management in the 
direction of a blossoming strategy. The third significant role is about how chairpersons could 
sustain cohesion among their compatriots. Since boards more often than not, conduct their jobs in 
the presence of and in dealings with management, it makes cohesion and solidity important (Pick, 
2009). This means that for boards to be influential, they must maintain a cohesive voice vis-à-vis 
top or senior management. The last but not the least role of board chairpersons is to help their 
compatriots to appreciate their roles as boards. Here, chairpersons are to ensure that their cohorts 
are working with a shared vision.                     
However, it has also been argued that such separation produces a new stratum of agency cost and 
raises information transfer cost from the CEO to the Chairperson (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1994). 
As long as the CEO controls the quality, quantity and timing of available information to the 
directors, it is quite difficult for directors to be sure of getting what they need for true independent 
supervision. Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) and Daily and Dalton (1997) conclude that there is no 
disparities in the financial performance between corporations with and without combined positions, 
describing them as either ‘fussing about’ or ‘much ado about nothing’.  
Dalton and Dalton (2009) argue that the separation of these two roles does not necessarily indicate 
independence of the leadership structure. Their argument stems from the assertion that in most 
cases the person who is the ‘separate’ board chairperson is the former CEO of the firm. In some 
cases too this separate board chairperson is either the founder of the firm or former CEO of 
acquired or merged companies. The authors further argue that a single voice directing the company 
at the board level is the most efficient and effective form of leadership. In this situation, “there will 
be no parties and constituencies-internal and external- who will question who is in charge and who 
is accountable” (p. 83). The fundamental idea is that any subordinate or minor must be supervised 
by a single and clear-cut authority. However, FinKelstein and D’Aveni (1994) contend that the 
combined structure and separated structure could determine higher or lower performance of a 
corporate business depending on how they are fit with the internal and external conditions of that 
corporation.   
Despite these arguments, Cadbury (1999); CACG (1999); OECD (2004); the recommended 
guidelines of Ghana, and many others have persistently advocated the non-duality (separated roles) 
structure. Thus this section concludes that non-duality structure is one of the key determinants of 
board control through board effectiveness. 
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Board meetings  
Board meetings are events whereby board directors meet to discuss and exchange ideas on how 
they wish to exercise their monitoring and controlling role over management and corporate 
businesses. It can also be explained as those board gatherings in which discussions are made 
concerning the discharge of the decision rights delegated by shareholders. They are meant to 
provide guidance and oversight. Therefore, the programme of the board has to encompass all vital 
issues of the firm. These meetings have to be effective and efficient in a manner that will inform 
board members about the issues the firm is encountering and how to deal with them. The board’s 
time has to be properly and efficiently utilized to make available the required and appropriate 
information, to permit in-depth discussion of every vital aspect for decision-making and to get into 
a conclusion on strategic decisions (Arguden, 2009). In order for directors to function and give 
what are inside of them to the benefit of the company, they should be fully informed about all the 
major developments of the company. Given the right information to board members at the right 
time is vital to ensuring board control. Also, ensuring meeting turnouts is of great importance. 
Meeting turnouts ought to be scheduled to include dates, hours, locations of the meetings and this 
can be designed for the whole year thus permitting members to have ample time to plan before 
meetings. Furthermore, board members ought to meet in less formal settings and spend time 
together at offsite strategy retreats. Special retreats can be held to discuss strategic issues about the 
firm. With this, ‘the board can raise questions from the diversity of experiences and different 
perspectives of its members and evaluate the competences needed’ (Steger, Lorange, Neubauer, 
Ward & George, 2004, p.26) 
Board meetings have to concentrate on the following: 1) Matters that each committee’s chairperson 
may wish to bring on board; 2) the firm’s key or strategic priorities; 3) mitigations concerning risk; 
4) internal control procedures; 5) endorsement and monitoring of budget; 6) vital investment 
decisions; 7) mergers and acquisitions; 8) stock performance; 9) compensation packages for top 
executives; 10) performance evaluation of management; 11) performance evaluation of members; 
and 12) new ventures, competitive market and product development prospects (Arguden, 2009). By 
taking into account the various recommendations of the chairs of each committee, the CEO and any 
other member of the board, the chairperson always ought to set the agenda for board meetings. The 
agenda for the meeting always has to be made available to each member of the board in order to 
give them sufficient time to study and prepare themselves adequately before board meetings.  
Finally, effective and efficient use of minutes may perhaps increase the effectiveness of the board 
to act as monitors and controllers. 
The principles of OECD and CACG, and the companies code 1963 (Act 179) of Ghana stress on 
the significance of passing information to members when the need arises. This means that 
timeliness and adequacy of governance information can serve as significant indicators of 
effectiveness of board.  Vafeas (1995) advocates that frequent board meetings is one of the 
indicators that can be used to measure effectiveness of board with special emphasis on control. This 
assertion has also been supported by Andres-Alonso and Vallelado-Gonzalez (2006) that the more 
frequent the meetings, the more detailed the control and monitoring of management as well as the 
more significant advisory role, which eventually has a direct effect on performance. This section 
therefore, concludes that, timeliness and adequacy of governance information are important 
indicators of effectiveness of board with respect to board control.   
Board Committees 
It is not every corporate issue that is discussed and interrogated by the full board thus the need to 
set up board committees. This implies that effective boards need effective committees that are 
made up of qualified members. Cadbury Report (2002) pronounces that the establishment of board 
committees is one way to avoid board meetings from being otherwise burdened. Charkman (2005) 
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also notes that the main objective of board committees is to effectively and efficiently manage 
board issues in a more detailed manner than would otherwise be appropriate to the whole board. 
Another objective is to increase objectivity either because of inherent conflict of interest such as 
executive remuneration, or the more responsive affair of disciplining personal favorites as in the 
exercise of patronage in the appointment of new members. The author also posits that the setting up 
of board committees gives an opportunity for NEDs to involve themselves in a more detailed 
aspects of corporate governance, which is considered to be key, and “the confidence to intervene 
when they should and knowledge about when not to” (Charkman, 2005, p.322).  Furthermore, 
when the board delegates some of its responsibilities to board committees, it would have ample 
time to concentrate on strategic issues (Lechem, 2002).  The establishment of board committees 
serves as a means of controlling management by boards. Some of these committees are the audit 
committee and remuneration committee. 
The audit committee is perhaps the most significant board committee in that it is responsible for 
overseeing the corporation’s dealings with its external auditors and supervising the corporation’s 
financial reporting procedure as well as assessing the financial statements of the corporation 
(Lipman & Lipman, 2006; Jacques du Plessis et al., 2011; Felo, 2011).  Massen (1999) contends 
that audit committees are connected to the control functions of the board. Canyon and Mallin 
(1997) also point out that audit committees potentially offer numerous benefits. These include; 
quality financial reporting, putting in place a climate of discipline and control which limits the 
chances of fraud, strengthening the positions of both internal and external auditors by making 
available much more independent channels devoid of the influence of  management, and increasing 
public confidence in the credibility of financial statements when published. In order to ensure these 
benefits, members of the audit committee must consist of independent directors who have the 
aptitude, agility and the zeal to appreciate the full twists and turns in accounting and auditing 
concepts. Also, audit committee members should possess the latest knowledge on the nuts and bolts 
of audit and byzantine financial instruments (Ward, 2003). However, the sustainability of the 
veracity of the audit process depends on the manner in which the committee employs and settles on 
the compensation plan of the independent auditor and pre- endorses all services (both auditing and 
non-auditing) made available by the auditor (Lipman & Lipman, 2006).         
Remuneration committee is also considered important in that, it acts in a manner in which larger 
firms can be in a position to control the levels of remuneration. It is a committee that monitors the 
level and structure of remuneration of directors and senior management. Knell (2006) asserts that 
the remuneration levels are supposed to be adequate to attract, keep and induce directors and 
managers of the quality needed to administer the firm in a successful way. However, a firm is 
supposed to be careful of not paying more than it is needed for this purpose. The rationale behind 
this is to avoid a remuneration plan that unjustly and outrageously enriches management at the 
expense of stockholders. In relation to this, concerns have been made regarding the levels of 
remuneration, and as a result, most remuneration committees in large corporations now rely on 
remuneration consultants to assist them design their remuneration plans. A study conducted by 
Cadman, Carter & Hillegeist (2008) points out that, 86percent of remuneration committees in large 
corporations use consultants to assist them in designing remuneration plans.  
Ethical matters arise when there is a would-be conflict of interest when the consultant hired by the 
remuneration committee also provides remuneration services to the corporation’s management 
team. The implication is that, there is a likelihood that the consultant will suggest a somewhat large 
remuneration packages for the CEO and other senior managers as an approach to guarantee that 
management will employ him or her to conduct other services for the corporation. In order to curb 
this conflict of interests, recommendations have been made that regulators should put forward extra 
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disclosures surrounding the use of remuneration consultants to guarantee that using them does not 
denigrate the interests of shareholders (Felo, 2011).     
Issues that arise from this characteristic come from the composition and the leadership of such 
committees. The leadership and composition of such committees are vital in establishing the extent 
of influence that independent non-executive directors can have. In order to increase this influence, 
these committees should be composed mostly of independent directors and chaired by independent 
non-executive directors. Independence of committee members has now become the new coin of the 
realm. One committee that is needed to be entirely made up of outside directors is the remuneration 
committee. Conger and Lawler (2009) argue that in addition to the remuneration committee, other 
board committees should predominantly, if not exclusively, by outside directors. But one should 
not conclude that having a vibrant independent leadership on such committees is an alternative for 
having a non-executive chairperson. If there is non-existence of non-executive chairperson, 
independent leadership is fragmented among a number of persons. There is no one independent 
director who has the sole responsibility to the board as well as making sure that its gamut of actions 
is interconnected. Therefore, it is a good practice to have committees, but it is a partial solution to 
ensuring board effectiveness.             
The OECD (1999), CACG (1999), OECD (2004), and the recommended guidelines of Ghana 
recommend the establishment of audit and remuneration committees with independent directors as 
majority. The rationale behind this is that executive directors who are members of the board may be 
biased towards the CEO, leading to remuneration plans that will one-sidedly enrich management, 
typically to the detriment of shareholders. This section thus concludes that audit and remuneration 
committees with qualified, competent, independent and tough minded directors as majority 
determine effectiveness of board with respect to board control. 
4.7.4 Board control 
The board functions at the apex of a corporation with a considerable potential to influence 
decisions on the direction and performance of the corporation (Gabrielsson & Diamanto, 2006; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  One of the most important ways for boards to control the 
directions of a corporation is through “decision control”, encompassing board operations such as 
the determination of the basic long-term goals of the corporation as well as adopting the path of 
actions and the allotment of resources required for carrying out those goals. Board of directors also 
has control over reporting of audited financial reports of the corporate business, the usage of 
external auditing of the corporate business’ state of affairs in terms of finance, and compliance with 
the Generally Accepted Accounting and Auditing rules and principles (Marnet, 2008) or 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) issued by International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB).  
The Anglo-American model points out that the legal obligation of the board to stockholders 
includes duties of honesty, care and candor to oversee management in order to ensure that they 
operate in accordance with the interests of stockholders. This implies that the board is supposed to 
review and give an approval to strategic options put forth by management-since management has 
in-depth understanding of the company to develop strategies that can be executed. However, the 
board should also make sure that decisions they make on these strategic options are properly 
supervised in relation to their execution. This reflects the case of Ghana where the Companies 
Code 1963 (Act 179) suggests that board of directors ought to have oversight responsibility over 
management for it to work in accordance with shareholders’ interests. The supervisory role implies 
a degree of opposition between executive and non-executive (Maasen, 1999; Stiles & Taylor, 
2001). Two organizations in the United States; the Business Roundtable and the American Law 
Institute have recommended important actions for the board in respect of board control.  The 
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Business Roundtable suggests that the operations of the board in relation to board control involve 
selecting, dismissing CEO, determining management’s compensation and reviewing succession 
plan. The American Law Institute also asserts  similar list of responsibilities: electing, reviewing 
and where necessary dismissing and replacing senior executives, oversee the conduct of the firm’s 
operations with a view of assessing, on an on-going basis, whether the firm’s assets are properly 
used in a way that maximizes shareholders’ wealth (Monks & Minow, 2002).  
The recommended guidelines of Ghana also points out relatively similar duties: Overseeing of 
internal control system; overseeing the management and conduct of the corporation; succession 
planning and the appointment, training, remuneration and replacement; strategic guidance of the 
corporate body in keeping with its business goals; identification of risk and the implementation of 
systems that manage risk and maintenance of the firm’s communications and information 
dissemination policy.  Therefore, the possible set of indicators of board control can be: Approval of 
corporation’s strategy; selection of, and ability to dismiss the CEO; setting the CEO’s 
remuneration; and assessing the performance of the CEO, individual board members and the board 
as a whole.  
4.8 Research propositions 
A proposition puts our focus on certain concerns that ought to be explored and examined within the 
scope of the study. It is a cautious and conjectural association between abstract constructs that is 
affirmed in a declarative manner (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Yin (2009; 2003) asserts that propositions 
reflect relevant theoretical issues and evidence about individual(s). Without propositions, case 
studies may be difficult, because a researcher might be fascinated to cover ‘everything’ which is 
impossible to conduct. Propositions assist in narrowing down the scope of the study. Yin (2003, 
p.23) posits “the more a study contains specific propositions, the more it will stay within feasible 
limits”. 
In order to connect the research questions to the model of the study depicted above (see figure 4.2) 
in finding answers to the study’s sub-questions two (2), the following propositions were 
formulated: 
Proposition 1 
Shareholders with larger shares exert shareholder control in a company. 
This proposition addresses the ownership structure and how it leads to shareholders control in a 
corporate organization.    
Proposition 2 
Effective and efficient board meetings lead to a panoptic board control in a company. 
This proposition addresses how effective board meetings are and how they result in board control 
in a company.  
Proposition 3 
The non-duality structure with independent chairperson results in a panoptic board control in a 
company. 
This proposition shows how board independence is linked to board control. In other words, how 
Chief Executive Officer-Chairperson separation leads to board control 
Proposition 4(a) 
Instituting a board audit committee with independent non-executive directors as its members leads 
to a panoptic board control in a company. 
This proposition addresses how an independent board audit committee leads to board control. 
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Proposition 4(b) 
Establishing a board remuneration committee with independent directors as its members leads to a 
panoptic board control in a company. 
This proposition addresses how an independent remuneration committee leads to board control. 
These propositions addressed above reflect the present situation in terms of corporate governance 
in Ghana. The study will revolve around these propositions and the empirical evidence will 
determine whether these propositions reflect and drive the prevailing corporate governance 
practices in Ghana.   
4.9 Operationalization of variables 
The major task of empirical social research is the accurate and detailed operationalization of 
variables (Bryman, 2001), given that many of the constructs such as bias, alienation and liberalism 
are difficult to explain, not to mention how to measure precisely (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
Operationalization refers to the specification of how, in practice, the constituents indicated in the 
model are to be examined (Verschuren & Doreeward, 1999). In other words, it is a technique of 
formulating accurate measures for abstract constructs (Bhattacherjee, 2012).    Alejandro and 
Hasanaga (2005) suggest that the more precise the definitions, the more objective and transferable 
knowledge they generate. A researcher could search the extant body of knowledge pertaining to 
his/her research area to get to know if there are existing prevalidated measures that could be 
adopted or adapted to measure his/her constructs of interests (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Accordingly, 
the study employed such strategy to define the variables in the theoretical propositions.   Table 4.1 
below depicts the indicators and their definitions.   
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Table 4.1: Definitions of the variables in the propositions 
Variable Explanation Indicator Literature 
Shareholder 
control 
how shareholders 
directly or indirectly 
exert control over the 
operations of the firm 
1.exerting power over decisions, 
2. influence the appointment of 
‘important personalities’ such as the 
CEO and Chairperson, 
3.influence corporate decisions taken by 
the board or management, 
4. direct partaking in the running of the 
corporate entity  
 
Denis & McConnel (2001)); 
Babatunde & Olaniran (2009). 
Board Control undertaking actions to 
exert control and 
monitor management 
1.selection of, and ability to dismiss the 
CEO 
2.assessing the performance of the CEO, 
activities of the board and other top 
executives 
3. Approval of corporate strategy  
4. setting the CEO’s remuneration 
package 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976),) 
 Mintzberg (1983), OECD (1999), 
CACG (1999), Companies Code 
(1963), Monks &Minow (2004), Payne 
et al. (2009), Brink (2011) 
Ownership 
Structure 
are identities of 
shareholders and the 
size of equity held by 
shareholders 
1.identities of shareholders 
2. the size of equity held by shareholders 
Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Roe (2003), 
Carlsson (2003), Denis & McConnell 
(2003) 
Board 
composition  
The percentages of 
outside and inside 
directors 
1.Executive directors 
2.Non-executive directors 
Mace (1986), Babatunde & Olaniran 
(2009), OECD (1999), CACG (1999), 
Companies Code (1963), Solomon 
(2007). 
Board/Director 
independence  
Not employed by the 
company or have a 
significant social or 
economic 
independence to 
management. 
1.Non-existence of social ties with the 
CEO 
2. Non-existence of business association 
with the firm or management 
3. Not representing or elected by a 
major equity holder. 
Lorsh & Mclver (1989), Denis 
&McConnel (2001), Baysinger and 
Butler (1985), Knell (2006),GSEC 
(2011) 
Non-duality 
structure 
Separation of the 
positions of the CEO 
and the Chairperson. 
CEO-chairperson separation Jensen (1993), Millstein & McAvoy 
(2003), OECD (2004), CACG (1999), 
Companies Code (1963) 
Board 
meetings 
Meetings by the board 
to discuss and 
exchange ideas on how 
they would be in a 
position to serve as 
monitors as well as to 
undertake key strategic 
issues concerning the 
firm 
1.timeliness of meetings 
2. adequacy of information available to 
outside directors 
Demb & Neubauer (1992), OECD 
(1999), CACG (1999). Companies 
code (1963) 
The board 
Audit 
Committee 
Committee to 
effectively and 
efficiently manage 
financial affairs of the 
firm 
1.how functioning is the committee 
2. The kind of directors on the audit 
committee 
Massen (1999), Canyon and Mallin 
(1997), OECD (1999), CAGG (1999) 
Companies code 
(1963) 
The board 
remuneration 
committee 
The committee that 
sets the CEO’s and 
other top executives’ 
remuneration 
packages 
1.how functioning the committee is 
2.The sort of directors that constitutes 
the committee 
Felo (2011), OECD (1999), CACG 
(1999), Knell (2006), Companies code 
(1963). 
Source: Castellini & Agyemang (2012)    
4.10  Conclusion 
Even though, there has been an existence of corporate governance principles in Ghana, so far, to 
the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no research study on the extent to which listed 
companies have complied with the requirements of these principles. The absence of empirical data 
on the adoption and implementation of the principle provides an opportunity for the researcher to 
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carry out such original study on Ghana. This study will thus establish whether the listed companies 
in Ghana are practicing effective corporate governance. There is therefore, an opportunity to carry 
out an original research on what serves as a driving force in corporate governance practices in 
Ghana. The various propositions have been used against the agency theory and the transaction cost 
economic theory expecting that, these two theories would provide general mechanisms to 
addressing an incentive problem. The findings of the research in chapter six are expected to provide 
answers to specific research question two of the study (see chapter one). The next chapter presents 
the study’s research design and methodology.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The preceding chapter presented the study’s conceptual framework with its theoretical 
propositions; this next chapter makes an effort to address the objective of the study by developing a 
multi-method research plan that supports the exploratory and descriptive nature of this study. It 
examines the study’s philosophical assumptions, research design, the overall methodological 
framework, and the study’s multiple data collection and analysis techniques that were employed to 
gather the required data needed to address the study’s research questions. It also discusses the 
principles for ensuring research quality and ethical consideration of this study. It further highlights 
the limitations of the study’s research design and how they were surmounted. Finally, a summary 
of this chapter is presented.  
5.1 Research paradigm 
Researchers more often than not, have to select an appropriate mental models or frames of 
references that can be applied to arrange their logical reasoning and observations (Bhattacherjee, 
2012; Neuman, 2010). These mental belief systems or mental models are called research 
paradigms. Research paradigms are usually difficult to recognize, in the sense that they are implicit, 
assumed and sometimes taken for gratuitous. However, recognizing them is crucial to appreciating 
and unifying disparities in individuals’ perceptions about the same phenomenon in its natural 
setting (Bhattacherjee, 2012). This appreciation and unification of different views of individuals 
about the same phenomenon determine the problems that are worth researching, and the techniques 
that can be applied to examine these problems (Perry & Cavaye, 2004). The choice of research 
methodology is dependent on the research paradigm that steers the entire research activity and 
therefore, ‘beliefs about nature of reality and humanity (ontology), the theory of knowledge that 
informs the research (epistemology), how that knowledge may be gained (methodology)’ (Tuli, 
2010, p. 99), and what counts as basic values as well as what is consciousness (moral choices, 
ethics and normative judgments) (McGregor & Murnane, 2010) , shape and explain the conduct of 
an enquiry (Popkewitz, Tabachnick & Zeichner, 1979).  
Ontology informs the methodology about the nature of reality or the assumptions about how this 
world is perceived by individuals (Tuli, 2010; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). On the other hand, whilst 
epistemology informs the methodology about the nature of knowledge or assumptions about the 
best manner in which this world can be inquired (Bhattacherjee, 2012), methodology refers to the 
process that translates ontological and epistemological principles into techniques, which divulge 
how the world is to be examined (Sarantakos, 2005). Axiology is basically concerned with the role 
and voice of the investigator and the research participants (Ponterotto, 2005). Through an 
application of these four sets of principles, a number of research paradigms has been developed to 
steer research (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Tuli, 2010). Gephart (1999) grouped research paradigms into 
three (3) philosophical discrete groups as positivism, interpretivism and critical postmodernism 
(see figure 5.1 below). These three research paradigms are ideal for this research in that they are 
popular paradigms in contemporary organizational and management studies.  
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Figure 5.1: Underpinning philosophical assumptions of the study 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
    
 
Source: Author’s construct 
It is worth mentioning that these three research paradigms vary in relation to their ontological, 
epistemological, methodological (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) and axiological perspectives (McGregor 
& Murnane, 2010; Ponterotto, 2005). But it is also worth considering that there is no consensus in 
regards to whether these three philosophical groups essentially contradict or whether they can be 
considered as contributing differing tasks in the same research (Myers, 1997). This clearly 
demonstrates that in order to establish a comprehensive appreciation of the research problem, the 
understanding and application of multiple research paradigms will probably be needed 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). Table 5.1 below summarizes these three philosophical perspectives in 
relation to their ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological perspectives. For the 
purpose of further appreciation of these three philosophical perspectives, the logic behind them is 
highlighted in the table as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretivism Positivism Critical Postmodernism 
Qualitative analysis 
101 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of research paradigms 
 Positivism 
(Scientific, empirical) 
Interpretivism 
(Humanistic) 
Critical postmodernism 
(Power) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ontology 
-reality is out there; waiting to 
be explored 
-there is single reality made of 
discrete elements: when we 
find them all via scientific 
technique, we have a full 
picture of reality 
-a single reality exists that 
people cannot see 
-a fact is a fact; it cannot be 
interpreted 
-true nature of reality can only 
be attained by testing theories 
-seeing is believing 
-laws of nature can be derived 
from scientific data 
-human nature is established 
by things people are unaware 
of and have to control over 
-humans are passive, 
malleable and controllable 
-reality is determined by the 
environment, inherited 
potential or the interaction of 
the two 
-reality is external to our 
consciousness 
-reality is in here (in 
people’s minds and 
collectively constructed) 
-social reality is relative 
to the observer and 
everyday concepts need to 
be understood to 
appreciate this reality 
-emphasis is on the life-
world and shared 
meanings and 
understandings of that 
world 
-reality is socially 
constructed through the 
lived experiences of 
people 
-human nature is 
determined by how 
people see themselves 
-human beings are active 
and self-creating 
-human beings can act 
deliberately  
-reality can be an outcome 
of people’s minds or the 
interactions of individuals 
-reality constitutes  that 
which is constructed by 
people by interacting with 
their contexts and other 
persons 
-reality is conditional 
upon human experiences 
 
-reality is here and now 
-reality is molded by ethnic, 
cultural, gender, social and 
political values and mediated 
by power relations 
-reality is constructed within 
social-historical context 
-humans are not confined to 
one specific state or set of 
conditions; things can change 
-human beings have the 
capacity to wield control 
over social arrangements and 
institutions; create a new 
reality 
-humans who are oppressed 
are able to emancipate 
themselves and challenge the 
status quo 
-reality is material, never 
fully understood and is 
deeply molded by power 
-seeks to truly appreciate the 
real situations in order to 
change everyday power 
balance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Epistemology 
-the one truth is out there 
waiting to be discovered 
through scientific method 
-strive for certainties, laws of 
behaviors, principles that offer 
explanations resulting in 
predictions and control of 
phenomena 
-knowledge is objective (bias 
free) 
-knowledge is fragmented and 
not related); mind and matter 
are separate 
-only knowledge generated 
using the scientific method is 
valid 
-only things that can be 
observed are worthy of study 
-knowledge is an outcome of 
scientific technique 
-truth is created and there 
is more than one truth; 
depends on humans’ 
interpretations of their 
world 
-strive for confidence 
-knowledge is constructed 
by individuals 
-agreed on knowledge in 
one culture may not be 
valid in another culture 
-takes into account social 
and cultural influences on 
knowledge creation 
-knowledge is subjective 
or Intersubjective and 
includes viewpoint  
-there are several ways of 
knowing apart from the 
scientific technique 
-knowledge can be 
cognitive, feelings and 
embodied 
-truth is grounded in the 
context 
-knowledge is grounded in 
social and historical 
perspectives 
-knowledge is emancipatory, 
created via critically 
questioning the manner 
things ‘have always been 
done’ 
-knowledge is about hidden 
power structures that 
permeate society 
-knowledge is dialectic 
(transformative), consensual 
and normative 
-knowledge is material and is 
subject to modification  
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Table 5.1 continues: Summary of research paradigms 
 
 Positivism  Interpretivism Critical postmodernism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Axiology 
-values neutral (values are 
often ignored) 
-moral issues are beyond 
empirical enquiry 
-no place for prejudice, values, 
feelings, perceptions, hopes or 
expectations of either 
investigator or research 
participants 
-researcher strives to control 
for anything that can 
contaminate the research 
-association between 
researcher and participant is 
objective and dualistic 
 
-values laden  
Intent is to uncover the 
beliefs, customs and so on 
that mold human behavior 
-bias, feelings, hopes, 
expectations, perceptions 
and values are central to 
the research process 
-participants play a major 
role in the research, even 
instigating it   
-the standpoints of the 
‘insiders’ supersedes that 
of the investigator 
-role of investigator is to 
uncover conscious and 
unconscious explanations 
people have for their life 
via dialogue with and 
among study participants 
-relationship between the 
researcher and 
participants is intense, 
prolonged and dialogic 
(deep insights via 
interaction)  
-values oriented and values 
driven  
-researcher’s pragmatic 
values regarding social 
justice are central to the 
study 
-goal is to critically examine 
unquestioned values, beliefs 
and norms to divulge power 
-researcher seeks to 
appreciate the consequences 
of power so as to assist 
people to empower 
themselves 
-very participatory research 
process that is grounded in 
terms of the insiders’ 
standpoint, respecting that 
researchers have contributing 
finesses  
-role of the researcher is to 
challenge insiders with 
expert research findings 
resulting in self-reflection 
and emancipation  
-goal is to create societal 
change by emancipating 
citizens to take action 
-relationship between 
researcher and participants is 
dialogic, transactional and 
dialectic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology 
Seeking causality, laws and 
relations through: 
Quantitative: 
Experiments, Quasi-
experiments, field experiments 
and surveys 
 
Seeking relations and 
regularities through: 
Qualitative: 
Quasi experiments, field 
experiments, surveys, 
ethnoscience (new 
ethnography), ethnography 
Phenomenology, case studies, 
and content analysis 
 
Seeking theory and 
patterns through: 
Phenomenology, case 
studies, content analysis, 
grounded theory, 
natural/interpretive 
inquiry, discourse 
analysis, thematic 
analysis, document 
analysis 
Seeking meanings and 
interpretations via: 
Case studies, discourse 
analysis, ethical enquiry, 
life history study, 
narrative study, 
hermeneutic enquiry, 
heuristic enquiry 
Seeking reflection, 
emancipation and problem 
solving through: 
Action research, discourse 
analysis, participatory 
research, critical analysis, 
feminist enquiry, case study 
and reflective 
phenomenology 
 
 
 
Logic 
-deductive, justification, 
formal logic 
-via objective observation, 
experts form research 
questions and hypotheses or 
propositions  and test 
empirically 
-concerned with prediction, 
control and explanation 
-inductive logic, effort to 
find various 
interpretations of reality 
and recognize patterns 
that govern and guide 
human behaviour 
-meaningful findings are 
more valuable than 
generalization 
-inductive logic, aimed at 
emancipation 
-concerned with critiquing 
and societal change 
-logic is to divulge power 
-assumes that researchers can 
assist people become aware 
of unconscious thoughts 
 Source: Adapted from McGregor & Murnane (2010) 
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5.1.1 Positivism 
The positivist research paradigm of examining social reality is founded on the philosophical 
perspective of the French Philosopher, August Comte (1798-1857), founder of the discipline of 
Sociology who strived to merge rationalism with empiricism. He posited that observations and 
theory have globular reliance on each other. While theories may be developed through logical 
reasoning, they are only valid if they can be confirmed via observations. This emphasis on 
confirmation began the schism of contemporary science from philosophy and metaphysics, and 
further formation of the ‘scientific techniques’ as fundamental ways of authenticating scientific 
arguments. The positivism research paradigm has to do with unearthing truth and illuminating it 
empirically (Henning, Van Rensburg & Smith, 2004).  
The positivists argue that scientific knowledge comprises facts while its ontology regards the 
reality as free from social construction (Walsham, 1995b). If the study is made up of a steady and 
static reality, then the investigator can employ an ‘objective’ standpoint; a realist ontology- a 
mental model in an objective, real world- and separated epistemological perspective founded on a 
mental model that people’s perceptions and thoughts are either right or wrong, true or false as well 
as a mental model founded on a perspective of knowledge as hard, real and attainable. Positivism 
considers human behavior as passive, controlled and established by external forces.  
The positivist research paradigm is associated with an array of theories and practices such as 
Comtean-kind positivism, behaviorism, logical positivism (non-realism), cognitive science and 
empiricism (Hwang, 1996). Even though this research paradigm continues to influence 
contemporary management research, interpretive constructionism and critical postmodernism 
critics have raised issues in regards to its subjectivity in explaining social reality. Its critics hold the 
view that objectivity needs to be substituted by subjectivity in the process of scientific investigation 
and that constructionism and critical postmodernism provide alternative theoretical, methodological 
and practical techniques to research (Gephart, 1999).  
In its undiluted structure, the realist viewpoint represents basically, the traditions of classical 
positivist. But a modified objectivist viewpoint called postpositivism or postempiricism 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012) amends positivism by suggesting that it is not possible to confirm the truth 
even though it is possible to reject false mental models, though it maintains the positivist 
perspective of an objective truth and its focus on the scientific technique. This vividly represents 
the critical realist perspective, which contends that there is external reality that is both theory-free 
and value-free from people’s perceptions and thoughts, but it is hardly to know such social reality 
with any degree of certainty (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Therefore, the positivist emphasis on 
experimental and quantitative techniques have been supplanted or complemented to some degree 
by an interest in applying qualitative techniques to collect catholic information outside of already 
existing or prevalidated variables (Gephart, 1999).  
5.1.2 Interpretivism 
If investigators believe that the most appropriate way to examine social order is through subjective 
explanation of participants involved, such as by interviewing different participants and unifying 
variations among their responses by applying their own subjective viewpoints to create and sustain 
a sense of truth specifically, in the face of rival explanations of social reality, then they are using 
interpretivism research paradigm (Bhattacherjee, 2012). It inductively constructs social science 
concepts employing concepts of social actors as the cornerstones for logical induction (Gephart, 
1999). The premise of interpretive investigators is that access to social reality (whether socially 
constructed or given) is only through social constructions such as language, awareness and 
common appreciations (Myers, 2013). Interpretivism research paradigm is strengthened by 
observation and interpretation. Therefore, to observe is to gather information about events, whilst 
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to interpret is to draw out conclusions or by concluding the match between information and some 
abstract trends (Aikenhead, 1997). It strives to appreciate phenomena via the explanations people 
assign to them (Deetz, 1996).  
The interpretivism research paradigm emphasizes on putting analysis in context (Reeves & 
Hedberg, 2003). It has to do with appreciating the world as it is from subjective experiences of 
people. It does not predefine endogenous or exogenous variables, but concentrates on the full 
intricacy of human sense of making as the situation arises (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994). 
Interpretivists are not interested in building a new theory, but to infer or assess, and fine-tune 
interpretive theories. Walsham (1995b) suggests three (3) differing uses of theory in interpretive 
case research; theory steering the research design and data gathering, theory as an iterative 
procedure of data gathering and analysis, and theory as a result of a case research. The application 
of theory as an iterative technique between data gathering and analysis has been employed in this 
study.  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that interpretivism research paradigm is not a single research 
paradigm, but in actual fact a large family of different research paradigms. The philosophical 
foundation of interpretive research paradigm is hermeneutic and phenomenology (Boland, 1985). 
Hermeneutics is an important kind of interpretive philosophy that emerged in the late nineteenth 
century. As a philosophical technique to human appreciation, hermeneutics offers the philosophical 
foundation for interpretivism research paradigm. It is an iterative process of moving back and forth 
from pieces of observations (text) to the entire social phenomenon (context) to unify their visible 
discord and to construct a theory that is in line with the differing subjective perspectives and 
experiences of the research participants (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Such iteration between the meaning 
of a phenomenon and observations must persist until ‘theoretical saturation’ is attained, whereby 
any extra back and forth movement does not result in any more information about the phenomenon.  
It is imperative that even though this study is not basically phenomenological; some aspects of it 
are strengthened by the principles of phenomenology, which emphasize on ascertaining and 
reporting germane features of phenomena in their natural context. Phenomenology is an 
interpretive research method that focuses on the study of conscious experiences as a way of 
appreciating the social reality around us (Bhattacherjee, 2012). It concerns itself with a systematic 
reflection and analysis of phenomena connected to conscious experiences, such as human 
inferences, perceptions and thoughts, actions, with the aim of a) understanding and explaining 
reality from differing subjective viewpoints of the involved participants, and b) appreciating the 
symbolic appreciations underpinning these subjective experiences (Bhattacherjee, 2012). This 
enquiry demands that investigators get rid of any prejudices, empathize with the situation of 
participants and focus on extant dimensions of that situation, so that they can exhaustively savvy 
the deep structures that establish the conscious, feeling and behavior of the participants involved in 
the study. Interviews and observations are the main data gathering techniques of phenomenology.  
This study employed the interpretivism research paradigm to get hold of an in-depth understanding 
of how corporate governance is practiced and the elements that drive its effectiveness in developing 
countries particularly, Ghana. Table 5.2 below re-echoes the features of interpretivism research 
paradigm as grouped into; a) the aim of the study, b) the nature of reality (ontology), nature of 
knowledge and the association between the researcher and what it is researched into, and c) the 
methodology employed.   
 
 
105 
 
Table 5.2: Re-echoing the features of interpretivism research paradigm 
Characteristic Description 
Aim of study to get hold of an in-depth understanding of how corporate governance is 
practiced and the elements that drive its effectiveness in developing countries 
particularly, Ghana 
Ontology  There are multiple social realities 
 Social reality can be explored, constructed via human  interactions and    
meaningful actions 
 Ascertaining and reporting germane features of phenomena in their 
natural context. These reporting could be text or visual expression 
 Several social realities exist as a result of differing human conscious, 
behavior, feelings and experiences 
 
 
 
Epistemology 
 Phenomena are appreciated via mental models of interpretation that is 
affected by interaction with social realities 
 Researcher and the researched-into are intertwined in an interactive way 
of communicating.  For instance, talking and listening, and reading and 
writing   
 More personal, interactive way of data gathering 
 Those involved in the research socially construct knowledge by the real 
life context 
 
 
Methodology  
 Data gathered using observation, interviews, text messages and 
reflective sessions 
 Analysis delves into themes to identify multiple layers of meaning while 
maintaining the fragility and ambiguity of subjects’ lived experiences 
 Research is the outcome of the investigator’s values 
Source: Adapted from Myers (2013); Bhattacherjee (2012); Tuli, (2010); McGregor & Murnane ( 2010); Walsham 
(1995b); Kaplan and Maxwell (1994); Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
 
The role of an investigator is to uncover conscious and unconscious explanations people have for 
their life via dialogue with and among study participants (McGregor & Murnane, 2010). The 
relationship between the researcher and participants is powerful, prolonged and dialogic (deep 
insights via interaction). This implies that in the interpretive technique, the investigator does not 
stand above or outside, but is a participant observer (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) who involves 
him/herself in the ongoing activities and becomes aware of the meanings of actions and the manner 
in which these actions are portrayed within particular social contexts.    
5.1.3 Critical postmodernism 
Critical postmodernism blends critical theory and postmodern thought (Gephart, 2004). Critical 
research explains the historical emergence of social realities and the current settings in which these 
social realities mold contradictions with repercussions for social activity and human liberty 
(Gephart, 2004). Thus critical investigators assume that social reality is historically structured and 
that it is produced and reproduced by individuals (Myers, 2013). Critical research concentrates on 
the conflicts, oppositions and contradictions in contemporary society, and hunts for emancipation. 
These contradictions, oppositions and conflicts are considered to be the basis for the exploitation 
that arises when hegemonic worldviews cover up opposition, conflicts and contradictions, leaving 
individuals ignorant of clear kinds of domination and subjugation, which exist (Gephart, 2004). In 
consequence, critical research uncovers relations of dominance and subjugation, and produces 
explanations in order to make social actors instinctively conscious of the roles they play in the 
production and reproduction of social structures.     
Critical postmodernism of exploring social reality is based on the assertion that reality is here and 
now and that it is formed by ethnic, cultural, gender, social and political values, and mediated by 
power relations (McGregor & Murnane, 2010).  Social reality is material, never fully understood 
and is deeply molded by power, but critical postmodernism seeks to fully appreciate the real 
situations in order to change everyday power. Since human beings have the capacity to wield 
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control over social structures and institutions, critical postmodernism induces researchers to 
challenge insiders with expert research findings leading to self-reflection and to create societal 
change by emancipating the ‘controlled’ (people) to take actions.  Therefore, critical 
postmodernism seeks to deconstruct power structures and domination that permeate society by 
opening opportunities for social involvement among people formerly excluded and controlled 
(McGregor & Murnane, 2010; Gephart, 2004).   
Methodologically, critical postmodern research more often than not, has concentrated on discourse 
at the micro level as compared to some extent macro level focus in critical theory study (Gephart, 
1999). It assumes that there are several perspectives of the world, and it employs interpretive and 
positivism approaches to uncover conflicting meanings held by groups in power-laden relations.  
However, its methodology differs from that of positivism and interpretivism in that it is committed 
to transactional, dialectical, and dialogic analysis between the researcher and research participants 
(McGregor & Murnane, 2010; Gephart, 1999).  
5.1.4 Rationale for the adoption of the philosophical perspectives  
Studies are always founded on philosophical viewpoints. Whilst some studies are founded on a 
single research paradigm, others are founded on multi-paradigmatic technique to research. This 
approach is dependent on the type of the study. However, holistic and more exhaustive 
appreciations of social phenomenon such as how corporate governance is effectively practiced in 
one organization than others require an understanding and application of a multi-paradigmatic 
method to research.  
The above discussion about the three philosophical perspectives to research, points out that the 
philosophical standpoint underpinning this study largely stems from interpretivism research 
approach, which is of hermeneutic quality. But the study has some trails of the other two 
philosophical viewpoints - positivism/post-positivism and critical postmodernism.  
Interpretive techniques often offer the study wider scope to deal with issues of influence and 
impact, and to ask questions as to why and how specific circumstances and practices take place 
within a particular phenomenon in its natural setting. In consequence, an interpretive approach of 
objective hermeneutic nature was employed in that it explains how individuals make sense of the 
world via intuition that emerges from ‘the understanding of underlying meaning, not the 
explanation of causal relationships’ (Alvelsson & Deetz, 2000, p. 52). Also, objective hermeneutic 
approach employs an objective perspective of the research phenomenon, but uses an understanding 
and interpretive approach to examine this phenomenon. This approach offered the researcher the 
opportunity to access and create the required data for a comprehensive description of corporate 
governance practices within the context of Ghana. It also offered an unassailable foundation for 
finding answers to the central research question, and with this the leeway for in-depth probing.  
The positivist research paradigm to some extent was employed in this study in that the study put 
forth five main theoretical propositions that were tested empirically. Also, apart from the objective 
observation the researcher conducted during the annual general meetings of the four cases, 
replication logic was employed by the researcher to ensure external validity. In regards to critical 
postmodernism paradigm research and its extent of application in this study, the researcher was 
able to divulge the power struggles in all the cases. This is because one aspect of this research was 
to reveal how shareholders and boards of directors wield control over corporate organizations. 
Also, the study took an interest in exploring how corporate governance practices in these corporate 
organizations have been modified over the years. This offered the researcher the possibility to get 
hold of the modifications of corporate governance practices in these companies.  
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In summary, this study was largely founded on interpretivism research paradigm of objective 
hermeneutic nature. In addition, the study employed two additional philosophical perspectives to 
research-positivism/post-positivism and critical postmodernism. However, this study is not 
claiming that these two philosophical assumptions were extensively applied in this study in the 
sense that most aspects pertaining to their ontological, epistemological, axiological and 
methodological perspectives were not applicable to this study. The next section of this chapter 
addresses the research methodology of the study.      
5.2 Research methodology and methods 
The main aim of conducting research is to contribute to knowledge by creating or testing theories. 
Research methodology is the way or manner a person makes a conscious effort to examine and 
obtain more insight about the social world (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In other words, it is the way a 
research problem is methodically solved. The most relevant aspect of a research methodology 
originates from the fact that it provides the logic behind the selected methods. Kothari (1985, p.8) 
asserts that; 
When we talk about a research methodology, we not only talk about research 
methods, but consider the logic behind the methods we use in the context of 
our research and explain why we are using a particular method or technique so 
that research results are capable of being evaluated either by the researcher 
him/herself or by others”. 
Formulating the research question essentially determines the methodology that is appropriate and 
desirable for the empirical aspect of the study (Aaltio & Heilmann, 2010).  
In addressing the study’s goal, objective and research sub-questions, the multi-method research 
strategy was needed to back both corporate governance practice in Ghana, and the meaning and 
insight of its development. This research strategy provided the researcher an opportunity to access 
and generate a comprehensive or detailed and sufficient data essential for answering the research 
sub-questions put forth by the study: 
1. What are the concepts available in the extant literature that are suitable for evaluating 
effectiveness of corporate governance? 
2. What is the prevailing condition in regards to corporate governance effectiveness in Ghana, 
and the elements that drive this effectiveness? 
3. What significant issues could be suggested as auxiliary for further development of 
corporate governance in Ghana? 
This research strategy was typified by two essential aspects: Qualitative study and case study. 
These aspects and their justifications are presented in detail in the next section.  
5.2.1 Qualitative research versus quantitative research  
Cresswell (1994, p.2) defines qualitative research as “an enquiry process of understanding a social 
or human problem, based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting 
detailed views of informants and conducted in a natural setting”. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) have 
the same notion about qualitative research. They view it as “…a situative activity that locates the 
[researcher] in the world” (p. 3). They add that qualitative research consists of “a set of interpretive, 
material practices that make the world visible” (p.3). This transforms the world into a gamut of 
representations such as interviews, field notes, discussions, images and footages. Many a times, 
qualitative research is referred as an interpretive, naturalistic, critical, hermeneutic, participatory or 
phenomenological (Tuli, 2010; Stake, 2010).    
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There is a clear distinction between qualitative research and quantitative analysis. First and 
foremost, whilst qualitative analysis is founded on creativity, which is contingent on the 
researcher’s capacity to conceptualize and discern the true nature of a situation (Cooper & 
Schlinder, 2010); quantitative research is always founded on statistical inference. Also, Gillham 
(2000) is of the notion that qualitative method has more to offer to researchers than what 
quantitative analysis can provide. The author highlights six (6) main qualities that make qualitative 
analysis superior to quantitative method. These are:  
    Qualitative method examines situations where not much is known about their existence 
and prevailing conditions characterizing them.   
    Qualitative approach explores the intricacies and dynamics that transcend the scope of 
quantitative approach. 
    Qualitative analysis strives to get in-depth understanding of the happenings within a 
specific group or organization- informal realism that can only be ascertained from within. 
   Qualitative method views a situation from inside out in order to establish the real case 
scenario from the notion of those involved.  
    It conducts studies into process that leads to outcomes instead of into how significant 
the outcomes are.  
   It strives to conduct an investigation where other approaches such as experimental 
research are not feasible or not ethically rationalized.  
Further, whilst qualitative analysis generally focuses on interpretation and offers absolute views of 
particular concepts in regards to their deep appreciation and environmental engagement, 
quantitative method is often regarded to be more scientific by concentrating on applying specific 
definitions and operationalizing the meaning of particular concepts and variables (Tewksbury, 
2009). In qualitative research, sampling procedures are focused on seeking information from 
particular groups and subgroups in the population, whilst sampling techniques in quantitative 
research seek to establish representativeness of findings by selecting subjects randomly (Hancock, 
2002). In qualitative analysis, data are used to construct theories and concepts that help us to 
appreciate the social world (that is, inductive approach), whilst quantitative approach is deductive 
in the sense that theories that have already been proposed are subject to test. Table 5.3 depicts the 
differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches.  
Table 5.3: The differences between qualitative and quantitative analyses 
Qualitative analysis Quantitative analysis 
Subjective Objective 
Holistic Reductionist 
Phenomenological Scientific 
Anti positivist Positivist 
Descriptive Experimental 
Naturalistic Contrived 
Inductive Deductive 
Small samples Large samples 
Individual measures are formulated taking into 
consideration specific facets of the study 
Existence of standard measures 
Source: Adopted from Hancock (2002) 
Yin (2011) argues that, qualitative research approach has recently become a pleasing, if not the 
mainstream, kind of research in both academic and professional fields of operation. 
Notwithstanding its reservations by some researchers, it has incrementally regarded as a powerful 
and reliable tool for highlighting and appreciating the human world (Higgs & Cherry, 2009). This 
is because ‘[a] creative and investigative mindset is needed for qualitative analysis, based on an 
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ethically enlightened and participant-in-context attitude, and a set of analytic strategies’ 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 113).  
Qualitative research is characterized by three main distinctive facets (Pope & Mays, 2006). First 
and foremost, it is subjective and offers a distinctive appreciation of a social phenomenon. Also, it 
studies a phenomenon in its natural setting instead of within its experimental or artificial context. 
Finally, it usually employs multi-method techniques in dealing with relevant questions about a 
social phenomenon. Corollary to these aspects, it can be concluded that qualitative research offers a 
less abstract and conclusive framework for a study. It constructs and conveys clear protocols for 
enacting research design chosen as the foundation for self and external assessment of the research 
design (Higgs & Cherry, 2009).            
5.2.2 Rationale for the qualitative analysis 
Having discussed the differences between quantitative analysis and qualitative research, it is 
imperative to pinpoint the rationale behind the selection of the qualitative analysis for this study.  
This study strived to offer a comprehensive, a close to practice, a sort of flexible and diverse 
appreciation about the practice of corporate governance in firms within the context of Ghana.  
Accordingly, qualitative analysis was considered a better technique to reveal these intricacies and 
dynamics of this subject in the sense that ‘the most powerful way that qualitative research can bring 
about change in practice is to research practice as it is actually happening’ (Higgs & Cherry, 2009, 
p. 11). Also, the application of a qualitative approach in carrying out research on corporate 
governance has increased recently. In their study, McNulty et al. (2013) revealed that qualitative 
studies on corporate governance have increased in absolute figures since the 1990s, but remain a 
small proportion of works on corporate governance. Since corporate governance is considered as an 
‘evolving, complex, global, multi-level phenomenon’ (McNulty et al., 2013, p.184), it requires for 
an enquiry that can be explored and examined using a qualitative research approach. In line with 
this, this study aspired to use qualitative approach to explore and examine corporate governance 
practices in Ghana in a real empirical context.  
5.2.3 Assumptions of qualitative research and their connection to this study 
Qualitative research approach is veered towards discovery, description, critical, interpretive and 
holistic appreciation of processes and activities. The following list highlights some fundamental 
assumptions of qualitative research and connects them to the study of corporate governance in the 
Ghanaian setting.  
 Qualitative research facilitates holistic standpoint: It assumes that a phenomenon is 
studied in whole and that complex systems can never be essentially lessened to a number 
of variables and linear causal associations. “The advantage of qualitative portrayals of 
holistic settings and impacts is that greater attention can be given to nuance, setting, 
interdependencies, complexities, idiosyncrasies, and context” (Apap, 2002, p. 43). The 
conceptual framework of this study in chapter 4 in combination of a qualitative research 
approach furnished the researcher the idea of appreciating corporate governance practices 
in Ghana holistically.    
 Qualitative research integrates an evolving design: It also assumes that research design 
cannot be completely formulated prior to the fieldwork. The meanings and insights that 
emerge from the research process and, each data collection and analysis process refine 
subsequent data collection and analysis. This study required suppleness to respond to the 
meanings and insights that emerged and eventually, followed new channels of 
investigation as required.  
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 Qualitative research is descriptive: It centers on describing and appreciating a 
phenomenon. This description includes an in-depth explanation of the context of the 
research, processes, activities and events. This study attempted to describe corporate 
governance practices in Ghana and the factors that drive its effectiveness, and relied on 
these descriptions to recommend policy and managerial measures to ameliorate these 
practices.  
 Qualitative research basically has to do with process instead of result: It is concerned 
with the activities, processes and events of a phenomenon in its natural setting. This study 
carried out fieldwork on the practices of corporate governance in firms in Ghana in order 
to gain understanding of this phenomenon and its natural setting.  
 Qualitative research uses the researcher as the basic instrument for data collection and 
analysis: It assumes that the researcher is the only instrument that can reconcile data rather 
than via interviews, archival records, observation and other data collection techniques. In 
the context of this study, data were gathered through the application of interviews from 
company chief executive officers, board chairpersons, board directors, shareholders, 
company secretaries, officials of SEC and GSE, and past chief executives and directors. 
Archival records were also gathered from the companies’ annual reports, extracts from 
internal files, prospectuses, circular to shareholders and other vital records. In order to 
observe the actual corporate governance practices of the companies, the researcher 
attended the annual general meetings of the companies   
 Qualitative research is interested in how informants are able to express themselves openly 
to bring out their experiences and perceptions about the phenomenon under study and its 
natural setting: Corporate governance is a concept which draws a variety of views from 
numerous stakeholders to concur on one or more ways of addressing it. This approach 
assumes that each view presented by each stakeholder brings out distinctive interpretation, 
understanding, perception and values of the concept of corporate governance. This 
research concentrated on the individual’s understanding, interpretations and perceptions of 
corporate governance.  
 
5.3 Major research strategies 
The qualitative research technique complemented the second aspect of the research strategy. 
However, before determining the exact research strategy that was suitable for carrying out this 
study, a discussion of five main research strategies suggested by Yin (2009) was conducted. These 
are; surveys, experiments, archival analysis, history and case study. Each one of these research 
strategies in social science research has distinctive way of collecting and analyzing data, in 
accordance with its own logic (Yin, 2009). Also, all the strategies are associated with some merits 
and demerits. It is worth mentioning that history and archival analysis rely on previous data and as 
result, this discussion would address only archival records. The study used archival analysis as a 
surrogate measure for history since the two strategies share almost the same merits and demerits. 
The following are brief explanations of these research strategies.    
Surveys are non-experimental strategies that neither control nor influence exogenous factors, but 
measure these factors and test their impacts through the application of statistical technique 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). Even though surveys are focused basically to quantify some factual 
information, they also address qualitative information (Zikmund, 2010). There are two types of 
surveys; cross-sectional field surveys and longitudinal field surveys. In cross-sectional surveys, 
exogenous and endogenous variables are measured simultaneously, whilst in longitudinal field 
surveys, exogenous variables are measured first before the measurement of endogenous variables. 
The strengths of surveys lie in their capability to capture and control for a substantial number of 
variables and to study a problem using several theories or viewpoints (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
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Another strength of surveys lies in external validity since data is gathered in field contexts. Aside 
their strengths, they are characterized by some weaknesses; internal validity (cause-effect 
associations) is difficult to infer and it may be subject to biases on the part of informants.  
Experiments are studies that aim to test cause-effect associations in a firmly controlled context by 
isolating the cause from effect in time, managing the cause of one category of subjects (the 
treatment category) but not to another category (control category), and examining how the mean 
effects differ between the subjects in these categories. Experiments can be carried out in field 
settings such as in organizations where the subject of attention is truly happening (field experiment) 
or in laboratory or artificial context such as at a tertiary institution (laboratory experiment) 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012; Coolican, 2009). The basic strength of experiments lies in their powerful 
internal validity as a result of their capability to separate, control, and increasingly analyze a small 
number of elements. However, their weakness is connected to their inability to generalize in the 
sense that real life usually is complex than arranged laboratory context (Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
Archival analysis is an analysis of data that has been collected and documented by other sources in 
the past. Such data may include business data, financial data from stock markets, government 
agencies data and so on. The strength of this analysis comes to the fore when primary data 
collection for a research is costly, time-consuming and not feasible. In this case, the availability of 
archival analysis is appropriate for addressing research questions (Bhattacherjee, 2012). It is 
associated with some limitations: 1) Data would probably not have been gathered in a systematic 
way and therefore, inappropriate for scientific enquiry; 2) Inasmuch as data was gathered for 
different reason, they might not sufficiently answer the research questions; and 3) internal validity 
is quite difficult to achieve if the sequential precedence between cause and effect is not clear 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012).    
Case study can be defined as an empirical research strategy employed to examine a contemporary 
phenomenon, concentrating on the intricacies and dynamics of the case, within its real-life context 
(Yin, 2009; Roth, 1999). Case study is an ideal research strategy when contemporary events are 
investigated and there is no possibility to control the behavioral events (Teegavarapu & Summers, 
2008). By comparing it with other social science research strategies discussed above, it is worth 
noting that case study research strategy is distinctive because although experiments and historical 
studies can address the same type of research question of case study, the latter does not address 
contemporary issues, while the former control behavioral events (Yin, 2009). Accordingly, it was 
deduced that case study research strategy was considered appropriate to address the study’s 
problem and questions. The next section of this chapter thoroughly explains case study research 
strategy and the rationale behind its selection as the preferred research strategy for this study.        
5.4 Case study 
Case study method allows an investigator to thoroughly evaluate or examine data within a 
particular context. Yin (2003, p.13) defines a case study ‘as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’. To Yin, case study is applied in many 
circumstances to contribute to knowledge of individual, group or an organization. Case studies can 
also be applied in economic related topics such as investigating the structure of a given industry. 
Zaidah (2007) explains that case studies explore and examine contemporary real-life phenomenon 
through contextually analyzing a limited number of events and how they are connected. Dul and 
Hak (2008) also describe it as a study in which a single case or a smaller number of cases in their 
actual life context are being selected, and scores obtained from these cases are qualitatively 
analyzed. To the authors, a case study means a project whereby a theory-oriented or practice-
oriented objective is developed and attained.  
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Yin (2009) categorizes case studies into three: Exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. First, 
exploratory case study explores any phenomenon in the data that is of interest to the investigator. 
With this case study, there will be a prior fieldwork before the study’s research questions are 
proposed, and from this, a framework of the study can also be proposed. They are conducted when 
the researcher knows little about the phenomenon (Zikmund, 2010). Dul and Hak (2008) opine that 
in practice, an exploratory study aims at identifying other kinds of theory such as ‘theories in use’ 
rather than ‘academic theories’. Theories in use are practitioners (manager, entrepreneur, policy 
maker, staff member, a team, company, business sector and so on) knowledge in terms of the object 
of the study, variables, hypotheses or propositions and a practice domain.  
Yin (2009) contends a pilot study is regarded as an example of an exploratory case study and it is 
very important in crafting out the protocol that would be used for the main study. Other data 
collection methods in exploratory studies are literature review, expert surveys, personal interviews 
and focus group discussions (Zikmund, 2010). Even though it is the objective of a study that 
establishes whether it is explanatory, descriptive or exploratory, each data collection technique 
offers different ways of collecting data (Zikmund, 2010). The outcomes of this research usually 
highlight some pattern on the phenomenon that will possibly lay a foundation for developing 
theories, which can be subject to quantitative testing later on (Sekran, 2009).  However, the main 
danger of this study is that the initial findings may seem more convincing to be released 
prematurely or early as conclusions (Yin, 2003). Corollary to this, exploratory studies ought to be 
followed by other studies to obtain more convincing and conclusive evidence (Zikmund, 2010).    
Second, a descriptive analysis tries to portray how a phenomenon looks like. Zaidah (2007) posits 
that ‘descriptive case study sets to describe the natural phenomenon which occurs within the data in 
question....’  The author further suggests that descriptive case studies may be in a narrative form. 
This particular study requires a theory to point the data collection in the correct order and this 
makes it less confusing than other types of research technique. It assists the investigator to 
analytically think, and to appreciate the characterizing features of a phenomenon in its natural 
setting (Sekaran, 2009). Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran (2001) argue that expert panels, participant 
observations and surveys are the usual techniques to gather data in descriptive studies.  
Descriptive research attempts to find answers to ‘how’, ‘where’, ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘why’ and ‘who’ 
questions (Zikmund, 2010). Questions that start with - how- deal mainly with the manner in which 
the objective of the study mirrors the techniques employed in carrying out the research (Dane, 
1999). The where questions deal with both the social and physical environment in which a study is 
carried out. Further, questions that start with-what- essentially focus on the topic and underlying 
theory of the study. Dane (1999) continues to elaborate that the when questions take into 
consideration the timeline of a study. In regards to the ‘why’ questions, researchers basically have 
to concentrate on the rationale for carrying out the study. The who questions ask which people will 
play instrumental parts in carrying out the research-researchers, study participants and research 
customers.  
Third, an explanatory case study also tries to analyze or scrutinize why and how something occurs 
or occurred. Here, a case study research question is more likely to be of ‘how’ and ‘why’.  The 
fundamental goals of exploratory study are to establish cause-and-effect associations between 
factors and by testing research propositions to establish the relevance of theories as well as the 
capability of specific theories to predict societal issues (Zikmund, 2010). Schell (1992) suggests 
there are two special cases where an explanatory case study can be used to test ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions: critical or strategic and deviant cases. The critical or strategic case seeks to evaluate the 
evidence for a conclusion emphasizing on the most favorable illustration of a specific issue. Schell 
(1992, p.5) explains that the deviant case “seeks to upset the adage that the exception proves the 
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rule, by showing how a general rule needs to be re-defined: If the rule isn’t faulty, then at best it is 
only true in limited application”. Even though the worth of exploratory research lies in internal 
validity and reliability, it paves the way for value-free atmosphere, which will probably not be 
appropriate for carrying out studies in management and marketing fields (McDaniel & Gates, 
2006). Table 5.4 sets out a summary of the aforementioned studies and their relevance to business 
research.  
Table 5.4: A synopsis of exploratory, descriptive and explanatory studies in business research 
Exploratory Descriptive Explanatory 
Familiarization of the essential 
facts, context and issues 
Provision of a catholic, favorably 
precise situation  
Testing of theoretical propositions  
Development of broad state of 
affair about a phenomenon 
Getting hold of new information 
that goes contrary to past 
information 
Expatiating and augmenting an 
explanation of a theory 
Formulating and concentrating on 
questions in regards to future 
study 
Developing a set of classification 
types or groups 
Extension of theory to fresh 
concerns or topics 
Creating new issues, concepts or 
propositions 
Systematic clarification of series 
of steps 
Confirming or disconfirming an 
explanation or proposition 
Establishing the viability of 
carrying out a study 
Recording a causal procedure  Connecting issues with a wide-
ranging principle 
Creating approaches for 
measuring and getting hold of 
future information 
Reporting on the background, 
profile, activities of a 
phenomenon in its natural setting 
Establishing the best explanation 
among the numerous 
explanations.  
Source: Adapted from Neuman (2010) 
Yin (2009) argues that there is a common misconception among social scientists about the 
individualistic notion of the various research approaches. The author further suggests a pluralistic 
and inclusive notion of these research approaches, in that each technique can be applied to all three 
forms of research-exploratory, descriptive and explanatory- and to build and test theories. The 
selection of research approach is dependent on three main conditions; 1) the kind of research 
question put forward, 2) the degree of control an investigator possesses over real behavioral events; 
and 3) the extent of concentration on current events as opposed to past events (Yin, 2009). Table 
5.5 portrays these three main conditions in regards to the selection of research strategies.   
 Types of research questions: The most relevant condition to strike out the differences 
among the various research approaches is to identify or establish the type of research 
question posed (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) argues that the fundamental classification 
schemes for the forms of questions is the traditional series: ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, 
‘how’ and ‘why’. The author further contends that certain types of questions that start 
with ‘what’ are exploratory and that as an exploratory research, any of the five research 
strategies can be applied-for instance, an exploratory case study, an exploratory 
experiment, or an exploratory survey. In the context of this study, the three research 
questions posed essentially begin with what.   
 Degree of control a researcher possesses over real behavioral events: Having 
discussed that certain ‘what’ questions can be applied in exploratory studies, it is 
imperative to further discuss the extent of control a research has over actual behavioral 
events. Case study is more desirable in examining real behavioral events, but when 
important behavioral events are free from manipulation (Yin, 2009). In the context of 
this study, past and present chief executives and board chairpersons, board members, 
shareholders and officials of SEC and GSE were interviewed in their natural setting. 
The interviews basically centred on corporate governance practices in the four-publicly 
listed corporate organizations. As mentioned earlier, these interviews were carried out 
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in the interviewees natural setting; implying that there was an absence of any degree of 
control by the researcher over the real behavioral events of the study. 
 The extent of concentration on contemporary events as against past events: Even 
though case study is dependent on many of the approaches applied in history, it 
includes two data collection techniques, which are not normally included in historical 
studies: Direct observation of the events being explored and interviews of the 
individuals who are involved in the events (Yin, 2009). Further, in some circumstances 
case study and histories overlap, but the former’s unique strength lies in its knack to 
deal with lots of evidence-interviews, archival records, artifacts and observations- as 
compared to the latter (Yin, 2009). In this study, a multi-method strategy was 
employed-interviews, direct observation and archival records- to gather a catholic and 
adequate data on how corporate governance is practiced in the four corporate 
organizations. Also, even though the study took into consideration the past corporate 
governance practices of the corporate organizations, the main goal of the study was to 
explore and describe their current corporate governance practices.  
Table 5.5: Conditions for selecting a research design 
METHOD Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioral Events? 
Focuses on Contemporary 
Events 
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival 
Analysis 
who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/no 
History how, why? No No 
Case study how, why? No Yes 
Source: Yin (2009, p. 8) 
In wrapping up, the case study approach was employed in this study. The rationale behind this 
decision was that this type of approach, unlike other approaches, adds two sources of evidence: 
Direct observation of the events studied as well as interviews of the individuals engaged in the 
events (Yin, 2009). Also, it is distinctive in the sense that it has the capability to deal with lots of 
evidence. For example, documents, interviews, observations as well as artefacts. Lastly, since this 
study’s aim was to ‘get under the skin’ of companies to examine what is happening in regard to 
their corporate governance practices, which can only be noticed from within (that is, to scrutinize 
the case from the inside out) these companies, it was deemed appropriate to employ this approach.   
Further, from the above discussed case study approaches, this study made use of both exploratory 
and descriptive case study approaches since the area being studied has not been extensively 
explored and examined within the context of the study. Tricker (2000) suggests that exploratory 
and descriptive case study approaches should be applied or employed in corporate governance 
studies where theories are still in development. It is even less developed in developing countries 
especially, African economies (McNulty et al., 2013; World Bank, 2000; Akinboade & Okeahalam, 
2003).  
5.4.1 Types of case study design 
Having discussed the justifiable rationale behind the adoption of case study as the most preferred 
strategy for this study, this section will be dedicated to discussing the two main types of case study 
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designs: Single-case study and multiple-case study. On the one hand, the single-case study will be 
discussed based on its holistic and embedded nature; single-case (holistic) and single-case 
(embedded) (Yin, 2009). Multiple-case study, on the other hand, will be discussed on the basis of 
how holistic or embedded it is; multiple-case (holistic) and multiple-case (embedded). It is worth 
mentioning that the selection of any one of these case study designs is dependent on the sort of 
questions and objectives a study poses and how they are to be addressed (Xiao, 2010). Table 5.6 
below highlights the two main case study types and their characterizing qualities. 
Table 5.6: Types of caste study design 
 Single-case study (I) Multiple-case study(II) 
Holistic (single-unit of analysis) (I) Type I Type III 
Embedded (multiple units of analysis) (II) Type II Type IV 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2003; 2009) 
The table above shows four main types of designs of case studies; single-case study (holistic) (Type 
I), single-case study (embedded) (Type II), multiple-case study (holistic) (Type III) and multiple-
case study (embedded) (Type IV) designs. This clearly demonstrates that a case study research may 
involve the investigation of a single unit of analysis (holistic case study) or multiple units of 
analysis (embedded case study)  
When a single case study investigates only the global nature of a phenomenon, a holistic case study 
design is applied, but when sub-units are examined in a single context, an embedded single case 
study is employed (Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2010). The application of type II suggests that an 
equal attention ought to be accorded to both the subunits and the case at large. However, inasmuch 
as the application of a single-case study design is associated with some benefits in regards to 
setting out an unambiguous focus on its unit of analysis as well as assisting researchers to succeed 
in appreciating a phenomenon in its natural setting comprehensively, investigators are warned 
about the possible shift in the focus and/or kind of a study in the course of execution (Xiao, 2010). 
Yin (2009) points out five main rationales for an application of a single case research design. First 
and foremost, it is applied if the case’s goal is to capture the conditions and circumstances of an 
everyday or commonplace scenario. Second, if the case represents an extreme case or a unique case 
in which a particular situation will probably be so rare that any single case is useful documenting 
and examining. Third, if it represents a critical case in testing a well-constructed theory whereby 
the theory has an unambiguous set of theoretical propositions and the conditions within which the 
propositions are considered to be factually accurate. In this situation, a single-case study can be 
applied to confirm, challenge, or extend the theory (Yin, 2009). Fourth, if there is a revelatory case 
in which a researcher is enthralled into analyzing a phenomenon formerly inaccessible to scientific 
enquiry.  Fifth, if a case is longitudinal in nature, single-case study is applied to study the same 
case at two or more differing points in time. 
The above discussion on single-case study vividly highlighted that a single-case research design 
was not applicable to this study in that the nature of this study did not satisfy any of these 
justifiable rationales. Corollary to this, the study then turned its focus on multiple case study 
research design and whether it was applicable to this study. There is a general agreement in the 
literature that an application of a multiple-case study design offers the best capabilities for testing 
theories or theoretical propositions in the sense that it allows investigators to methodologically 
compare differences between/among cases (Bleijenbergh, 2010). Even though theoretical 
propositions can be formulated from a single-case study, a much powerful conceptual argument can 
be generated with a multiple-case study design (Foley, 2010). Unlike a single-case study, multiple-
case study design uses many instruments and bounded cases are analyzed using multi-method data 
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collection technique (Chmiliar, 2010). It offers results that are much powerful (Parkhe, 1993) and 
robust (Herriot & Firestone, 1983).  
Multiple case studies may have one unit or several units of analysis, but the selection of the unit of 
analysis is dependent on the need to establish and describe the object (s) the investigator is 
interested, and considers them useful in addressing his/her research problem (Fletcher & 
Plakoyiannaki, 2010). Practically, the unit of analysis will possibly be obtained from three differing 
levels; individual, group and/or organizational. Whilst holistic case design involves a single unit of 
analysis, embedded case study design involves several units of analysis (Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 
2010; Yin, 2009). This implies that an investigator can include subunits such as departments, 
faculties, organizations, teams, group of individuals and regulatory bodies (Chmiliar, 2010; Yin, 
2010; Zikmund, 2010; Teegavarapu & Summers, 2008). In the context of this study, a multiple-
case research design with a multiple unit of analysis was employed to select three units of analysis 
namely; management body, board of directors and shareholders of corporate organizations. This 
implies that Type IV in accordance with the categories portrayed in table 5.1.2 was chosen to 
address the study’s research problem and questions.    
Case selection  
Stake (1994) suggests three main types of case study: Intrinsic case study, collective case study and 
instrumental case study. The author describes an intrinsic case study as: 
….not undertaken primarily because the case represents other cases or because 
it illustrates a particular trait or problem, but because in all its particularity and 
ordinariness, [the] case itself is of interest….The purpose is not to come to 
understand some abstract concept or generic phenomena…The researcher 
temporarily subordinates other curiosities so that the case may reveal its story 
(p. 237).  
Collective case study is where a variety of cases is studied together in order to investigate the 
phenomena, population, or general setting. On the other hand, Instrumental case study is used to 
achieve something other than a specific situation (Baxter & Jack, 2008). It provides an insight into 
an issue or theory refinement. Stake (1995, p.237) contends that “the case is of secondary interest; 
it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else”. The case often looks at 
in-depth, its context scrutinized, its ordinary actions detailed, since it assists the researcher to 
pursue his/her external interest. This case is chosen when there is a presence of a research question 
and puzzlement. Patton and Appelbaum (2003) describe the instrumental case as a strategic case 
selection. 
Since this study was interested in gaining an insight and understanding of corporate governance 
practices in Ghana, the instrumental case was applied. Stiles and Taylor (2001) argue that corporate 
governance is an issue in listed corporate entities where the idea of ownership and control, which 
rest at the center of the corporate governance discourse, will surface. Listed corporate entities are 
likely to have widely dispersed ownership since they have the propensity to create capital from a 
very large number of capital providers. These corporate entities have the tendency to be large. In 
the context of this study, large corporate entities that are listed on Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 
based on Ghanaian standard were selected. 
The selection of cases is significant facet in case studies. For instance, in order to control 
extraneous variation as well as to help define the limits for extrapolating the findings, the selection 
of more suitable cases is deemed necessary (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Meanwhile, sampling cases from a 
selected population is rare in theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989a) or theory testing with regard to 
case studies. As a result, the study employed a criterion-based sampling technique where cases 
were selected to provide rich evidences, but not for statistical reasons. The rationale behind this 
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selection was that this technique furnishes the investigator a combination of circumstances to alter 
the emphasis of the study at early stages so that the data collected are a mirror image of what is 
happening in the field rather than conjecturing about what is supposed to have taken place (Coyle, 
1997; Glaser, 1978; Straus & Cobin, 1990). Thompson (1999) posits that sampling technique in 
qualitative study is guided not by the need to generalize about something, but somewhat by the 
need to select subjects and data possible to produce robust, rich and unfathomable levels of 
appreciation. Sampling for qualitative case study is about suitability, objective and access to 
adequate information rather than representativeness as in the case of quantitative research 
(Bleijenbergh, 2010; Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2010).  
In order to apply the criterion-based sampling technique in this study, the various companies in 
Ghana were categorized in terms of their sizes as depicted in Table 5.7 below. This grouping was 
based on the National Board of Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) categorization of companies in 
Ghana.    
Table 5.7: Classification of Companies in Ghana 
 Micro Small Medium Large 
Number of Workers 1-5 6-29 30-99 Above 100 
Value of fixed Assets 
(US $) 
Not exceeding 
10,000 
Not exceeding 
100,000 
Equal to 
100,000 
Exceeding 
100,000 
Note: Value of fixed assets excludes land and building 
Source: National Board of Small Scale Industries 
Even though there are many large companies in Ghana, this study limited itself to those large 
companies that are listed on the GSE. Large companies are those that employ more than 100 
workers and have a value of fixed assets exceeding US$100,000. The rationale was that selecting 
cases with same characteristics retains theoretical flexibility, constrains extraneous variation and 
sharpens external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
At the beginning of the research, the strategy was to cover all large corporate organizations listed 
on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Accordingly, these companies were contacted and their authorities 
concurred to participate. But when it was time for data collection, most of these companies were 
reluctant to cooperate, and without spending much time wooing them, the researcher thought it 
wise to proceed to collect data from the four (4) companies that were willing to cooperate, since 
generally, for a case study research, between four and ten cases are considered appropriate. This is 
because; fewer than four cases are too few to provide the necessary and adequate evidence, while 
more than ten cases are not needed (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Therefore, the requirement for adequacy of 
evidence was realized in this study. In each of these cases the researcher interviewed individuals 
that were rich in information regarding the practice of corporate governance in corporate 
organizations. Thus it can be judged that the cases were wholly representative of the population.     
 
Summary of the research design 
Research design ultimately consists of a logical sequence that serves as a nexus between empirical 
data and the study’s initial research questions and eventually, to its conclusion (Yin, 2003). It also 
deals with the whole purpose of the study (Maxwell, 1996).  In case study research method, a 
catalog of research design has not yet been developed (Yin, 2003). To Yin (2003), there are no 
textbooks that encapsulate the various research designs for quasi-experimental circumstances.  The 
most important constituents of a case study research design are: a) the study’s question, b) the 
propositions of the study; c) the units of analysis; d) the logical sequence that links the data to the 
propositions, and e) the benchmarks for implementing the findings (Yin, 2003). Each of these 
constituents is dealt with in the subsequent sections.  
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Research question 
The conceptual part of this study was addressed by identifying the central research question. Case 
study research is connected to ‘how’, ‘why’, and ‘what’ questions. The study attempted to explore 
the driving forces of effective corporate governance by highlighting the prevailing corporate 
governance practices in Ghana.  In consequence, the primary question that was identified was 
‘what are the driving forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana?’ From this, the following 
sub-questions were asked ‘what are the concepts available in the extant literature that are suitable 
for evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance in Ghana?’, ‘what is the prevailing 
condition in regards to corporate governance effectiveness in Ghana, and the elements that drive 
this effectiveness?’ and ‘what significant issues could be suggested as auxiliary for further 
development of corporate governance in Ghana?’ (See section 1.5). The study answered these 
questions by employing a case study research as a conduit to appreciate nature and the usage of the 
theories of corporate governance. 
Study propositions 
Propositions are statements that specify the relationship among concepts (Dul & Hak, 2008). These 
put the study’s focus on certain concerns that ought to be explored and examined within the scope 
of the study. Yin (2003) opines that propositions reflect relevant theoretical issues and evidence 
about an individual(s). Without propositions, case studies may be difficult, because a researcher 
might be fascinated to cover ‘everything’, which is impossible to conduct. Propositions assist in 
narrowing down the scope of the study. Yin (2003, p.23) posits “the more a study contains specific 
propositions, the more it will stay within feasible limits”. In order to connect the research questions 
to the conceptual framework (see figure 4.1.1) to find answers to sub-question two (see section 
1.5.1), five propositions were coined and examined (see section 4.7).  
Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is a constituent or component that is connected to the central problem of what 
the case is to the researcher. In case study research, the researcher ought to be able to identify the 
unit to be analyzed be it individual, a group, department or an organizational level (Yin, 2009; 
Teegavarapu & Summers, 2008). In the current study, the unit of analysis was limited to 
management body, board of directors and shareholders of corporate organizations. Relevant 
information of each individual case was collected and each individual case was included in a 
multiple case.  
Linking the data to propositions and interpreting the findings 
The fourth and fifth constituents of a case study research design are the logical linkage of data to 
propositions and interpretation of the study’s findings. The two constituents suggest or foretell the 
stages in data analysis in case study research and how the research design lays a solid groundwork 
for the analysis (Yin, 2003). Linking data to propositions can be done in so many ways, but 
Campbell (cited in Yin, 2003) suggests the idea of ‘pattern matching’ which is considered to be one 
promising approach for case study research. This technique of analysis in case study research links 
data to the propositions.  Different patterns can be clarified based on assessing two or more 
differing propositions. Accordingly, this study linked data that were collected to the propositions 
and finally, interpreted the findings. 
5.5 Role of theory in research design 
After the coverage of these five components of research design, the next step will definitely result 
in the development of initial theory that will be connected to the study. Yin (2003, p.29) posits, 
“...for case studies, theory development as part of the design phase is essential, whether the ensuing 
case study’s purpose is to develop or test theory”. The theory should not necessarily be considered 
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to be a grand theory or for the researcher to become a master in theory development, but it can be a 
sufficient blueprint for the study.  
Yin (2009) suggests that there are four theories that a researcher ought to consider in case study 
research namely, 1) individual theories consisting theories of individual development, cognitive 
behavior, personality, learning and disability, individual perception and interpersonal skills; 2) 
group theories consisting theories of family functioning, informal groups, work teams, supervisory-
employee relations and interpersonal networks; 3) organizational theories such as theories of 
bureaucracies, organizational structure and functions, excellence in organizational performance and 
inter-organizational partnerships; and 4) societal theories such as theories of urban development, 
international behavior, cultural institutions, technological development and marketplace functions.  
Development of theory in case studies will probably be constructed through an application of 
inductive or deductive reasoning (Packer, 2011; Zikmund, 2010; Gerring, 2007; Goulding, 2002). 
On the one hand, inductive approach of reasoning is a logically coherent manner of constructing a 
general proposition based on observing specific facts. It would possibly be derived from an extant 
framework imposing guidelines for the generation of specific appreciations (Kompf, 2010). On the 
other hand, deductive reasoning is a logically coherent manner of drawing a conclusion from a 
known premise or statement of fact by moving from a general assertion to a particular statement. 
This implies that these two reasoning approaches are on the same coin. However, even though they 
are usually considered as separate, it is in contention that in case study research, these two 
reasoning approaches are vague and mutually valuable in theory generation (Harlow, 2010, 
Zikmund, 2010). Table 5.8 below highlights the disparities between these two logical reasoning 
techniques. 
Table 5.8: Major disparities between inductive and deductive reasoning  
Inductive reasoning Deductive reasoning 
 An extensive appreciation of the context of 
the study 
 Highly structured technique 
 The gathering of qualitative data  Independence of the researcher of what is 
being studied 
 The awareness that the researcher is an 
integral part of the study 
 Explains causal associations between 
variables 
 Less emphasis on generalization  The gathering of quantitative data 
 There is some amount of flexibility that 
allows the researcher to alter the focus of the 
study as he/she progresses  
 Operationalization of concepts in order to 
ensure clearness of definitions  
 Gaining a comprehensive appreciation of the 
importance human beings attach to events   
 The relevance of selecting samples that are 
sizeable to make inferences  
  Requires scientific principles 
  It moves from theory to data 
  Intensification of controls to ensure data 
validity 
Source: Adapted from Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009) 
Case study research is characterized by some elements that permit both theory building (induction) 
and testing of theory (deduction) (Bhattacherjee, 2012). But it is contended that case study research 
ought to be made up of unadulterated induction (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Nonetheless, many researchers 
have advocated that case study research ought to merge both theory building and theory testing in 
that these two processes are critical for the advancement of science (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Zikmund, 
2010). Accordingly, this study took a balanced perspective in that ‘[e]legant theories are not 
valuable if they do not match [up] with reality’ (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 4). Also, ‘pure induction 
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might prevent the researcher from benefiting from existing theories, just as pure deduction might 
prevent the development of new and useful theory’ (Perry, 1998b, p. 789). Logically, a complete 
investigator is the one that can pass through the entire cycle of the research and can merge both 
theory building and theory testing approaches.  
In order to achieve an effective combination of these two procedures in research, three possible 
approaches have been suggested (Nair & Riege, 1995). First and foremost, preliminary and 
convergent interviews with professionals are usually included in a research strategy particularly, 
during the literature review stage of a study (Carson, Gilmore & Gronhaug, 2001).  This approach 
was achieved at the initial stages of this study in that professionals or practitioners were 
interviewed in relation to corporate governance practices in corporate organizations. Also, initial 
information on corporate governance practices was divulged during the literature review stage of 
this study.  
Secondly, one or two pilot studies can be carried out to tweak the case study protocol before the 
actual data gathering (Yin, 2009). A pilot study can also be conducted to revise and enhance the 
initial conceptual framework of a study. Consequently, prior to the construction of the final 
conceptual framework and actual data gathering, a pilot study was carried out to revise the initial 
conceptual framework and to prepare the interview guide to steer and direct data gathering. The 
final approach of merging theory testing and theory building involves initial interviews during the 
verification and non-verification stage with unstructured questions as opposed to probe questions 
developed from prior theory. This was accomplished in the descriptive stage of this study. Primary 
data from the four corporate organizations was gathered through an application of semi-structured 
interviews, as steered and directed by the case study protocol.        
5.6 Sources of data and data collection techniques  
Yin (2011) posits that data gathering for qualitative study typically engages the researcher to relate 
with a phenomenon in its real-world context and the individuals in them. Data collection ought to 
be directed by a case study protocol (See Appendix 1). This protocol forces the study to spell out in 
detail how it plans to answer the research questions. Rowley (2002) suggests that case study 
protocol needs to include three main sections: 1) an overview of the case study project; 2) field 
procedures such as the use of disparate sources of information and access arrangements to these 
sources; and 3) the case study questions or the questions that the researcher needs to keep in mind 
when collecting data. 
Usually, case studies draw on multiple sources of evidence. These include documents, archival 
records, interviews, observations (direct or participant) and physical artifacts. Rowley (2002) points 
out three (3) principles of data collection in case study that this study followed: triangulation, case 
study database and chain of evidence. Triangulation is one of the major strengths of case studies as 
compared to other methods (Rowley, 2002) since it is of significant importance for ‘interpreting, 
embedding and validating results’ (Huse et. al., 2011, p. 21). With this principle, evidences are 
collected from multiple sources. This technique therefore, serves as validity procedure to fashion 
out categories and themes in a study (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  
Furthermore, the study made use of a case study database during data collection. This was to ensure 
that the unprocessed data were available to other researchers. Davis (2010, p.79) asserts that ‘[a] 
formal case study database not only enables researchers who are not involved in the case study 
project to juxtapose data collected and cited in the database with claims made and conclusions 
drawn, but such a database also increases the reliability of the overall case study’.  Therefore, the 
preparation of reliable and practical case study database for further analysis was imperative for 
ensuring accurateness of the data gathered and analysis. Following Davis (2010), the study’s case 
121 
 
study database included notes that were made by the researcher, case study documents collected 
during the entire period of the study, case study tabular materials and case study narratives. The 
notes that were taken included messages gathered from interviews, observations and document 
analysis compiled throughout the entire research. Case study document was also gathered by the 
researcher by developing an annotated bibliography. Furthermore, tabular materials were obtained 
from quantitative data from each of the companies’ annual reports such as percentage 
shareholdings of shareholders, company performance and other quantitative records. Lastly, the 
researcher employed case study narratives in documenting the answers to the various questions in 
the case study protocol. This was done by footnoting important evidences from the archival 
records, interviews and observations.    
Finally, the researcher required maintaining a chain of evidence that would be easily accessible in 
the database. This was important because with this technique, an explicit link among the various 
questions that were asked, the data collected and the conclusions that were drawn was established. 
This followed Rowley (2002) suggestion that, data that are collected should follow the protocol and 
link the protocol questions, and at the same time maintain transparent propositions.  
Based on the aforementioned three principles, the study employed three main sources of data 
collection: Archival records, interviews and observations. 
Archival records 
Patton (1990, p.245) posits that archival records “analysis provides behind-the-scenes look at the 
program that may not be directly observable and about which the interviewer might not ask 
appropriate questions”. Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.27) also viewed archival records as “a stable 
source of information……[in] that they may accurately reflect situations that occurred at sometime 
in the past and that they can be analyzed and re-analyzed without undergoing changes in the 
interim”. Prior to this research, archival research on secondary resources such as the corporate 
organizations’ annual reports, prospectuses, extracts from internal memos and circular to 
shareholders helped the researcher to draw a firm profile and delineate each firm’s recent history 
and performance. Additional information on each company was gathered from publications and 
company’s press releases. As the knowledge and know-how of board of directors could contribute 
to explaining board effectiveness, additional quest helped the researcher in highlighting the 
professional backgrounds of most of the directors. Following other works (such as Baysinger & 
Zardkhooni, 1986; Hillman et al., 2000; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006), board directors were grouped on 
their presumed strategic roles as controllers of decisions (ie. representative of shareholders), 
executive directors, business experts and supporting specialists such as lawyers, bankers and other 
professionals. Data from the Ghana Stock Exchange on the companies were also referred to. These 
archival records helped corroborate and support the various evidences collected during the 
interviews.  
Interviews 
Since “interviews are a ubiquitous way of collecting data throughout the social sciences” (Packer, 
2011, p.42), the researcher conducted interviews to elicit information for the study’s analysis. 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face with company directors, senior management, company 
secretaries and shareholders. Also, in order to attain historical data, past executive and non-
executive directors of the company were interviewed to offer extra insight into the operations of the 
corporate organization in regards to corporate governance practice. The selection of this study’s 
informants was aimed at: 1) Collecting data from respondents who were in a better position to offer 
rich information with regards to corporate governance; 2) capturing different views on board-
related issues as well as company operations; and 3) minimizing the risk of selecting biased 
representation.  Goulding (2002) posits that in a more realistic manner, a qualitative case study 
122 
 
research has to employ a face-to-face semi-structured, open-ended, ethnographic, in-depth 
conversational interview. The justification is that it has the possibility to produce rich and 
comprehensive accounts of a person’s experience. It also allows interviewees to articulate 
themselves in a more candid manner to define the world from their own viewpoint, not only from 
the viewpoint of the investigator. 
In the context of this study, interviewees were asked about how they carry out their various 
activities in relation to the topic in hand (corporate governance). Since semi-structured interview 
has recently become the workhorse of qualitative research (Packer, 2011), the study’s interviews 
took the structure of semi-structured interview.  Appendix 2 contains a set of questions that were 
asked during the interview session.  Interviews with officials of the regulatory bodies such as the 
Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) and Ghana Securities and Exchange Commission (GSEC) were also 
conducted in order to gain more insight into the subject matter. The various interviews that were 
conducted were tape recorded and transcribed immediately after each session. Following 
suggestions from Miles and Huberman (1994) as well as Ravasi and Zattoni (2006), transcriptions 
were reinforced by contact summary sheets and interview notes (such as report of important data, 
vital issues cropping up from the interviews as well as detailed quotations). Even though interviews 
were mostly carried out in English, some were also carried out in Akan (one of the local languages 
in Ghana). However, during the reporting stage, the quotations from the interviews that were 
carried out in the local language were translated into English. 
Observation  
Observation, as a data collection technique means an active engagement with a phenomenon in its 
natural setting. It ‘can be an invaluable way of collecting data because what [the researcher] sees 
with [his/her] own eyes and perceive with [his/her] own senses is not filtered by what the author of 
some document might have seen’ (Yin, 2011, p.143).  Adler & Adler (1994) point out that the 
trademark of observation is its non-meddling feature that lessens any intrusion in the behavior of 
those observed, neither wangling nor provoking them. For this study, the researcher had direct 
experience of how corporate organizations conduct their annual general meetings. This observation 
involved two main components: 1) Observation of how corporate governance structures are put to 
use during the companies’ annual general meetings as well as recording the observation in a set of 
field notes; and 2) subsequent interviews were conducted with selected shareholders to aid in cross-
examining and member checking for data quality of the field notes. The role of the researcher was 
to observe how these corporate organizations carry out their annual general meetings. During these 
meetings, the researcher recorded the events that occurred in a set of field notes. These events were 
also tape-recorded. Following Merriam (1988, p. 98-99), vital issues were recorded in the field 
note: Descriptions of the event, the individuals involved; ‘activities and interactions’; quoting 
directly or a gist of what participants said; and ‘observer comments’.  
The researcher paid a critical attention to voting on key decisions, how decisions were taken during 
such meetings, how minority shareholders were allowed to ask questions, election of board 
members, how board members reacted to minority shareholders’ questions vis-à-vis majority 
shareholders questions and other gamut of actions. Subsequent interviews with shareholders who 
were present during such meetings offered an additional strategy to minimize researcher bias in 
regards to the data gathered from the observation. This offered the purpose of member checking 
and cross examination in that, it helped in evaluating the accurateness and quality of field notes and 
the researcher understanding of the activities and behaviors that prevailed during such meetings.  
5.6.1 Summary of data collection techniques  
This study employed three sources of data collection techniques to gather data. All the three 
techniques complemented themselves. Each technique gathered different forms of data and had 
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helped the study in one way or the other. The main aim for data collection was to create a 
storehouse of information upon which the researcher could answer the research questions of the 
study, particularly specific research question 2. This multi-approach system was used to maximize 
the series of available information to the researcher, enhance data credibility as well as to offer a 
source for triangulation among these methods. Each of these methods had its strengths and 
weaknesses, and by employing a combination of methods, the weaknesses of one method were 
substituted by the strengths of another. This combination also offered the researcher differing views 
about the subject matter. Table 5.9 below depicts a summary of the techniques and their associated 
contributions to this study. 
Table 5.9: Summary of data collection techniques and their contributions to the study 
Data 
technique 
Type of data Contribution 
 
Archival 
records 
Textual data in the form of annual 
reports,      prospectuses, extract 
from internal files, circular to 
shareholders and data from the 
regulatory bodies. 
Offered firm profile and described each firm’s recent 
history and performance. Helped corroborate and support 
the various evidences collected from other sources. It 
provided the researcher with the companies’ histories, 
performances, ownership structures and shareholdings.  
Interviews Data related to ownership 
structure, ownership control, board 
of directors, board effectiveness 
and board control. 
Produced rich and comprehensive accounts of the 
interviewees’ experiences. It also allowed interviewees to 
articulate themselves in a more candid manner to define 
the world from their own viewpoint, not only from the 
viewpoint of the inquirer. It helped the researcher to gain a 
vivid understanding about the companies’ governance 
structures.  
Observation Textual data in the form of field 
notes of the researcher-description 
of events, the manner in which 
individuals were involved in their 
activities and interactions, gist of 
what participants said and observer 
comments. 
Helped the researcher to have direct experience with how 
corporate organizations conduct their annual general 
meetings. It furnished the researcher on how voting were 
done during annual general meetings, how decisions were 
taken during such meetings, how minority shareholders 
were allowed to ask questions, how board members were 
elected, how board members reacted to minority 
shareholders’ questions vis-à-vis majority shareholders 
questions and other series of actions. 
Source: Author’s construct 
Even though archival records were first examined by the researcher, data collection was in actual 
sense an iterative and interactive method employing all three sources of data. For instance, the 
archival records offered the researcher historical backgrounds of the companies, but these 
information gained weight through the introduction of other sources of data. During the interview 
session, relevant and interesting developments cropped up that helped the researcher. These 
developments were not available in the archival records. Also, interesting developments were 
highlighted during the observation session in that, some information that were gathered from the 
interviewees were in contradiction to what prevailed during annual general meetings.  Below is a 
summary of how data were collected from the four corporate organizations.  
Ghana Commercial Bank Ltd. (GCB)  
This case study was carried out in April 2012 and extra data was collected in August 2012. In all, 
twelve people were interviewed: one executive director, two non-executive directors, the company 
secretary, and two officers of the Ghana Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Ghana. Shareholders of the corporate organization were also interviewed: two 
institutional representatives and two individual shareholders. Other people who have knowledge 
about the corporate organization were interviewed informally. Past executive and non-executive 
directors of the company were also interviewed to offer extra insight into the operations of the 
corporate organizations in regards to corporate governance practice. Observation of the firm’s 
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annual general meeting was carried out in 2012. An examination of the firm’s video recordings of 
previous years’ annual general meetings was conducted. Records of the firm that were referred to 
included annual reports, prospectuses, extracts from internal files and circular to shareholders. Data 
from the Ghana Stock Exchange on the company were also referred to.    
SIC Insurance Company Ltd. (SIC) 
This case study was carried out in May 2012 and extra data were collected in August 2012. 
Thirteen people formally participated in the interview session: one executive director, two non-
executive directors, the company secretary, two officers of the Ghana Stock Exchange and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, two representatives of institutional shareholders, three 
individual shareholders, and two past executive and non-executive directors. Informal interviews 
were also conducted to get more insight into the operations of the corporate organization from the 
citizenry. Observations of the company’s annual general meeting were conducted in 2012. Also, 
footages of the company’s previous years’ annual general meetings were examined to get more 
insight into the operations of the company. Records of the firms such as annual reports, 
prospectuses, extract of internal files and circular to shareholders were examined. Data about the 
company from the Ghana Stock Exchange were examined. 
UT Bank Ltd. 
This case study was conducted in June 2012 and additional data were collected in September 2012. 
Data were collected from interviews, observations and archival records. Formally, ten people were 
interviewed: the company’s board chairperson, two non-executive directors, the company secretary, 
two officials of the Ghana Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana, 
two institutional representatives and two minority shareholders. Observations were carried out 
during the company’s annual general meeting in 2012. Footages of the firm’s previous years’ 
annual general meetings were requested and examined. Archival records such as the company’s 
previous annual reports, extract from internal files, circular to shareholders and prospectuses were 
requested and examined. Additional data to give insight into the operations of the company in 
relation to corporate governance practice were provided by the Ghana Stock Exchange.  
Accra Breweries Ltd. (ABL) 
This case study was conducted in July 2012 and additional data were gathered in September 2012. 
In all, seven people partook in the interview session: the company’s board chairperson, the 
managing director, the company’s secretary, two officers of the Ghana Stock Exchange and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana and two individual shareholders. Observations 
were also conducted during the company’s annual general meeting. Footages of the company’s 
previous years’ annual general meetings were requested and examined. Archival records such as 
the company’s previous annual reports, extract from internal files, circular to shareholders and 
prospectuses were demanded and examined. Additional data to give insight into the operations of 
the company in relation to corporate governance practice were provided by the Ghana Stock 
Exchange.  
5.7 Analyzing case study evidence 
Analyzing case study evidence is one of the least developed and the most difficult facets in case 
studies (Yin, 2003). This is as a result of the multitude of different evidence from different sources. 
Rowley (2002) asserts data analysis in case study is basically to examine, categorize and tabulate 
evidence to evaluate whether the evidence supports the initial propositions of the study or 
otherwise.   
Even though there is no agreed procedure in analyzing a case study results, there are a number of 
components that is often times found in most reports. The report ought to be coherent with the 
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event, program, situation or activity under study, and how the study effort is bounded by time and 
space (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).  Rowley (2002) suggests four main principles whereby a 
good case study analysis should adhere to: 1) The analysis ought to make use of all the significant 
evidence; 2) the analysis ought to take into consideration all the major rival interpretations and at 
the same time examine each of them; 3) the most relevant facets of the case study should be tackled 
in the analysis; and 4) the researchers prior knowledge should be drawn, but in an unbiased and 
dispassionate manner. Consequently, the study adhered to these four principles in analyzing the 
data that were gathered during the data collection period.  
Case study analysis typically involves detailed case write-ups for each case (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Those write-ups are often simply pure descriptions but they are central to the generation of insight 
(Gersick, 1988; Pettigrew, 1990). The study relied on theoretical propositions and the development 
of a case description for its analysis. With this, there was a descriptive framework for organizing 
the case study while following the propositions. Descriptions included narratives of the companies’ 
histories, tabular presentation of the companies’ performance and the ownership structure. 
Shareholders’ identities were also provided. Finally, the data were summarized qualitatively in that, 
data acquired from each case were compared with other cases, and that resulted in the creation of 
four studies in one and one study from four.  
5.8 Methodological framework of the study 
The strategy of the research offered the overall methodological framework for a systematic study 
that addressed the study’s objectives and questions. This section of this chapter summarizes the 
overall design, activities and sources of data for this research approach. Figure 5.2 below illustrates 
the methodological framework that was employed in this study. This methodological framework 
mirrors the sequential flow from preliminary activities that introduced the study and the 
development of the general model of corporate governance (see fig. 4.2) through to the pilot study 
(See section 4.6), the development of the final conceptual framework (see fig. 4.3), the formulation 
of theoretical propositions, the application of multi-method data collection technique and the report 
writing.  
 Preliminary activities: For a justification and initiation of this study, the researcher: 
 Integrated his prior knowledge about corporate governance into the initial general 
model of corporate governance. 
 Conducted preliminary interviews with experts and professionals of corporate 
governance-business professionals and academics. 
 Carried out an extensive review of the extant body of knowledge on corporate 
governance, theoretical perspectives of corporate governance, models of corporate 
governance and previous studies on corporate governance.  
 Development of the general model of corporate governance-Through an extensive review 
of the extant literature, preliminary interviews with practitioners and academics of 
corporate governance and the researcher’s prior knowledge about the subject matter, a  
general model of corporate governance was constructed to serve as an initial guiding 
framework for this study. After the development of this model, the researcher reviewed the 
practice of corporate governance in the context of developing economies via-a-vis the 
various corporate governance mechanisms found in the extant literature. Thereafter, some 
interesting conclusions were drawn.  
 Pilot study- A pilot study was carried out to verify the conclusions that were drawn from 
the review the researcher conducted by comparing corporate governance practice in Ghana 
and that of the various mechanisms of corporate governance. The pilot study supported the 
researcher’s conclusion that, only two mechanisms namely, the ownership structure and 
board of directors work in the Ghanaian context.  
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 Revised and enhanced conceptual framework- After the pilot study had corroborated the 
conclusions drawn from the extant literature by the researcher; the final framework of the 
study was developed.  
 Theoretical propositions- Subsequent to the development of the study’s conceptual 
framework, five testable propositions were formulated. This stage also brought out the 
definitions of the variables that were included in the conceptual framework.  
 Data Collection, data reduction and data analysis-The researcher gathered the necessary 
and sufficient data to address the study’s research sub-question 2 by employing multi-
method technique of data collection and evidence. Data were coded by the researcher as a 
method of data reduction. Amalgamation/aggregation of data was done by comparing and 
cross-checking data from their sources.  
 Findings- The findings of the study were reported. 
 Member checking- The findings were communicated to the informants and professionals to 
engage them again to respond and comment on the collected data and findings in 
connection with their exactness and quality. This procedure added credibility to the study 
by given respondents the opportunity to act in response to both the data and the ultimate 
analysis (Cresswell & Miller, 2000).  
 Individual reports- The researcher started writing the individual case reports after the 
member checking, by linking the findings to the propositions.  
 Cross-case report- The researcher compiled the reports of the individual cases into this 
document.   
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Figure 5.2: Methodological framework of the Study 
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5.9 Ensuring Research Quality 
There are at least four (4) principles or criteria to ensuring the quality of a research design in social 
science: Construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Construct validity 
deals with the establishment of correct operational measures for the concepts being studied (Yin, 
2009). Yin (2009) points out that construct validity is relatively difficult test to pass in case study 
research. However, the author further suggests three main tactics to increase construct validity 
when conducting a case study research: 1) The use of multiple sources of evidence; 2) establish 
chain of evidence; and 3) have key informants review draft report. An application of multiple 
sources of evidence is relevant during data collection and also serves as a tool to encourage 
convergent lines of enquiry (Yin, 2009). This method is termed, triangulation. The term, 
triangulation in qualitative study can normally be compared to marine navigation. In the context of 
marine navigation, it is a navigational term applied to establish a position of a vessel or proposed 
position at sea. The navigator uses at least two, but desirably three reference points to establish 
position. In other words, a triangle ought to be structured in the area in order to allow the navigator 
to precisely account for and measure the passage of the vessel. This concept is also applied to other 
positional and navigational exercises. For instance, in marine or military exercises, three reference 
points are applied to pinpoint the precise position of an object. In a realistic investigation, the 
investigator applies triangulation to pinpoint the navigation of the sources of data to a focal point.  
Triangulation can be defined as ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon’ (Denzin, 1989, p. 291). Also, triangulation has been defined by Stake (2000, p. 443) 
as ‘….process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation’. This helps the researcher to clearly get the meaning of his/her 
evidence to develop confidence that the evidence is of high-quality (Stake, 2010). It is an important 
technique not only for analyzing data but also for collecting data. In data collection technique, 
triangulation can be achieved by employing ‘multiple sources of data’ and/or strategies to examine 
the research questions or by including differing types of data-for instance, interviews with differing 
stakeholders in an organization (Tobin, 2010). This concept can reveal convergences, divergences 
and discontinuities that are relevant to describing the phenomenon (McGinn, 2010). It also 
contributes to intensifying rigor in the sense that comparisons, insights and fresh appreciations in 
the study will be created through analysis of other sources of data (Pauly, 2010). In this way, 
investigators can establish robust appreciation about the case under study that is likely to be 
regarded credible (McGinn, 2010).              
 In this study, multiple sources of evidence were employed: Interviewing various directors, 
executive and non-executive directors, senior members, company secretaries, senior members of 
management and shareholders. Evidence from documents and observations were also obtained. 
This tactic is relevant in data collection and was applied in this study, especially to fathom the 
relative power of majority shareholders on how they exercise control over corporations. 
Furthermore, the establishment of a chain of evidence during data collection in a case study is 
relevant. The study explicitly established a link between the various questions that were asked, the 
data collected and the conclusions that were drawn. Having key informants to review a case study 
draft report is also important during data collection in the sense that it provides key informants 
opportunity to remember and produce further evidence they had forgotten during the initial data 
collection time (Cresswell & Miller, 2000). The study adhered to such tactic to enrich the data that 
were collected.     
Internal validity refers to a causal relationship establishment whereby certain conditions are 
depicted to lead to other conditions. It has interest in only causal case studies, whereby the 
researcher or investigator tries to examine how one event leads to the other (Yin, 2009). The 
concern over internal validity may be spread to a wider problem of making inferences. Yin (2003, 
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p. 36) opines that “a case study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly 
observed”. A researcher may ‘infer’ specific occurrence resulting from some initial event, based on 
documentary evidence and interview (Yin, 2009). Accordingly, the study determined the prior 
theory, correctly probed during interviewing stages, and generated comprehensive listening 
mechanisms (Perry, 2001). In addition, the study constructed connections between the gathered 
data in inferential structure, explanations and understandings in order to insure that deductions 
made were methodologically explored and examined. More so, the application of within-case 
analysis helped build explanations (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Finally, the study employed a 
pattern matching mechanism to ensure the quality of the research.  Pattern matching is a 
comparison of at least two patterns by visual inspection to determine whether patterns 
correspond/match (ie. whether they are similar) or do not correspond (ie. whether they vary) (Dul 
& Hak, 2008). It is basically, a non-statistical test of the rightness of the proposition.    
External validity is concerned with the establishment of the domain whereby the findings of the 
study can be generalized. Stake (1995) argues that generalization from a case study is unnecessary 
since each case tends to be distinctive. Rowley (2002) points out that “generalization can only be 
performed if the case study design has been appropriately informed by theory, and can therefore be 
seen to add to theory”. The approach of generalization is not statistical but rather analytical in 
which already developed theories can be used as a prototype to compare the findings of the case 
study (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2003; Dul & Hak, 2008). Rowley (2002) further suggests that a 
replication can be claimed if two or more cases are depicted to support the same theory. 
Generalization is increased when a study’s propositions are supported in a series of replications, 
and it decreases when a study’s propositions are not supported in a number of such texts (Dul & 
Hak, 2008). Even though case study research does not offer generalization of findings, it can 
inform theory if juxtaposed with extant hypothetical propositions (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 
2008). Accordingly, a judicious selection of the cases and informants was employed to ensure 
external validity in theory construction and logical generalizations. The results of the present study 
were compared with the results of other studies and the conceptual framework developed through 
the review of extant art of knowledge (Yin, 2009). Although the study interviewed shareholders, 
the major objective was to target informants who had practical knowledge about corporate 
governance practices in the corporate organizations.      
Reliability demonstrates the study’s operation such that data collection produced can be reprised to 
acquire the same result when another researcher uses it. It can be achieved by documenting the 
procedures and keeping records appropriately (Rowley, 2002). The main objective of reliability is 
to minimize biases and errors on the part of the investigator when conducting the study (Yin, 
2009). Consequently, this study employed a common approach for data collection and this 
approach was guided by a case study protocol that included four sections:1) An overview of the 
case study project; 2) field procedures such as the use of different sources of information as well as 
access arrangements of the sources; 3) a case study question, and 4) a guide for case report.  This 
case study protocol was prepared in advance before data were collected by the researcher (see 
appendix 1). Also, another method to ensuring that a case study is reliable is to develop a case 
study database. Yin (2009) argues that with no case study database, the unprocessed data may not 
be accessible to independent researchers and may result in major setbacks, which will probably 
affect the credibility of the study. In order to avoid this shortfall, the study employed a case study 
database during its data collection period.  Also, teamwork with a research assistant during the 
process of data gathering and analysis of the study, and with the supervisor of the thesis during the 
entire period of the research, reliability was achieved. Table 5.10 below indicates the mechanisms 
that were employed in this study to ensure quality research.   
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Table 5.10:  Strategies employed to ensure quality research 
 
TESTS 
 
Case study strategy 
Phase of research in which 
strategy happened 
Construct validity  applying multiple sources of 
evidence 
 constructing chain of evidence 
 member checking 
 
data collection  
data collection 
composition 
Internal validity  do pattern matching 
 do explanation building 
 address rival explanations 
 use logic models 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis 
data analysis  
External validity  application of replication logic  research design 
 
Reliability  application of case study protocol 
 developing case study database 
data collection 
data collection 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009) 
In summary, the above strategies were employed during the entire period of the study. Yin (2009) 
argues in case study research, the numerous strategies should be employed throughout the entire 
stages of the work, not just its commencement. The next section will focus on limitations of case 
study design and how they were surmounted in this study.  
5.10 Limitations of case study design 
Case study research methodology can be a fertile source for appreciating several structures, which 
corroborate and sustain corporate businesses (Aaltio & Heilmann, 2010). Its strengths lie in its 
knack to obtain insider’s perspective during the process of research, in its flexibility in applying 
differing techniques and in its ability to produce a more comprehensive and distinctive results 
(Zikmund, 2010; Yin, 2009; Dul & Hak, 2008; Goulding, 2002; Gillham, 2000). However, since 
there ‘are no perfect research designs’ (Patton, 1990, p.162), it is associated with some limitations. 
Table 5.11 below highlights the limitations that are related to case study research methodology. 
Table 5.11: Limitations of case study research and how they were surmounted  
Limitations of case study 
 
Literature  
Proposed techniques to 
surmount setbacks 
Chapters addressing 
these limitations 
 Gear towards generating theories 
which are unreasonably complex  
Parkhe (1993) 
Eisenhardt (1989a) 
 Review of extant literature 
 Research problem and 
questions 
   Prior theory 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
 Difficult and time consuming to 
conduct 
Eisenhardt (1989a) 
Parkhe (1993) 
Teegavarapu & 
Summers, 2008 
Case study protocol 
 
Propositions 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
 Absence of external validity Eisenhardt (1989a) 
Yin (2009) 
Gillham (2000) 
Goulding (2002) 
Rowley (2002) 
Theoretical replication 
 
Literal replication 
Chapter 4 
 Inadequate to result in theory 
building 
Parkhe (1993) 
Eisenhardt (1989a) 
Multi-method research 
approach 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
 Related to researcher prejudice Wicks (2010) 
Yin (2009) 
Moore (2010) 
Teegavarapu & 
Summers 
(2008) 
 Replication logic 
 Multi-method technique 
of data collection 
 Systematic rechecking of 
core constructs  
 Peer debriefing 
 Member checking 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
 
Source: Author’s construct 
131 
 
The above table highlights the limitations of a case study research approach and the proposed 
techniques used in this study to surmount them. Firstly, case study research methodology is argued 
to gear towards generating theories, which are unreasonably complex (Parkhe, 1993; Eisenhardt, 
1989a). The study surmounted this setback through a well-structured case study design. Also, the 
study painstakingly reviewed the extant literature related to corporate governance in chapters 2, 3 
and 4 to clearly spell out the research problem, questions and theoretical propositions. Further, a 
pilot study was conducted and this helped the study to enhance and revise the initial general 
corporate governance framework and the study’s protocol (after cross-examining the initial 
interview structure). The restructuring of the study’s protocol through proper arrangements helped 
the study to obtain reliable information to address the study’s problem, questions and theoretical 
propositions. 
It is in contention that case study research is difficult and time consuming (Teegavarapu & 
Summers, 2008; Parkhe, 1993; Eisenhardt, 1989a). In order to overcome this limitation, a well-
structured case study protocol was developed to enumerate the various stages of the study. Also, 
five theoretical propositions were formulated to define the boundaries of the study. Case study 
research methodology is believed to lack external validity (Yin, 2009; Rowley, 2002; Goulding, 
2002; Gillham, 2000). This study surmounted this limitation through theoretical and literal 
replication in chapter 5. Further, it is contended that there are some associated limitations to case 
study research that makes it impotent in theory building ((Parkhe, 1993; Eisenhardt, 1989a). In 
order to overcome this limitation, the study relied on multi-method strategy of researching in this 
chapter. Finally, case study is argued to be associated with subjectivity and therefore, it is 
considered to be bias (Wicks, 2010; Moore, 2010; Yin, 2009; Teegavarapu & Summers, 2008). 
This setback was surmounted through peer debriefing, member-checking, multi-method strategy of 
gathering data and replication logic.            
5.11 Ethical consideration 
Ethical consideration is an indispensable and fundamental basis of scientific accomplishments and 
should be recognized always. Inasmuch as ethics is about a vision of good life, it can be deduced 
that research ethics is about a vision of good research knowledge. The term ‘research ethics’ is 
defined as a varied set of values, norms and institutional interconnections that always assist in 
constituting and regulating a scientific action.  
I can flawlessly and lucidly declare that the literary lucubration, avowal of sincerity, introductory 
and concluding remarks, lineament composition, epistemological, ontological, axiological and 
methodological agreement, fundamental impeccability, orderly representation, intellectual 
declaration, germane connotations, unswerving representation, consultations, openly affirmed 
developments and smoothly coordinated facts are extracts from various scholarly sources- scholarly 
articles, books, abstracts of articles, Google search engine, SCOPUS, EBSCO, Index Copernicus 
and other sources- which include literary art of arriving at the truth via logical and coherent 
arguments.           
I have tried to carry out this study as a researcher with credibility and honesty. I have strived and 
persistently struggled to acknowledge every single source in the text or the reference list section. In 
the event of any omissions, I admittedly, ceaselessly, profusely, devouringly, fervently and 
candidly request for forgiveness. Also, in the course of going through millions of pages in order to 
concretize, strengthen, invigorate, rejuvenate, revivify and consubstantiate this titanic work single-
handedly, I may have repeated myself and in view of that, I honestly plead, passionately implore 
and obsequiously request for forgiveness on that score. It was very challenging when I was keeping 
track of the gathered information in the process of my writing. However, I have done my best and 
will always continue to do my best to take steps in accordance with good research ethics. I will 
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never ever let/permit personal considerations with respect to ethnicity, ideology, religious or 
materialistic sentiments to outshine my ethical conscientiousness.  
5.12 Summary 
This chapter presented the research methodology. The initial proposal of this study highlighted the 
main constituents of the research-the strategy of the study, research design, data collection 
strategies and data analysis technique. The study employed a case study qualitative research design. 
The most essential constituents of a case study research design were discussed: a) the study’s 
question, b) the propositions of the study; c) the units of analysis; d) the logical sequence that links 
the data to the propositions, and e) the benchmarks for implementing the findings. Also, the study 
applied a multi-method technique in addressing the complexities and dynamics of corporate 
governance practices in Ghana-archival records, interviews and observations. The application of 
this multi-method approach yielded a large repository of data. Even though the researcher was 
extremely careful in regards to the quality and credibility of the gathered data, data management 
and analysis about corporate governance practices in Ghana was a bit challenging.  
The researcher encountered unexpected challenges and issues in regards to the methodological 
framework of the study. Whilst the researcher had expected the research design to develop 
gradually by envisaging that guided interview data would be the principal data collection technique 
in savvying corporate governance practices in Ghana, it proved to be incorrect evaluation since the 
study’s findings were enriched when he applied two other methods of data collection to the 
research-archival records and observation.  
The objective of the study was to examine the driving forces of effective corporate governance in 
Ghana by developing an in-depth understanding of the complex and dynamic concept of corporate 
governance through an exploratory and descriptive case study of four large publicly-listed 
corporate organizations on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The data gathered and analyzed offered 
evidence for the individual case reports in chapter 6. Also, the study was able to construct an initial 
general model of corporate governance. This was done in part to preliminary fix the research in a 
conceptual or theoretical framework. Furthermore, the researcher undertook a pilot study and this 
allowed him to revise and enhance the initial framework that was developed from the extant body 
of knowledge to one which satisfactorily guided this research. After the revised and enhanced 
framework was done, five principal testable propositions were drawn out of it. Finally, the 
analytical process of the data was done by linking the gathered data to the testable propositions and 
thereafter, interpreting the data. However, tracking the complex analytical process posed some 
challenges to the researcher. 
For achieving the objectives of the research, the strategy of the study was suitable but highly 
challenging. Formulating the methodological and conceptual frameworks for an in-depth 
appreciation of corporate governance practices in Ghana was arduously achieved. The amount of 
data required for a detailed appreciation of corporate governance practice in Ghana was properly 
acquired to the degree greater than what the researcher expected. While the researcher did find 
answers to the research questions of the study, he believes, assumes and thinks that a more 
significant contribution of this research is the laid-down foundation this study offers for successive 
research on corporate governance practice in Ghana and in most developing and transition 
economies. The next chapter presents the individual case reports of the four cases.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSES 
Chapter five described the research methodology and methods of this study. This chapter presents 
the background, profile and activities of the four corporate organizations.  The annual reports of 
their financial performance are also presented. It then proceeds to analyze the corporate governance 
framework of each corporate organization. Finally, it presents the results of the testable 
propositions of each corporate organization.   
6.1 Ghana Commercial Bank Limited (GCB) 
This section of the study analyzes the background, profile and activities of GCB. It then proceeds 
to analyze the financial performance of the bank for the period, 2008 to 2011. Further, the 
corporate governance framework of the bank will be analyzed by highlighting how both the 
ownership structure and board structure work to ensuring ownership control and board control 
respectively. It concludes by highlighting how the evidences gathered from the company through 
interviews, observations and archival records confirm or disconfirm the propositions.  
6.1.1 Background, profile and activities of the Company 
Ghana Commercial Bank Limited (GCB) was established in 1953. It was first recognized as the 
Bank of the Gold Coast, which was aimed to make available banking services to the emerging 
economy for socio-economic development. It was to provide special banking services to Ghanaian 
businessmen, traders and farmers who were unable to access financial services from the expatriate 
financial institutions. In 1957, the year when Ghana gained independence, the bank of Ghana was 
set up as the Central Bank of Ghana and in consequence, the Bank of the Gold Coast was renamed, 
Ghana Commercial Bank to focus on commercial banking services. Ever since, GCB has been able 
to open branches across the length and breadth of the country, tapping the potentials of each one of 
the ten regions that constitute Ghana. The bank now has over 150 branches and 11 agencies 
throughout the country. Today GCB boasts of being the widest networked bank in Ghana.  
The bank was solely owned by the state until 1996 when under the Government’s privatization 
program, part of the state’s ownership was divested. Currently, state ownership stands at 
21.36percent while individual (48.83percent) and institutional (29.81percent) ownerships add up to 
78.6percent (GCB Annual report, 2010). The bank’s human resource capacity stood at 2,101 as at 
2009. This is a landmark inferring from the number of employees (that is, 27) that started the bank. 
The growth of GCB has been tantamount to its customer base. During the first five years of its 
operations, the bank’s customers were mainly made up of small Ghanaian traders and other 
nationals who were supposed to maintain credit balance accounts. This was because; the bank was 
then not sufficiently capitalized. From Ghanaian small traders as customers, the bank has now 
widened its customer base ranging from salaried workers through small and medium scale 
entrepreneurs to large trading partners, parastatals, quasi-state institutions and corporate customers. 
The bank now provides a wide variety of products and services to the benefit of its cherished 
customers. From the conventional products of the Current and Saving Accounts, the bank now 
provides specialized products and services comprising Link2Home for Ghanaian nationals living 
abroad, doorstep cash collections, loans and overdrafts. It also provides investment products such 
as treasury bills as well as fixed and cash deposits. With the advent of information, communication 
and technology, the bank has taken advantage of introducing some internet-based products and 
services. These are internet banking, Royal banking, Smart Pay, “Kudi Nkusuo”, GCB Inland 
Express Money Transfer, international Money Remittance Payments, GCB Kidistar Account and 
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Mastercard. All these financial services have been instituted by the bank to increase profit and 
enhance shareholder value.   
Financial performance 
2008 Performance 
In 2008, the bank witnessed a profit before tax of Gh₵ 49.7 million as compared to Gh₵ 47.0 
million in 2007, representing a rise of 5 percent. Profit after tax rose to Gh₵ 37.59 million in 2008 
from the previous level of Gh₵ 32.87 million. This remarkable achievement was as a result of the 
bank’s expansion of its credit portfolio, investment in new products, and the use of Information, 
Communication and Technology (ICT) to carry out services in an efficient manner via 
centralization and spending control. Gross Loans and Advances increased appreciably to Gh₵ 
1,087.1 million in 2008 from Gh₵ 750.6 million in 2007. In percentages, Gross Loans and 
advances increased by 45.1 percent in 2008. This was in consequence of the competitive pricing 
method adopted by the bank’s authorities and the Small and Medium Scale Enterprise (SME) 
advisory services being given to already existing and prospective customers.  
Meanwhile, this increment brought about an increase in Loan Loss Provision from GH₵ 10.2 
million in 2007 to Gh₵ 16.7 million in 2008. The proportion of Gross Non-performing Loans to 
total credit portfolio was 2.0 percent. This was unchanged from the 2007 level. There was an 
increase in interest income from GH₵ 112.4 million in 2007 to GH₵ 181.7 million in 2008, 
representing a rise of 61.6 percent rise. This appreciable increase resulted from the effective pricing 
method adopted by the bank’s authorities regardless of the intense competition in the market. 
Incomes out of loans and advances rose from GH₵ 75.5 million in 2007 to GH₵ 145million in 
2008 representing a rise of 92.1 percent. Furthermore, there was a rise in Investment income from 
GH₵ 32.2 million in 2007 to Gh₵ 32.7 million in 2008, depicting an increase of GH₵ 0.5 million 
or 1.5 percent.  
Recoveries and Dividends decreased from GH₵ 19.2 million in 2007 to GH₵ 3.0 million in 2008. 
Further, stockholder’s funds increased to GH₵ 207.7 million in 2008 from GH₵ 176.9 in 2007, 
indicating a substantial rise of GH₵ 30.8 million or 17.4 percent. This increment was as a result of 
an increase in income surplus from GH₵ 73.1 million in 2007 to GH₵ 89.9 in 2008. The banks 
market capitalization was Gh₵ 72,000,000, the same figure recorded in the previous year. Basic 
earnings per share increased to Gh₵ 0.140 in 2008 as compared to Gh₵ 0.122 in 2007, signifying a 
Gh₵ 0.018 growth. Total assets also increased from GH₵ 1,154.7 million in 2007 to GH₵ 1,650.2 
million in 2008, depicting a rise of GH₵ 839.4 million. More so, deposits in total rose from GH₵ 
839.4 million in 2007 to GH₵ 1,030.1 million in 2008. This indicates a rise of GH₵ 190.7 million 
or 22.7 percent.  
2009 Performance  
The bank recorded a profit before tax of GH₵ 20.6 million in 2009 as compared to GH₵ 49.7 
million in 2008, depicting a fall of 58.5 percent. Profit after tax fell to Gh₵ 18.8 million in 2009 
from Gh₵ 37.59 million in 2008. Gross Loans and Advances rose to Gh₵ 1,319.0 million in 2009 
from Gh₵ 1,103.8 million in 2008, indicating a rise of 19.5 percent. The substantial increase was 
ascribable to increases in overdrafts and Term Loans especially to the petroleum sector. The rise of 
Gross loans and Advances brought some setbacks in ensuring the high portfolio management 
standards of the Bank. Provisions for impairment Loss rose to Gh₵ 36.7 million in 2009 from Gh₵ 
8.8 million in 2008. The proportion of Non-performing Loans to Gross Loans and Advances was 
19 percent, which was substantially higher than 2.0 percent in 2008. Interest Income rose to Gh₵ 
266.0 million in 2008 as against that of 2008, which was Gh₵ 181.7 million, representing a growth 
of 46.4 percent. This appreciable increase was as a result of competitive pricing of the bank’s assets 
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in regards to higher outstanding exposure to the petroleum sector coupled with its inventive and 
innovative products and services into the market.  
Incomes accruals from loans and advances rose to Gh₵ 229.2 million in 2009 from Gh₵ 145.0 
million in 2008, depicting a growth of 58.1percent. Investment income also increased appreciably 
to Gh₵ 36.3 million in 2009 from Gh₵ 32.7 million in 2008. Other operating incomes rose 
substantially to Gh₵ 4.2 million in 2009 from Gh₵ 3.0 million in 2008. These operating incomes 
comprise recoveries of bad debts written off, sale of properties, dividends received and so on. 
Shareholders fund, which at the end of 2008 stood at Gh₵ 207.7 million lowered to Gh₵ 203.4 
million in 2009, representing a decline of Gh₵ 4.3 million. The bank’s market capitalization 
remained the same at Gh₵ 72,000,000, as compared to the previous year’s figure.  Basic Earnings 
per share reduced to Gh₵ 0.068 in 2009 from Gh₵ 0.14 in 2008, indicating a reduction of Gh₵ 
0.072. Furthermore, total assets increased from Gh₵ 1,650.2 million in 2008 to Gh₵ 1,922.7 
million in 2009, depicting a rise of 16.5 percent. Total Deposits shot up to Gh₵ 1,259.5 million in 
2009 from Gh₵ 1,030.1 million in 2008, representing a rise of 22.9 percent. 
2010 Performance   
GCB chalked a profit before tax of Gh₵ 91.3 million in 2010. This represents a growth of 343 
percent from that of 2009, which recorded Gh₵ 20.6 million. Profit after tax substantially increased 
to Gh₵ 56.1 million in 2010 from Gh₵ 18.8 million in 2009. Income performance of Gh₵ 330.7 
million, which indicates a growth of 64 percent, was recorded in 2010 as compared to Gh₵ 202.5 
million in 2009. This increment was largely, as a result of the strong growth in Net Interest Income 
that arose from a combination of strong deposit growth, improved margin management and 
progress witnessed on improving the quality of some loan assets that allowed the bank to write-
back suspended income. The bank witnessed an increase in Non-performing loans, which resulted 
in a credit impairment allowance of Gh₵ 70.9 million in 2010 as compared to Gh₵ 36.7 million in 
2009. Operating spending rose to Gh₵ 168.5 in 2010, reflecting an increase in staff-related costs 
investments in improving delivery platform, information, communication and technology.  
Furthermore, the 2010 results reflected a Return on Average Equity (ROE) of 25percent and Return 
on Average Assets (ROA) of 2.8percent as compared to that of 2009 that stood at 9 percent and 
1percent respectively. Loans and Advances reduced to GH₵ 1,003 million in 2010. This was as a 
result of the measures that were put in place by its management to re-balance the bank’s loan book. 
In so doing, the bank reduced its over-exposure to the oil sector while placing much attention to 
expand business in retail, Small and Medium Scale Enterprise and private corporate sector. Market 
capitalization of the company still remained at Gh₵ 72,000,000. Basic Earnings per share rose to 
Gh₵ 0.19 in 2010 as compared to the previous year’s figure of Gh₵ 0.068, representing a growth 
of Gh₵ 0.122. Further, total assets rose to Gh₵ 2,113 million in 2010 from Gh₵ 1,922.9 million in 
2009, representing a growth of 10percent. Total deposits increased to Gh₵ 1,575 million in 2010, 
representing a growth of 25 percent as compared to the previous year’s figure of Gh₵ 1,259.5 
million. This was driven by strong growth in customer deposits across retail, corporate sector and 
SME.  
2011 Performance 
The bank witnessed profit before tax of Gh₵ 31.1 million in 2011 as compared to Gh₵ 91.3 
million, signifying a 56 percent reduction. This was mainly in consequence of the combination of 
expected revenue shortfall from restructuring of portfolios and higher costs offset by a significant 
decrease in impairment charges (GCB Annual report, 2011). Post tax profit decreased to Gh₵ 17.8 
million in 2011 from Gh₵ 50.9 million in 2010, representing a reduction of Gh₵ 33.1million. This 
shortfall was a direct result of a 50 percent decrease in the loan book, which was needed to bring 
the bank’s exposure to the public sector within limits. Nonetheless, the full undesirable effect on 
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net income of this structural alteration was offset by well-built fee income performance, lower 
funding costs and considerably, lower credit impairment charges. Net income rose to Gh₵ 278 
million as compared to Gh₵ 260.5 million in the previous year, representing a 7 percent growth.  
There was a rise in net commission and fees to Gh₵ 64.5 million in 2011, indicating a 41percent 
growth over the previous year.  Operating costs for 2011 amounted to Gh₵ 251.3 million, a rise of 
31percent over the Gh₵ 192.3 million witnessed in 2010. This increase was mainly driven by 
depreciation charges, staff costs, ICT operation costs, staff restructuring costs and non-credit 
related impairment losses. In addition, provision for defined benefit obligations witnessed a net 
increase of Gh₵ 2.9 million. The bank thus evidenced a cost income ratio of 87 percent as 
compared to 58 percent in 2010. Impairment charge on loans and advances recorded Gh₵ 10.6 
million, a reduction of 85 percent from the Gh₵ 70.9 million witnessed in the previous year. Loans 
and Advances decreased to Gh₵ 476.2 million in 2011 from Gh₵ 995.3 million in 2010, indicating 
a 52 percent decrease. The Government of Ghana retired the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) debt by 
handing out bonds to the Bank. Corollary to this, there was a decrease in the loan book, which 
subsequently increased investment securities portfolio (GCB Annual Report, 2011).  
However, the bank’s market capitalization in 2008 stood at Gh₵ 72,000,000. Basic Earnings per 
share reduced from Gh₵ 0.19 in 2010 to Gh₵ 0.07 in 2011, representing a reduction of Gh₵ 0.12. 
Furthermore, total assets rose to Gh₵ 2.46 billion, representing an 18 percent growth over the Gh₵ 
2.08 billion recorded over the same period last year. This growth was as a result of strong growth in 
customer deposits that increased to Gh₵ 2.06 billion from Gh₵ 1.58 billion, representing a growth 
of 30 percent. The bank attributes this improvement in customer deposits to some factors such as 
domestic payments for corporate and consumer banking customers, and enhanced product offering 
in cash management. Table 6.1 below shows a tabular representation of financial performance of 
the company from 2008 to 2011.   
Table 6.1.: Financial performance of GCB: 2008-2011 
GH₵ 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Profit before Tax  49,713,392 20,640,271 91,312,559 29,681,000 
Profit after Tax 37,590,000 18,800,000 56,100,000 16,683,000 
Total Assets 1,650,220,348 1,922,664,249 2,112,821,536 2,454,564,000 
Shareholders Fund 207,729,124 203,442,842 250,418,215 - 
Customer Deposits 1,030,106,198 1,259,470,137 1,575,281,050 2,061,390,000 
Total Loans & Advances 1,087,118,928 1,265,516,727 1,003,682,422 1,265,517,000 
Earnings per Share 
Market Capitalization 
0.140 
72,000,000 
0.068 
72,000,000 
0.1901 
72,000,000 
0.070 
72,000,000 
Source: Annual reports of GCB (2008-2011) 
6.1.2 Corporate governance layout  
Corporate governance layout has to match up with the framework that is contained in the 
Companies code 1963 (Act 179). The framework considers stockholders as active members of the 
firm and therefore, they have the right to partake in the company’s dealings or affairs. GCB has a 
unitary board system, which supervises management and it is referred to as the Board of directors. 
The board is the topmost decision making body in the company and has decision-control privileges.  
The company has senior management body, which is responsible for day-to-day operations. The 
Managing Director who is in effect the Chief Executive Officer of the company is the head of the 
management body. The members of the management body are referred to as General Management: 
For example, the general manager of inspection division and the general manager of human 
resource division. The Managing director serves as a conduit between the board and management 
body. All general managers are accountable to the Managing Director who presides over all 
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meetings of the management body and reports strategic issues that transpire at such meetings to the 
board of directors.  
6.1.3 Ownership structure and control 
Ownership structure  
The ownership structure of GCB has been changing since its establishment. The change in identity 
and level of ownership is as a result of the changes in the Ghanaian economy in regards to 
government holdings of companies and the ongoing realization of private possessions of 
companies. The bank was solely owned by the state until 1996 when under the divestiture 
implementation program, part of the state’s ownership was divested. Table 6.2 below depicts the 
identities and the various holdings of the shareholders.  
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Table 6.2: The Ownership Structure of GCB 
Identity of Shareholder Shareholding and Percentage holdings 
                            2008   2009                                          2010 
Shareholding Percentage Shareholding Percentage Shareholding Percentage 
SSNIT 79,000,000 29.81% 79,000,000 29.81% 79,000,000 29.81% 
GH/GV Act. By Min. of Fin & Econ. Plan.  
 
56,608,613 21.36% 56,608,613 21.36% 56,608,613 21.36% 
BBGN Northern Trust COAVFC 6314B 10,559,352 3.98% 17,439,804 6.53% 17,697,904 6.68% 
Daniel Ofori 8,579,276 3.24% 7,229,276 2.73% 8,790,006 3.32% 
BBG NBNY JPMCC Clearing GHC 6,051,271 2.28% 3,000,000 1.13% - - 
QVT FD LP 5,759,067 2.17% - - - - 
BBGN Re Epack Invst. Fund Ltd 5,626,898 2.12% 2,000,000 0.75% 2,000,000 0.75% 
SCBN/ PICTET Africa Non Tax 6275J - - 2,199,990 0.83% 4,364,490 1.65% 
BBGN/Barclays Mauritius Re Deut Africa - - 2,114,316 0.80% - - 
SCBN/SSB & TAS Custodian Re SQM Frontier Africa - - - - 3,950,047 1.49% 
SCBN/London Care of SSB LDN. Invst. Assets Mgt (PTY) - - - - 1,250,000 0.47% 
SCBN/CITI NY Advanced Series Trust Para Emg Mkts. - - 1,190,800 0.45% 1,190,800 0.45% 
SCBN/BBH Eaton Vance Emerald PPA EMEMKT EQ. FUNDS PLC. - - 1,245,700 0.47% 1,245,700 0.47% 
SCBN/SSB Inv. Ad-Emerging Africa Fund-AACG - - - - 1,000,000 0.38% 
SCBN/Northern Trust Co. AVFC 6314B - - - - 2,282,251 0.86% 
SCBN/SSB Teacher Retirement systems of Texas FD - - 1,790,000 0.68% 1,790,000 0.68% 
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Source: Annual Reports of GCB from 2008-2010 
Identity of Shareholder Shareholding and Percentage holdings 
                       2008                                     2009                                                    2010 
Shareholding        Percentage      Shareholding      Percentage       Shareholding        Percentage 
SCBN/SSB Eaton Vance Structured Emerging Mkt Fund 
 
- - - - 1,453,841 0.55% 
BBG/SSB Eaton Vance Tax-managed Emerging Mkt. Fund - - 1,384,370 0.52% 1,384,370 0.52% 
STD Bank Noms TVL PTY Ltd. 3,433,300 1.30% 1,924,208 0.73% - - 
GCB Staff Provident Fund 2,996,695 1.13% 2,996,695 1.13% 2,996,695 1.13% 
Falcon Family LP - - 2,523,238 0.95% 2,523,238 0.95% 
BBGN HSBC Bank Plc. 1,931,767 0.73% - - - - 
Ghana Reinsurance Co. Ltd. 1,799,651 0.68% 1,799,651 0.68% 1,799,651 0.68% 
State Insurance Co. Ltd.   1,796,399 0.68% 1,796,399 0.68% 1,796,399 0.68% 
Ghana Cocoa Board 1,600,000 0.60% 1,600,000 0.60% 1,600,000 0.60% 
BBGN Barclays Mauritius 1,500,000 0.57% - - - - 
BBGN HSS LUX HALBIS FD 1,400,000 0.53% - - - - 
BBGN Barclays Mauritius Re/CAP Sec. Ltd 1,338,908 0.57% - - - - 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. Provident Fund 1,300,000 0.49% 1,300,000 0.49% - - 
Tema Oil Refinery Ltd. 1,000,000 0.38% - - 1,000,000 0.38% 
BBGN SSB Vance Tax Managed FD 967,303 0.37% - - - - 
ESSPA 944,529 0.36% - - - - 
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Presently, state ownership stands at 21.36 percent, while individual and institutional ownership add 
up to 78.6 percent. Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) holds the majority of the 
company’s shares with 29.81percent. However, SSNIT is a state institution whereby its head and 
other top managers are government appointees. Corollary to this, the state controls the holdings of 
SSNIT, making it (ie the state) the majority shareholder with 51.17percent of the total shares of the 
company. There is an agreement between the government and SSNIT by which SSNIT is required 
to inform the government when it plans to sell out some of its holdings to another investor. Other 
current minority shareholders are: BBGN Northern Trust COAVFC 6314B (6.68 percent), Daniel 
Ofori (3.32 percent), SCBN/ PICTET Africa Non Tax 6275J (1.65 percent), GCB Staff Provident 
Fund (1.13 percent) and the general public- consisting of about 96,805 who own small numbers of 
shares(26.14 percent). The general public secured shares when GCB was listed on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. The listing of the company was to some extent targeted to widening up the ownership 
stand of the company in accordance with the goals of the government’s privatization policy.   
Ownership control  
Basically, there are two significant structures upon which shareholders exercise their controlling 
prowess over the company. These are Annual General Meetings and the incessant influence on 
decision-making processes of the company by the state. The application of these two structures to 
enable shareholders to exercise their controlling abilities mirrors the level of ownership of the 
company.  
The Government- majority shareholder 
With the combination of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and SSNIT holdings, the 
state becomes majority shareholder of the company. Accordingly, the state has been wielding 
control over the company through its appointment of key personalities of the bank. It also has 
direct contact with these important people-the Managing director and board chair of the firm. 
Influence on decision-making processes or procedures including veto power in the company, 
access to information as well as direct involvement in the management of the company are relevant 
ways of control opened to the government. The government does not wait for decisions that are 
made at the annual general meetings or the minimum disclosures mandated by law to exert its 
control or influence over the company. This is because; the government can rely on the incessant 
delivery of information by the management of GCB to it (government) in the course of reporting. 
These provisions ensure that the government or the state has access to relevant information and 
decisions that come to light at GCB.  
The reports that are made available to the Government consist of  relevant operational issues such 
as total deposits, profits, loans and advances, directors emoluments, Auditors remunerations, 
floatation expenses, administrative expenses as well as advertising and marketing spending. 
Reports on these issues are made available to the government on daily, weekly, monthly and yearly 
bases in a pre-arranged form. Special reports are also made available to the government anytime 
upon a request. The implication is that annual general meetings are just rubber stamps or legal 
cosmetics and perhaps a platform to let minority or small equity holders to get abreast with some 
developments within their company. Figure 6.2 below depicts the direct and indirect control 
wielded by the government and minority shareholders of GCB. The government has strong direct 
connection with both the board and top management. This has been portrayed by a straight line 
from the government (large equity holder) to both the board and top management. The broken lines 
from the individual small shareholders to the board and management on the other hand, portray a 
limited level of connection. This makes the government a controlling force within the company.  
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Fig 6.2: Domineering role of Government within the operations of GCB  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                              
  
                                   
 
                                                                    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Adapted from Roe (2003) 
Minority shareholders 
There are two groups of small equity holders within GCB. First are those minority shareholders 
who have adequate shares to appoint a director. Second are those who do not have sufficient shares 
to select a director. Minority shareholders whose ownership stand is sufficient to appoint a director 
have access to board decisions and can exercise some degree of influence on board decisions.  
Small equity holders whose ownership base does not permit them to select a director have no 
access to strategic decision-making processes of the company. Those shareholders consist of 
individuals and institutions: AngloGold Ashanti, Tema Oil Refinery, State Insurance co. ltd., 
Ghana Reinsurance co. ltd., and so on. A considerable number of persons who holds small number 
of shares is made up of members of the general public. Their influence on decision-making 
processes of the company is near to the ground in that; they have limited access to information.   
This group of individuals with minority shares relies on annual general meetings to voice out their 
views and concerns in order to attempt exercising their influence on the decision-making processes 
of GCB. These come to bear in the questions about decisions that have been executed by 
management or those that are proposed during annual general meetings. Their actions are taken 
into consideration in accordance with the minimum statutory disclosures required by the companies 
code, 1963 and GSE listing regulations in which all equity holders ought to have access to annual 
audited reports and quarterly reports.  
Annual audited reports are sent to every equity holder of the company whilst quarterly reports are 
made public via the company’s webpage and GSE notice board. Other sources of information to 
minority equity holders include newspapers, radio and television. The statutory reports that are 
made available to equity holders include a notice of the annual general meeting and an invitation to 
attend such meeting. The agenda for the annual general meeting is prepared and designed by 
management and approved by the board. The program for the annual general meeting entails: 
receiving and considering audited financial statement for the year under review, declaration of 
dividend for the year under review, re-electing directors, appointment of auditors for the next 
financial year, fixing remuneration packages for directors and auditors, ratifying the appointment of 
a director and any other businesses.  
Equity holders are permissible to vote during annual general meetings, which is in line with the 
requirement of the law (principles of corporate governance of Ghana) and as suggested in the 
OECD principles (see Chapter 2), of corporate governance. An equity holder of the company who 
is entitled to attend and vote is at liberty to appoint a proxy or surrogate (who need not also be an 
equity holder) to attend and vote in his/her stead. Even though the company’s decisions are made 
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during annual general meetings through a voting process, as a result of the majority holdings of the 
government, these meetings are more often than not considered as a ‘cosmetic’.  
The notion that GCB annual general meetings are just legal formalities is reinforced when minority 
shareholders’ questions and suggestions are not given the needed attention by the board of 
directors. Accordingly, these minority shareholders are always unable to influence situations at 
hand. They do not have the authority to discipline or punish management or directors. Interviews 
conducted on the opinions of the minority shareholders revealed that the manner in which annual 
general meetings are carried out restricts their aptitude to exercise control over the company. For 
instance, they are restricted to ask a certain number of questions during annual general meetings. 
Since the state is the majority shareholder, in most cases, when minority shareholders are not in 
agreement with issues that management or directors raise, they place their hopes in the government 
to safeguard them from the abuses of management or directors.  
With regards to shareholder control, the minority shareholders collectively scored low in all the 
following indicators: Influence on the appointment/selection and access to important personalities 
of the company, influence on strategic-decision processes of management or directors and 
influence on the voting pattern during annual general meeting. Table 6.3 portrays responses to 
assertions on shareholder control.   
Table 6.3: Shareholder control at Ghana Commercial Bank 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Duties of the board are being fulfilled when they report to 
shareholders during AGMs  
√   
Annual audited reports are made available to shareholders 
before AGMs 
√   
Quarterly reports are made publicly √   
All shareholders receive invitations to AGMs √   
During AGMs, shareholders have the right to vote on 
board’s proposals/suggestions 
√   
Large shareholders exert extensive influence during AGMs √   
Decisions taken at AGMs are subject to voting √   
The kind of influence that majority shareholders have in the 
selection or appointment of directors makes it possible for 
them to exert control over the firm 
√   
It is easy for large shareholders to have access to very 
important personalities in the firm 
√   
Decisions of management or directors can be questioned or 
altered by large shareholders 
√   
Shareholders have the right to call for Extraordinary 
General Meetings for clarifications of issues 
  
√ 
 
Source: Fieldwork  
The government appoints the majority of directors, the managing director and the board chairman 
of the company. Practically, decisions taken by the board are not influenced by the worries or 
concerns of minority shareholders. In an interview with one of the board members of the company, 
he revealed that when minority shareholders complain about certain decisions that are taken during 
annual general meetings, the board just sit, listen and keep quite over these complains since the 
board knows that such protests do not make any difference.  
The extensive and invariable communication between GCB and the government induces 
management of GCB to constantly exert efforts towards achieving the interests of the government. 
In wrapping up, the percentage of ownership of GCB by the government enables it (the 
government) to exert control and this action ultimately, decreases the incentive problem in the 
organization.   
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6.1.4 Effectiveness of the board   
This section examines the factors that normally determine the effectiveness of the board of GCB in 
relation to board control. The factors are; the board composition, director independence, the 
leadership structure of the board, board meetings, board audit committee and board remuneration 
committee.   
Board composition 
GCB has nine directors that constitute its board. Two of whom are non-executive directors and the 
remaining are executive directors. The directors include current and retired senior officers. The 
board chairperson is an academic with vast experience in economic policy analysis and economic 
reform measures. Other members include former Director and Head of Human Resource 
Department of the Central bank of Ghana, an academic, a business executive, Deputy Minister of 
Finance and Economic Planning, Investment banker, a lawyer, the current Director for Regulatory 
Administration Division of the National Communication Authority (NCA), a chartered accountant 
by profession, the managing director of the company, the company’s secretary and two deputy 
managing directors in charge of operations and finance. The involvement of the deputy minister of 
Finance and Economic Planning on the board is based on his capability to influence management 
decisions or policies to the benefit of the government.  
Board independence  
In order to determine director independence, the approach for appointment and probable rapport 
between the CEO and major shareholders were examined. In terms of appointment or selection, 
directors are selected via a procedure agreed on by the government. This means that the controlling 
shareholder (the government) selects its political cohorts in business decision-making processes of 
the company. The implication is that a large number of shareholders is not included in the decision-
making processes and allocation of resources in the company. The method of discovering a 
prospective director to represent the government on the board is politically motivated. For instance, 
there was a change of government in 2008 and as a result, the board was reconstituted by the 
current government. Although the composition of the board is normally political in nature, the 
government through its council of state does select well-qualified people to form the board. This 
means that cronyism and nepotism have been the order of the day. However, the appointment of 
competent people to man the affairs of the board turns to minimize this scourge. Also, the manner 
in which the advisors are tasked by the government to select or appoint members to constitute the 
board makes directors to be economically or psychologically independent of management.  
Leadership structure of the board       
The positions of the Chief Executive Officer and the board chairman have been separated. The 
company has instituted the board chairmanship as well as the managing directorship positions. The 
board chairman does not get involved in the day-to-day dealings of the company. He does not form 
part of the management, but necessary and sufficient information is provided to him by 
management anytime he requires. The board chairman manages the board, settles on its priorities, 
and lays down the agenda for meetings. The chairman makes sure that there is timely and 
sufficient/adequate communication between the management and members of the board in order to 
create an atmosphere of trust and a preparedness to bring out sound judgment about strategic issues 
for the company. This is because with proper communication, members would be able to 
understand and assist in articulating vitally important issues in the company. Also, with effective 
communication, an atmosphere of checks and balances in the processing of information in the 
company will be created so that it will be transparent and dependable (Charkman, 2005). The 
managing director, in turn, performs the functions of a CEO. He runs the company on a day-to-day 
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basis and accountable to corporate performance, chairs management meetings and reports to the 
board. 
Board meetings   
Even though board meetings are held four times per year, they can be increased when needed. For 
instance, in 2010, a total of 73 board meetings were held. In addition, a total of 25 ordinary and 
special board meetings were held in the same year. Preparations for these meetings involve sending 
reports to board members before meetings. These reports include dates, hours and locations of 
meetings. On the basis of the information provided by management to the board chairman, he (the 
board chairman) sets agenda for these meetings. Schedules of board meetings are deemed to tackle 
the following: Appraisal of previous meetings; quarterly business reports; profit forecast; internal 
control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of the Bank’s financial statements; taken 
reasonable steps for the prevention and detection of fraud and other irregularities; the company’s 
strategic priorities; major investment decisions; the company’s stock performance; and new 
business, market and product development opportunities. This is in line with Arguden with respect 
to how board meetings ought to be planned (Arguden, 2009). The close connection of the 
government in management indicates that board meetings are, in a practical manner, “an advice-
giving/ consultative session”.  
Board audit committee 
The board has instituted an audit and compliance committee. The committee is made up of three 
(3) non-executive directors. The committee’s functions include: Reviewing, advising, reporting to 
the board on the satisfactoriness of the company’s internal control; Advising the board on the 
maintenance of well-grounded books of account and the dependability/reliability of financial 
information used within the company; and other duties and responsibilities it may be assigned by 
the board from time to time.  
The audit committee serves as a link between the external auditor and the board. The committee 
meets four (4) times a year to review inspection reports from 157 branches and divisions, auditor’s 
report, Bank of Ghana Examination and other governance issues. In some cases, the committee 
meets more than the number of times it is required to meet in a year. For instance, in 2010, the 
committee met ten (10) times to deliberate on issues concerning the affairs of the bank.  
The committee assists the board in being efficient and effective in its dealings. The actions of the 
committee are being influenced by the involvement of the government in the affairs of the bank. 
When issues are raised by external auditors, they are communicated to the government, which in 
agreement with GCB board; the audit committee is tasked to address those concerns with the 
external auditors. Through the audit and compliance committee, the board’s alertness of 
management decisions and its capacity to exercise control over management decisions are 
enhanced.  
Remuneration committee 
The company has established a human resource and remuneration committee. The committee is 
made up of three (3) non-executive directors. The main responsibility of the committee is 
reviewing the recruitment and termination policies of the bank including employment contracts 
remuneration, pension and other rewards, making appropriate recommendations and any other 
responsibility that may be assigned by the board. Upon approval of the board, it sets the managing 
director and other top executives remuneration packages. Also, remuneration packages for board 
members are being set by this committee, but have to be approved by the shareholders of the bank 
during annual general meetings.  
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The committee helps the board in being efficient and effective in its actions. The operations of the 
committee are being influenced by the government. This is because the government normally has 
to approve remuneration packages for the managing director as well as other top managers of the 
bank. Even the remuneration packages of members of the board have to be evaluated by the 
government before the committee sets them. Table 6.4 depicts the summary of the interviews of the 
determinants of effectiveness of the board of directors with regards to its (the board) control 
function.  
Table 6.4: Effectiveness of board of directors at GCB 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
For the past 10 years, majority of board members have 
been  NEDs 
√ 
 
  
There is an existence of social or economic tie between 
directors and the firm 
  √ 
 
There is an existence of social or economic tie between 
directors and top managers 
  √ 
 
There is a presence of social or economic tie between 
directors and majority shareholders 
 √ 
 
 
Positions of the CEO and the Chairperson have been 
separated and occupied by different people for the past 10 
years 
√ 
 
  
There is an existence of an audit committee instituted by 
the board 
√ 
 
  
There is a presence of a board remuneration committee √ 
 
  
Majority of the members on the audit committee are NEDs √ 
 
  
NEDs form majority on the remuneration committee √ 
 
  
Membership appointments to the audit committee are made 
known to shareholders 
√ 
 
  
Membership appointments to the remuneration committee 
are made known to shareholders 
√ 
 
  
There are criteria for the selection and replacement of 
directors 
  √ 
 
There is a laid down procedure upon which board meetings 
are held 
√ 
 
  
Before board meetings, information about the firm are 
made available to members on time 
√ 
 
  
Source: Fieldwork 
6.1.5 Board control 
The decision to hire or replace the managing director is not done by the board of directors. The 
board can only offer an advice to the government if directors hold the opinion that the managing 
director is not performing as expected of him. The decision about the remuneration package of the 
managing director is done by the human resource and remuneration committee of the board. 
Although the committee sets the remuneration package of the managing director, the government 
has to give an approval before it can be effected.  More so, the board has put in place certain 
mechanisms to conduct a formal assessment/evaluation of the managing director, of individual 
directors, or activities of the board. Apart from the board’s evaluation of management, it can be 
contended further that supplementary assessment is not needed since the government conducts its 
own assessment based on the frequent reports sent by GCB management. Therefore, the 
government executes all the controlling activities that are normally the sole duty of the board, with 
the outcome that the board conducts a counseling/advisory role to management rather than exerting 
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control over it. This evidence suggests that boards play a vital counseling/advisory role in 
companies. This is consistent with the findings of Coles et al. (2008), Adams and Ferreira (2007), 
Adam and Mehran (2003), and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001). Table 6.5 below depicts interviews 
that were conducted with regard to board control in the case of GCB. It can be deduced that the 
board has a limited control over GCB.      
Table 6.5: Board control at GCB 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Decisions in terms of hiring a CEO is made by the 
board                                        
     √ 
The CEO can be replaced by the board in case of 
mismanagement 
  
√ 
 
Strategies are discussed and approved by the board √   
Decisions on the CEO’s remuneration package is 
made by the board via the remuneration committee 
  √ 
The activities of the CEO are assessed by the board 
 
√   
The board makes sure the firm complies with 
existing laws regarding the day to day running of the 
firm eg, Generally Accepted Accounting and 
Auditing Principles laid down by ICAG 
 
√ 
  
The board determines the type of information it 
needs from management anytime 
√   
    Source: Fieldwork 
6.1.6 Analysis and confirmation of propositions 
The analysis of the ownership structure and equity holders control depicts that the government 
exerts control over management. The implication is that the agency problem is dealt with by the 
government via its regular monitoring of the performance of management. The government 
appoints the managing director as well as the majority of directors. The government’s appointment 
of the majority of directors implies that if counteractive action is needed, such as changing the 
managing director, this decision can be taken by them. The government is regarded as an insider in 
that it takes part in the decision-making procedures of GCB. This is a verification/confirmation of 
proposition 1 that: Shareholders with larger shares exert shareholder control in a company. 
With regards to board meetings, the findings depict that they are carried out in a more efficient and 
effective manner. This is because of the frequent availability of information to board members and 
their possible position to challenge management during board meetings. Even though all the 
indicators of effective and efficient board meetings are in place, the exclusion of the board in the 
control function of the bank means that board meetings do not have any connection with board 
control. This points out that proposition 2, which states that: Effective and efficient board meetings 
lead to a panoptic board control in a company is not confirmed in the case of GCB. 
In terms of the leadership structure of the board, the separation of the positions of the board 
chairman and managing director is in line with agency theory in terms of strengthening board 
control. In spite of this, at GCB, the board chairman is not independent of the controlling 
shareholder and as a result, plays no vital role in the enhancement of board control. Since both the 
managing director and board chairman are appointed by the government, and hence not 
independent of the government, proposition 3, which states that: The non-duality structure with 
independent chairperson results in panoptic board control in a company is not confirmed in the 
case of GCB.  
With respect to the audit committee, the findings reveal that the bank has such committee that has 
been formed with non-executive directors as its members. In spite of this, the role of the committee 
is insignificant in that the government does exercise director control over its activities. This 
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conclusion means that proposition 4(a), which states: Instituting a board audit committee with 
independent directors as its members, leads to a panoptic board control in a company is not 
confirmed in the case of GCB.  
The findings of the remuneration committee depict that the bank has instituted a human resource 
and remuneration committee with non-executive directors as its members. However, the position 
and role of this committee is not necessary since the government does exercise director control. 
This stems from the evidence that remuneration packages for both the managing director and board 
chairman have to be communicated and approved by the controlling shareholder. This conclusion 
points out that proposition 4(b), which states that: Establishing a board remuneration committee 
with independent directors as its members, leads to a panoptic control in a company is not 
confirmed in the case of GCB.         
 
6.2 SIC Insurance Company Limited 
The background, profile and activities of SIC are analyzed in this section. It then continues to 
analyze the financial performance of the insurance company from 2008 to 2011. Further, the 
corporate governance layout of SIC is analyzed by highlighting how both the ownership structure 
and board structure operate to ensuring ownership control and board control respectively. Lastly, 
analysis on the verification or non-verification of the study’s propositions will be highlighted.       
6.2.1 Background, profile and activities of the Company 
SIC Insurance Company Ltd. is one of the oldest non-life insurance firms in Ghana. It traces its 
existence from the year, 1955. This was the year; the Gold Coast Insurance Company was 
instituted. Its name was changed to Ghana Insurance Company in 1957; the year Ghana became an 
independent nation. In February, 1962, it was incorporated by an Executive instrument (E.I) No. 17 
as State Insurance Corporation. This was effected under the Statutory Corporation Act, 1962 (Act 
232). It was then established as a corporate entity by a Legislative Instrument (L.I) No. 424 of 
1964, with an initial paid-up capital of Gh₵ 1 million. The company’s mission is to provide 
innovative and competitive insurance and allied financial services to its clients through a highly 
skilled and motivated workforce with a commitment to deliver value to all stakeholders. 
The corporation was transmogrified into a limited liability entity and was renamed, State Insurance 
Company of Ghana Limited in August, 1995 under the Government of Ghana’s privatization 
program. It was registered in accordance with the requirement of the companies code, 1963 (Act 
179) of Ghana. On October 2, 2007, a particular resolution was passed to change its name to SIC 
Insurance Company Limited. Further, in agreement with the requirements of the insurance Act, 
2006, the company has separated its activities from the life business by instituting the SIC Life 
Limited. Another resolution was passed for the company to transfer the life business activities and 
assets to SIC Life Limited, and in accordance with this resolution, 80,000,000 ordinary shares were 
issued to the Government of Ghana (GoG).  
The company has branches in all the ten regions of Ghana.  Its business operations cover motor, 
fire, accident, and marine and aviation. It also provides special insurance products such as hoteliers 
and leisure policy, and policy for the hospitality sector. It has long-standing associations with 
insurance brokerage entities and some self-regulating agents, who make up some of its main 
distribution channels.   
Firm performance  
SIC has consistently without a fail, maintained a steady market leadership. In 2006, 40 percent of 
the insurance market was secured by SIC. This achievement is a reflection of the company’s vision 
to maintaining their dominance in the Insurance industry in the country. SIC has won a lot of 
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awards as a result of their consistent leadership in the insurance sector without a fail. From 2003 to 
2007, the company was adjudged insurance company of the year by the Chartered Institute of 
Marketing, Ghana (CIMG). It was the first insurance firm in Ghana to be ushered into the CIMG 
Hall of Fame category, Insurance category two years running (2008 and 2009). It was rated AA by 
the Global Credit Rating Company (GCRC) of South Africa. The implication is that SIC has a very 
high claims paying capacity and its fortification factors are strong. 
Financial performance of SIC 
2008 Financial Performance 
In 2008, SIC recorded a profit before tax of Gh₵10.9 million as compared to Gh₵ 9.3 million in 
2007, representing a growth of Gh₵1.6 million. A Profit before Tax rose to Gh₵ 8.6 million in 
2008 from Gh₵ 7 million in 2007, depicting a growth of Gh₵ 1.6 million. The total assets of the 
company rose from Gh₵ 91,925,300 in 2007 to Gh₵ 119,573,137 in 2008, representing a growth of 
Gh₵ 27,647,837. More so, Investment income, which comprises dividend, interest receivable, and 
gains and losses increased from Gh₵ 1,660,297 in 2007 to Gh₵ 2,374,385 in 2008, depicting a 
growth of Gh₵ 714,088. Other incomes also rose to Gh₵ 1,351,316 in 2008 from Gh₵ 1,330,432 
in 2007. Basic earnings per share increased to Gh₵ 0.0444 in 2008 as compared to Gh₵ 0.0360 in 
2007. Meanwhile, return on shareholders’ fund rose from 0.1299 percent in 2007 to 0.1318 percent, 
indicating a rise of 0.0019percent.   
2009 Financial Performance 
SIC witnessed Profit before Tax of Gh₵7,487,560 in 2009 as compared to Gh₵10, 994,570 in 
2008, indicating a reduction of Gh₵3,507,010. A Profit after Tax in 2009 decreased from Gh₵ 
8,696,418 in 2008 to Gh₵ 5, 891,490, depicting a reduction of Gh₵ 2,804,926. The company’s 
total assets fell to Gh₵ 117,438,935 in 2009 as compared to Gh₵ 119,573,137 in 2008. Investment 
Income also decreased from Gh₵ 2,374,385 in 2008 to Gh₵ 1,925, 687 in 2009, depicting a fall of 
Gh₵ 448,698. Other incomes stood at Gh₵ 3,773,985 in 2009 as compared with Gh₵ 1,351,316 in 
2008, representing a growth of Gh₵ 2,422,669. Basic Earnings per share in 2009 stood at Gh₵ 
0.0301 from Gh₵ 0.0444 in 2008, depicting a reduction of Gh₵ 0.0143. Further, Return on 
Shareholders Fund fell from 0.1318 percent in 2008 to 0.0952 percent in 2009, signifying a 
reduction of 0.0366percent.  
2010 Financial Performance  
SIC witnessed a Profit before Tax of Gh₵8,044,295 in 2010 as compared to Gh₵7,487,560, 
representing an increase of Gh₵556,735. A Profit after Tax in 2010 increased from Gh₵ 5,891,490 
in 2009 to Gh₵ 6,028,415, depicting a rise of Gh₵ 136,925. The company’s total assets rose to 
Gh₵ 137,441,579 in 2010 as compared to Gh₵ 117,438,935 in 2009, signifying a substantial 
increase of Gh₵ 20,002,644. Investment Income also decreased further from Gh₵ 1,925,687 in 
2009 to Gh₵ 1,610,638 in 2010, depicting a fall of Gh₵ 315,049. Other incomes stood at Gh₵ 
1,717,940 in 2010 as compared to Gh₵ 3,773,985 in 2009, representing a reduction of Gh₵ 
2,056,045. Basic Earnings per share in 2010 stood at Gh₵ 0.0308 from Gh₵ 0.0301 in 2009, 
depicting an increase of Gh₵ 0.0007. Meanwhile, Return on Shareholders Fund fell further from 
0.0952 percent in 2009 to 0.0719percent in 2010, signifying a reduction of 0.0233 percent.  
2011 Performance 
SIC recorded a Pre-Tax profit of Gh₵7,337,329 in 2011 as against the previous year’s 
Gh₵8,044,291, representing a Gh₵ 706,962 reduction. Post-Tax profit in 2011 stood at Gh₵ 
6,081,044, depicting a growth of Gh₵ 52,629 over the previous year’s figure of Gh₵ 6,028,415.  A 
total asset recorded in 2011 was Gh₵ 149,370,424, signifying a Gh₵ 11,928,845 rise over the 
previous year’s value of Gh₵ 137,441,579. Furthermore, investment income was down by Gh₵ 
100,222 from Gh₵ 1,610,638 in 2010 to Gh₵ 1,510,416 in 2011. Other incomes rose to Gh₵ 
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3,827,940 in 2011 as compared to Gh₵ 1,717,940 in 2010, denoting a Gh₵ 2,110,000 growth. 
Moreover, in 2011, the company witnessed a Basic Earnings per share of Gh₵ 0.0311 as against 
Gh₵ 0.0308 in 2010, indicating a rise of Gh₵ 0.0003. Return on shareholders’ fund recorded the 
same as compared to that of 2010. Table 6.6 depicts a tabular representation of SIC’s financial 
performance from 2008 to 2011.   
Table 6.6: Financial performance of SIC: 2008-2011 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Profit before Tax  (Gh₵) 10,994,570 7,487,560 8,044,295 7,337,329 
Profit after Tax (Gh₵) 8,696,418 5,891,490 6,028,415 6,081,044 
Total Assets (Gh₵) 119,573,137 117,438,935 137,441,579 149,370,424 
Return on Shareholders (percent) 0.1318 0.0952 0.0719 0.07 
Investment Income(Gh₵) 2,374,385 1,925,687 1,610,638 1,510,416 
Earnings per Share(Gh₵) 
 
0.0444 0.0301 0.0308 0.0311 
 
Source: Annual Reports of SIC from 2008-2011 
6.2.2 Corporate governance layout 
The company’s corporate governance framework has to be in line with the framework that is 
outlined in the companies code 1963. The company considers shareholders as one of its active 
members and therefore, the only group that is represented on its unitary board of directors. They 
are also permitted to exercise their franchise at the company’s annual general meetings. This point 
of reference is encapsulated by a remark made by an equity holder during one of the company’s 
annual general meetings: 
…….We, as equity holders, like management, have our interests in the 
company as capital providers. The interests of management and us 
[Shareholders] differ and as equity holders, we ought to put some measures 
in place to ensure that the people we put in the helm of affairs of the 
company work for our interest and not theirs. We ought to find out the 
most effective and efficient mechanism. Probably, we should have a team 
of seven persons from ourselves [shareholders] who will be examining the 
company’s quarterly reports and query management about issues that need 
further clarifications. I believe they [the team] can do better than the 
board…….    
The company has senior management body, which is responsible for daily operations of the 
company. The managing director (who is in effect the Chief Executive Officer) of the company is 
the head of the management body.  
6.2.3 Ownership structure and control  
Ownership structure 
In 1995, individual and institutional capital providers secured some of the shares held by the 
government in SIC. This was in line with the Government of Ghana’s (GOG) divestiture program. 
Currently, the government holds 40.0 percent of the total shares of the company. The general 
public holds 27.4, whilst institutional capital providers hold 32.6 percent. The Social Security and 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT) holds 11.291 percent of the institutional holdings. As a result of SSNIT 
holdings in the company, the state becomes the majority shareholder with 51.291 percent of the 
total equity of the company.  This is because; SSNIT is a state institution whereby its head and 
other top managers are government appointees. As a result, the state controls the holdings of 
SSNIT. There is an agreement between the government and SSNIT by which SSNIT is required to 
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inform the former when it plans to sell out some of its holdings to another capital provider. The 
present number of equity holders is over 80,000. These equity holders include SIC employee share 
ownership plan. Table 6.7 below indicates the identities and the various equity holdings of the 
shareholders. 
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Table 6.7: The Ownership Structure of SIC    
Identity of Shareholder 2008 2009 2010 
Shareholding Percentage  Shareholding Percentage Shareholding Percentage 
Government of Ghana 78,258,000 40.000% 78,258,000 40.000% 78,258,000 40.000% 
SSNIT 22,090,392 11.291% 22,090,392 11.291% 22,090,392 11.291% 
SIC Employee Share Ownership Plan 10,977,035   5.611% 10,977,035 5.611% 3,631,110 1.856 
BBGN/HSBC Bank Plc Account Clients 8,900,000 4.549%     
STD Nom. TVL (Pty) Ltd./Standard Bank Plc Clients 8,807,501 4.502% 7,338,760 3.750% 7,027,160 3.592% 
Ghana Reinsurance Company Limited 6,666,612 3.408% 6,666,612 3.410% 6,666,612 3.408% 
BBGN/Barclays Mauritius Re Deut Africa Opportunity Fund   4,827,500 2.470% 3,172,000 1.621% 
SIC Life Company Limited 3,333,300 1.704% 3,333,300 1.700% 3,333,300 1.704% 
SIC-FSL/SIC Provident Fund 3,246,465 1.659% 3,246,465 1.6602% 3,146,465 1.608% 
BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. Renaissance African Master Fund     2,821,976 1.442% 
BBGN/JP Morgan Chase Onshore 6178C 2,200,000 1.124% 2,200,000 1.120% 2,200,000 1.124% 
Ghana Commercial Bank Limited 2,000,000 1.022% 2,000,000 1.020% 2,000,000 1.022% 
Teachers’ Fund 1,666,700 0.852% 1,666,700 0.850% 1,666,700 0.852% 
Amoah Kofi Dr 1,500,000 0.767% 1,500,000 0.767% 1,500,000 0.767% 
STD Nom. TVL (Pty) Ltd./Standard Bank Plc clients A/C     1,094,500 0.559% 
BBGN/BBH Cust DZ Bank Int. S.A. Lux-Silk FD-African Lion FD GH   1,495,000 0.760% 3,222,993 1.647% 
BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. AIG Sub-Sah. Africa Master Fund   1,000,000 0.500% 1,000,000 0.511% 
BBAGN/Barclays Cap.Sec. Ltd. Cayman Clients 1,458,950 0.746% 2,821,976 1.440%   
EDC Stockbrokers Limited 869,824 0.445%     
BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. AIG Sub-Sah. Africa Mkt Fun 850,000 0.434% 850,000 0.430% 850,000 0.434% 
BBGN/PICTET Africa Non Tax 6257J   600,000 0.310% 2,050,000 1.048 
Mainstream Reinsurance 517,332 0.264%     
Ghana Cocoa Company 507,500 0.259% 507,500 0.260% 824,500 0.421 
Donewell Life Company Limited 500,000 0.256% 500,000 0.260%   
STD.Nom/METLIFE Share Holders Fund 500,000 0.256%     
Strategic African Securities 500,000 0.256% 500,000 0.260%   
STD Nom. TVL (Pty) Ltd./Metlife Classic Fund     615,000 0.314% 
Source: Annual reports of SIC from 2008-2010 
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The company’s current minority shareholders include: STD Nom. TVL (Pty) Ltd. /Standard Bank 
Plc clients A/C (3.592 percent), Ghana Reinsurance Company Limited (3.408 percent), SIC Life 
Company Limited (1.704 percent), BBGN/BBH Cust DZ Bank Int. S.A. Lux-Silk FD-African Lion 
FD GH (1.647 percent), BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. Deut Africa Opportunity Fund (1.621 percent), 
SIC- FSL/SIC Provident Fund (1.608 percent), BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. Renaissance African 
Master Fund (1.442 percent), BBGN/JP Morgan Chase Onshore 6178C (1.124 percent), 
BBGN/PICTET Africa Non Tax 6257J (1.048 percent), Ghana Commercial Bank Limited 
(1.022percent), Teachers’ Fund (0.852 percent), Dr. Kofi Amoah (0.767 percent), STD Nom. TVL 
(Pty) Ltd./Standard Bank Plc clients A/C (0.559 percent), BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. AIG Sub-
Sah. Africa Master Fund (0.511percent), BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. Renaissance African Market 
Fund (0.434 percent), Ghana Cocoa Company Limited (0.421 percent), STD Nom. TVL (Pty) 
Ltd./Metlife Classic Fund (0.314 percent) and the general populace consisting of about 80,00 who 
owns small numbers of shares (26.14 percent). The general public secured shares when SIC was 
listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The listing of the company was to some extent targeted to 
widening up the ownership stand of the company in accordance with the goals of the government’s 
privatization program.   
Ownership control 
Shareholder or ownership control at SIC mirrors the ownership structure as depicted in table 16. 
The government, who holds the majority of the shares, exerts more control over the company than 
the other equity holders. This controlling function of the government is demonstrated during AGMs 
and by its (government) persistent influence on the decision-making processes of management.  
The Government-Majority shareholder    
The state wields absolute control over the affairs of the company. In regards to access to 
information, the government has greater advantage than other equity holders. Monthly, quarterly 
and yearly reports are made available to the government upon request. The management of SIC, 
more often than not, requires government’s approval/consent before major decisions are taken. The 
government also has access to key persons in the company. For instance, the government has 
greater access to the chairman of the board and Chief executive Officer (the Managing Director) of 
SIC. The government has the power to summon the board chairman and the managing director to 
interrogate on issues pertaining to the performance of the company and the way forward. The 
government through its council of state/advisory group appoints key people within the company. 
For example, in 2009, the present government, with its greater influence, reconstituted the board 
with its political cohorts. Also, the managing director at that time was also directed to proceed on 
leave and after sometime, he was retired. The position became vacant and as result, the government 
appointed an acting managing director through an advice given to it by its reconstituted board.  
There are inefficiencies that occur at the manner in which this control is exerted by the 
government. For instance, urgent issues that are needed to be taken sometimes take a very long 
time. Notwithstanding this weakness,   the government’s influence on the affairs of the company is 
momentous and is taken critically by management. The expression of the view by management that 
the government is the most relevant equity holder, whose investment ought to be upheld always 
point to the fact that, the government is a credible menace and induces managers to undertake 
decisions to maximize shareholder value.  
Minority Shareholders 
The annual general meeting serves as a forum for minority equity holders to be informed about 
management decisions that have been made during the year under review and for considering 
proposals of management. This is because the company’s annual general meetings are not all that 
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important to the government as it is consistently informed about the affairs of the company by 
management. The involvement of the minority equity holders in the day-to-day activities of the 
company is made easier by the minimum disclosures mandated by the companies code, 1963 and 
the GSE listing regulations. Such disclosures consist of annual audited reports and quarterly non-
audited financial reports. These are made available on the company’s official website, newspapers 
and on the GSE notice boards. As a matter of fact, the kind of role minority shareholders play on 
annual general meetings of the company does not affect decision-making processes during these 
meetings. Even though minority equity holders exercise their voting rights on proposals, the 
outcome of the vote does depend on the government since it (the government) is the majority 
shareholder.   
The ways in which annual general meetings are held and agendas are set reduce the potential 
influence of minority equity holders on the affairs of the company. In 2012, the agenda for the 
annual general meeting, which offers the framework for allowing complete disclosure of 
information and, induce accountability and transparency came under considerable criticisms from 
minority equity holders. A minority equity holder articulated that:  
The manner in which the agenda for the meeting has been prepared is 
such that a number of essential elements has been mislaid in order not to 
allow us [shareholders] to get hold of important matters within the 
company. This is to furnish management the necessary platform to 
conceal certain important information.                       
This assertion implies that minority equity holders can only get hold of information if management 
and directors permit. This is different from how the government is treated in getting information on 
the firm in that, the company’s management always furnishes the government with all the 
necessary information about the company. Table 6.8 below depicts comments on aspects of 
shareholder control at GCB.  
Table 6.8: Shareholder Control at SIC Insurance Company Ltd. 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Duties of the board are being fulfilled when they report to 
shareholders during AGMs  
√   
Annual audited reports are made available to shareholders 
before AGMs 
√   
Quarterly reports are made publicly √   
All shareholders receive invitations to AGMs √   
During AGMs, shareholders have the right to vote on 
board’s proposals/suggestions 
√   
Large shareholders exert extensive influence during AGMs √   
Decisions taken at AGMs are subject to voting √   
The kind of influence that majority shareholders have in the 
selection or appointment of directors makes it possible for 
them to exert control over the firm 
√   
It is easy for large shareholders to have access to very 
important personalities in the firm 
√   
Decisions of management or directors can be questioned or 
altered by large shareholders 
√   
Shareholders have the right to call for Extraordinary 
General Meetings for clarifications of issues 
  
√ 
 
Source: Fieldwork 
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6.2.4 Effectiveness of the board 
The factors that usually determine the effectiveness of a board with respect to board control were 
explored and examined. These factors are: the board composition; director independence; the 
leadership structure of the board; board meetings; board audit committee; and board remuneration 
committee.  
Board composition 
Currently, SIC has nine board members of whom eight are non-executive directors and the 
remainder, an executive director. The directors are made up of business magnates, an actuary, a 
chartered accountant by profession, a lawyer, a medical practitioner, an engineer, economist and a 
financial analyst, and the managing director who in effect is the Chief Executive Officer of the 
company. Some of the board members are either heads of, or occupy key positions in other 
corporate organizations. Others have also occupied key positions in other organizations. For 
instance, the current board chairperson served as the Chief Executive Officer of Ghana Reinsurance 
Company in 1997. He was also one of the board members of Ghana Stock Exchange. More so, the 
Managing Director of the company is the chairperson of the academic board of the Ghana 
Insurance College and also serves on the board of Ghana International Bank.  
Board Independence 
To settle on director independence, the method of appointment and possible connection between 
the CEO and major equity holders were scrutinized. Appointment/Selection of members to serve on 
the company’s board is made through a method agreed on by the government. This implies that the 
government, through its council of state (advisory body), appoints its political fellows to partake in 
the business decision-making processes of the company. Therefore, a large number of equity 
holders is not involved in the company’s decision-making processes and allocation of the 
company’s limited resources. The process of identifying a potential director to represent the 
government on the company’s board is politically induced. A typical example is what happened in 
2008, when there was a change of government. Consequently, the company’s board was 
reconstituted by the present government in power. In an interview with one of the board members, 
this was what he had to say: 
……….this problem has been with us since time in memorial and until the 
state started building strong institutions to find solutions to it once and for 
all, we would live with this for a very long time to come. Why am I saying 
this? Even though I was appointed by the government to serve on this board 
by bringing on board my expertise, I am not independent. This is because, I 
have been selected to serve the government’s interest……….. Also, upon the 
exit of this government, I will have no option than to exit or vacate my 
post….. Is that what we want in this country? I don’t like this idea but our 
society has made or crafted it to be like that and we don’t have any option 
but to live with it. It is pathetic……… 
Although the constitution of the board is usually political, the government through its advisory 
group (council of state) does select well-qualified persons to serve on the company’s board. With 
this, the advisors are charged by the government to appoint members who are economically, 
socially or psychologically independent of management.  
The leadership structure of the board           
The positions of the board chairperson and that of the managing director have been separated. This 
brings about checks and balances in the decision-making processes of the company. This is in line 
with the fifth principle of OECD, which states that the separation of the positions of the Chief 
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Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairperson of the board may be considered as the best practice. 
This can help attain an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and objectivity, and 
improve the ability of the board for decision making, which is independent of management. 
However, as noted earlier, the government appoints the chairman and managing director (Chief 
Executive Officer) of SIC and as a result; the chairperson of the board is not independent of the 
government. The managing director works hand-in-hand with the board chairperson in managing 
the company as well as in the preparation for board meetings. This furnishes the chairperson with a 
lot of information when he needs them. During annual general meetings, the managing director 
relies on the company’s chairperson for assistance. Any time the managing director deems it 
necessary to get an approval of an issue from the board, he first and foremost thrashes out with the 
chairperson who will eventually support the managing director’s position during board 
deliberations. This points to the fact that the managing director has to convince the chairperson in 
order to have his support. The implication is that directors can fail to accept proposals of 
management.  
Board meetings      
Board meetings are carried out four times a year and can be scheduled or increased as situations 
require. Reports on the company are sent to members four (4) weeks ahead of the meeting in order 
to give board members ample time to prepare. One other channel upon which board members use 
to get access to information about the company is by meeting the managing director (Chief 
Executive Officer). Meeting agendas are set by management, but they need to be approved by the 
board. The agenda for the meeting is the first item to be deliberated and agreed on. Further, matters 
that directors put forward are incorporated into the agenda, which generally contains: Approval of 
previous board meeting minutes; matters/issues arising; quarterly financial performance report; and 
any other business. This arrangement does help in the management of the company’s affairs and 
serves as a platform of progress assessment as well as serving as a basis for subsequent actions.  
Board audit committee  
SIC has established a formal audit and finance committee for the purpose of how to apply the 
financial reporting and internal control ethics, and for upholding a suitable connection with the 
organization’s external auditors. The committee consists of four (4) non-executives directors. Rules 
governing the committee avoid/bar the board’s chairperson from being the committee’s 
chairperson. The committee requires at least two (2) of its members to be financially literate at the 
time such members are selected. It is required of the internal auditor of the company to attend 
meetings of the committee.  
The principal duties and responsibilities of the committee are: Monitoring the maintenance of 
proper accounting records and the reliability of financial reports used in the affairs of the company; 
putting forward reasonable assurance of the protection of assets against unauthorized use or 
disposition; authorizing, directing and reviewing the program of the internal auditor; receiving 
reports from the internal auditor and considering the major findings of those reports; monitoring 
follow-up activities of management; keeping accounting policies of the company under review and 
making recommendations to the board to amend or repeal such policies; monitoring compliance 
with the vital legal and regulatory framework; presenting audit reports to board members during 
board meetings; discussing any challenges or reservations that arise from the interim or final audit 
and any issues the external auditor may wish to deliberate on; reviewing the way in which 
management ensures and monitors the manner, magnitude and efficacy of the company’s 
accounting, risk management and financial control systems; and holding discussions with the 
external auditor ahead of the period their audit commences.  
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The committee has the authority of the board to scrutinize any actions that fall within its main 
duties. It also has the authority to seek any information it needs from any employee, past and 
present and such employee is fully obliged to cooperate with any demand made by the committee. 
The committee also has the authority of the board of directors to obtain outside legal or other 
independent professional advice and if it deems it necessary to seek the services of outsiders with 
vital experience and expertise to undertake its duties and responsibilities, it could do so. Through 
this arrangement, the board’s awareness of decisions of management and the board’s capability to 
exercise control over decisions of management are enhanced. 
Board remuneration committee  
The company has not established a formal remuneration committee. However, the audit and 
finance committee of the company has been delegated by the board to look into issues concerning 
compensation packages. The audit and finance committee has been tasked by the board to deal with 
the following issues: Recommending the levels of remuneration of non-executive directors for 
approval by the board and ultimately by the shareholders; undertaking of annual reviews of 
executives emoluments; and reviewing and recommending to the board, executives and staff 
bonuses and long-term incentive packages. Since non-executive remuneration packages are to be 
approved by the board and ultimately by shareholders, the government always has an influence on 
them. This is because before the board approves these remuneration packages, they are 
communicated to the government for its endorsement prior to annual general meetings. Table 6.9 
below depicts the result of the interviews on the determinants of board effectiveness in respect of 
the board’s control function. 
Table 6.9: Effectiveness of the board of SIC 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
For the past 10 years, majority of board members have 
been  NEDs 
√ 
 
  
There is an existence of social or economic tie between 
directors and the firm 
  √ 
 
There is an existence of social or economic tie between 
directors and top managers 
  √ 
 
There is a presence of social or economic tie between 
directors and majority shareholders 
 √ 
 
 
Positions of the CEO and the Chairperson have been 
separated and occupied by different people for the past 10 
years 
√ 
 
  
There is an existence of an audit committee instituted by 
the board 
√ 
 
  
There is a presence of a board remuneration committee   √ 
 
Majority of the members on the audit committee are 
NEDs 
√ 
 
  
NEDs form majority on the remuneration committee NO REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
Membership appointments to the audit committee are 
made known to shareholders 
√ 
 
  
Membership appointments to the remuneration committee 
are made known to shareholders 
NO REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
There are criteria for the selection and replacement of 
directors 
  √ 
 
There is a laid down procedure upon which board 
meetings are held 
√ 
 
  
Before board meetings, information about the firm are 
made available to members on time 
√ 
 
  
Source: Fieldwork 
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6.2.5 Board control 
With an advice from the board of directors, the power of hiring or selecting the managing director 
is vested in the government. The board can only advise the government if directors have the view 
that the managing director is not performing satisfactorily. For instance, in 2012, with an advice 
from the board of directors to the government, the managing director was relieved of his position. 
The reason for his dismissal was not effectively communicated to other shareholders since the 
board did not want to disclose what happened. With this, most of the minority shareholders were 
disappointed with this action of the board. This displeasure came to bare during the company’s 
2012 annual general meeting when one of the minority shareholders raised the issue. He was 
looking for some clarifications from the board chairperson, but he did not get any. In accordance 
with this, most of the minority shareholders walked out of the meeting to exhibit their displeasure. 
They thought, with that demonstration, the board would be persuaded to give an explanation, but it 
did not work the way they (minority shareholders) wanted. In an interview with one of the minority 
shareholders after the meeting, this was what he had to say: 
……I do not consider our board as a credible or dependable board. A board, 
which does not want minority shareholders to know exactly what goes on in 
the company they have a stake in….Oh my God!! I have regretted investing 
in such a company. Today this, tomorrow that. What at all do they [board 
members] do? Perhaps it is not their fault since there is a big hand [the 
government] that instructs them to serve its interest. What I mean is, all of 
them [board members] are government appointees and they are being 
compelled to serve the government’s interest. Everything is political….. 
There is something fishy somewhere and we [minority shareholders] need to 
know. 
This revelation points to the assertion that although shareholders are usually assumed to possess the 
right to demand changes in companies, the right of minority shareholders to equally partake in 
carrying out these changes are normally impeded (Mantysaari, 2005). This overtly illuminates that 
the board of SIC does not have the authority to appoint or fire the company’s managing director 
unless it has been given the go ahead by the government (the major shareholder) to undertake such 
decisions. Although the audit and finance committee of the company determines remuneration 
packages of the managing director and individual directors, it has to be always approved by the 
government. The board through its audit and finance committee has instituted a formal evaluation 
structure to evaluate/assess the performances of the managing director, board members and the 
activities of the board. An implicit assessment of the performance of management happens on an 
incessant basis. It can be stated further that additional evaluation of management, directors and the 
activities of the board is not vital in the sense that the government carries out an assessment, based 
on the normal presentation of reports to the government by management. Therefore, the 
government executes all the control functions, which are more often than not,  in the domain of the 
board of directors. The implication is that the board plays a more advisory/counseling role to 
management rather than wielding control over it. Table 6.10 below shows the responses with 
regard to board control in the case of SIC. It can be figured out that the board of SIC has a limited 
control function.  
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Table 6.10: Board control at SIC 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Decisions in terms of hiring a CEO is made by the 
board                                        
     √ 
The CEO can be replaced by the board in case of 
mismanagement 
  
√ 
 
Strategies are discussed and approved by the board √   
Decisions on the CEO’s remuneration package is 
made by the board via the remuneration committee 
  √ 
The activities of the CEO are assessed by the board 
 
√   
The board makes sure the firm complies with 
existing laws regarding the day to day running of 
the firm eg, Generally Accepted Accounting and 
Auditing Principles laid down by ICAG 
 
√ 
  
The board determines the type of information it 
needs from management anytime 
√   
   Source: Fieldwork 
6.2.6 Analysis and confirmation of propositions 
The level of control that the government exerts in the case of SIC is significant. Regular access of 
information and the power to appoint or fire key individuals of the company imply that 
management will always take decisions to meet the government’s interest. This portrays the 
government as a credible threat and therefore, plays a vital role in tackling agency problem. This 
verifies proposition 1 that equity holders that possess the majority of shares in a corporate entity 
exert control. Unlike GCB where the government always exerts effective control, the case of SIC is 
different in that this control is always not effectively and efficiently effected. The rate at which 
decisions are made by the government is slow and it points to the fact that, a certain degree of 
inefficiency exists with regards to the use of power possessed and information accessed by the 
government.  
In respect of board meetings, the findings indicate that they are carried out in an effective and 
efficient way. This stems from the fact that board members are always being furnished with 
requisite information by management. This put board members in a position where they can query 
management on certain issues that are not clear to them during board meetings. Even though board 
members have control over management, inasmuch as the government always influences decisions 
of both management and the board, the control function of the board is limited. The implication is 
that, proposition 2, which states that: Effective and efficient board meetings result in an extensive 
board control in a corporation is not confirmed in the case of SIC.  
The separation of the role of the managing director and that of the chairperson of the board is in 
line with the agency theory in terms of strengthening board control. Even with this, at SIC, the 
board chairperson is not independent of the controlling shareholder and because of this; he 
(chairperson) does not play any significant role in enhancing board control. Since the position of 
the managing director and that of the chairperson have always been government appointees, and 
hence being influenced by the government always, proposition 3 that: The non-duality structure 
with an independent chairperson results in panoptic board control in a company is not confirmed 
in the case of SIC. 
The findings in terms of a prim and proper audit committee depict that a formal audit committee 
has been instituted with non-executive directors as its members. Even with this, the role of the 
committee is irrelevant stemming from the fact that the government does exert control over the 
affairs of the company. This means proposition 4(a), which states that: Instituting a board audit 
committee with independent directors as its members, leads to an extensive board control in a 
company is not confirmed in the case of SIC. 
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With regards to a board remuneration committee, the company has not established a formal 
remuneration committee. For this reason, proposition 4(b) that, instituting a board remuneration 
committee with independent directors as its members, leads to a panoptic board control in a 
company is not confirmed in the case of SIC. Notwithstanding the non-verification of this 
proposition, there are evidence that the presence of such a committee is necessary in enhancing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the board in terms of its control function. The presence of the audit 
and finance committee to carry out works that are to be performed by the remuneration committee 
points to the need to institute such a prim and proper remuneration committee.  
6.3 UT Bank Ghana Limited 
This section of the analyses will address the background, profile and activities of the UT bank. It 
will further the analyses by highlighting the financial performance of the bank for the period, 2008-
2011. It will examine the bank’s corporate governance framework by illuminating how both the 
ownership structure and board structure lead to shareholder control and board control respectively. 
Finally, the confirmation or disconfirmation of the study’s propositions will be examined on the 
basis of the evidences gathered from the company.     
6.3.1 Background, profile and activities of the Company 
UT bank Ghana Limited (formerly UT Financial Services Limited) started business as a finance 
house in 1997 under the name Unique Trust Financial Services (UT Bank Annual Report, 2011). 
From an unassuming beginning as a privately owned business entity in Ghana, UT Financial 
Services became a publicly owned company in 2008 with stocks listed and actively traded on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange. Although UT was initially to focus on servicing the ‘unbanked’ informal 
sector, over the past few years, its services have extended to include the formal sector and offering 
stop gap loans and trade financing to Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs).  
The bank offers a very solid business structure, flexible and opportune financial needs to its clients 
in at most forty-eight (48) hours. With its 26 branches countrywide, over 600 staff and a twelve-
monthly turnover of Gh₵ 74 million, UT bank is one of the fastest growing and formidable 
indigenous banks in Ghana.  The bank has for some years dedicated itself to serving the desires of 
Ghanaian traders’ businesses, not usually catered for by the traditional banks.    
Currently, the bank provides a wide range of products and services to its valued clients. These are: 
1) Unique Current Account- it is designed to allow clients to carry out their businesses with 
cheques. The motive behind this is that the bank does not want its clients to carry with them huge 
sums of money everywhere to make transactions; 2) Unique Savings Account- it is designed to 
induce persons to set aside money in a gradual manner to meet up future and unforeseen 
contingencies. This product can be used as security to apply for loans from the bank; 3) Unique 
smartcard- it is designed to secure a channel to make transactions based on biometric identification 
and therefore, allow holders of the card and merchants to carry out funds upload, spend and settle a 
variety of transactions including deposit, payment, withdrawal and transfer; 4)  Foreign Accounts, 
which is made up of Foreign Exchange Account and Foreign Currency Account;5) Investment 
Products- it is designed to provide a safe and sound return for money that a person, corporate 
entity, association and even government agencies are not prepared to make use of immediately; 6) 
Loans- consisting Asset Finance, Fon4loan and Business Loans; and 7) Remittances.   
Firm Performance 
UT bank Ghana Limited is one of the fastest growing indigenous banks in Ghana. In consequence 
of its overwhelming performance since its inception, the bank has received numerous awards that 
make it one of the outstanding companies that have been contributing immensely to the socio-
economic development of Ghana. In 2003, the bank was regarded as being the best non-financial 
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institution by Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC). The bank was also adjudged the 18
th
 
best company as well as the 3
rd
 best financial institution in Ghana the same year by GIPC.  In 2004, 
it maintained its position as the 3
rd
 best financial institution as well as the best financial institution 
in Ghana. In addition, its position as the 18
th
 best company in 2003 improved to 13
th
 best corporate 
entity in 2004. Table 6.11 below shows the various endorsements, in terms of banking and national 
awards that UT has chalked over the years.  
Table 6.11: Banking and National awards of UT bank Ghana Ltd. 
YEAR AWARDS 
2005 1.2
nd Best Company in Ghana by GIPC. 
2. Best Non-Bank Financial Institution by GIPC. 
3. Best Financial Institution by GIPC. 
2006 1. UT won the Chartered Institute of Marketing, Ghana’s (CIMG) advert of the year award. 
2.The CEO of UT won the CIMG’s Marketing Man of the year 
2007 UT won an award for its outstanding contribution to the Socio-economic development of Ghana under the 
Business and Financial Services Excellence Awards. 
2008 1. Order of the Volta Award conferred on the CEO by the then President of Ghana. 
2. The Bank’s CEO was adjudged the Most Respected CEO for the year 2007 by GIPC. 
3.2nd most respected company by GIPC. 
2009 1.5
th Best Company in Ghana. 
2. 2nd Best Financial institution by GIPC. 
3. Best Non-Bank Financial Institution in Ghana by GIPC. 
2010 1.5
th Best Company in Ghana by GIPC. 
2.2nd Best Financial Institution in Ghana by GIPC. 
3. Number one Indigenous Company by GIPC. 
2011 1.41
st Position of Top 100 companies in Ghana by GIPC. 
2. Best bank in Short Term Loan Financing under the Ghana Banking Awards Scheme. 
3.2nd Runner up of IT and electronic platform under the Ghana Banking Awards Scheme. 
Source: UT annual reports (2008-2011) 
In 2005, the bank was regarded as being the 2
nd
 Best company in Ghana, Best Non-Bank Financial 
Institution as well as Best Financial Institution by GIPC. Whilst the bank’s CEO won the CIMG’s 
marketing man of the year, the bank, itself received the CIMG’s advert of the year award in 2006.  
Moreover, because of the bank’s outstanding contribution to the social and economic development 
of Ghana, it received award during the Business and financial Services Excellence awards held in 
2007. Furthermore, in the year 2008, the Order of the Volta award was conferred on the bank’s 
CEO for his visionary leadership by the then President of Ghana. The bank was also adjudged the 
second most respected company in Ghana by GIPC. UT bank became the fifth best company as 
well as the second best financial institution in Ghana in 2009. In addition, the bank was also 
regarded as the best non-bank financial institution in Ghana by GIPC.  In 2010, the bank 
maintained its position as the fifth best company as well as the second best financial institution in 
Ghana. This same year, it was adjudged as the number one indigenous company in Ghana. More 
so, the bank was able to pick an award as the 2
nd
 runner-up of IT and electronic platform under the 
Ghana Banking Awards Scheme in 2011. It also became the best bank in short term loan financing 
under the same award scheme in 2011.  
Financial Performance of UT  
2008 Financial Performance  
By the mid-year of 2008, the bank’s operational results were very strong, which accounted for its 
initial public offering becoming the major single profitable offer to date (UT Annual report, 2008).  
UT bank recorded a pre-tax profit of GH₵ 7.6 million in 2008 compared with GH₵ 5.9 million in 
2007, representing a 28 percent growth. The post-tax profit of the bank in 2008 stood at Gh₵ 5.3 
million as weighed against GH₵ 4.4 million in 2007, showcasing a growth of GH₵ 0.9 million. 
With the bank’s portfolio standing at GH₵ 100 million, Loans and Advances was up to GH₵ 98.1 
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million in 2008 as against GH₵ 57. 2 million in 2007, indicating a 46 percent growth. The bank’s 
inactive portfolio was halved and management was able to retain more than half of the bank’s 
profit before provision for bad debt for the first time. The total operating income increased to Gh₵ 
33.8 million in 2008 as against GH₵ 30.8 million in the previous year, signifying a growth of 10 
percent. The bank’s cost efficiency ratio in 2008 was also up to 49 percent as compared with the 
recorded figure of 45percent in 2007, indicating a 4 percent growth. Further, the bank’s profit 
attributable to its shareholders increased to GH₵ 5.3 million in 2008 as against GH₵ 4.4 million 
recorded in 2007, portraying a 21 percent growth. More so, whilst the bank’s earnings per share 
increased to GH₵ 0.035 in 2008 as weighed against GH₵ 0.022 in 2007, representing a 61 percent 
growth, Return on Average Invested Capital was decreased from 237 percent in 2007 to 64 percent 
in 2008. Moreover, weighing against the figure of GH₵ 11.1 million in 2007, the bank’s total 
equity rose to GH₵ 16.9 million in 2008, exhibiting a growth of 52 percent. Finally, the bank 
chalked a growth of 68 percent of its total assets from GH₵ 75 million in 2007 to GH₵ 127.8 
million in 2008.         
2009 Financial Performance 
UT bank witnessed a profit before tax of Gh₵ 9.7 million in 2009 as weighed against the GH₵ 7.6 
million in the previous year, exhibiting an increase of GH₵ 2.1 million. Profit after tax recorded 
GH₵ 7.5 million in the year under review compared with the recorded figure of GH₵ 5.3 million in 
the previous year, denoting a rise of GH₵ 2.2 million. Also, Loans and advances stood at Gh₵ 
138.3 million in 2009 weighing against the GH₵ 98.1 million recorded figure in the previous year. 
This means that Loans and Advances increased by GH₵ 40.3 in 2009. Further, the bank’s total 
operating income rose by GH₵ 1.5 million, from GH₵ 33.8 million in the previous year to GH₵ 
35.3 million in 2009. With regards to the cost efficiency ratio, the bank recorded a 1percent growth 
from 49 percent in the past year to 50 percent in 2009. More so, the bank’s profit attributable to its 
cherished ordinary shareholders stood at GH₵ 7.5 million in 2009 compared with GH₵ 5.3 that 
was recorded in the previous year, portraying an increase of GH₵ 2.2 million. Moreover, basic 
earnings per share increased to GH₵ 0.04 in 2009 against the recorded figure of GH₵ 0.035 in the 
preceding year, indicating an increase of GH₵ 0.005.  The bank’s total equity was up by GH₵ 5.5 
million from GH₵ 16.8 million in the previous year to GH₵ 22.3 million in 2009. Lastly, the 
bank’s total assets also exhibited a tremendous improvement judging from the previous year’s 
figure of GH₵ 127.8 million. The total assets for the year, 2009, stood at GH₵ 211.9 million, 
denoting an increase of GH₵ 84 million.   
2010 Financial Performance 
The bank recorded a pre-tax profit of Gh₵ 12.2 million in 2010, exhibiting a Gh₵ 3.0 million 
growth over the previous year’s value of Gh₵ 9.7 million. Post-tax profit stood at Gh₵ 9.9 million 
in 2010 as against the Gh₵ 7.5 million witnessed in 2009. This implies the bank’s net profit 
increased by Gh₵ 2.4 million in 2010. The bank’s loans and advances increased by Gh₵ 177 
million from Gh₵ 138.3 million in 2009 to Gh₵ 315.3 million in 2010. More so, its operating cost 
was up by 30 percent from the previous year’s figure of Gh₵ 35.3 million to Gh₵ 45.7 million in 
2010. This increase was predominantly as a result of the acquisition of ‘UT Bank’ and the costs of 
the expanded operations; its branches increased from 16 to 26 and staff from 400 to 600. 
Meanwhile, the cost to income ratio of the bank moved to 58 percent from the previous figure of 48 
percent. Customer deposits surged up by 128 percent, from the Gh₵ 165.3 recorded in 2009 to 
Gh₵ 377.3 million in 2010. Further, shareholders fund also increased to Gh₵ 51.1 million in 2010 
from the immediate past year’s Gh₵ 22.3 million, representing a 129 percent increase. Meanwhile, 
basic earnings per share reduced by Gh₵ 0.01 from Gh₵ 0.04 in 2009 to Gh₵ 0.03 in 2010. 
Finally, the bank witnessed a significant improvement in its total assets in 2010. It increased by 144 
percent, from Gh₵ 211.9 million in 2009 to Gh₵ 516.6 million.                      
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2011 Performance  
UT Bank overall market return for 2011 was -3.10 percent, a dismissal performance when 
compared to the value recorded in the previous year (UT Bank Annual report, 2011). Financial 
stocks rapidly dropped yielding a return of -13.69 percent at the end of 2011 calendar year. 
Meanwhile, UT bank stocks gained an inspiring 14.29 percent return. The share price of the bank 
generally held from month to month made some gains during the first half of the year. Profit before 
tax in 2011 was Gh₵ 17.3 million as compared to Gh₵ 12.1 million in 2010, signifying a growth of 
Gh₵ 5.2 million. With the introduction of the National Stabilization Levy, the bank recorded a post 
tax profit of Gh₵ 13.1 million, representing a Gh₵ 3.2 million over the previous year’s Gh₵ 9.9 
million. Total loans and advances stood at Gh₵ 475.2 million as against the Gh₵ 315.3 million in 
2010, denoting a Gh₵ 159.9 growth. The operating income of the bank was up by Gh₵ 33.3 
million from Gh₵ 45.7 million in 2010 to Gh₵ 79 million.  Also, weighing cost to income ratio of 
60 percent against 58 percent recorded in 2010, there was an increase of 45 percent (Gh₵ 50 
million) in 2011. More so, customer deposit surged up to Gh₵ 545.8 million in 2011, showing a 
Gh₵ 168.5 million rise over the figure recorded over the same period in 2010. There was an 
increase in shareholders fund by Gh₵ 10.1 million from the immediate past year’s figure of Gh₵ 
51.1 million to Gh₵ 61.2 million in 2011. More so, the bank’s basic earnings per share rose by 
Gh₵ 0.01 in 2011. It increased from Gh₵ 0.03 in 2010 to Gh₵ 0.04 in 2011. Lastly, total assets 
went up to Gh₵ 712 million, representing a 38 percent growth. This rapid increase necessitated an 
increase in deposit to assist loan book. Table 6.12 below shows a tabular representation of the 
financial performance of the UT bank from 2008 to 2011.   
Table 6.12: Financial Performance of UT Bank: 2008-2011 
GH₵ 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Profit before Tax  7,550,000 9,705,000 12,160,000 17,300,000 
Profit after Tax 5,300,000 7,521,000 9,905,000 13,065,000 
Total Assets 127,823,000 211,921,000 516,632,000 712,864,000 
Shareholders Fund 16,878,000 22,279,000 51,087,000 61,229,000 
Customer Deposits - 165,275,000 377,286,000 545,808,000 
Total Loans & Advances 98,116,000 138,281,000 315,297,000 475,232,000 
Earnings per Share 
 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 
Source: UT bank Annual Report (2008-2011) 
6.3.2 Corporate governance framework 
Corporate governance structure of this company reflects the shareholder perspective model of 
corporate governance enshrined in the companies code 1963 (Act 179) in which board directors are 
appointed by the company’s shareholders. Shareholders are the only organizational constituents 
that carry out corporate governance-related activities in the company including voting at the annual 
general meeting. The corporate entity has a one-tier board system.  
6.3.3 Ownership structure and Shareholder control 
Ownership structure 
The initial capital for the establishment of this company was provided by two founding 
entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs who still hold stocks in this company are a business consultant 
and retired military officer, and a distinguished Ghanaian business executive.  In 2008, the two 
entrepreneurs decided to strengthen the company’s brand to enable it to succeed in expanding to 
other operational areas. As a result, these two entrepreneurs created UT holding Ltd by combining 
their holdings to consolidate activities of their affiliated corporate entities.  
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The bank became a publicly owned company in 2008 with shares listed and actively traded on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange. The company issued 15,000,000,000 ordinary shares. In May, the same 
year, a resolution was passed to consolidate the authorized stocks of the company to 750,000,000.  
Databank Brokerage Ltd. and Databank Balance Fund, both subsidiaries of Databank Group 
obtained shares in that year. The ownership structure after the company’s listing on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange in 2008 is portrayed in Table 6.13 below. The years covered in this table signify a 
period during which significant alterations took place with regards to the ownership structure of the 
corporate entity; mainly the spread of the ownership base of the bank with other shareholders 
obtaining major stocks.     
UT holdings Ltd. is presently, the majority shareholder of UT bank. It holds 61.11 percent of the 
total shares of the bank. Even though UT holdings Ltd. holds a majority of the company’s shares, it 
does not regard UT bank as its subsidiary. This is as a result of the fact that it does not have 
absolute control over the board of directors of the company stemming from the fact that there are 
some limitations provided in the company’s rules and regulations guiding it.  
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Table 6.13: The Ownership Structure of UT Bank 
Identity of Shareholder 2008 2009 2010 
Shareholding Percentage Shareholding Percentage Shareholding Percentage 
UT Holdings Ltd     184,565,098 61.11% 
Nsonamoah Joseph Mr 60,219,750 28.58% 60,698,900 28.8%   
Amoabeng Prince Capt. 60,219,750 28.58% 60,698,900 28.8%   
SCBN/SSB London Investec Premier Funds PCC Ltd Africa Fund     17,000,000 5.63% 
BBGN/Barclays Mauritius RE Kura Africa Fund     14,690,879 4.86% 
Databank Brokerage Ltd 11,695,900 5.55% 11,695,900 5.55%   
SCBN/SSB London Care of SSB LDN. INV. Assets Mgt(PTY)     9,639,750 3.19% 
SCBN/ Standchart Mauritius Re Kura Africa Fund       
BBGN/Epack Investment Fund Ltd/Zenith Bank 6,666,600 3.16% 6,666,600 3.16%   
SCBN/EPACK Investment Fund Ltd- Transactions A/C     6,666,600 2.21% 
SCBN/ Standchart Mauritius Re Deut Africa Opportunities Fund       
UTFSL ESOP 4,000,000 1.89% 4,000,000 1.89%   
SCBN/Chase Offshore 6179C       
SCBN/ELAC Policy Holders Fund 2,300,000 1.09% 2,300,000 1.09% 2,300,000 0.76% 
SCBN/Investec Institutional Pan Africa Fund LLC-IAM4     2,600,000 0.86% 
SCGN/JP Morgan Chase Duet Gamla Liv Africa  Opportunities Fund IC       
SCBN//UNIL GH Managers Pension Fund 1,200,000 0.57% 1,200,000 0.57% 1,200,000 0.40% 
SCBN/BB Mauritius RE UBS AG LDN. Nubuke AFR Multi STR Master     1,476,400 0.49% 
UT Bank Ltd Share Deals Account     1,441,300 0.48% 
Kura Africa Fund Share Warehousing Account       
SCGN/JPMC The Fulcrum Africa All Cap Master Fund       
BBGN/SAS Fortune Fund 1,000,000 0.48% 1,000,000 0.48%   
Databank Financial Service 1,000,000 0.48% 1,000,000 0.48%   
BBGN/Databank Balance Fund 999,000 0.48% 999,000 0.48%   
COCOBOD End of Service Benefit Scheme     1,056,989 0.35% 
SCBN/Mauritius Re Kura Africa Step Change FD SPC for and on behalf of 
Kura Afr Step Change Main S.P 
      
SCBN/Kura Africa Fund       
KEK Insurance Broker Ltd 700,000 0.33% 700,000 0.33% 700,000 0.23% 
Teachers Fund 700,000 0.33% 700,000 0.33% 700,000 0.23% 
Mould-Arbenser Mariel Mrs 666,000 0.32% 666,000 0.32% 666,000 0.22% 
Mould Alex Mr. 666,000 0.32% 666,000 0.32% 666,000 0.22% 
Mega African Capital Ltd 666,000 0.31% 666,000 0.31% 660,000 0.22% 
Nanka-Bruce Richard Henry Morton 650,000 0.30% 650,000 0.30% 750,000 0.25% 
SCBN RE ELAC Shareholders Fund 650,000 0.30% 650,000 0.30% 650,000 0.22% 
SCBN/Barclays Mauritius RE Herrison Fund SPC For Ɛt On Behalf of KURA 
Africa Sgre 
    822,167 0.27% 
Aidoo Charles Sydney   500,000 0.24% 500,000 0.17% 
Bediako Kwaku Mr.   500,000 0.24%   
Ben-Ahmed Musah Mr.   500,000 0.24%   
Source: UT Bank Annual Reports (2008-2010) 
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Shareholder control 
Unlike the previous two cases, where stockholders with majority of the companies’ equity capital 
are able to exert control over the corporate entity, the governing rules and regulations of this bank 
have set a limit to the extent of control executable by a single equity holder through the board. A 
single equity holder is entitled to appoint only one director to the board of the company. However, 
the controlling shareholder (UT holdings Ltd.) has the tendency to wield a certain level of influence 
on management decision-making processes. Management seeks information from the 
representative of the controlling shareholder before any major decision is made.  
The founding members of UT bank demanded vehemently that equity holders ought to be directors 
so that they could partake directly in the decision-making processes of the bank. If not, they can 
select people to represent them on the board. In this case, each equity holder has direct access to the 
person he/she/it has selected.  
Directors are mandated to report to stockholders irrespective of their holdings during annual 
general meetings. Inasmuch as equity holders with at least 5 percent of equity capital can either be 
board members or select board members, such equity holders have access to important information 
about the dealings of the bank. Annual general meetings are vital to minority equity holders who in 
real terms cannot access information directly through board members. In respect of influencing 
decisions, these annual meetings serve as forums to inform minority shareholders about the 
operations of the bank since they have no adequate/satisfactory power to alter decisions. In case of 
voting on issues that are raised during annual general meetings, the votes of minority equity holders 
cannot change any decision that UT holdings backs. When asked if minority equity holders, who 
add up to over 9000 can influence any made decisions at annual general meetings, this was what 
one of the non-executive directors had to say: ‘there is no such influence; but when they churn out 
their grievances or questions, they [the questions] are courteously answered during such meetings’.  
Accessing information about the bank’s operations and performance mirrors the ownership 
structure. In spite of that, all equity holders have access to the bank’s report as required by the 
companies’ code 1963 and GSE listing regulations. Reports that are to be made known to equity 
holders are annual audited reports and quarterly unaudited financial statements of the company. 
Whilst  annual audited reports are sent to each equity holder of the company at least twenty-one 
days as required by the companies code 1963 prior to annual general meetings, the quarterly 
financial statements of the bank are always made available on the company’s website, GSE notice 
board and newspapers.  
Annual audited reports contain the agenda for the annual general meeting and an invitation to the 
general meeting. The agenda of the annual general meeting includes; adoption of the year’s 
statement of account of the bank, adoption of the year’s annual report, confirmation of the previous 
year’s minute, appointment/selection of external auditors, dividends declaration and consideration, 
confirmation of directors, fix remuneration of directors,  and any other issues that arise.   In 
addition, equity holders are also given the chance to tender issues that concern them to be included 
in the agenda. However, no such act was encountered during the study’s observation. Table 6.14 
below brings out the responses in respect of shareholder control at UT bank.  
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Table 6.14: Shareholder Control at UT Bank 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Duties of the board are being fulfilled when they report to 
shareholders during AGMs  
√   
Annual audited reports are made available to shareholders 
before AGMs 
√   
Quarterly reports are made publicly √   
All shareholders receive invitations to AGMs √   
During AGMs, shareholders have the right to vote on 
board’s proposals/suggestions 
√   
Large shareholders exert extensive influence during AGMs √   
Decisions taken at AGMs are subject to voting √   
The kind of influence that majority shareholders have in the 
selection or appointment of directors makes it possible for 
them to exert control over the firm 
 √  
It is easy for large shareholders to have access to very 
important personalities in the firm 
√   
Decisions of management or directors can be questioned or 
altered by large shareholders 
√   
Shareholders have the right to call for Extraordinary 
General Meetings for clarifications of issues 
  
√ 
 
Source: Fieldwork 
6.3.4 Effectiveness of Board of directors  
Factors that determine board effectiveness of the board of UT bank in exercising control are 
examined. These are; board composition; director independence; leadership structure of the board; 
board meetings, board audit committee and board remuneration committee.   
Board composition  
Currently, UT bank has six board members of whom four (4) are non-executive directors. The 
executive directors include the Chief executive officer and his deputy. These directors are business 
professionals in areas such as investment, insurance, accountancy, management and so on. The two 
founding entrepreneurs are members of the board. They are on the board not because they founded 
the company, but by the degrees of their equity holdings. The constitution of the board directly 
mirrors the ownership structure of the company. 
Board members frequently receive training in order to keep themselves abreast with current issues 
pertaining to corporate governance. In addition to corporate governance, in 2011, board members 
attended training on Information Security Systems (ISS) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML).  
This is in line with Knell (2006) that board members’ skills and knowledge ought to be regularly 
updated and refreshed in order to fulfill their role both on the board and on board committees.   
Director Independence  
The company’s regulations governing it make it clear that equity holders who hold at least 5 
percent of the equity capital in the company do qualify to select a director to represent them on the 
company’s board. Equity holders directly select directors and most of such selectees are employees 
of those equity holders (ie. the appointers). In reality, this is the case of institutional investors. With 
the exception of the board chairperson, all the directors of the company do not have any business 
relationship with the company. This implies that there is no existence of psychological or economic 
relationships between them and the CEO. However, directors are not independent of the 
shareholders who appointed them.  
The tradition in this company is that, immediately an equity holder has acquired adequate holdings 
that qualify him/her/it to select a director, the secretary of the company will convey this 
information about his/her/its right to select a director. As equity holders select board members they 
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prefer, at the time of their selection, there are no direct links between these appointments and any 
particular criterion since there are no clear criteria to guide these appointments. Nevertheless, the 
secretary of the company makes available an informal general guides to an equity holder who 
qualifies to make such appointment. Meanwhile, financial and investment skills were cited as key 
skills a director ought to possess in order to deliberate as well as influence board decisions.  
Leadership structure of the board    
The two top-most positions in the company have been divided. Both the chairperson and the Chief 
Executive Officer were founding members of the company. Logically, the division of these two 
positions in this company is considered as power-sharing between the founders, as opposed to 
considering it as an effort to introduce checks and balances to induce accountability. The CEO 
concentrates on the day-to-day issues of the company, accountable to corporate performance, chairs 
management meetings and reports to the board. The board chairman, on the other hand, manages 
the board, settles on its priorities, and lays down the agenda for meetings. 
Board meetings   
Board meetings are held four times in a year as stipulated by the company’s regulations, but can be 
increased when the need arises. For example, the board met six times in 2011. The modus operandi 
for carrying out these meetings is fully known to all board members. The secretary of the company 
put together the agenda for meetings and deliberates it with the CEO. Board members are also 
allowed to suggest topics for deliberation at the commencement of the meeting. Along with 
management reports, the meeting agenda is sent to all directors twenty-one days prior to the 
meeting in order to allow them prepare for the meeting.  
The monthly reports of management made available by the CEO provide a source for board 
members to exert control over management decisions by allowing members to ask critical 
questions. One of the directors of the company stated that the reports he has been receiving from 
the CEO are more detailed and informative, a situation that is different when he was serving as a 
board member in a company, he chose not to disclose. This is consistent with Knell (2006) that all 
board information need to be disseminated to board members in good time so that they can be 
understood and digested. This allows evocative deliberations to take place and significant decisions 
to be made.   
Board audit committee 
The bank has established an audit committee comprising three (3) Non-executive directors. In 
2011, the audit committee was reconstituted and renamed Audit, Risk and Compliance committee. 
The committee is supposed to meet four times in a year as stipulated by the company’s regulations, 
but when the need arises, committee members can increase the number of times they meet. For 
instance, in 2011, the committee met five (5) times. 
This committee is supposed to authorize, direct and review the program of the internal audit unit of 
the company, review the company’s compliance with financial and risk management control 
systems as well as review audit reports. It reviews important financial and other risk revelations 
and the mechanisms that are needed to be taken to monitor, control and report such revelations.     
Remuneration committee 
The bank has instituted a remuneration committee, which is made up of three (3) non-executive 
directors. The Committee is responsible for reviewing all human resource policies to ensure that 
workers are treated honestly and work in very favorable environments. It is also responsible for 
putting up performance indicators for the company and determining the structure of remuneration 
of the Bank’s Chairperson and executive directors. Also, the Committee reviews and approves the 
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remuneration packages, incentive plans and staff bonuses for the company. These responsibilities 
make the board to get to know all HR, compliance and financial aspect of the firm. This is in line 
with the claim that the establishment of board committees is vital in assisting boards to gain vivid 
understanding of the company’s dealings including financial aspect (Tricker, 1994). Table 6.15 
shows the responses in regards to the determinants of board effectiveness in terms of the control 
function of the UT board.  
Table 6.15: Effectiveness of the board of directors at UT Bank 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
For the past 10 years, majority of board members have 
been  NEDs 
√ 
 
  
There is an existence of social or economic tie between 
directors and the firm 
  √ 
 
There is an existence of social or economic tie between 
directors and top managers 
  √ 
 
There is a presence of social or economic tie between 
directors and majority shareholders 
√ 
 
  
Positions of the CEO and the Chairperson have been 
separated and occupied by different people for the past 10 
years 
√ 
 
  
There is an existence of an audit committee instituted by 
the board 
√ 
 
  
There is a presence of a board remuneration committee √ 
 
  
Majority of the members on the audit committee are NEDs √ 
 
  
NEDs form majority on the remuneration committee √ 
 
  
Membership appointments to the audit committee are made 
known to shareholders 
√ 
 
  
Membership appointments to the remuneration committee 
are made known to shareholders 
√ 
 
  
There are criteria for the selection and replacement of 
directors 
  √ 
 
There is a laid down procedure upon which board meetings 
are held 
√ 
 
  
Before board meetings, information about the firm are 
made available to members on time 
√ 
 
  
Source: fieldwork 
6.3.5 Board Control 
Board members carry out all activities connected to the control function of the board (see table 
6.16). Decision to hire the CEO is made by board members. Board members also have the ability to 
replace the CEO for non-performance. Members through the remuneration committee approve the 
CEOs remuneration package and always hold detail and informative deliberations on the 
company’s strategy prior to the approval.  
The board through its remuneration committee has put forward formal evaluation indicators to 
evaluate the activities of the CEO, board activities as well as individual directors. Also, the board 
through its audit committee makes sure that the bank complies with the existing laws (ie. Generally 
Accepted Accounting and Auditing Principles that are laid down by the ICAG) regarding the day-
to-day running of the firm.  
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Table 6.16: Board Control at UT Bank   
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Decisions in terms of hiring a CEO is made by the 
board                                        
√   
The CEO can be replaced by the board in case of 
mismanagement 
√  
 
 
Strategies are discussed and approved by the board √   
Decisions on the CEO’s remuneration package is 
made by the board via the remuneration committee 
√   
The activities of the CEO are assessed by the board 
 
√   
The board makes sure the firm complies with 
existing laws regarding the day to day running of 
the firm eg, Generally Accepted Accounting and 
Auditing Principles laid down by ICAG 
 
√ 
  
The board determines the type of information it 
needs from management anytime 
√   
Source: Fieldwork 
6.3.6 Analysis and confirmation of propositions 
In regards to ownership control at UT bank, the above discussions have shown that UT holding 
Ltd., which holds the majority of equity capital, exerts substantial influence on the decision-making 
processes of the company, and that major decisions can never be made without an approval from it. 
The implication is that UT holding Ltd. exerts substantial control over the company’s management.  
Even though UT holding Ltd. has influence over the company, via the board members, such 
influence is limited since there is a limitation on the number of directors it can select. But it still has 
substantial influence on management via the direct connections between UT holdings Ltd. 
representative and the Chief Executive Officer of UT bank. In respect of agency problems, it can be 
wrapped up that UT holdings takes action to reduce agency problem in the company. This backs 
proposition 1 that equity holders with majority of equity capital exert significant control in a 
corporate entity. 
The results in respect of board control show that the board of UT bank exerts substantial control. 
The majority of board members are appointees of different equity holders. These appointees are 
independent of management and therefore, can have views that are independent of management 
without compromising. Important aspects of effective and efficient board meetings are observed, 
and this means board meeting sessions help contribute in the enhancement of board control. This 
implies that Proposition 2, which states that: Effective and efficient board meetings result in a 
panoptic board control in a corporation is confirmed in the case of UT bank. 
In terms of the leadership structure of UT bank, the positions of the CEO and the Chairperson of 
the company are separated. However, accountability is not encouraged in that this separation is 
viewed as a power sharing idea within the company by the two founding entrepreneurs. This means 
that the non-duality structure in the company’s present arrangement does not attend to the role 
encouraged in agency theory, which tends in fostering board control over management. This means 
that proposition 3, which states that: The non-duality structure with independent chairperson 
results in a panoptic board control in a company is thus not confirmed in the case of UT bank. 
The findings reveal that UT bank has established a board audit committee with non-executive 
directors as its members. This enhances board control over management in the sense that, non-
executive directors of UT bank are independent of management and free from any economic or 
other connections with the company which could materially or psychologically compromise their 
independent judgment. This implies that Proposition 4(a), which states that: Instituting a board 
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audit committee with independent director as its members, leads to an extensive board control in a 
company is verified in the case of UT bank. 
With respect to board remuneration committee, the findings indicate that the bank has established a 
remuneration committee with non-executive members as its constituents. This enhances board 
control over management. This means that Proposition 4(b), which states that: Establishing a 
remuneration committee with independent non-executive members as its constituents leads to a 
significant board control is confirmed in the case of UT bank  
6.4 Accra Brewery Limited (ABL) 
This section of the study’s analyses will concentrate on the background, profile and activities of 
Accra Brewery Limited. It will then continue to analyze the financial performance of the corporate 
organization. Further, it analyzes the corporate governance layout of the company by highlighting 
how both the ownership structure and board structure work to ensuring ownership control and 
board control respectively. It finally addresses how the evidences gathered from the company 
through interviews, observations and archival records confirm or disconfirm the propositions.  
6.4.1 Background, profile and activities of the Company 
Accra Brewery Limited (ABL) is the first brewing corporate organization in West Africa. It was 
originally established as Overseas Breweries in 1931. In 1975, the locally registered Accra 
Brewery Limited acquired the assets of Overseas Brewery Ltd.  In 1997, it became a subsidiary of 
SABMiller Plc. As a subsidiary of SABMiller, the company appreciates that its profitability stems 
from healthy environment, growing economies and the conscientious use of scarce natural 
resources.  
The company’s vision is to be the most esteemed corporate body in the beverage sector by being: 
1) The investment of choice; 2) The employer of choice; and 3) The partner of choice. ABL has a 
mission to own and nurture local and international brands that are the first choice of consumers. 
The core values of the company are: 1) That people are the company’s enduring advantage; 2) that 
accountability is clear and personal; 3) that the company appreciates and respects its customers and 
consumers; 4) that the company work and win in teams; and 6) that the company’s reputation is 
indivisible.  
Currently, ABL engages in the production, marketing and distribution of alcoholic and non-
alcoholic drinks and the company’s leading brands include Club Gold Export, Stone Strong Lager, 
Castle Milk Stout, Redd’s Fruit Fusion, Chibuku Shake, Castle Milk Stout, Club Cola, Club 
Orange, Chairman Malt Liquor, Club Shandy, Club Quinine Tonic and Peroni Nastro Azzurro.  
Company performance 
ABL has approximately 30percent volume share of Ghana’s beverage sector. In 2006, ABL 
adopted a strategy to gain their dominance in clearly demarcated areas. Each demarcated area has a 
minimum of twenty outlets and a maximum of sixty outlets. With this, the six key sales drivers of 
availability, activations, pricing, visibility, quality as well as advocacy were excellently and 
perfectly executed. Presently, the company has gained market share in all areas where the concept 
was introduced. In 2008/2009 financial year, the company invested USD$ 20 million to purchase 
equipments such as bottle washer, an electronic bottle inspector, filler and a pasteurizer. After such 
investment, the company was able to increase its packaging capacity from 22,000 bottles per hour 
to 36,000 bottles per hour.  
ABL is one of the most important corporate organizations to the Ghanaian economy. It is presently, 
one of the largest corporate tax payers in the country. In 2010, the total value-added that the 
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company directly contributed to Ghana’s economy, 70 percent was in the form of taxes (Kapstein, 
Kim, Ruster & Van Manen, 2011). In terms of jobs, the company is connected directly and 
indirectly with a substantial number of jobs. Even though the company’s employment figure stands 
at 900, its activities assist in supporting almost 18000 jobs across the length and breadth of the 
Ghanaian economy. The implication is that for every job that is created by ABL, another 20 jobs 
are created throughout the country. 
In addition to the company’s economic significance to the Ghanaian economy, ABL over the years 
has contributed immensely in the social needs of Ghanaians. The company focuses on three main 
areas: education; health and the environment. In respect of education, ABL has focused on 
improving school attendance by providing pupils and students with transportation in several 
communities in the country (example, Aboabo, Koforidua, Ada and so on). The company has also 
provided thousands of people living in Adabraka with free health and when the need arises, with 
required medical treatment. Lastly, ABL supports local farmers who provide the company with the 
necessary raw materials with farm equipments.  
Financial Performance 
2008 Financial Performance 
In 2008, ABL witnessed a profit before tax of Gh₵ 1,804,000 as compared to the previous year’s 
figure of Gh₵ 326,000. This shows a substantial growth of 414 percent. Profit after tax recorded 
Gh₵ 886,000, signifying a 163.1 percent growth over the figure recorded over the same period in 
2007. The company’s operating cash flow witnessed a 58 percent fall, from Gh₵ 7,053,000 in 2007 
to Gh₵ 2,912,000 in 2008. Shareholders’ fund recorded an increase from Gh₵ 10, 530, 00 in 2007 
to Gh₵ 11,167,000 in 2008, representing a 6.0 percent rise. More so, the company’s earnings per 
share in 2008 rose to Gh₵ 0.0036 as compared with the previous year’s value of Gh₵ 0.0014. This 
portrays a significant growth of 163.1 percent. Lastly, ABL’s total asset rose from Gh₵ 24, 
232,000 in 2006 to Gh₵ 26,954,000 in 2008, denoting a growth of Gh₵ 2, 722, 000.   
2009 Financial Performance     
ABL witnessed a pre-tax profit of Gh₵ 2,427,000 in 2009, representing a 244.8 percent growth 
over the previous year’s figure of Gh₵ 1,676,000. Post-tax profit of the company also saw a 
substantial growth of 352.8 percent, from Gh₵ 886,000 in 2008 to Gh₵ 2, 240, 00 in 2009. More 
so, ABL’s operating cash flow increased from Gh₵ 2,912,000 in 2008 to Gh₵ 22,182,000 in 2009, 
denoting a significant growth of 661.7 percent. Shareholders’ funds reduced from Gh₵11,167,000 
in 2008 to Gh₵8,303,000 in 2009, representing a 25.6 percent reduction. Further, ABL’s earnings 
per share recorded Gh₵ 0.0090 in 2009 from Gh₵ 0.0036 in 2008, signifying a 352.8 percent rise. 
Lastly, the company’s total assets increased considerably to Gh₵ 55, 815, 00 in 2009 as compared 
to Gh₵ 26,954,000 in 2008, depicting a growth of Gh₵ 28,861,000.  
2010 Financial Performance 
In 2010, the company witnessed a profit before tax of Gh₵ 6,813,000 as compared with the 
previous year’s figure of Gh₵ 2,427,000, representing a significant growth of 180.7 percent. ABL 
recorded a post tax profit of Gh₵ 5,671,000 in 2010, a Gh₵ 3,431,000 growth over the recorded 
figure of Gh₵ 2,240,000 in the previous year. Further, the company’s operating cash flow stood at 
Gh₵ 5,080,000 in 2010, signifying a reduction of 122.9 percent as compared with Gh₵ 22,182,000 
recorded in 2009. ABL’s shareholders’ funds also reduced to Gh₵ 2,632,000 in 2010 from Gh₵ 
8,303,000 in 2009, indicating a 68 percent reduction. However, Earnings per share recorded Gh₵ 
0.0227 in 2010 as compared with the Gh₵ 0.0090 in 2009, denoting a growth of 153.1percent. 
Finally, ABL’s total assets for 2010 financial year stood at Gh₵ 73,610,000, portraying a Gh₵ 
17,795,000 growth over previous year’s value of Gh₵ 55,815,000. Table 6.17 below depicts a 
tabular representation of the financial performance of ABL from 2008-2010.  
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Table 6.17: Financial Performance of ABL: From 2008-2010 
GH₵ 2008 2009 2010 
Profit before Tax  1,676,000 2,427,000 6,813,000 
Profit after Tax 886,000 3,431,000 5,671,000 
Total Assets 26,954,000 55,815,000 73,610,000 
Shareholders Fund 11,167,000 8,303,000 2,632,000 
Operating Cash Flow 2,912,000 22,182,000 5,080,000 
Earnings Per Share 0.0036 0.0090 0.0227 
Source: ABL Annual Report (2008-2010) 
6.4.2 Corporate governance framework 
The company’s corporate governance framework has to fit within the one recommended in the 
companies code 1963. This framework regards equity holders as constituents of the company and 
that they have the right to take part in the company’s affairs. ABL has a unitary board, which is 
referred as supervisory board. This board supervises the activities of management and it is the 
uppermost decision making body in the company. It has decision control rights.  
The company also has an Executive Management Committee that is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the company. The Managing director heads this committee. Members who constitute 
this committee are referred to as directors. For instance; the finance director, technical director, 
operations director and so on. This committee serves as a nexus between the managing director and 
supervisory board. All senior managers report to the managing director who presides and 
superintends over all meetings and reports to the supervisory board. More so, the Managing 
Director reports to the management of SABMiller.  
6.4.3 Ownership structure and control   
Ownership structure 
Over the years, the ownership structure of ABL has changed. This change in the identity and 
degree of ownership mirrors changes in the Ghanaian economy with regards to government 
ownership of organizations and the development of private ownership of organizations 
progressively. The company was established and owned by Overseas Brewery Ltd. In 1975, a state 
controlled locally registered company called Accra Brewery Limited acquired the assets of 
Overseas Brewery Ltd. Twenty-two years after, the state decided to sell its shares in the company 
as a result of the divestiture implementation program by the state. In view of this, SABMiller plc 
purchased the majority of the shares making it the majority shareholder with 69.20 percent. ABL is 
now a subsidiary of SABMiller. This mirrors the growing control of important Ghanaian corporate 
organizations by multinational companies. Table 6.18 below indicates the identities and the various 
holdings of the shareholders of ABL. 
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Table 6.18: The Ownership Structure of ABL 
Identity of Shareholder 2008 2009 2010 
Shareholding Percentage Shareholding Percentage Shareholding Percentage 
Overseas Brewery Limited 172,624,029 69.20% 172,624,029 69.20% 172,624,029 69.20% 
SSNIT 27,763,719 11.13% 27,763,719 11.13% 27,763,719 11.13% 
BBGN/SSB TST X71 AX71 14,904,183 5.97% 14,904,183 5.97% 23,904,183 9.58% 
Strategic Initiative Limited 4,049,465 1.62% 4,049,465 1.62%   
Ziga Investments Limited 3,074,666 1.23% 3,074,666 1.23% 3,074,666 1.23% 
B.B.G. Nominee/EPACK Investment Fund Limited 2,954,330 1.18% 2,954,330 1.18% 1,480,183 0.59% 
Mr. G. Amenuvor 2,294,262 0.92% 2,294,262 0.92% 2,294,262 0.92% 
StarLife Assurance Company Limited 1,920,000 0.77% 1,920,000 0.77% 1,920,000 0.77% 
Accra Brewery Ltd Employees Trust 1,897,762 0.76% 1,897,762 0.76% 1,897,762 0.76% 
Databank Brokerage Limited 1,408,366 0.56% 1,408,366 0.56% 1,408,366 0.56% 
Mr. P. Hammond 510,000 0.20% 510,000 0.20% 510,000 0.20% 
SAS Nominees 3 498,800 0.20% 498,800 0.20%   
SAS Nominees 1 413,400 0.17% 413,400 0.17%   
Mr. J. Idun-Ogde 400,000 0.16% 400,000  0.16% 400,000  0.16% 
Mr. H. Hotz 369,884 0.15% 369,884 0.15% 369,884 0.15% 
Merban Stockbrokers Portfolio 299,753 0.12% 299,753 0.12% 296,853 0.12% 
SAS/MERKI Janet Aku 294,117 0.12% 294,117 0.12%   
Mr. F.T. Gambrah 267,000 0.11% 267,000 0.11% 267,000 0.11% 
Mr. H. J. K. Ephraim 253,300 0.10% 253,300 0.10% 253,300 0.10% 
Kwaku Okyere and Co Limited 210,000 0.08% 210,000 0.08% 210,000 0.08% 
Ephraim     200,600 0.08% 
Segbawu     191,190 0.08% 
Star Assurance Company Ltd     184,980 0.07% 
Source: Annual Reports of ABL (2008-2010) 
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Other shareholders of the company are the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) 
(11.13%), Ziga Investment Company (1.23%), StarLife Assurance Company Ltd. (0.77%), Accra 
Brewery Ltd. Employees Trust (0.76%), Epack Investment Fund (0.59%), Databank Brokerage 
Ltd. (0.56%), HOTZ (0.15%), Merban Stockbrokers Portfolio (0.12%), Kwaku Okyere and 
Company Ltd. (0.08%). Star Assurance Company Ltd. (0.07%), Unique Trust Financial Services 
(0.07%) and the general public (5.67%) –who consist of 3700 individual shareholders.   
Ownership Control  
Equity holders exercise control over the activities of the company upon two main structures: 
Shareholders annual general meeting and the incessant influence on decision-making processes of 
the company by SABMiller. The application of these two structures mirrors the degree of 
ownership of the organization.  
Majority Shareholder (SABMiller) 
SABMiller Plc is one of the world’s major brewers with brewing interests and distribution accords 
globally. The group’s broad portfolio of brands includes premium international beers such as 
Pilsner Urguel, Peroni Nastro Azzurro, and Grolsch and so on. SABMiller is also one of the 
world’s major bottlers of Coca Cola Products. Its control of ABL is made known through its 
appointment/selection of ‘important’ people in the company as well as its direct access to these key 
people-the board chairperson and managing director.  
Access to information and influence on decision-making procedures including veto power, as well 
as direct participation in the management and operations of the company are vital ways of control 
available to SABMiller Plc. SABMiller does not rely on the company’s annual general meeting or 
the minimum disclosures mandated by law to exert control over ABL. It always relies on the 
incessant flooding of information via a process of reporting by ABL management to it. This 
arrangement does guarantee that SABMiller always has access to vital information and decisions 
taken at ABL.  
The reports to SABMiller Plc involve vital operational issues: Sale targets, cash positions as well as 
product quality. These reports are daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly made available to 
SABMiller in a prescribed structure. This means that the company’s annual general meeting is a 
sheer legal requirement and probably, serves more as a platform for the minority equity holders to 
be educated on developments within the corporate organization. Figure 6.2 depicts the direct and 
indirect control exerted by SABMiller and the company’s minority shareholders.  SABMiller has 
strong and direct connection to both the board and top management of ABL. This has been 
portrayed by a straight line from SABMiller Plc to both the board and top management. The broken 
lines from the individual small shareholders to the board and management on the other hand, 
portray a limited accessibility by small equity holders to both the management and board of ABL. 
This makes SABMiller Plc a controlling force within the company.  
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Figure 6.2: Domineering role of SABMiller on the operations of ABL  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                              
 
                                   
 
                                                                    
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Adapted from Roe (2003) 
Small equity holders 
There are two groups of small equity holders at ABL: 1) Small equity holders who have adequate 
stocks to allow them select a director; and 2) those minority equity holders who do not possess 
adequate stocks to let them take this action. Small equity holders who have the qualification to 
appoint directors do so and therefore, they have access to board of directors and can exercise 
influence on board decisions.  
Those small equity holders who are not eligible to select/appoint directors have no access to the 
company’s decision-making procedures in that, they have imperfect access to information and have 
no capacity to influence decisions. These small equity holders are usually individuals and some 
institutions: Epack Investment Fund, Databank Brokerage Ltd., Ziga Investment Company, Unique 
Trust Financial Services and so on. 
This group of small equity holders depends on the company’s annual general meeting to voice out 
their opinions and strives to exercise influence on the company’s decision-making processes. These 
are mirrored in the type of questions about decisions that have been put to work, or which are 
recommended at the company’s annual general meeting. These minority shareholders’ actions are 
taken as a result of the bare minimum mandated disclosures by the companies’ code and the GSE 
listing regulations. The companies’ code and the GSE listing regulations require that all equity 
holders irrespective of their holdings should have access to: the company’s yearly audited reports 
and quarterly reports. Whilst the annual audited reports are forwarded to all equity holders, the 
quarterly reports are made public via GSE notice boards and the media.     
The reports that are sent to equity holders involve a notice of the company’s annual general 
meeting and an invitation. The agenda of the meeting includes: adoption of the year’s statement of 
account of the company, adoption of the year’s annual report, confirmation of the previous year’s 
minute, appointment/selection of external auditors, dividends declaration and consideration, 
confirmation of directors, fix remuneration of directors, and any other issues that arise. This agenda 
is prepared by management and it is needed to be given an approval by the board of directors.  
Equity holders are allowed to vote during the company’s annual general meeting. This is in line 
with the requirement of the companies code 1963 and also recommended in the OECD and CACG 
principles of corporate governance (See Chapter 2). They are permitted by law to vote by proxy. 
Even though decisions are made via voting process, since the large chunk of shares are held by 
SABMiller, the company’s annual general meetings are basically a cosmetic. 
The notion that ABL annual general meeting is regarded as a legal procedure/formality is 
highlighted by the fact that, practically, individual small equity holders do ask questions that 
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exhibit keen insight and good judgment at these meetings, but if they are unsatisfied with the 
answers, there is nothing they can do since they cannot change the state of affairs. They do not 
have power to punish management or directors. Interviews conducted to elicit information from 
small equity holders point to the fact that, the manner in which the annual general meetings are 
conducted regulates their capacity to exercise control.  
In regards to equity holder control, via influence on the selection and access to ‘important’ 
personalities, influence on strategic decisions of management/board, and influence on decisions as 
well as the level of vote, the company’s small equity holders scored low in all. Table 6.19 below 
depicts the responses with regards to shareholder control in ABL.      
Table 6.19: Shareholder Control at Accra Brewery Limited 
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Duties of the board are being fulfilled when they report to 
shareholders during AGMs  
√   
Annual audited reports are made available to shareholders 
before AGMs 
√   
Quarterly reports are made publicly √   
All shareholders receive invitations to AGMs √   
During AGMs, shareholders have the right to vote on 
board’s proposals/suggestions 
 √  
Large shareholders exert extensive influence during AGMs √   
Decisions taken at AGMs are subject to voting √   
The kind of influence that majority shareholders have in the 
selection or appointment of directors makes it possible for 
them to exert control over the firm 
 
 
√ 
  
It is easy for large shareholders to have access to very 
important personalities in the firm 
√   
Decisions of management or directors can be questioned or 
altered by large shareholders 
√   
Shareholders have the right to call for Extraordinary 
General Meetings for clarifications 
  
√ 
 
   Source: Fieldwork  
SABMiller Plc appoints the majority of board members, the managing director as well as the board 
chairman of ABL. Practically; small equity holders cannot influence board members. The far-
reaching and incessant communication between ABL and management of SABMiller in the 
decision-making processes of the company, induce ABL’s management to ceaselessly strive 
towards meeting SABMiller’s interests. The implication is that SABMiller’s holdings permit and 
induce it to exert control and thus lessen incentive problems.     
6.4.4 Effectiveness of the Board  
Factors that determine board effectiveness in exerting its control function were scrutinized. These 
factors are: the board composition; director independence; the leadership structure of the board; 
board meetings, board audit committee and board remuneration committee.  
Board constitution 
Currently, ABL board has four (4) directors and its composition mirrors the ownership structure of 
the company. Three of the directors are non-executive directors. The executive director is the 
managing director of the company. These members are well-informed individuals with experience 
in the brewing industry as well as in their areas of discipline.  
Director independence 
Director independence was examined by taken into account the manner in which 
appointment/selection of board members is done and whether there is any close relationship 
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between board members and management or the company. With regards to appointment/selection, 
board members are selected via a procedure settled on by SABMiller. This means that all directors 
are SABMiller appointees.  
The procedure of spotting a potential board member to represent SABMiller on the board as well as 
senior management is conducted by SABMiller Plc. In respect of the procedure to recruit board 
members, SABMiller approaches persons and asks them if they are interested in serving as board 
members of ABL. These persons are then asked to tender their curriculum vitae for a careful 
examination by SABMiller Management before an appointment. The manner in which SABMiller 
carries out the appointment is devised to make sure that board members are psychologically or 
economically independent of management. 
The leadership structure of the Board   
The positions of the managing director and the board chairman have been divided. ABL has 
established the board chairmanship as well as the managing directorship positions. The board 
chairman does not meddle in the day-to-day operations of the firm. The board chairman is not part 
of the executive management committee of the company, but important and adequate information 
is provided to him by management, anytime he demands. The managing director, on the other hand, 
performs functions of Chief Executive Officer. He runs the company on a day-to-day basis and 
always accountable to firm performance. The managing director chairs the executive management 
committee and reports to the board.    
Board meetings 
Board meetings are held four times in a year, and can also be arranged as the need arises. For 
instance, they can be arranged to deliberate on issues that are urgent and cannot wait for normal 
meetings. For normal board meetings, all board members are notified twenty-one days before they 
take place. Preparation for the company’s board meetings includes sending information to board 
members at least a week before the meeting is held. The company’s Executive Management 
Committee members, whose issues are required to be integrated in the agenda, prepare reports 
which are appraised by a committee comprising the managing director, the company secretary and 
the company’s financial controller. This is done to ensure the fineness of the content of the report. 
Therefore, points/items that are included in the agenda are normally obtained from the Executive 
Management Committee and are compiled by the company secretary.      
Board Audit Committee  
The board has set up an audit committee, which is made up four members of whom three are non-
executive directors. The committee is chaired by an executive of SABMiller. This committee 
appraises both the operational and financial aspects of the firm. It also appraises the financial 
performance, risk management, compliance with policies and laws, audit reports as well as 
business practices of the firm.  
The audit committee meets four times (ie. quarterly) in a year to deliberate on the financial 
statements of the firm and management report made available by the external auditor. The 
committee helps the board in being effective and efficient in its activities. The activities of the 
committee are influenced by the involvement of an executive from SABMiller Plc, who at the same 
time chairs the committee.     
Remuneration Committee 
ABL has not established a formal remuneration committee. No apparent reason was given. 
However, as ABL keeps on growing there is an increasing need for a remuneration committee. 
Currently, discussions are on-going about the formation of a remuneration committee. Table 6.20 
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below shows the responses in regards to the determinants of board effectiveness with respect to the 
control function of the board.  
Table 6.20: Effectiveness of the board of directors at ABL 
 At all 
times 
Occasionally  Absolutely not 
For    The past 10 years, majority of board members have been  NEDs √ 
 
  
 
There is an existence of social or economic ties between directors 
and the firm 
 
 
  
√ 
 
There is an existence of social or economic tie between directors 
and top managers 
 
 
 √ 
 
There is a presence of social or economic tie between directors 
and majority shareholders 
  
√ 
 
Positions of the CEO and the Chairperson have been separated and 
occupied by different people for the past 10 years 
√ 
 
  
 
There is an existence of an audit committee instituted by the board √ 
 
  
There is a presence of a board remuneration committee NO REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
Majority of the members on the audit committee are NEDs √ 
 
  
 
NEDs form majority on the remuneration committee NO REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
Membership appointment to the audit committee are made known 
to shareholders 
√ 
 
  
 
Membership appointment to the remuneration committee are made 
known to shareholders 
NO REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
There are criteria for the selection and replacement of directors  
√ 
  
 
There is a laid down procedure upon which board meetings are 
held 
√ 
 
  
 
Before board meetings, information about the firm are made 
available to members on time 
√ 
 
  
 
Source: Fieldwork 
6.4.5 Board Control 
The decision of hiring and firing the managing director is not done by the company’s board. The 
board only advises SABMiller management if the board holds the view that the managing director 
is not performing as required of him. Also, decisions and actions of the managing director’s 
remuneration as well as formal assessments/appraisal of the managing director, of individual board 
members and board activities, are not carried out by the board. A hidden assessment of 
management activities takes place on a continuing basis. But such an evaluation is not necessary 
since SABMiller carries out assessment, based on the regular reports that are made available to it 
(SABMiller) by ABL management. Thus SABMiller conducts all the control activities, which are 
normally vested in the board. This sort of role SABMiller plc plays in the affairs of the company 
makes the board to function as an advisory body to management rather than wielding control over 
it. Table 6.21 below portrays the responses with regard to board control in the case of ABL. It can 
be figured out that the board of ABL has a limited control function. 
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Table 6.21: Board Control at Accra Brewery Limited        
 At all times Occasionally Absolutely not 
Decisions in terms of hiring a CEO is made by the 
board                                        
  √ 
The CEO can be replaced by the board in case of 
mismanagement 
  
 
√ 
Strategies are discussed and approved by the board √   
Decisions on the CEO’s remuneration package is 
made by the board via the remuneration committee 
  √ 
The activities of the CEO are assessed by the board 
 
  √ 
The board makes sure the firm complies with 
existing laws regarding the day to day running of 
the firm eg, Generally Accepted Accounting and 
Auditing Principles laid down by ICAG 
 
√ 
  
The board determines the type of information it 
needs from management anytime 
√   
  Source: Fieldwork 
6.4.6 Analysis and verification of Propositions 
Analysis of the ownership structure and ownership control depicts that SABMiller Plc exerts 
control over management. This solves the agency problem via SABMiller Plc’s regular monitoring 
of the performance of management. SABMiller Plc appoints the managing director as well as the 
majority of directors. SABMiller Plc’s appointment of the majority of directors implies that if 
counteractive action is needed, such as changing the managing director, this decision can be taken 
by them. The SABMiller Plc is regarded as an insider in that it takes part in the decision-making 
processors of ABL. This is a verification of proposition 1 that: Shareholders with larger shares 
exert shareholder control in a company. 
With regards to board meetings, the findings depict that they are carried out in a more efficient and 
effective manner. This is because of the frequent availability of information to board members and 
their possible position to challenge management during board meetings. Even though all the 
indicators of effective and efficient board meetings are in place, the exclusion of the board in the 
controlling function of the company means that board meetings do not have any connection with 
board control. This turns to point out that proposition 2, which states that: Effective and efficient 
board meetings lead to a panoptic board control in a company is not confirmed in the case of ABL. 
In terms of the leadership structure of the board, the separation of the positions of the board 
chairman and managing director is in line with agency theory in respect of strengthening board 
control. In spite of this, at ABL, the board chairman is not independent of the controlling 
shareholder and as a result, plays no vital role in the enhancement of board control. Since both the 
managing director and board chairman are appointees of SABMiller Plc, and hence not 
independent of SABMiller Plc, proposition 3 that: The non-duality structure with an independent 
director as the board chairperson, results in a panoptic board control in a company, is not 
confirmed in the case of ABL.  
With respect to the audit committee, the findings reveal that the company has such committee that 
has been formed with non-executive directors as majority of its members. In spite of this, the role 
of the committee is insignificant in that SABMiller Plc does exercise director control. This means 
that proposition 4(a), which that: Instituting a board audit committee with independent directors as 
its members, leads to a panoptic board control in a company is not confirmed in the case of ABL.  
The board of ABL has not set up a board remuneration committee. This means that proposition 
4(b), which states that: Setting up a remuneration committee with independent non-executive 
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members as its constituents, leads to a significant board control could thus not be confirmed in the 
case of ABL.  
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the data collected from the four corporate organizations through interviews, 
observations and archival records. The analyses addressed the backgrounds, profiles and activities 
of the organization. It then proceeded to analyze the corporate governance framework of each of 
the four companies by highlighting how ownership structure and board control operate to ensuring 
ownership control and board control respectively. Finally, based on the evidences highlighted, the 
analyses and confirmation or disconfirmation of the study’s propositions were addressed. The next 
chapter highlights cross-case analyses of the four companies and subsequently, compares the 
empirical facts of the study to the guidelines of corporate governance of Ghana.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CROSS CASE ANALYSES AND COMPARISON OF 
RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES WITH EMPIRICAL 
OBSERVATION 
The preceding chapter examined the individual cases of the study. This current chapter presents 
cross-case analyses of the data gathered from the four corporate organizations. It finally, compares 
the recommended guidelines of corporate governance of Ghana to the empirical evidence of the 
study.   
  
7.1 Ownership structure and ownership control 
7.1.1 Ownership structure 
There is a presence of ownership concentration in all the four (4) organizations examined. This 
implies that each corporate organization has a large shareholder that holds a sizeable amount of its 
equity capital. These large shareholders hold more than 50 percent of the equity capital of their 
respective corporations. Their control over the companies stems from the evidence that the 
distribution of the remaining shares of each of the companies is so widely fragmented among 
minority equity holders that, it is not possible for them (minority shareholders) to determine voting 
outcomes (Leech, 2013). Table 7.1 depicts the large equity holders’ identities and the degree of 
their holdings in the organizations. With the exception of ABL, the controlling shareholders are 
local bodies. This means that key decisions that have upshots on the performance of these 
companies, and the Ghanaian economy at large, are taken locally.   
Table 7.1: Ownership Structure of the four corporate organizations 
 GCB SIC UT ABL 
Controlling shareholder Government of 
Ghana & SSNIT 
Government of Ghana 
& SSNIT 
UT holdings Ltd. SABMiller 
Degree of holdings by 
controlling shareholders 
(percent) 
51.17 51.291 61.11 69.20 
Holdings of other shareholders 
combined (percent) 
48.83 48.709 38.89 30.8 
Ownership by foreign 
shareholders (percent) 
5.76 14.614 19.66 69.20 
Ownership by local 
shareholders (percent) 
94.24 85.386 80.34 30.8 
Number of individual 
shareholders 
96,805 - 9,858 3,700 
Market capitalization (GH₵) 72,000,000 2,500,000 85,275,000 - 
Issued Shares 265,000,000* 195,645,000* 456,310,181* 249,446,664 
Source: The annual reports of the companies. *The total number of issued shares as at 07/05/2013 
The ownership structures of these corporations mirror historical developments in Ghana that keep 
on shaping corporate governance practice of the country. The ownership concentration of ABL 
reflects the country’s privatization policy that was adopted to divest State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) through the selling of large number of stocks to strategic investors. Even though the state 
holds a large number of shares of GCB and SIC, ownership structures of these two corporations 
reflect the privatization program (ie. the Divestiture Implementation Policy) of the government in 
the 1990s.  
UT bank was set up after the economic reforms. Its ownership structure mirrors the sources of the 
funds used for its establishment, which mainly came from UT holdings Ltd. This feature of 
ownership concentration is not only limited to these companies. Most companies in Ghana have 
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been, and continue, to be divested, through the selling of large amounts of the state shares to 
strategic investors, resulting in ownership concentration in corporations. For instance, SSNIT, 
which holds 55 percent of the total shares of Merchant Bank Limited, Ghana, decided to sell its 
stake to Fortiz bank in 2013, as part of its plans to deal with the liquidity and solvency of the bank.  
7.1.2 Ownership Control   
 All the four organizations are characterized by controlling shareholders. These controlling 
shareholders exert control over the activities of the companies through their participation in the 
decision-making activities of these companies. And this participation is always made possible 
through the incessant flow of information to these controlling shareholders. For instance, while 
minority shareholders always depend on information that are always available in annual audited 
and quarterly un-audited reports, majority shareholders always have access to information upon 
request. 
Also, management of these four corporate organizations always consult controlling shareholders 
before any major decisions are made. The set goals that management are striving to realize are also 
in consonance with that of controlling shareholders. In order to ensure free flow of information 
from management to them (ie. controlling shareholders), they have put in place some internal 
structures and mechanisms in these companies.  
Controlling shareholders of these corporate organizations have access to key personalities in the 
companies. For instance, they have access to the board chairperson and chief executive officer. 
These key personalities are either appointed/selected by these controlling shareholders or have a 
certain level of influence in their selection. Apart from UT bank, controlling shareholders of the 
remaining three companies appoint or select the board chairperson, chief executive officer and the 
majority of the directors who constitute their boards. 
The level of influence of these controlling shareholders always comes to the fore during annual 
general meetings of the companies. For example, when major decisions that need shareholders’ 
approval are to be voted on, controlling shareholders, more often than not, determine the outcome 
of the voting. The panoptic control exerted by controlling shareholders has been considered and 
positively regarded by the regulatory authorities (ie. the SEC and GSE) in Ghana. This may stem 
from the fact that the rules and regulations in regards to corporate governance are poorly enforced 
thus leaving large shareholders to protect their investments. In this case, large shareholders serve as 
a substitute for legal protection by ensuring investor protection in Ghana. This is in line with the 
assertion by La Porta et al. (2000) that the emergence of ownership concentration is a substitute for 
legal protection for economies with poor investor-protection. In an interview with one of the 
officers of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he said: 
Since companies in developed countries are well-supervised, they have 
the tendency to perform well. This situation is different from Ghana’s 
experience. This is because, our companies are poorly supervised and for 
that matter, it is incumbent on these controlling shareholders to supervise 
their companies in order to put them on track so that they can perform 
well. Until we started enforcing our laws, we should not attempt to oppose 
this kind of occurrence.   
This evidence is in line with the assertion that in times of unpredictable or weak enforcement of 
legal and regulatory framework, shareholders do not anticipate that their interests will be 
safeguarded through lawful channels and hence they do take a more direct involvement in 
governance oversight, either via better rights offered through charters and bylaws, or via direct 
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representation on companies’ boards (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). In circumstances in which legal 
institutions are ineffective in exercising their functions, principal-agent problems calls for large 
shareholders to monitor and control corporate managers in order to avert or reduce expropriation 
(Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007).   The findings of this study apply to a large number of listed 
and non-listed companies in Ghana. In other words, this shareholder control phenomenon, which is 
as a result of ownership concentration, applies to a large number of corporate organizations in 
Ghana. The implication is that the separation of ownership and control is absent in Ghana. Whilst 
this conclusion challenges Berle and Means assertion that ownership and control have been 
separated, it backs the existing body of knowledge, that apart from the United States and United 
Kingdom, in most countries, ownership and control work hand-in-hand (ie. have not been 
separated) (Berglof & Claessens, 2004; Clark & Clegg, 1998). Table 7.2 depicts responses with 
respect to ownership control in the four companies via interviews and documents.  
Table 7.2: Ownership control in Ghanaian corporate organizations 
 GCB SIC UT ABL 
 A O N A O N A O N A O N 
Duties of the board are fulfilled when they report 
to shareholders during AGMs 
√   √   √   √   
Annual audited reports are made available 
to shareholders before AGMs 
√   √   √    
√ 
  
Quarterly reports are made in public √   √   √   √   
All shareholders receive invitations to 
AGMs 
√   √   √   √   
During AGMs, shareholders have the right 
to vote on board’s proposals/suggestions 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
    
√ 
 
Large shareholders exert extensive 
influence on AGMs 
 
√ 
   
√ 
  √   √   
Decisions taken at AGMs are subject to 
voting 
 
√ 
   
√ 
  √   √   
The kind of influence that majority 
shareholders have in the selection or 
appointment of directors makes it possible 
for them to exert control over the firm 
 
 
√ 
   
 
√ 
    
 
√ 
  
 
√ 
  
It is easy for large shareholders to have 
access to very important personalities in the 
firm 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  √   
Decisions of management or directors can 
be questioned or altered by large 
shareholders 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  √   
Shareholders have the right to call for 
Extraordinary General Meetings for 
clarifications on certain issues 
  
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
 
Key: A= At all times, O= Occasionally, N= Never/Absolutely Not 
7.2 Effectiveness of the Board 
Board composition 
All corporate organizations studied have boards of directors that are characterized by more non-
executive directors than executive directors. The rules and regulations governing these four 
companies have categorically made it clear that NEDs should always form the majority on the 
board. Two of the corporate organizations (GCB and SIC) studied, include on their boards persons 
who hold senior government positions or who have one way or the other, have links to the 
government. It is clear that those individuals are on the board to make sure that the government’s 
influences on the decision-making processes of these companies are properly effected. Even though 
UT and ABL do not have such persons on their board, the state still has a certain level of influence 
in their decision-making processes. This is consistent with the observation that corporate 
governance in developing economies is directly or indirectly characterized by politics (Berglof & 
Claessens, 2004).  
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Director independence 
In all four companies studied, director appointments are closely linked to shareholdings. At GCB, 
SIC and ABL, majority shareholders appoint the majority of directors who serve on their boards. 
For instance, at GCB and SIC, since the state is the majority shareholder, it (ie. the state) appoints 
almost all their board members. At ABL, the majority shareholder also appoints the majority of 
directors who serve on the company’s board. In the case of UT, even though director selection is 
connected to shareholding, it has been unambiguously stated in the company’s rules and regulations 
governing it that, equity holders with at least 5 percent of the total equity capital of the company is 
entitled to appoint/select a director to represent them on the company’s board. 
Also, in all four organizations, the nomination of directors has to be approved by all shareholders, 
irrespective of their shareholdings, at their (ie. the companies) annual general meetings. Most of the 
minority shareholders interviewed expressed their displeasure in terms of the approval process. 
They considered it as a ‘rubber stamp’ in that, before those nominated are presented to them at 
annual general meetings, the majority shareholders had already given their approval and in lieu of 
this, their votes cannot influence the approval process. One interviewee observed that:  
My brother, I was not surprised when those who were nominated to be board 
members were given an approval to serve on the company’s board. It is nothing new. 
It has been there since the day I started attending these meetings. Even if we 
[minority shareholders] disapprove, they will still go ahead to be appointed as 
directors……. 
Furthermore, in all four organizations, the CEO or managing director does not have any influence 
over the selection of directors. There is an absence of business connection between the 
organizations and their board members. This implies that board members are always independent of 
the CEOs of these organizations. Board members normally know the shareholders that selected 
them and to whom they are accountable to in all four organizations. The implication is that, board 
members or directors are not independent of the shareholders who selected them to represent them.  
There are no overt criteria for the selection of directors in all cases. Shareholders apply their own 
value judgment in selecting individuals they perceive as suitable for the directorship job. However, 
in all cases, it was noticed that for a person to be appointed, he/she has to possess a special kind of 
finesse and knowledge that are considered as being useful for board discussions. For instance, 
he/she is supposed to have knowledge about the organization as well as the financial aspects of the 
organization. Also, he/she has to have a good insight into the industry in which the company 
operates.     
Board leadership structure 
In all organizations studied, the post of the Board Chairperson and that of the CEO have been 
separated. This split is considered by the organizations as a way of bringing in checks and balances 
to avoid circumstances where a person will be created (for instance, a ‘Frankenstein Monster’), 
who would perhaps be difficult to be monitored and controlled. In that case, this decision (ie. the 
decision to separate the two posts) is taken to exert control and it therefore, helps in solving agency 
problem. In the case of UT bank, this split is more or less considered as power sharing between the 
two founding fathers of the organization, instead of checks and balances mechanism. This situation 
does not foster board control in this organization.  
Board meetings  
The boards of the four organizations have a formal procedure for conducting their meetings. These 
procedures are explicitly stated in the rules and regulations governing these organizations. The 
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procedures include meeting preparations, conveying board papers as well as meeting agenda to 
board members in order to give them ample time to prepare. Meeting procedures of these 
organizations are in consonance with the internationally standardized way of conducting board 
meetings.  
In principle, board meetings of these organizations follow an agenda that includes minutes’ 
approval, the quarterly reports, and issues arising as well as other businesses. In all four cases, 
management always prepare meeting agendas but more often than not, they seek advice from the 
board chairperson. Notwithstanding that, directors are also allowed to incorporate new ideas into 
the set agendas for deliberation. The manner in which meeting agendas are set as well as board 
meetings are executed paves the  way for directors to effectively pay attention to all important 
issues, which are considered as vital for carrying out board control functions effectively.   
Board audit committee 
All four corporate organizations have instituted formal board audit committees with non-executive 
directors as the majority of their members. With the exception of ABL, membership composition of 
the audit committee is made up of non-executive directors only. In the case of ABL, although the 
committee is not entirely made up of non-executive directors, non-executive directors constitute the 
majority. At GCB, SIC and UT, the board audit committee meets at least four times in a year but 
can be increased when situations demand. In the case of ABL, the committee is supposed to meet at 
least three times in a year but can be increased when circumstances require.  
Also, in all cases, the principal duties and responsibilities of the committee are: Monitoring the 
maintenance of proper accounting records and the reliability of financial reports used in the affairs 
of the company; putting forward reasonable assurance of the protection of assets against 
unauthorized use or disposition; authorizing, directing and reviewing the program of the internal 
auditor; receiving reports from the internal auditor and considering the major findings of those 
reports; monitoring follow-up activities of management; keeping accounting policies of the 
company under review and making recommendations to the board to amend or repeal such policies; 
monitoring compliance with the vital legal and regulatory framework; presenting audit reports to 
board members during board meetings; discussing any challenges or reservations that arise from 
the interim or final audit and any issues the external auditor may wish to deliberate on; reviewing 
the way in which management ensures and monitors the manner, magnitude and efficacy of the 
company’s accounting, risk management and financial control systems; and holding discussions 
with the external auditor ahead of the period their audit commences.  
Board remuneration committee 
GCB and UT bank have established a formal board remuneration committee with non-executive 
directors as members of the committee. At GCB, the main responsibility of the committee is 
reviewing the recruitment and termination policies of the bank including employment contracts 
remuneration, pension and other rewards, making appropriate recommendations and any other 
responsibility that may be assigned by the board. Furthermore, UT bank’s remuneration committee 
is responsible for reviewing all human resource policies to ensure that workers are treated honestly 
and work in very favorable environments. It is also responsible for putting up performance 
indicators for the company and determining the structure of remuneration of the Bank’s chairperson 
and executive directors. Also, the Committee reviews and approves the remuneration packages, 
incentive plans and staff bonuses for the company. These responsibilities make the board to get to 
know all HR, compliance and financial aspects of the firm.   
SIC and ABL have not established a formal board remuneration committee. However, at SIC, the 
audit and finance committee of the company has been delegated by the board to look into issues 
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concerning compensation packages. This committee has been tasked by the board to deal with the 
following issues: recommending the levels of remuneration of non-executive directors for approval 
by the board and ultimately by the shareholders; undertaking of annual reviews of executives 
emoluments; and reviewing and recommending to the board, executives and staff bonuses and 
long-term incentive packages. In the case of ABL, discussions are on-going about the formation of 
a remuneration committee. Table 7.3 below depicts the responses in regards to the determinants of 
board effectiveness of Ghanaian Companies.  
187 
 
Table 7.3: Board effectiveness in Ghanaian corporate organizations 
 GCB SIC UT ABL 
 A O N A O N A O N A O N 
For the past 10 years, majority of board members 
have been  NEDs 
√   √   √   √   
There is an existence of social or economic tie 
between directors and the firm 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  
√ 
    
√ 
There is an existence of social or economic tie 
between directors and top managers 
   
√ 
   
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
    
√ 
There is a presence of social or economic tie 
between directors and majority shareholders 
 
 
 
√ 
   
√ 
  
√ 
    
√ 
 
Positions of the CEO and the Chairperson have 
been divided and occupied by different persons for 
the past 10 years 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  
There is an existence of board audit committee 
instituted by the board 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  
There is a presence of a board remuneration 
committee 
 
√ 
  No Remuneration 
Committee 
√   No Remuneration Committee 
Majority of the members on the audit board are 
NEDs 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  
NEDs form majority on the board remuneration 
committee 
 
√ 
  No Committee 
 
√   No Remuneration Committee 
Membership appointments to the audit committee 
are made known to shareholders 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  
Membership appointments to the remuneration 
committee are made known to shareholders 
 
√ 
  No Remuneration 
committee 
 
√ 
  No Remuneration Committee 
There are criteria for the selection and replacement 
of directors 
 
 
  
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
There is a laid down procedure upon which board 
meetings are held 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  
Before board meetings, information about the firm 
are made available to members on time 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
   
√ 
  
Key: A= At all times, O= Occasionally, N= Never/Absolutely Not 
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7.3 Board control 
In the case of UT bank, board members/directors carry out all activities in relation to the control 
function of the board: taking decisions in terms of hiring and disciplining the CEO; replacing the 
CEO in case of mismanagement; discussing and approving the company’s strategies, determining 
the type of information they need from management; and setting up the CEOs compensation 
package. In the other three cases of GCB, SIC and ABL, board members have limited control over 
the activities of the organizations. The only control activity that members carry out is to discuss 
and approve corporate strategies in these three organizations. But these discussions of corporate 
strategies are not for the purpose of exerting board control over the activities of management. They 
rather aid the purpose of providing board members with a chance to offer advice to management on 
how the set goals can be realized. 
With respect to a formal assessment of the activities of the Chief executive officer, the board and 
individual board members, it was observed that, directors of GCB, SIC and ABL perform an 
implicit assessment of their chief executive officers/ managing directors. The levels of assessment 
of boards of directors of GCB, SIC and ABL differ from that of UT bank in that, directors of GCB, 
SIC and ABL do conduct such assessments only when they are discussing and approving corporate 
strategies of these organizations. In the case of UT bank, the board performs its controlling 
function without any interference from the controlling shareholder. 
At GCB, SIC and ABL, the control function of directors has been replaced by the controlling 
prowess of their controlling shareholders. This is in line with the assertion of Roe (2003) that, when 
a controlling shareholder exerts an extensive control over the activities of management, it leaves 
little room for the board to exercise its control function. Although the controlling shareholders of 
GCB, SIC and ABL exercise control over the activities of the company, they (ie. the controlling 
shareholders) leave room for directors to exert a certain level of control as witnessed via their 
involvement in control activities. Table 7.4 indicates responses with respect to board control in 
Ghanaian companies.  
Table 7.4: Board control in Ghanaian corporate organizations 
 GCB SIC UT ABL 
 A O N A O N A O N A O N 
Decisions in terms of hiring a 
CEO are made by the board 
  √   √ √     √ 
The CEO can be replaced by 
the board in case of 
mismanagement 
 √   √  √     √ 
Strategies are discussed and 
approved by the board 
√   √   √  √    
Decisions on the CEO’s 
remuneration package are 
made by the board via the 
remuneration committee 
 
 
  
√ 
   
√ 
 
√ 
     
√ 
The activities of the CEO are 
assessed by the board 
√   √   √     √ 
The board makes sure the 
firm complies with existing 
laws regarding the day to day 
running of the firm eg, 
Generally Accepted 
Accounting and Auditing 
Principles laid down by ICAG 
 
 
√ 
   
 
√ 
   
 
√ 
  
 
 
 
√ 
  
 
 
The board determines the type 
of information it needs from 
management anytime 
√   √   √    
 
 √ 
Key: A= At all times, O= Occasionally, N= Never/Absolutely Not 
189 
 
7.4 Analysis and confirmation of propositions 
It has been revealed that the four organizations investigated have large controlling shareholders. 
And that these controlling shareholders are the vital driving force of effective corporate governance 
in these organizations. This means that Proposition 1, which states that: Shareholders with larger 
shares exert shareholder control in a company is verified in all four organizations. 
With respect to board meetings, the observable facts depict that, elements of effective and efficient 
board meetings are in existence in all four organizations. However, the connection between 
effective and efficient board meetings and board control was only realized in one organization. 
This implies that, Proposition 2, which states: Effective and efficient board meetings result in a 
panoptic board control is verified in one organization and not verified in the other three.   
With regards to the leadership structure, the observable facts depict that the position of the chief 
executive officer and that of the chairperson have been separated in all four corporate 
organizations. However, the relationship between this separation and board control was not realized 
(See chapter 6). This means that, Proposition 3, which states: The non-duality structure with an 
independent director as the board chairperson, results in a panoptic board control in a company is 
not confirmed in all four organizations.  
In terms of a prim and proper audit committee, the findings indicate that all four corporate 
organizations have established a formal board audit committee with non-executive directors as its 
members. However, the observable facts also reveal that, there is a relationship between a board 
audit committee and board control in only one organization. This implies that Proposition 4, which 
states:  Instituting a board audit committee with independent directors as its members, leads to 
board control in an organization is verified in one organization and not verified in the other three.  
The findings of a board remuneration committee show that two of the four organizations 
investigated have established a remuneration committee. In spite of this, a relationship between a 
board remuneration committee and board control does exist in only one of these two organizations. 
This implies that, Proposition 5, which states: Setting up a board remuneration committee with 
independent directors as its members, leads to board control is confirmed in one organization and 
not confirmed in the other three.    
7.5 Comparison of the recommended guidelines with the empirical evidence 
This section compares the recommended guidelines of corporate governance of Ghana with the 
observable facts of the study. It first compares the recommended guidelines with the empirical facts 
in terms of shareholder rights and control. It then continues to compare the recommended 
guidelines with the empirical evidence in relation to board effectiveness and control. Lastly, a 
discussion on the comparison of the recommended guidelines of Ghana with the observable facts in 
regards to shareholder rights and shareholder control as well as board effectiveness and board 
control is conducted.  
7.5.1 Shareholder control 
The regulatory framework for effective corporate governance in Ghana is contained in the 
securities and exchange commission of Ghana’s principles of corporate governance. This 
framework deals with issues that intensify the focus of this study (see Chapter 2). For instance, it 
deals with issues such as shareholder rights and control, activities of the board in exerting its 
control function and determinants of board effectiveness in regards to board control. Table 7.5 
reveals the aspects of shareholder control contained in this framework which have been compared 
with the observable facts of the four cases investigated.  
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Table 7.5: Shareholder Control 
Principles of Ghana  Observable Facts 
Shareholders have to actively get involved to protect, 
preserve and  actively exercise the supreme authority of 
the organization through annual general meetings  
Controlling shareholders actively partake in the affairs of 
the company by influencing decision-making processes in 
the four organizations. 
Shareholders have the right to be satisfactorily informed 
about decisions concerning fundamental changes such as 
amendment of statutes, authorization of additional shares 
and so on. 
Information of this kind is normally provided. However, in 
order for these  changes to be effected, an approval from 
controlling shareholders is needed 
Shareholders have the right to partake in the decision-
making processes of the organization. For instance, 
partaking in the company’s voting process, obtaining 
timely and regular information and so on.  
Large shareholders have greater access to information since 
they have access to key persons such as the board 
chairperson and Chief Executive Officer. Minority 
shareholders, on the other hand, only rely on the statutory 
disclosures of the companies.  
The rights of shareholders are to be safeguarded and the 
manner in which these rights are to be effected ought to 
be secured 
This requirement is clearly stated in the various rules and 
regulations governing all four corporate organizations.  
There should be an equitable treatment of all 
shareholders irrespective of their holdings 
Large shareholders always receive the necessary attention. 
For instance, they have access to key persons in the 
organizations; have greater access to information and so on. 
7.5.2 Board effectiveness in regards to Board Control 
The recommendations of the principles of corporate governance of Ghana in regards to board 
effectiveness and control, and their associated determinants are indicated in Table 7.6 below. They 
are compared with the observable facts from the four cases.  
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Table 7.6: Board Control  
Board control Observable facts 
Effective board should properly manage the company 
in order to safeguard and enhance shareholder value, 
and to meet the company’s obligation to shareholders. 
It also has to provide strategic guidance and effectively 
control the management of the company 
In the cases of GCB, SIC and ABL, boards do not exert 
control. In the case of UT bank, the board does exert 
extensive control over the management of the company. 
During Annual General Meetings, formal reporting takes 
place as well as the provision of Annual Report. 
Board effectiveness 
 Description Observable facts 
Composition The board should include a balance of 
Executive directors and independent Non-
Executive directors, with the complement of 
Non-Executive directors being at least one-third 
of the total membership. Independent non-
executive directors should be independent of 
management and should be free from other 
connections with the company, which may 
interfere with their ability to carry out their 
responsibilities in an independent manner. 
Non-executive directors form the larger 
constituent of the boards of directors of all 
corporate organizations studied. In all four 
companies, NEDs are independent of 
management, but not independent of appointing 
shareholders.   
Leadership 
Structure 
The position of the Chief Executive Officer and 
that of the board chairperson should be 
separated. The chairperson should be a person 
who is independent and does not interfere in the 
management of the company.  
The roles of the Chief Executive Officers and 
that of the Chairpersons have been separated in 
all companies investigated. The board 
chairpersons of these companies are 
independent of management, but not 
independent of controlling shareholders. 
Selection  and 
Board 
Independence 
The selection procedure of new directors ought 
to be based on merit and should be formal and 
transparent.  
In the cases of GCB, SIC and ABL, directors 
are selected by controlling shareholders. In the 
case of UT bank, selection/appointment can be 
done by a shareholder, if he/she/it satisfies a 
specified criterion.  
There are no lucid criteria for the selection of 
directors in all four organizations investigated.  
Board Meetings In order for the board to discharge its duties 
effectively, it should meet at least six times a 
year.  
In all four organizations, boards of directors 
meet four times a year and can be increased as 
situation demands.  
Board Committee In order for the board to work effectively and 
avoid any conflict of interest, it should establish 
independent committees as it may deem 
appropriate to help it perform its duties: 
Independent Audit and Remunerations 
Committees.  
All four companies investigated have 
established a formal board audit committee 
with independent non-executive directors as 
members. When it comes to a formal board 
remuneration committee, only GCB and UT 
bank boards have established one.   
Board Succession 
Plan 
In order for companies to adjust to the 
dynamics of corporate governance, the board 
should be responsible for the drawing of 
succession plans and appointments.  
In all four companies, there is no succession 
plan in that, directors are all shareholder 
appointees 
 
7.6 Discussion of the comparison of recommended guidelines of Ghana with the Observable 
facts 
Ghana’s principles of corporate governance mirror the Anglo-American concept of corporate 
governance: That is., by effectively directing boards to monitor management to take decisions that 
will maximize shareholder wealth (See chapter 2).  
A comparison of the principles of corporate governance with the observable facts reveals that in all 
four companies, a number of corporate governance practices suggested by the principles; does 
shape their current corporate governance structures. Also, this comparison shows that there are 
some germane aspects that are thoroughly needed to be applied by the organizations in relation to 
their corporate governance practices in order for them to be in conformity with the principles’ 
recommendation.  
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In regards to the type of directors who constitute the board, the findings show that in all four 
companies, NEDs form the majority of their boards. The principles recommend that NEDs should 
at least be one-third of the total membership of the board. Although the principles recommend that 
all shareholders, irrespective of their holdings are supposed to be represented on the board, this was 
not the case in all four organizations. In all organizations, director appointment right is closely 
connected to the degree or magnitude of shareholdings (See Chapter 6). 
With respect to board meetings, the four organizations portray uniform way in carrying out board 
meetings: Information are sent by management to directors on time; directors have opportunity to 
integrate items they deem germane for deliberations; and board deliberations are efficiently and 
effectively carried out. This is consistent with the recommendation of the principles. Even though 
this is consistent with the recommended guidelines of SEC, three of the companies’ board meetings 
do not enhance board control since their controlling shareholders exert substantial influence on 
board activities.   
In terms of leadership structure of the board, the two positions of the board chairperson and CEO 
have been separated in all four organizations. However, this proves inadequate to meeting the 
principles’ recommendation. This is because, in three of the companies, their CEOs and board 
chairpersons are appointed by their controlling shareholders. And if these two top individuals of 
these organizations are always appointed by these controlling shareholders, then it leaves no room 
for board chairpersons of these companies to function effectively as expected of them. Also, the 
leadership structure of the remaining company proves inadequate in the sense that, these two 
positions are occupied by the founding fathers of the company. The implication is that, this sort of 
separation is more of ‘power sharing’ mechanism rather than a ‘check and balance’ measure to 
enhance board effectiveness.   
A board audit committee has been set up in all four organizations studied, which is to some extent 
in line with the recommendation of the companies code 1963 (Act 179). However, they prove 
inadequate in three of the companies in that, committee members are not independent of the whims 
and caprices of their controlling shareholders. Even though the remaining company’s committee 
members are not independent of its controlling shareholder, the manner in which committee 
members carry out their activities paves the way for the committee to effectively function to 
enhance board effectiveness. 
Furthermore, a board remuneration committee has been established in two organizations, which is 
to some level consistent with the companies code’s recommendation. However, they prove 
inadequate in one of the companies in that, committee members are not independent of controlling 
shareholders. Even though the remaining company’s committee members are not independent of its 
controlling shareholder, the manner in which committee members carry out their activities makes 
the committee effective and efficient. The other two organizations have not instituted a formal 
board remuneration committee and therefore, do not meet the code’s recommendation.  
The principles recommend that the method of director appointment should be formal and 
transparent to all shareholders and that information about potential persons is to be made public. 
These include the working experience, accomplishments, stature and credibility of potential 
persons. However, none of the four organizations studied has a clear explanation in relation with 
the criteria for director appointments as recommended by the principles.    
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter divulged the cross-case analyses of the data collected from the four companies. It 
proceeded to compare the empirical evidence of the study with the recommended guidelines of 
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corporate governance of Ghana. It finally carried out a discussion of this comparison. The 
subsequent chapter brings out the overview of the research questions, a summary of the driving 
forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana, a reflection on the study, conclusions and 
recommendations, contributions and weaknesses of the study, areas for further studies and the 
concluding remarks of this study.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 
The study’s literature was presented in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 of this study brought out the 
conceptual framework and its associated theoretical propositions. The research methodology of the 
study was described in chapter 5. In chapter 6, the individual reports of the four cases including the 
confirmation of the theoretical propositions were presented. The cross-case report of the four cases 
was presented in chapter 7. In this chapter, an overview of the research questions, a summary of the 
driving forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana, a reflection on the study, conclusions 
and recommendations, contributions and weaknesses of the study, areas for further studies and the 
concluding remarks are reported. Also, the findings in chapters 6 and 7 will be dovetailed to the 
study’s literature in chapters 2, 3 and 4. It is worth noting that the review of literature was finalized 
in April 2011 since the researcher started collecting the required data at that time to examine the 
issues that emerged from the body of knowledge. Hence, more recent literature will be integrated 
into this chapter to help in the discussion of the findings. Although some of the research findings 
do corroborate expectations from the existing body of knowledge, it is the first time such a study 
has been carried out within a Ghanaian context. Therefore, this study contributes to the extant body 
of knowledge since the findings add a fresh depth of appreciation to our understanding of corporate 
governance practices in developing and transition economies and for that matter, Ghana. 
Nevertheless, this study does not consider only this addition as a contribution in the sense that, this 
chapter will also focus on other equally vitally important contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge by suggesting other areas that are to be given a critical attention in corporate 
governance discourse by scholars of both management and organization. Table 8.1 below depicts 
the overview of the propositions of the study. 
Table 8.1: Overview of the research propositions 
Propositions Confirmation 
Shareholders with larger shares exert shareholder control 
in a company 
Confirmed in all cases 
Effective and efficient board meetings result in an 
extensive board control 
To a very small extent in that only one case 
confirmed this proposition. 
The non-duality structure with independent chairperson 
results in board control 
Not confirmed in all cases 
Instituting a board audit committee with independent 
directors leads to board control in an organization 
To a very small extent because only one case 
confirmed this proposition 
Setting up a board remuneration committee with 
independent directors leads to board control 
To a very small extent because only one case 
confirmed this proposition.  
Source: Fieldwork 
8.1 An Overview of the research questions   
8.1.1 The concepts available in the extant literature, which are suitable for evaluating corporate 
governance effectiveness in Ghana. 
The various definitions of corporate governance reflect the two main perspectives of corporate 
governance; the shareholder perspective and stakeholder perspective (see chapter two). These two 
perspectives come with three main models of corporate governance: The Anglo-American, 
Germanic model and Japanese model. Whilst the Anglo-American model that falls under the 
outsider model is market-oriented with strong investor protection, the Germanic and Japanese 
models, under the insider model are block holder-based with weak investor protection. These three 
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models have been applied in most countries, but they have been modified to suit the prevailing 
conditions of these countries.  
These models of corporate governance gradually developed in distinctive settings in which social 
patterns in relation to corporate governance are at variance. Currently, corporate governance 
practices around the globe are related to these differences. Debates are on-going about the probable 
convergence of the various models of corporate governance. The increasing economic globalization 
has catapulted the discourse on the best corporate governance model and the hindrances (such as 
powerful interest and lobby groups) to the development of a single corporate governance model 
(Goergen, Martynova, Renneboog, 2005; McCahery, Moerland, Raaijmakers & Renneboog, 2002). 
Recent studies and changes have shown a general direction of convergence of the models (Goergen 
et al., 2005; Hopt & Leyens, 2004; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Haansman & Kraakman, 2000), but 
the studies and changes are not in agreement in regard to the trend of this convergence (Goergen et 
al., 2005).  
Currently, board structures of corporate businesses in Japan and Germany are converging towards 
the Anglo-American model of a one-tier board system. Changes are also happening in the Anglo-
American market-centered model. For example, large shareholders have recently emerged in the 
UK and US (See Chapter 2). There is also a differing view that convergence is not likely to happen 
as a result of some basic differences that exist between the two main competing models.  Therefore, 
the two contending models have to borrow the best practices from one another. This would lead to 
a ‘hybrid model’ with the right combination of corporate regulation, market discipline as well as 
power of corporate stakeholders (Goergen et al., 2005).   
Several theoretical perspectives can be employed to examine and explore corporate governance 
phenomenon: Transaction cost theory, agency theory, resource dependency theory, stewardship 
theory, stakeholder theory, managerial hegemony theory and class hegemony theory. In the context 
of this study, the agency and transaction cost theories were employed. The reason is that these two 
theories are similar particularly, in managerial decisions and behavioral assumptions such as 
bounded rationality and opportunism, which are present in the Ghanaian setting. The transaction 
cost and agency theories attempt to tackle similar problem. For instance, the problem of how to 
induce corporate managers to pursue the interests of shareholders and at the same time, to take 
decisions that would maximize shareholder value. Shareholders borne every cost of non-wealth 
actions/decisions by managers and therefore, the need to control management to take decisions to 
minimize these costs and maximize shareholder value are vitally important (Hart, 1995). The need 
to induce corporate managers to maximize shareholder value is extremely important in encouraging 
shareholders to supply the necessary and sufficient finance required by corporations, which is a 
vital issue in corporate governance debate nowadays (Berglof & Claessens, 2004).  
The principal-agent and transaction cost theories highlight some general corporate governance 
mechanisms that induce management to take decisions that will serve the interests of shareholders. 
These corporate governance mechanisms have been grouped into two: Internal and External 
corporate governance mechanisms. Internal mechanisms operate within organizations and can be 
altered to harmonize situations of organizations (Dyck, 2001). These are; board of directors, 
ownership structure, performance-based director incentives, bonding and debt financing. External 
mechanisms are those that operate outside the firm; legal and regulatory framework, and 
competitive markets comprising the product market, capital market as well as managerial labor 
market (See chapter 2).  
The prevailing conditions in Ghana do not allow the external corporate governance mechanisms to 
effectively function (See chapter 4). This is because Ghana is characterized by immature 
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competitive market as well as weak legal and regulatory framework. This is the case of developing 
economies in general (Berglof & Claessens, 2004; Lin, 2000). Also, some internal mechanisms 
such as bonding, debt financing and performance-based incentive do not function well in Ghana 
since they largely depend on the legal and regulatory framework. It was deduced from the literature 
that performance-based incentive mechanism are largely applied in countries where ownership is 
dispersed (such as the UK and US) and less applied in countries where ownership is concentrated 
(such as Germany and Japan).  
Since Ghana is currently, characterized by a concentrated ownership, performance-based incentive 
mechanism perhaps will not be common. This deduction is consistent with Berglof & Claessens’ 
(2004) assertion that performance-based mechanisms in developing countries are ineffective 
stemming from the evidence that large shareholders exist and could easily hire and fire 
management as and when they perform poorly.  On the basis of this conclusion, this study 
concentrated on the internal mechanisms of the ownership structure and board structure as they 
appeared to be the only mechanisms that could be applied in answering the study’s main research 
question (see chapters 1). The board structure and ownership structure formed the basis of the 
study’s conceptual framework to examining the driving forces of corporate governance practices in 
Ghana as well as their effectiveness. The general idea of the study inferred from the literature 
linking the ownership structure and board structure was developed, and empirically applied. This 
took into account ownership control, board control and board effectiveness- board composition, 
director independence, leadership structure of the board, board meetings, board audit committee 
and board remuneration committee.  
8.1.2 Prevailing condition in regards to corporate governance effectiveness in Ghana and the 
elements that drive this effectiveness  
The shareholder perspective of corporate governance put forth that, the objective task of an 
organization ought to focus only on those who have monetary share of the organization. It 
considers organizations as devices for shareholders to maximize their investment returns, on the 
basis that theoretically, they (ie. shareholders) are residual claimants (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Accordingly, effective corporate governance was defined in this study as how the ownership 
structure and the board structure serve as good corporate governance mechanisms in reducing 
agency problem in an organization, by narrowing the gap between the interests of shareholders and 
managers. In the context of this study, effective corporate governance is realized if the mechanisms 
examined (ie. the ownership structure and the board structure) help in solving agency problems in 
the prevailing Ghanaian setting.  
Ownership Structure 
In all organizations studied, controlling shareholders function as monitors and controllers of 
managers. Controlling shareholders exert control over decisions of management via their incessant 
access to and selection (and the authority to dismiss) of key persons in the organizations, their 
frequent access to information and their activeness in decision-making processes of the 
organizations. With these possibilities, controlling shareholders induce management to take 
decisions that will maximize shareholder value and consequently, help reduce agency problem. 
Also, controlling shareholders of these organizations have the ultimate say in regards to decisions 
during annual general meetings, in view of the fact that, they have the control rights. This allows 
them to pervasively influence decisions of management and in consequence, management has to 
take actions to maximize shareholder value.  
The revelation of this ownership concentration in all four organizations studied, is a feature that 
cuts across all Ghanaian organizations listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange, and a number of 
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organizations that is not listed. In simple terms, all Ghanaian organizations have controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, the four cases offer a dependable proof that the ownership structure is a 
vital driving force of effective corporate governance in Ghana. This revelation from the cases 
investigated in regards to the role of large shareholders is in line with the extant literature on 
corporate governance. Denise and McConnell (2003) opine that large shareholders have the 
incentive to use up resources to monitor and control management in order to make sure that their 
interests are met. Further, large shareholders are observed as vital corporate governance mechanism 
in the developing world in that; they strongly influence the course of achieving effective corporate 
governance in these economies (Berglof & Claessens, 2004).  
Board effectiveness 
In regards to the board, the study concentrated on elements that are regarded vital in agency theory 
to determine board effectiveness in connection with board control. The elements examined in this 
study were; board composition, leadership structure of the board, director independence, meetings 
of the board, board audit committee and board remuneration committee.  
Board composition  
The findings of the study depict that in all organizations, non-executive directors form the majority 
of their boards. The degree to which board composition determines board effectiveness in 
connection with board control function is assessed to be low in three organizations. In these three 
cases, boards do not get involved in the crucial elements of control in the organizations since 
controlling shareholders execute such operations. This observable fact from these three 
organizations confirms the findings in the extant literature that the existence of large shareholders 
has the proclivity to weaken other corporate governance mechanisms (Berglof & Claessens, 2004). 
It is only in one case that board composition was evaluated to settle on board control to a large 
extent in the sense that non-executive directors do carry out all the crucial elements pertaining to 
board control in the organization. This enhances the debate in the extant body of knowledge that 
boards can be effective governance mechanism (Berglof & Claessens, 2004; Denis & McConnell, 
2003). However, this study highlights that boards can only become effective corporate governance 
mechanism only if large shareholders allow them (by means of absenting themselves from 
performing control-related operations) to carry out their control function in corporate organizations. 
The finding in regards to the number of non-executive directors relative to the board size in all 
organizations studied meets the recommendations of the principles of corporate governance of 
Ghana (See chapter 2), which states that at least one-third of board members should be non-
executive directors.   
Director independence 
In all organizations studied, the extent to which director independence drives board effectiveness 
relative to board control is high. Such director independence has the propensity to transform into 
effective and efficient control of management. However, the observable facts also show that 
although directors are independent of management, the subject of director independence in relation 
to controlling shareholders continue to be challenging. The prevailing condition where controlling 
shareholders are given rights to select directors, present a great conundrum to director 
independence. This empirical evidence corroborates the extant body of knowledge in that; large 
shareholders in general, jeopardize director independence since large shareholders tend to have an 
authoritative command in relation to director appointment (Berglof & Claessens, 2004). The aspect 
of director independence in all four organizations met the recommended guidelines by the 
principles of corporate governance of Ghana.  
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Board leadership structure    
The extent to which the division of the roles of the chief executive officer and the board 
chairperson settles on board control is low for all four organizations studied. In regards to the 
suggested guidelines, the division of the roles in all four organizations meets the requirement of 
Ghana’s principles of corporate governance since one person does not perform the two roles. 
However, the division of the roles in three organizations that scored low do not conform with the 
guidelines of the principles in that, board chairpersons in these organizations are not independent of 
controlling shareholders. In the case of the other organization, the split of the positions of the chief 
executive officer and board chair was found to be power sharing mechanism to appease the two 
founding fathers.    
Board Meetings 
The extent to which board meetings settle on board effectiveness in regards to board control 
function is low for three organizations and high for one. As with other driving forces of board 
effectiveness, board meetings do not pave important way to board effectiveness with respect to 
board control in three organizations, because their boards do not wiled control over management 
and corporate decisions. In the remaining organization, board meetings settle on board control in 
that, they (ie. board meetings) represent platforms that offer the board the authority to wield control 
over management and corporate decisions.  
It is only in one of the four organizations studied that its board has put in place performance 
evaluation mechanism to assess the performance of directors, the CEO and the board. In regards to 
this finding, three organizations do not meet the recommendation of the principles of corporate 
governance of Ghana.  
Board audit committee    
The role of the board audit committee in determining board control is low for three organizations 
and high for one. As with other determining forces of board effectiveness, the establishment of 
board audit committees does not necessarily lead to board effectiveness in relation to board control 
function in three organizations in that, controlling shareholders perform extensive control over the 
organizations. This is consistent with the earlier deduction that the ownership structure has 
influence on internal mechanisms of corporate governance (Berglof & Claessens, 2004). This result 
is also consistent with the study of Mendez and Garcia (2007) on the effects the ownership 
structure and board composition have on audit committees in Spain. Their results portrayed a 
negative relationship between large shareholders and audit committee activity. They attributed this 
result to the extensive control large shareholders wield over the activities of the committee.  
As a matter of fact, the ineffectiveness of the board audit committees of these three organizations 
as a result of the presence of controlling shareholders makes the companies code 1963 
recommendation with respect to board committees irrelevant. Since the board is ineffective as a 
result of the extensive control over its activities by the controlling shareholders, it can be envisaged 
that any committee established by the board will be ineffective.   
Board remuneration committee  
Two of the organizations studied have established board remuneration committee. However, the 
role of the remuneration committee in determining board control is low for one of the two 
organizations and high for the other. The establishment of board remuneration committees does not 
lead to board control in these organizations (ie. low-scored organizations) in the sense that, their 
controlling shareholders perform extensive control over their operations. This is in line with the 
earlier deduction that the ownership structure has influence on internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance (Berglof & Claessens, 2004). 
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8.1.3 Auxiliary issues that could be used for further enhancement of corporate governance in 
Ghana 
The observable facts reveal three key issues that need to be given the necessary attention to 
enhance corporate governance practice in Ghana. These are: Improving the corporate governance 
foundation; safeguarding the right of minority shareholders; and fashioning out measures to 
enhance board effectiveness.  
Improving the corporate governance foundation 
The discussions in chapter 4 about the different corporate governance mechanisms that can be 
applied to induce management to advance the course of achieving shareholder wealth have 
revealed that a market-oriented economy is still gaining roots in Ghana. This is because a lot of 
factors that create efficient market-oriented economy are still developing. For instance, Ghana’s 
capital market is still in its early stage. Hitherto, the capital market is not efficient to induce 
management to proceed along the course of maximizing shareholder value. In other words, it does 
not serve as an effective, efficient and dependable threat to corporate managers who do not take 
decisions to maximize shareholder value. Also, law enforcement, which is a key element for 
efficient and effective market-oriented economy is weak in Ghana.  
The world bank (2003) reports that corporate governance in most developing and transition 
economies is not properly practiced because most developing and transition economies have not 
succeeded to always and equably enforce rules and regulations concerning corporate governance.  
Practices like insider trading and self-dealing are common. Such offenses by and large go 
undisciplined, even if harsh penalties apply in theory (World Bank, 2003). Ghana’s position to 
supporting the implementation of corporate governance is undermined by weak monitoring and 
enforcement practices. In consequence of the aforementioned challenges, there is a need to improve 
the foundation for effective corporate governance in Ghana, which is no different to the needs of 
other emergent economies. For example, most commonwealth countries are faced with such 
challenges (Berglof & Claessens, 2004).     
Safeguarding the right of minority shareholders  
Currently, large shareholders play significant role in determining effective corporate governance in 
Ghana, but they also cause a significant challenge to the enhancement of corporate governance 
practices. This is because shareholders with larger shares are more likely to represent a controlling 
interest (Okpara, 2010). Such control furnishes them (ie. shareholders with large shares) with the 
possibility of private benefit (ie. benefits that are unavailable to other shareholders) (La porta et al., 
2000), and with this practice, firm value is more likely to be reduced (Berglof & Claessens, 2004; 
Denis & McConnell, 2003).  
The empirical facts of this study reveal that there are significant information and power 
asymmetries between controlling equity holders and small/minority equity holders. Presently, small 
equity holders cannot effectively influence decision-making processes of corporate organizations. 
Generally, minority shareholders do not have representatives on the boards of corporate 
organizations. Even in annual general meetings where they depend on for information about the 
growth of their firms, they are always denied of adequate voice (See Chapter 6 & 7).  This usually 
makes them susceptible to the abuses of majority shareholders and in consequence, they play a 
lesser role on how corporate organizations are steered and directed.  
The vulnerability of small equity holders means that the conventional agency problem confronting 
Anglo-American organizations, which sets equity holders against powerful management, is not 
salient in the Ghanaian setting. This is because the main problem is the struggle between 
controlling equity holders and minority equity holders.   This is archetypal of most developing and 
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transition economies (Okpara, 2010; Berglof & Claessens, 2004). And this leads to expropriation 
problem where majority shareholders with their controlling prowess over corporate organizations 
tend to divert resources from corporate organizations in a manner, which dispossesses minority 
shareholders of their fair share of income from those resources (Oman, Fries & Buiter, 2003). 
These controlling rights of large shareholders not only offer them with unrestricted power to punish 
poorly performed management, but to channel company resources for their private gains 
(Zhonghua, 2008). Also, controlling shareholders always act contrary to the limitations imposed by 
central planning, and faced with opportunities to maximize their personal interest, probably be 
tempted to get involved in, or acquiesce to, corporate scandals (Chen, Firth, Gao & Rui, 2006). 
Such revelations have been reported to have taken place in some independent commonwealth 
economies, South-Eastern economies of Europe and China (Chen et al., 2006; OECD, 2003). Even 
though this study has not found concrete evidence that such a deprivation of possession of minority 
shareholders is prevalent in Ghana, it brings out that the prevailing condition presents a fertile 
ground for this to happen.  
The implication for further improvement of corporate governance practice in Ghana is to put some 
measures in place to safeguard minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (2000) have suggested six (6) 
legal protection forms termed as anti-director rights measured by the ‘anti-director rights index’. 
These are: 1) Permitting equity holders to mail their proxy votes to the company; 2) not requiring 
equity holders to deposit their shares before the annual general meeting; 3) cumulative voting; 4) 
ensuring proportional representation of small/minority equity holders on boards; 5) the presence of 
a mechanism for oppressed small equity holders; and 6) allowing small equity holders to organize 
an extraordinary shareholders meeting.   
The principles of corporate governance of Ghana recommend an equitable treatment of all 
shareholders (for example, minority shareholders should be given the opportunity to attain effective 
redress for violation of their rights) (See Chapter 2). Even though this section of the principle is 
aimed to safeguard the rights of minority shareholders, the main problem confronting Ghana in 
regards to laws is their enforcement. There may be an existence of laws to safeguard minorities, but 
their application is generally, poor. A law-oriented method of solving this problem, which is clearly 
spelt out by Black et al. (1999) in the context of Russia also applies to Ghana:   
[T]he principal problem is not that laws aren’t strong enough; but that they 
aren’t enforced… unhappy shareholders can rarely develop enough facts to 
prove the rampant self-dealing that occurs every day. The courts respect 
only documentary evidence, which is rarely available, given limited 
discovery and manager’s skills in covering their tracks…pursuing a case… 
will take years, and when you are done, enforcing a judgment is 
problematic, because enforcement is by the same biased or corrupt lower 
court that the shareholder began at (Black et al., 1999 cited in Dyck, 2001, 
p. 11-12).  
The problem of enforcing laws, and rules and regulations is a challenging issue confronting most 
developing and transition economies with respect to corporate governance (Okpara, 2010; Berglof 
& Claessens, 2004).  If the law courts do not effectively perform their functions in developing 
countries where corruption is rife, governance structures in individual firms will lack appropriate 
means of enforcement (Charkman, 2005). A situation like this automatically leads to weak investor 
protection which will shy foreign investors away from these countries. Leuz, Lins & Warnock 
(2009) contend that foreign capital providers invest insignificant amount of money in corporate 
organizations that situate in countries where weak investor protection is the order of the day.  This 
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then points to the fact that mechanisms should be put in place for such enforcement. For instance, 
meeting this problem needs the recognition that the structure and capacity of regulatory and judicial 
frameworks are essential parts of the corporate governance structure.    
Issues that affect board effectiveness 
A number of issues that drives board effectiveness in regards to board control function still needs to 
be dealt with. These include; director independence, assessment of directors and the leadership 
structure of the board.  
Director independence 
The observable facts of the four cases reveal that the size of equity capital that is needed for 
shareholders to select representatives to the board is well-established in the various rules and 
regulations governing the companies. This regulation normally backs controlling shareholders 
because it permits them to select the majority of board members, the chairperson and the CEO, 
while excluding a lot of small equity holders from partaking in all vital decision-making processes. 
This is in line with the findings of Berglof and Claessens (2004) that director independence is 
weakened with the presence of controlling shareholders. This concern is needed to be addressed 
(see section 8.4.2 of this chapter for how this teething issue can be addressed by boards).    
Director assessment 
With an exception of one corporate business, the various boards of the companies studied do not 
deal with issues pertaining to formal assessments of directors, the CEO and board activities. This 
means that boards need for particular skills, abilities and knowledge is not all that important. Since 
there are no laid down measures in assessing the CEO and other individual members of the 
companies, once these individuals are appointed or selected, they tend not to fully involve 
themselves in regards to how they apply their skills, knowledge, competences and expertise as 
required of them for the betterment of the companies. It is argued that director assessments- be it at 
board level, committee level or individual level- are relevant in that they facilitate the board’s 
understanding of whether it is meeting its own performance expectations or otherwise (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2011). Also, director assessments aid boards to take a note of the performances of their 
directors and the manner in which directors apply their skills, knowledge, competences and 
expertise as required of them. In circumstances where a director is inactively involved in board 
activities, this assessment mechanism can be an effective and efficient way for introducing a 
discussion about enhancement or substitution (section 8.4.2 of this chapter extensively addresses 
this pressing concern).         
Leadership structure of the Board  
All four corporate organizations have separated the roles of the board chairperson and the chief 
executive officer, but none of these separations enhances board control. The general evidence is 
that the schism of the two positions is only vital for the purposes of control when the board is, 
practically, involved in decision control. But in circumstances-as highlighted in our four cases-
where major stockholders always control and monitor the affairs of their corporate organizations, 
such schism cannot be regarded as a value added mechanism.  
8.2 Summary: driving forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana 
The following driving forces of effective corporate governance can be identified currently in 
Ghana.  
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8.2.1 Ownership Structure   
The ownership structure, which drives ownership control, is a significant driving force that was 
witnessed in all four cases. Ghana is characterized by a concentrated ownership and in 
consequence; there is a substantial possibility that large equity holders form an important driving 
force of effective corporate governance in many Ghanaian corporate organizations.    
8.2.2 Board effectiveness  
Board of directors is also an important corporate governance mechanism to ensuring effective 
corporate governance in Ghana. However, its effectiveness with respect to its control function 
differs from organization to organization as witnessed in the four cases. Board effectiveness is 
restricted by the ownership structure as well as the extent of ownership control. In a situation where 
there is significant ownership control, the board is likely to be less involved in decision control and 
as result, it becomes an advisory body. This is consistent with the findings of Castellini and 
Agyemang (2013), Coles et al. (2008), Adams and Ferreira (2007), Adams and Mehran (2003), and 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001).  Meanwhile, the observable facts of the cases have indicated that in 
organizations where boards are vitally important for the purposes of control (ie. exerting decision 
control), board effectiveness at different levels, is driven by its composition, director independence, 
board meetings, board audit committee and board remuneration committee. 
Board composition and independence   
Board composition and director independence are two significant forces that drive effective 
corporate governance in one of the organizations studied. They foster effective corporate 
governance by enhancing board control. Generally, this happens in circumstances where the board 
exerts board control over management and it is in line with the agency theory (chapter 3). Even 
though these driving forces are found only in one company, it can be inferred that board 
composition and director independence can possibly be significant driving forces of effective 
corporate governance in corporate organizations that share the same characteristics with this 
company.  
Board meetings 
Board meetings were key driving force of effective corporate governance in one of the 
organizations studied. This is because they serve as a platform for conducting strategic-decision 
control operations of firms. Generally, board meetings are significant driving force of effective 
corporate governance in circumstances where boards exert control over management operations.  
Board audit committee 
The board audit committee was a significant driving force of effective corporate governance in one 
of the organizations studied. Normally, this occurs in circumstances where the board exerts control 
over management and it is in line with the agency literature. Although this driving force is found in 
one firm, the finding implies that in corporations with similar conditions, board audit committees 
can possibly be an important driving force of effective corporate governance.  
Board remuneration committee 
The board remuneration committee was a significant driving force of effective corporate 
governance in one of the companies studied. Normally, this occurs in circumstances where the 
board exerts control over management and it is consistent with the agency literature. Even though 
this driving force is witnessed in only one organization, the finding implies that, in firms with 
similar characterizing features, board remuneration committees are important force in driving 
effective corporate governance.  
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Skills and knowledge of directors 
Although skills and knowledge of directors are not included in the conceptual framework of this 
study, they are important requirement for effective board discussions to enhance board control. 
Payne et al. (2009) argue that boards with adequate finesse, power, external information and 
opportunity are more efficient in achieving their goals. Therefore, the questions that need to be 
asked to make sure whether the candidate is well-fit to be qualified as a member are as follows; 1) 
does the candidate have the necessary skills, knowledge and experience the company requires from 
the board as in accounting, auditing, marketing, technology and so on?, 2) is the candidate a person 
who adheres to a strict moral or ethical code?, 3) is the person someone who appears to be 
appealing and  is capable to take on constructive or productive discussions with other members of 
the board?, and 4) is the person a candidate who will fit into the group? Requiring answers to these 
questions demand not only interviewing the person, but information on him or her can be acquired 
from others who have seen him or her in action. This issue extends the original conceptual 
framework of the study as developed in chapter 4 (see chapter 4).  
8.3 Reflection on the study 
The findings of this study strengthen the emerging state of knowledge on corporate governance in 
developing and transition economies in that, this study has been undertaken in the context of a 
developing economy (Castellini & Agyemang, 2013; Berglof & Claessens, 2004). On the basis of 
the theoretical foundation of this study, a set of corporate governance mechanisms has been 
identified to operate both outside and inside of corporate organizations-external mechanisms and 
internal mechanisms. The external mechanisms that have been identified and discussed include the 
legal and regulatory framework and the competitive market of capital, product as well as 
managerial labor. The internal mechanisms of corporate governance discussed include bond, 
performance-based incentive, the ownership structure, debt financing and the board of directors. 
This aspect of the study answered the first specific research question of this study (see section 
1.6.1).  
The discussion in regards to both external and internal mechanisms of corporate governance was 
conducted in the context of a developing country. Accordingly, only two internal mechanisms were 
highlighted as the main elements that drive effective corporate governance in developing countries 
and for that matter, Ghana. In order to dig deeper into this revelation, a pilot study was conducted 
and its outcome corroborated the deduction that only ownership and board structures determine 
sound corporate governance in Ghana. Consequently, the conceptual framework of the study was 
constructed. On the basis of this, five theoretical propositions were formulated to utterly define the 
boundaries of the research. Further, data were gathered from four publicly-listed firms on the GSE 
to answer the study’s specific research question 2 (see section 1.6.1). After the analyses of the data, 
it was highlighted that between these two structures (that is, the ownership structure and board 
structure), the ownership structure significantly drives effective corporate governance in Ghana. 
This is because these four companies are characterized by ownership concentration and that large 
shareholders totally dominate and have control over the firms thus averting agency problems in the 
companies. This tacitly implies that while minority equity holders are ineffective in the 
management of their companies, large shareholders play effective roles in managing their firms. 
This result corroborates the works of Leech (2013), Okpara (2010), and Berglof and Claessens 
(2004). It is also consistent with the assertion that in times of weak law enforcement regime, 
shareholders do not expect that their interests will be protected via lawful channels and therefore, 
they do take a more direct participation in the administration of their companies (Larcker & Tayan, 
2011; La Porta et al. 1997).           
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Furthermore, the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance does exist in Ghana, but 
needs further development in regards to its enforcement. Most developing economies have failed to 
consistently and evenly enforce their legal and regulatory framework with respect to corporate 
governance (World Bank, 2003). In Ghana, the capacity to carry out the implementation of good 
corporate governance is threatened by the presence of weak enforcement of existing rules and 
regulations. This is considered as the most challenging issue in Ghana (chapter 4) and in most 
developing and transition economies (Immordino & Pagano, 2010; Okpara, 2010; Berglof & 
Claessens, 2004).  Effective enforcement of existing laws and regulations is a vital determinant for 
a sound foundation upon which effective corporate governance can thrive (Okpara, 2010; Leuz, 
Lins & Warnock, 2009; Berglof & Claessens, 2004; Oman et al, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1999). 
Theoretically, the claim that an effective enforcement of existing laws and regulations (for 
instance, safeguarding minority shareholders) will induce investors as well as disperse ownership 
cannot be identified in the Ghanaian context. This goes a long way to negatively affect Ghana’s 
capital market. Since Ghana has sufficient laws and regulations, an effective enforcement of them 
is needed to induce investment as well as to improve her capital market.  
8.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.4.1 Conclusions 
The proposition that shareholders who hold large proportions of equity capital wield an extensive 
shareholder control over the activities of corporate entities has been established. This implies that 
large shareholders in corporate organizations are considered important determining elements of 
effective corporate governance in Ghana. This finding is consistent with the findings in the general 
body of knowledge that shareholders with not inconsiderable shares in a corporate entity are 
considered to be the driving force of good corporate governance (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013a; 
Roe, 2003; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). It also reinforces the emerging 
body of knowledge on corporate governance in developing economies that major stockholders are 
the only imperative mechanism (Berglof & Claessens, 2004).  Even though major shareholders are 
effective in addressing incentive problems; this situation tends to create problems with regards to 
the interests of small equity holders. One of the findings of this study has indicated that a vital issue 
that arises regarding corporate governance is the one of the weak small shareholders vis-à-vis 
major ones. This is consistent with the existing body of knowledge in the sense that, in developing 
economies, the matter of corporate governance typically involves the expropriation of small equity 
holders by major equity holders (Agyemang & Aboagye, 2013; Okpara, 2010; Zhonghua, 2008; 
Oman et al., 2003; Denis & McConnell, 2003).  
There is evidence that corroborates the theory with regards to the functions of the board in 
exercising its control function. The findings portray that an effective and efficient board is a vital 
driver in determining good corporate governance. This usually happens when controlling equity 
holders do not deal with aspects of control which are vested in the board. In other words, when 
major equity holders fully involve themselves in corporate decision-making processes, boards 
appear to be mere counselors or advisors to management. This corroborates the body of knowledge 
in the sense that, major equity holders are inclined to make other corporate mechanisms futile 
(Berglof & Claessens, 2004; Zhonghua, 2008; Roe, 2003).  The same conclusion applies to the 
non-duality structure. Such split does not inevitably result in a more effective and efficient board 
with regards to board control. This means that corporate governance experts ought to be very 
careful when applying governance principles of advanced countries in developing economies, in 
that the conditions in regards to corporate governance practices are different in these economies.   
The findings also depict that, at times, compliance with the various principles of corporate 
governance that have been prescribed regarding board composition does not certainly result in 
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effective and efficient board with respect to board control function. However, evidence shows that 
with an absence of large shareholders who closely monitor and control the activities of 
management, a large number of independent NEDs on boards is useful in their control and 
monitoring function. Furthermore, the findings regarding director independence bring about some 
challenges to the various principles of corporate governance, which recommend that NEDs must be 
independent. In circumstances where the controlling shareholder appoints the majority of directors, 
independence remains a problem or huge challenge. Also, director appointment by large 
shareholders also brings about a challenge in that; it raises the issue pertaining to criteria for 
appointments. This finding demonstrates that the appointment procedure of directors is not guided 
by clear criteria.  
The confirmation from the case study poses a challenge to the privatization program that have been 
in place since the divestiture implementation program with the aim of broadening ownership and 
empowering Ghanaian entrepreneurs. When privatization prevails, it attracts strategic investors 
which will then lead to an emergence of large private equity holders who eventually rule out large 
number of small equity holders from key decision-making processes of corporate entities. This is in 
sharp contrast with the objective of the privatization program in Ghana. This means that post-
privatization corporate governance guidelines should be carefully thought-out and designed. 
8.4.2 Recommendations 
Recommendations for government and regulatory bodies 
Enforcing existing laws and regulations for effective corporate governance 
Based on the theoretical foundation of this study, it has been established that although Ghana has 
sufficient laws and regulations with respect to corporate governance, the major challenge is the 
absence of active devices for their effective enforcement. Without an effective enforcement of the 
rules and regulations in regards to corporate governance, it will be very difficult for developing and 
transition economies to develop a strong and vibrant capital markets, which are currently regarded 
as important for sustainable economic development for countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; 
Berglof & Claessens, 2004).  Hail and Leuz (2006) argue that countries with well-developed legal 
enforcement structures have the tendency of attracting capital at lower cost than countries that are 
otherwise. Since the accounting and auditing rules are not always dependable or external auditors 
are perhaps not considered straightforward to confirm their appropriate application, countries 
should consider replacing a vigilant enforcement mechanism to discourage agency problems 
(Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  Furthermore, since the significance of legal and regulatory framework is 
higher in countries whose economies are actively incorporated into the global capital markets than 
those whose economies are otherwise (Larcker & Tayan, 2011); countries like Ghana should 
consider enforcing their rules and regulations regarding corporate governance practices.  
On the basis of this issue, the recommended strategy to ensuring effective enforcement of existing 
laws and regulations is by recognizing that the structure and capacity of the laws, and legal and 
regulatory framework are essential components of the corporate governance system. This will offer 
a sound protection that can help mitigate the pervasiveness and seriousness of agency problems 
since penalties can be meted out on self-centered management or insiders (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  
Also, with this enforcement, investor confidence will be enhanced in the sense that corporate 
managers will be monitored and checked and property rights will be safeguarded. In achieving this, 
the following mechanisms have been suggested by this study: Improving the regulatory framework 
by making the laws accessible to all equity holders and the populace; fashioning out effective 
mechanisms for law enforcement  as well as strengthening enforcement mechanisms (by providing 
training, logistics, equipments and so on); taking on alternative dispute resolution strategies; 
creating a conducive environment by keeping up the possible will to execute policies; creating an 
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independent and intrepid judiciary; and encouraging the media to report issues of corporate 
governance and become more critical/judicious on issues of corporate governance. 
Protection of Minority Equity holders  
An important issue that cropped up from the empirical findings was the need to safeguard small 
equity holders from the abuses of large equity holders. Safeguarding of small equity holders is 
currently an important issue in developing economies (Berglof & Claessens, 2004) of which Ghana 
is no exception. Corporate organizations that uphold the rights of minority shareholders win the 
confidence of capital providers, and they (capital providers) more often than not prefer retaining 
equity capital of the companies, which will eventually, increase the market value of the firms in the 
long run (Bijalwan & Madan, 2013). The protection of small equity holders basically demands that 
the implementation of existing rules and regulations be improved.  It also requires a concurrent 
implementation of other strategies including the gaining of greater access to information, reviewing 
the current rules and regulations, educating small equity holders and an effective enforcement of 
existing recommendations and guidelines/principles of corporate governance.  
Availability of information to small shareholders will enable them to challenge both management 
and large shareholders in relation to corporate decisions. This challenge can possibly help prevent a 
potential diversion of corporate resources. Mechanisms for easy access to information by minority 
shareholders include the development of highly regarded bodies such as a well-focused 
investigative financial body, brokerage firms and financial think-tanks that could assist in 
enhancing corporate governance practice. Empowering professional accounting and auditing bodies 
such as the ICAG should in addition, form part of the effort/attempt to improving corporate 
governance practices.    
Finally, in order to protect the right of minority shareholders, they should be educated. This will 
make them aware of their rights to further reduce abuses from large shareholders. Educational 
campaigns can be carried out to bring about an understanding of their rights. The SEC of Ghana 
and GSE should also encourage corporate organizations to organize educational symposiums, 
conferences, forums and so on to sensitize their shareholders on their rights. The SEC and GSE can 
also encourage minority shareholders to form vibrant associations to safeguard their interests.  
Reforming annual general meetings 
An arrangement of a company’s internal corporate decision-making processes helps in 
safeguarding minority shareholders. In all organizations studied, minority shareholders were not 
given ample time to express their grievances during annual general meetings. When board 
chairpersons chair those meetings, they may have an interest in safeguarding the board from 
shareholder criticisms. It is recommended that annual general meetings should be reformed so that 
they could be chaired by individuals who are independent of both management and boards. Those 
individuals should be elected by shareholders for each annual shareholder meeting. This will enable 
the board to be accountable to all shareholders. To give credence to this recommendation, 
regulatory bodies such as the SEC and GSE ought to include this in the listing requirements of 
GSE.      
Employee representation 
The recommendation of the principles of corporate governance of Ghana, which states that 
directors are supposed to consider the interests of other stakeholders, can only be manifested if 
other stakeholders such as employees are represented on boards. The SEC should partake in 
achieving the ‘consideration of other stakeholders’ into practice, and to try to include employee 
representation law. Employee representation on boards can enhance internal relations, minimize 
strikes and reduce agency costs via supervision of management remuneration and perquisites 
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(Larcker & Tayan, 2011). Also, allowing employees to serve on corporate boards is ‘a way to 
credibly commit to cooperative management style’ (Miller, 2000, p. 19). Corollary to this, the trade 
unions such as the Trade Union Congress (TUC) of Ghana and the Ghana Federation of labor 
(GFL) should keenly deliberate on this subject and try to seek actual employee representation on 
boards as recommended by law. 
Women representation 
Even though this study did not take into account how women are represented on boards of 
corporate organizations in Ghana, in the course of the study, it was evidenced that women were 
significantly under-represented on boards of all four cases investigated. It is argued that since 
managerial talent is consistently fragmented across men and women, limiting boards to 
predominantly include men-if not men only-gets rid of an equally qualified talented group in our 
societies (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). This means that the representation of women on corporate 
boards of directors might positively influence corporate performance. For instance, women 
representation on corporate boards can improve board independence by minimizing social 
differences that can compromise boards’ independence. 
Also, women would probably demonstrate higher levels of credibility and teamwork than their 
counterparts, hence enhancing boardroom discussions. As a result of the possible benefits that 
corporations can derive from women representation on their boards, this study recommends that, 
regulatory bodies such as the SEC and GSE ought to work hand-in-hand to ensure women 
representation on boards of listed corporations by including this recommendation in the listing 
requirements of GSE.      
The issue of business accountability  
The issue of business accountability of corporate organizations to the Ghanaian community has 
relevant connotation with the development of corporate governance in Ghana. Corporate 
governance should be considered as a public policy matter, and attempts should be made to draw a 
clear distinction between corporate decision-making processes and political decision-making 
processes. This subject needs to be dealt with as an element of the wider initiative of improving 
effective corporate governance.  
Reviewing guidelines of corporate governance  
Although the principles of corporate governance of Ghana do address the inequality between large 
shareholders and small shareholders, companies are not implementing this recommendation. The 
SEC and GSE should effectively persuade organizations to execute this recommendation. Also, the 
SEC should conduct seasonal evaluations to get hold of the extent of compliance by corporate 
organizations as well as occasionally reviewing guidelines. This will induce self-monitoring and 
help out in achieving good corporate governance.  
Divestiture policies and corporate governance 
The essence of considering the consequences of privatization on corporate governance, and the 
eventual position of large shareholders in the decision-making processes of organizations, call for a 
revision of Ghana’s principles of corporate governance to protect minority shareholders. It has been 
deduced that instead of privatization through strategic investors/capital providers to empower local 
shareholders, it undermines them, and eventually makes them vulnerable to the expropriation 
problem.  The study recommends that future divestitures should also address the concerns of local 
shareholders.  
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Recommendation regarding boards of directors 
Enhancing director independence 
The issue of director independence has been identified as a pressing issue in Ghana. In order to 
curb this, the positions should be announced in public with all the requirements so that a person 
who considers him/herself qualified would tender his/her application. This means that directors will 
be recruited from the market by applying a free and fair mechanism of inviting applications from 
well-qualified people. This can be achieved through the establishment of a board nomination 
committee. The role of this committee is to select and nominate well-qualified individuals for 
directorship positions. This calls for a critical assessment of the know-how and competence of the 
individual. After the selections have been done, the candidates should be subject to shareholder-
elections. This will ensure transparency in the selection of board directors.  
The nomination committee should be solely composed of independent non-executive directors to 
ensure that individuals selected are independent of management. However, there is no guarantee 
that director independence will automatically lead to good corporate governance. This is because 
“personal attributes might influence independence of perspective more than predetermined 
standards” (Larcker & Tayan, 2011 p. 14). And since personal attributes such as director’s business 
expertise, professional background, engagement level and ethical standards influence director 
independence, the study recommends that they should be factored into director independence 
analysis.  This recommendation should not be considered as a regulation, but instead a best 
practice.   
Director evaluation  
The idea of board evaluation is gaining grounds in the corporate community. This is because 
subjecting board of directors to any sort of evaluation is not something inappropriately 
unreasonable. A board assessment is the cornerstone to complement the public monitoring activity 
in the sense that without it, it is not possible to make any assessment of the intrinsic quality of 
governance in a corporate organization (Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2013).  A board evaluation 
process, which is properly arranged can bring the required level of consciousness to the fore, 
enhance the appreciation of individual director’s viewpoints and disclose the complexities and 
dynamics of board issues. Consequently, it is recommended that organizations ought to put in place 
evaluation mechanisms. Effective and efficient boards need to introduce and put in place criteria 
for assessing their own performance and monitoring their accomplishments as well as to design 
remedial action mechanisms when the need arises (Tricker, 2003). Huse (2007) opines that the 
actual form of evaluation may differ, but he goes on to recommend that the evaluation should be 
formal and regular, taking place at least once a year. Director evaluation can be executed under the 
leadership of an independent director, with support from external consultants. Various suggestions 
have been made in regards to the objectives and forms of board evaluation.  
Huse (2007) has grouped the objectives into two: Externally related objectives- which are 
associated with transparency; and Internally related objectives-which are associated with the 
development of internal effectiveness of the board by evaluating the manner in which the board 
conducts its business, by checking that all vital issues are appropriately prepared and deliberated, 
and by measuring the real contribution of each director to the board’s work in general, through 
his/her skills, competence and participation in board deliberations.  The board could hold a meeting 
at least once a year, at which time the assessment of the board chairperson, individual directors as 
well as the chief executive officer’s  respective performances would be conducted. Steger et al. 
(2004) suggest that if evaluations are undertaken meticulously and the procedure is well-designed 
and executed in a manner that all directors agree, with an assurance of confidentiality, these 
evaluations can bring gains to the board in general.  
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However, the issue of individual board member evaluation is threatening in the sense that it can 
destroy the shared power and authority vested among board members as well as their common trust 
on the board. Corollary to this, the study recommends a peer review mechanism-whereby 
individual directors are asked to evaluate the performance of every other director-or setting up a 
corporate governance committee, which should be composed of all non-executive directors of the 
board to carry out such assessments. After that, the board should effectively communicate the 
assessment process and system to equity holders and other stakeholders each year in annual reports 
and the steps taken as a result. However, such a comprehensive exercise need to tackle priorities 
and concentrate on the most important matters, the areas that deserve critical attention or/and are in 
need of further enhancement, rather than assessing the same areas repeatedly (Van den Berghe & 
Levrau, 2013).  This recommendation can be executed by boards of directors through an externally 
supported board evaluation examination or self-assessment process.   
Introduction of new members  
Orientation to a new job is vital for optimal performance (Huse, 2007). Ward (2003, p.63) argues 
that ‘bringing a board newbie up to speed requires more than just jumping a basket of “to read” 
materials on his or her desk’.  The empirical observations from the cases show that organizations 
do not normally orient newly-appointed board members, or formally introduce them to their 
respective jobs. Newly-appointed directors should receive a formal method of orientation into the 
affairs of the organization. A personal contact between the company’s key staffers and the newly-
appointed director is imperative. This can be done by the board chairperson through the crafting of 
a curriculum scheme and agenda that can help insure that all newly-appointed directors are 
furnished with full, official and customized orientation on joining the board. Newly-appointed 
directors should be familiarized with the corporate organization’s dealings and top management, its 
environment and be inducted in relation to their fiduciary roles and responsibilities as well as in 
regards to the expectation of the board. If newly-appointed director has little or no board 
experience, he/she must receive training.  
Board education 
Huse (2007, p. 194) argues that ‘the board itself, but, as the highest authority in the corporate 
structure, the board is responsible for its own job specification, including the boardroom culture’. 
Board directors can be appropriately recruited and educated to bring forth their specific expertise to 
work on oversights so that the amount of unreasonable time spent on misgovernance can be 
redirected to vital issues (Ward, 2003). The empirical observations from the cases show that 
organizations often do not educate their members on some of the nitty-gritty of accounting and 
auditing. The Cadbury code (1992) highlights the role of directors’ education in this regard and 
pronounces their role as follows:  
The weight of responsibility borne by all directors and the increasing 
commitment which their duties require emphasise the importance of the 
manner in which they prepare themselves for their posts. Given the 
varying backgrounds, qualifications and experience of directors, it is 
highly desirable that they should all undertake some form of internal or 
external training; this is particularly important for directors……with no 
previous board experience (section 4.19).  
Since it is better to have competent and dynamic people in a bad structure than incompetent and 
inactive ones in a good structure, this study recommends that chairpersons of corporate 
organizations should make sure that board members consistently upgrade their skills and 
knowledge, as well as their considerable acquaintances with the organizations in order to bring into 
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actuality successful board tasks-both on the board as well as on board committees. This is because; 
good corporate governance structure does not suffice everything, therefore the accentuation of the 
training of board members is imperative (Charkman, 2005).  
Board structure  
The empirical observations of this study have shown varied results with respect to the leadership 
structure in driving corporate governance effectiveness. It is recommended that the implementation 
of the split leadership structure should be carefully looked at, and its importance established, on a 
case-by-case basis, by applying independent judgment and an analytical appreciation of how the 
split leadership structure could possibly interact with other governance structures to enhance board 
effectiveness. Although the principles of corporate governance of Ghana have recommended that 
the two roles ought to be separated, this is useful in circumstances where director independence is 
present. This is also the case of board composition and the setting up of board committees since an 
absence of board independence means a nonexistence of board effectiveness therefore, making 
other board characteristics fruitless. When board independence is compromised, directors’ role of 
maintaining adequate objectivity is undermined.  
Notwithstanding the conventional board independent criteria that have been addressed in the 2010 
Code of best practices of Ghana, the Code does not painstakingly deal with issues pertaining to 
social connections that will make it possible for board members to have a sense of psychological 
relationship that could probably influence them to unduly depend on CEOs without upholding 
adequate independence. Accordingly, this study recommends that for an individual to be 
considered an independent director, his/her social connections with the company or other board 
members should be extensively crosschecked to clear any doubt. This can be done by subjecting 
the candidate to socially independent criteria. The study further suggests that in order for a 
candidate to satisfy all the socially independent criteria, he/she: Should not have graduated from 
the same educational institution the company’s CEO graduated; was not born in the same 
town/village/community where the CEO was born; does not have similar academic discipline with 
the CEO; should not have any of his/her relatives married to a relative of the CEO; and does not 
have a third party connection with the CEO via another board member. Boards of corporate 
organizations can work hand-in-hand with their shareholders in dealing with this issue.  
Recommendation for educational institutions  
Recruiting from a market goes hand-in-hand with the development of a market for board members. 
Larcker and Tayan (2011) suggest that since board directors play vitally important role in regards 
to governance processes of companies, the quality of persons who are selected and elected to 
boards has a positive association with the quality of counsel and supervision boards offer to 
management. The cases have indicated that most organizations currently appoint either government 
functionaries or retired civil servants. This creates a lot of challenges to the organizations since 
most of these people do not normally possess the needed finesses in relation to private sector 
issues. Accordingly, there is the need to create a large pool of directors from which organizations 
could tap well-qualified and competent persons from.  
In consequence of the crucial role board directors execute in the governance process, the quality of 
persons who are nominated and elected to the board has a positive relationship with the quality of 
advise and supervision the board offers to management (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).This means that if 
the competencies of board members are questionable, then the best system will prove frivolous. 
Given the intricacies and dynamics ‘of the information processing demands placed on directors, 
boards need sufficient technical ability to evaluate options and make decisions’ (Payne et al., 2009, 
p. 709). With true visionary, skillful, well-educated and competent board members, corporate 
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strategies can be reviewed, approved and executed irrespective of the existing governance 
structure. This calls for the development of corporate governance practice via educational/training 
programs. And this can be achieved by tasking universities, polytechnics and other professional 
institutions to introduce courses/subjects on corporate governance.      
8.5 Contribution of the study 
Firstly, a substantial amount of research has been carried out on the subject of corporate 
governance, and the challenges confronting its development and implementation in major western 
economies (Okpara, 2010). However, studies on corporate governance practices in developing and 
transition economies are meager. This study therefore, has contributed to the extant literature by 
partially bridging the research lacuna on this issue and unearthing the challenges inhibiting the 
development and execution of effective corporate governance in Ghana.  
Secondly, in this study, corporate governance mechanisms have been pinpointed from the extant 
body of knowledge and met head-on with the specific Ghanaian context to determining those 
mechanisms that are essentially effective in inducing management to take decisions to maximize 
shareholder value. This study reinforces theoretical as well as empirical foundations of the extant 
art of knowledge with respect to corporate governance structures in developing and transition 
economies (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013; Okpara, 2010; Berglof & Claessens, 2004), by 
identifying the limitations of a large number of corporate governance mechanisms in Ghana’s 
context. 
Thirdly, corporate governance mechanisms that are currently driving effective corporate 
governance in Ghana have been illuminated in this study. These mechanisms were empirically 
examined and described. It has been identified that the ownership structure is a significant driving 
force of effective corporate governance in Ghana. This in line with the notion in the emerging body 
of knowledge on corporate governance in developing and transition economies that ownership 
structure is the most important corporate governance mechanism in these economies (Agyemang & 
Castellini, 2013; Okpara, 2010; Attig, Ghoul & Guedhami, 2009; Berglof & Claessens, 2004). 
Fourthly, this study has shown the entanglement of corporate decision-making processes and that 
of political decision-making processes. This results from the involvement of government 
functionaries as well as retired civil servants on the boards of corporate organizations. This 
situation essentially highlights the basic accountability challenges between corporate organizations 
and the Ghanaian society, and as a result, makes the development of corporate governance highly 
complicated. With this, this study demonstrates that corporate governance practices in Ghana have 
similarities with those of most developing and transition economies (Okpara, 2010; McGee, 2009; 
Oman et al., 2000).  
Fifthly, a suitable self-explanatory conceptual framework for effective corporate governance has 
been developed from the prevailing conditions with respect to corporate governance in developing 
countries and for that matter, Ghana. Inasmuch as most developing and transition economies have 
similar features in relation to corporate governance (for example, weak or non-existent law 
enforcement mechanisms and immature competitive markets), the conceptual framework 
developed in this study could be tried and tested in other developing or transition economies.        
Sixthly, the various recommendations of the principles of corporate governance of Ghana have 
been critically examined and challenged as to how they deal with the principal-agent problem of 
corporate governance in Ghana for instance, the possible expropriation of small shareholders by 
large shareholders. Accordingly, this study has suggested some measures that are absent in the 
principles of corporate governance of Ghana in regards to how to safeguard minority shareholders 
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from the abuses of majority shareholders. These suggestions should be considered as best practices 
rather than mere recommendations for corporate governance improvement in Ghana.  
Seventhly, comparative analyses of the empirical observation of this study and the recommended 
guidelines of corporate governance of Ghana have been carried out, and aspects in which corporate 
organizations need to reform and improve their corporate governance practices in order to fully 
comply with the guidelines are highlighted; director independence, director evaluation, introduction 
of new directors and board education. This could possibly be the foundation upon which corporate 
governance structures in these organizations can be reformed and further improved.  
Eighthly, this study has identified the essence of considering the consequences of privatization on 
corporate governance and the eventual position of large shareholders in the decision-making 
processes of organizations. It has been deduced that instead of privatization via strategic 
investors/capital providers to empower local shareholders, it undermines them, and eventually 
makes them vulnerable to the expropriation problem.   
8.6 Weaknesses of the study 
This was a study to establish the driving forces of effective corporate governance in Ghana thus the 
observable facts do not apply to other developing and transition economies. Also, the sample does 
not represent all organizations in Ghana therefore, the empirical observations cannot be a pars pro 
toto in the sense that, they cannot be generalized to cover the corporate organizations that have not 
been included in this study. However, the empirical results can be applied to other similar corporate 
organizations in Ghana in an analytical sense. With the application of inductive reasoning, the 
results can be applied to provide important appreciation in an effort to understanding the structure 
of corporate governance practices in those organizations.  
8.7 Areas for further studies  
A case study qualitative research method was employed in this study, focusing on corporate 
organizations listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The findings revealed important issues, which 
to a certain extent, apply to corporate organizations considering listing on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. Further studies based on survey method of research, specifically in regards to non-listed 
corporate organizations, will offer a wide range of important issues for generalization.  
Also, this study can be replicated in different economies (especially, in other developing and 
transition economies) by applying the same methodological framework in order to compare the 
findings. McNulty et al. (2013) suggest that an increase in the number of comparative studies of 
practices of corporate governance at the global level would substantially contribute to the creation 
of universal theory of corporate governance. This would also help develop further understanding on 
the broader enhancement of corporate governance in developing and transition economies. 
Furthermore, a study can be conducted to acquire additional understanding about the motivation, if 
any, for corporate organizations to adopt and put to work the principles of corporate governance 
recommended by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana.  
Moreover, this study was geared towards large listed corporate organizations only. Therefore other 
future studies could be conducted in the context of unlisted companies- small and medium scale 
enterprises. This stems from the assertion that as unlisted companies grow, good corporate 
governance becomes essentially beneficial for their operations. Also, research on these unlisted 
firms will highlight the awkward subject of the domination of majority shareholders over their 
minority counterparts in developing countries (Charkman, 2005).  
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This study has concentrated largely on financial organizations. Research focusing on other sectors 
such as the health sector, industrial sector, and departments and agencies, is expected to offer 
additional understanding of corporate governance practices in Ghana.  
Lastly, this study had its foundation on the principal-agent perspective. However, certain 
assumptions of this theory are in contention. For instance, the theory assumes that with the 
exception of shareholders, there is a perfect contract between corporate organizations and all other 
stakeholders (Child & Rodriguez, 2003; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Grossman, 2002). 
Nevertheless, it is argued that if researchers are to assume an imperfect contract between firms and 
all other stakeholders, then matters related to stakeholder perspective of corporate governance 
come into view naturally (Huse et al., 2011; Hoskisson, Castleton, Withers, 2009). Accordingly, 
this then calls for a new perspective on corporate governance research (Huse et. al, 2011) that 
ought to be founded on identity theories (Payne et al., 2009; Ashforth & Mael, 1989), team 
production theory (Payne et al., 2009; Blair & Stout, 1999; 2001) and behavioral theory of the firm 
(Cyert & March, 1963). This study suggests that future studies on corporate governance that will 
specifically focus on board of directors and its effectiveness should strive to apply these three 
theories in that they challenge the existing conventional assumptions of agency theory, highlight 
the processes within and outside the boardroom and concentrate on process-centred data that will 
help researchers explore what they are unaware of (Huse et. al, 2011).  
8.8 Concluding remarks 
This study has made an effort to examine the driving forces of effective corporate governance in 
developing countries and for that matter, Ghana. It does not claim to have identified the answer to 
the likelihood failure of corporate governance practice in developing countries, or to have 
developed a best practice model of corporate governance for these economies particularly, Ghana. 
However, the objective of the researcher was to highlight definite organizational governance in 
order to improve what is already identified about the practice of corporate governance in Ghana. 
This is because ‘travelling the road of corporate governance won’t guarantee success, but not 
travelling upon it, will almost certainly guarantee failure’ (Abetz, 2003, p. 11).  
Although these concluding remarks present the end of the study, I believe, think and assume that it 
is not the end of the debate on corporate governance. It will perchance serve as a curtain raiser to 
assist the world in understanding the concept of corporate governance within the context of 
developing economies. It is an act of inviting academics, business professionals and all 
stakeholders to develop keen interest in corporate governance practice in developing countries. 
This study finally contends that, since governance as a social construction does not have one 
human face (McGreggor, 2000), it will be prudent if many faces and voices come in, to 
conclusively and collectively mould the governance of corporate entities particularly, those in 
developing countries.  
As the fundamental principles of corporate governance are universal (Abetz, 2003), this study 
offers overt understanding into the complex world of governance of corporate organizations. It 
attempts to help in providing catholic appreciation of broad and varied concept tagged as corporate 
governance.  
As declared by Abetz (2003, p.1) that ‘corporate governance should not be viewed as a goal to be 
attained, a benchmark to be met……rather, it is a process that requires vigilance, constant review, 
and ongoing consideration’, I humbly invite others to take the watchful voyage of consideration 
and constant review of this subject matter. This is because, with enthusiastic watchfulness and 
constant review, the concept of corporate governance can be enhanced universally. Thank you!!    
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Appendix 1: Case study protocol 
 
WHAT DRIVES EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GHANA? 
Section Contents 
Case study overview  Research objectives and sponsorship  
 Matters pertaining to case study 
 Important fields to read 
Field procedure  Officicial documents of cases 
 Accessibility to the ‘sites’  
 Relevant information pertaining to human subjects, data 
sources and bereaucratic prompts 
Case study questions  Possible questions for gathering data 
 ‘Table shells’ for particluar arrays of data 
 Possible information sources for addressing questions 
Guide for case report  outline 
 data format 
 the application and representation of  of other forms of 
documents 
 bibliograhic information 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
 
234 
 
Appendix 2: Exogenous and endogenous variables 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
 Analysis & Conclusions 
BOARD CONTROL  
Indicators:  
1. Reviewing and guiding firm’s strategy  
2. Selecting and replacing senior 
management particularly, the CEO 
 
3. Setting CEO remuneration  
4. Ensuring Compliance with the law  
5. Evaluating CEO’s Performance  
  
SHAREHOLDER CONTROL  
Indicators:  
1. Access to timely and regular information  
2. Voting control over the company’s 
decisions 
 
3. Influencing key decisions of the 
company 
 
4. Influencing the selection of and access 
to key decision-makers in the company, 
particularly the CEO and Chairperson 
 
 
 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
 Analysis & Conclusions 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
1. The size of equity held by shareholders  
2. Identities of stockholders  
BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
1) Composition of board  
Percentage of inside directors to outside directors 
on the board 
 
2) Board Independence  
a) Absence of social (family) ties with the 
CEO 
 
b) Absence of business associations with 
the corporation 
 
c) Not being a representative of, or 
elected/appointed by a major 
stockholders 
 
3) Board leadership structure  
Chairperson-CEO separation  
4) Board Meetings   
a) Timeliness and adequacy of information  
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to members before board meetings  
b) Assessment of board members and board 
of activities 
 
c) Procedures for conducting meetings  
5) Board Audit Committees  
a) Establishing audit committees  
b) The composition of the board 
(independent directors) 
 
c) Activities of the audit committee  
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Appendix 3: TO EXAMINE THE DRIVING FORCES OF EFFECTIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 Otuo Serebour Agyemang, a PhD student, contacting you to help in determining how good 
corporate governance is effectively and efficiently applied in your prestigious corporate 
organization 
 I am making the very effort to interview those involved in decision-making to review 
corporate governance practice in your firm 
 This will be an interview and it has been structured to be qualitative in nature. A follow-up 
interviews will take place if the need arises 
 The rationale behind this interview is research only. Findings are to be published as part of 
my PhD and in academic journals but will be entirely anonymous. All information given 
will be treated as confidential. Any disclosed information about your corporate 
organization would be protected at the University 
 This interview is supposed to last for 50 minutes 
 Do you mind if the interview is tape-recorded? 
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Appendix 4: Interview schedule 
Interview questions:           Corporate governance 
PhD Candidate:                  Otuo Serebour Agyemang, Department of Economics and 
                                            Management, University of Ferrara, Italy 
Contact detail via email:     otuoserebou.agyemang@student.unife.it 
 
 
Interview Schedule 
1. Please, when was the firm established? 
2. Who are the founding stockholders of the firm? 
3. Please, what is the performance of the firm for the past three years in terms of; 
a) Profit; 
b) Stockholders’ dividends; 
c) Assets value; and  
d) Market capitalisation 
4. How many members serve on the company’s board? 
Endogenous Variables 
 Possible Questions  
Board Control  
Indicators:  
6. Reviewing and guiding firm’s strategy  
a. Is the role of the board makes it possible 
for it to discuss and approve the 
corporation’s strategy? Please, explain 
b. During board meetings, do members ask 
management important questions about 
the corporation’s strategy such as 
financial data, debt conditions, short- and 
long-term prognosis, and other important 
information like market shares, key 
media articles on the corporation and 
competition, financial analyst’s reports 
for the corporation and major competitors 
, consumer preference survey, employee 
attitude surveys and so on? 
c. During board meetings, do members 
request for minutes of management 
committee meetings? Please explain 
d. Is there any standard of measurement set 
by the board to assess the performance of 
the company? Please, explain 
 
7. Selecting and replacing senior 
management particularly the CEO 
e. Does the appointment of the CEO made 
by the board? Can the board discipline 
management, particularly the CEO? 
Please, explain 
f. Does the board always have a name 
ready in case the CEO is suddenly 
incapacitated, makes a huge mistake, or 
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gets another appointment?  
g. Does the board familiar with the senior 
staff to get a perspective on the CEOs 
performance and a sense of who should 
be nurtured as a candidate for the CEO 
position? Please explain 
h. When does the board have a sense of 
starting up the full scale search for a 
CEO? Please, explain 
i. How does the board carry out the search? 
Please, explain 
8. Setting CEO remuneration j. Does the board have a remuneration 
committee that sets CEO’s remuneration?  
k. If yes, what is the composition of this 
committee? 
l. Is there any policy on how directors 
remuneration should be set and 
implemented? Please, explain  
9. Ensuring Compliance with the law m. Does the board monitor how 
management comply with the Generally 
Accepted Accounting and Auditing 
principles? If yes, how? 
10. Evaluating CEO’s Performance n. Is the board in a position to assess the 
performance of the CEO? If yes, how 
does the board do it? 
  
Shareholder Control  
Indicators:  
5. Access to timely and regular 
information 
a. Please, explain the nature of information 
given to shareholders  
b. What are the measures or arrangements 
of providing information to stockholders? 
c. How many times in a year do 
shareholders get information on the 
corporation? 
d. In your opinion, please, do you think the 
information to shareholders is given on 
time and sufficient to allow them make 
decisions? Please explain 
e. Do majority shareholders have access to 
information more than the minority 
shareholders? Please explain 
6. Voting control over the company’s 
decisions 
f. During annual general meetings, do 
shareholders who are present have voting 
rights? If yes, can they veto on decisions 
of the company? 
g. If no, please, explain why it is so? 
h. What is the voting pattern? 
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7. Influencing key decisions of the 
company 
i. Can shareholders make the ultimate 
decision on issues that will affect the 
corporation? Please, explain 
j. Do shareholders influence the working 
out of goals, which the corporation ought 
to achieve within a specific period of 
time? Please, explain 
 
8. Influencing the selection of and access 
to key decision-makers in the 
company, particularly the CEO and 
Chairperson 
k. Do shareholders have any influence in 
the selection of directors, chairperson or 
the CEO? Please, explain 
l. Do shareholders especially the majority 
shareholders have access to key decision-
makers in the corporation such as the 
Chairperson and the CEO? Please, 
explain 
 
Board Control 
 At all 
times 
Occasionall
y 
Absolutely 
not 
Decisions in terms of hiring a CEO are made by the 
board 
   
The CEO can be punished/fired by the board    
Strategies of the corporation are discussed and 
approved by the board 
   
Decisions on CEO’s remuneration are made by the 
board through the remuneration committee 
   
The activities of the CEO are assessed by the board    
The board makes sure the company complies with the 
law especially, balance sheets and earnings are in 
accordance with the generally accepted accounting 
principles 
   
The board determines what information they need 
from management 
   
 
Shareholder Control 
 At all 
times 
Occasionally Absolutely not 
The duties of directors are being fulfilled when 
they report to the shareholders during annual 
general meetings (AGM) 
   
Annual audited reports are made available to 
shareholders before AGM 
   
Quarterly reports are made publicly    
All shareholders receive invitations to AGM    
During AGM, shareholders have the right to 
vote on the board’s proposals/suggestions 
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Majority shareholders exert extensive influence 
at the AGM 
   
Decisions taken at the AGM are subjected to 
voting 
   
The kind of influence that majority shareholders 
have in the selection or appointment of directors 
makes it possible for them( majority 
shareholders) to exert control over the 
corporation 
   
It is easy for majority shareholders to have 
access to very important persons of the 
corporation. 
   
The decisions of management or directors can be 
questioned or altered by shareholders 
   
Shareholders have the right to call for 
Extraordinary General Meeting of the 
corporation 
   
 
Exogenous Variables 
 Possible Questions  
Ownership Structure  
3. Identities of stockholders a) Please, who are the stockholders of your 
corporation?  
2) The size of equity held by 
shareholders 
b)  Please, give details on the various stakes/ shares 
each of these shareholders hold base on 
percentages. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
6) Composition of board  
Percentage of inside directors to 
outside directors on the board 
a) What is the total number of full time employees of 
the company that serve on the board? 
b) What is the total number of persons who are not 
employees of the corporation (NEDs) that serve on 
the board? 
c) Does the percentage of NEDs have any impact on 
the level of effectiveness of the board? If yes, how? 
7) Board Independence  
d) Absence of social (family) 
ties with the CEO 
1. Do present members of the board have any business 
ties with the corporation? 
e) Absence of business 
associations with the 
corporation 
2. Do present members have any social ties with the 
corporation? 
f) Not being a representative 
of, or elected/appointed by a 
major stockholders 
3. Do the current directors represent or appointed by a 
major stockholder? 
4. Do social ties between the CEO and an individual 
make that individual unbefitting to be appointed as 
NED? Please explain 
5. Do you think these ties can have an impact on the 
level of effectiveness of the board to control 
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management? Please explain 
6. Please, describe how selection of board 
members/Chairperson is done in your corporation. 
7. Do you think the nature in which board members 
are selected has any impact on the level of 
effectiveness of the board? If yes, in terms of what? 
8) Board leadership 
structure 
 
Chairperson-CEO separation 1. Does the position of the CEO separated from the 
Chairperson in your company? 
2. If yes, what is its usefulness in respect of the 
board’s ability to monitor/check management? 
9) Board Meetings   
d) Timeliness and adequacy of 
information to members 
before board meetings  
1. Do board members get access to sufficient 
information before meetings are held? Please 
explain 
2. Are information sent on time before the meeting 
date? Typically, how long? 
3. Are board meetings used for discussion rather than 
lengthy management presentations? Please, explain. 
4. Are there some limitations on services (term limits 
or limits on other comments) during board meetings 
to guarantee viewpoints and active partaking? 
Please, explain  
e) Assessment of board 
members and board  
activities 
5. Is there any approved mechanism in your company 
upon which directors and their activities are 
evaluated? Please explain  
 
f) Procedures for conducting 
meetings 
6. Does the board have an approved procedure in 
conducting meetings? Please explain 
10) Board Audit Committees  
d) Establishing audit 
committees 
1. Does the board have an audit committee?  
e) The composition of the 
board (independent 
directors) 
2. If yes, describe the composition of the board in 
respect of executive directors and NEDs. 
3. If no, please, explain why it is so? 
 
f) Activities of the audit 
committee 
4. Please, how does the audit committee function? 
How often does the committee conduct its business? 
What authority does the committee have? How does 
the committee report to the board?  
 
 
Board Effectiveness 
 At all 
times 
Occasionally Absolutely 
not 
Majority of the board members are non-executive    
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Regulators 
1. Ghana has a set of principles of good corporate governance. Please, how are corporate 
businesses motivated to take on these principles? 
2. In Ghana, there is an existence of large stockholders who exert major control on corporate 
entities. 
a) Is it a matter of concern that majority stockholders may control minority shareholders? 
b) How do you safeguard minority shareholders from the abuses of majority 
shareholders?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
directors (NEDs) 
There are existence of social/business/economic ties 
between directors and the corporate entity or senior 
management or majority stockholders 
   
Positions of the Chief Executive Officer and the 
Chairperson of the board are separated and occupied by 
different persons 
   
The board institutes audit and remuneration committees    
    
Majority of the members of the audit and remuneration 
committees are constituted by NEDs 
   
    
Selection and appointment of members are made known to 
stockholders 
   
There are criteria for selecting and replacing directors    
The board has a procedure for conducting board meetings    
Before board meetings, information about the firm are 
made available to members in time 
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The extent of application of the transaction cost theory 
The TCE theory and agency theory have been applied to examine the practice of corporate 
governance in the context of Ghana. In this study, TCE theory has been employed to illuminate the 
limitations of some mechanisms of corporate governance (see chapter 4). Costs resulting from 
transactions are a major rationale behind the exclusion of contracts or bonding solutions for putting 
an end to governance problems, as they would entail writing contracts that are perfect, but this is 
not possible in practice as a result of bounded rationality and costs emanating from transactions.  
External mechanisms of corporate governance  (see chapter 4) were not recommended for 
empirical investigation in that, the application of such mechanisms  entails  significant  transaction 
costs (for example, law courts are costly and their ineptitude to deal with issues of corporate  
governance ). Therefore, TCE theory provides an explanation as to why state institutions such as 
law courts usually provide less ‘satisfactory’ means of punishing corrupt top management of 
corporate organizations than for instance, ‘exit’. Hence, whilst equity holders will probably not 
really weigh the financial pros and cons of seeking redress in the law courts versus the application 
of an exit strategy, their behavior can be explained as if they really do.  
In light of the limitations of exit options in the case of Ghana (such as the absence of effective and 
efficient competitive markets such as those available in the US and UK), it is laudable to focus on 
executive management behavior and particularly, the mechanisms that have the potency to induce 
management to take decisions to meet the interests of equity holders. This has been carried out via 
the lens of principal-agent theory. This clearly divulges that the TCE theory is applied to rationalize 
the application of agency theory, but it is not substantially applied in this study. Agency theory is 
significantly used to comprehend contemporary debates on corporate behavior in particular, the 
self-interestedness of managerial behavior.    
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 Qualitative research 
EDUCATION 
 PhD ., Economics  and Business Management                                                              April 8, 2014 
University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy 
Research Advisor: Prof. Monia Castellini 
Dissertation title: Driving Forces of Effective Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: 
A Ghanaian Experience 
 
 Master of Science, Economics                                                                                         2008 – 2010 
University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana 
Research Advisors: Dr. Mark Kojo Armah and Mr. James Atta Peprah 
Thesis title: Determinants of Private Savings in Ghana: Evidence from Time Series Data 
 
 BA (Hons) Economics                                                                                                         2003-2007 
              Second Class (Upper Division) 
              University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana 
              Project Advisor: Prof. Vijay Bhasin 
              Project title: Impacts of Monetary and Fiscal Policies on Inflation in Ghana 
AWARDS AND GRANTS 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 University of Ferrara PhD Studentship Award (01/01/2011/31/12/2013) 
 University of Ferrara Mobility Award (1800 Euros) 
 Recipient of a research grant from the Educational Research Network for West and Central Africa 
(ERNWACA) in 2009. 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 Delivering tutorial sessions for courses in microeconomics (principles), macroeconomics 
(principles), international finance and managerial economics (2011-2013) for groups of up to 24, 1-
4 hours at a time, requiring prior-evaluation of curriculum, development of appropriate resources in 
conjunction with other presenters, delivery of sessions and course work marking 
 
 Demonstrating at University of Ferrara summer school for Erasmus students (L2, Planning and 
Control) for a group of up to 15, 1-3 hours at a time. 
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EXTRA REVELANT EXPERIENCE 
Business trainer, Millennium Development Authority, Ghana                                   01/2010- 01/2011 
  
 Working as part of a team to provide basic business training to more than 2000 agro-chemical 
dealers and farmers in Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions of Ghana 
 Taught courses on budgeting, planning and organisation in relation to their work and everyday 
activities.    
Auditor/Finance officer, Ghana Audit Service, Headquarters, Accra                      09/2007-08/2008 
 
 Raising payment vouchers 
 Account reconciliation 
 Calculating allowances such as overtime, clothing and leave, sitting allowances and so on. 
 Writing of cheques for payments  
 Teaming up with a group of colleagues to audit public institutions.         
RELEVANT SKILLS AND COURSES 
 Teaching skills (First level) – introduction to teaching and lecturing techniques (a day course; 
University of Ferrara, 2011), Supervising PhD dissertation (2 day workshop, The European Institute 
for Advanced Studies in Management) 
 The EIASM workshop (Copenhagen, 2013) – Doctoral and Young Seminar on Visualising, 
Measuring and Managing Intangibles and Intellectual 
 The EIASM workshop (Brussels, 2013)  - Workshop on Corporate Governance    
 Microsoft Office; daily use of Microsoft Word (thesis and publications), PowerPoint (conference 
and workshop presentations), Excel (Data analysis) 
 Statistical and Econometric Packages: STATA, SPSS, MICROFIT, R, Eviews 
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP OF SOCIETIES 
 Association of Research Managers and Administrators (from 2012) 
 European Corporate Governance Institute (from 2013) 
PUBLICATIONS 
 Agyemang, O.S. & Castellini, M. (Accepted), Corporate Governance in an Emergent Economy: A 
Ghanaian Experience, Corporate Governance. Emeraldinsight (Scopus) 
 
 Agyemang, O.S., Aboagye, E. & Ahali, Y.A (Accepted), Board of directors and Firm Performance 
of Banking Institutions: A Ghanaian Experience, European Journal of Economics, Finance and 
Administrative sciences (Scopus) 
 
 Aboagye, E., Agyemang, O.S. & Tjerbo, T (2014),  Elderly Demand for Family-based Care and 
Support: Evidence from a Social Intervention Strategy, Global Journal of Health Science, 6(2): 94-
104, doi:10.5539/gjhs.v6n2p94 (Scopus) 
 
 Agyemang, O.S. & Castellini, M. (2013), Shareholder Control vs. Board Control: Evidence from a 
sub-Saharan African Economy, Global Journal of Governance and Strategies, 19 (4): 109-134. 
 
 Agyemang, O.S. & Castellini, M. (2013), Corporate Governance in an Emergent Economy: A case 
of Ghana, The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, 12 (3): 7-44.  
 
 Agyemang, O.S. & Castellini, M. (2013), The Guidelines of Corporate Governance of Ghana: 
Issues, Deficiencies and Suggestions, International Business Research, 6(8): 163-173, 
doi:10.5539/ibr.v6n10p163 
 
 Aboagye, E. & Agyemang, O.S. (2013)  Maternal Health-Seeking Behavior: The Role of Financing 
and Organization of Health Services in Ghana, Global Journal of Health Science, 5(5): 67-79, 
doi:10.5539/gjhs.v5n5p67 (Scopus) 
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 Agyemang, O.S. & Aboagye, E.(2013) Ownership and Control in Corporate Organisations in 
Developing Countries: Evidence from a Transition Economy, European Journal of Business and 
Management, 5 (20): 136-150. 
 
 Amponsah, E. K., Aboagye, E. & Agyemang, O.S. (2013), Crop Technology Adoption Among 
Rural Farmers in Some Selected Regions of Mali, Journal of Sustainable Development, Vol. 6, No. 
10,  pp. 25-35,  doi:10.5539/jsd.v6n10p25 
 
 Agyemang, O. S., Aboagye, E., & Ahali, A. Y. O. (2013) Prospects and Challenges of Corporate 
Governance in Ghana, International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(5) 
 
 Castellini, M. & Agyemang, O.S. (2012) Ownership and Board Structures to Ensuring Effective 
Corporate Governance through Ownership and Board Control Systems, Corporate Ownership and 
Control, 9(3): 343-354. 
 
 Agyemang, O.S. & Odoi, A. (2010), Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth in Ghana: Evidence from 
Times Series Data, International Journal of Social Sciences, 2 (10): 92-118 
CONFERENCE PAPERS 
 Agyemang, O.S. & Castellini, M., The 2010 Code of best practices of Ghana. A paper presented at 
the Modern Technology and Management Institute’s 2013 annual conference, Virginia, USA. 20-21 
September, 2013.  
 
 Agyemang, O.S. & Castellini, M., How Ownership Control and Board Control Systems Lead to 
Effective Corporate Governance in Corporate Organisations: Evidence from Four Ghanaian 
Corporate Organisations. A paper presented at the International Conference on Social Sciences 
(ICSS), Izmir, Turkey, 04-05 October, 2013. 
PAPERS IN REVIEW 
 Castellini, M & Agyemang, O.S. (Forthcoming).Corporate Governance in Italian Public Agencies: 
Governance and Autonomy of Agencies, European Management Review.  
 
WORK IN PROGRESS 
 Personal Digital Assistants, Corruption, Government Expenditure and Health Outcomes in 
ECOWAS Countries 
 Cost of Management of Diabetes among Diabetic Patients in Ghana 
 Is there any link between Governance and Effectiveness of Corporate Boards? A New Perspective 
 Governance and Minority Shareholder Protection: An African Experience 
 Effect of Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and Political Stability on 
Ethical behaviour of Firms 
 Governance, Accountability and Autonomy of Italian Public Agencies 
EDITORIAL SERVICE 
 Member of editorial review board, Independent Journal of Management and Production 
 Ad hoc reviewer, Journal of African Business 
 Ad hoc reviewer, Journal of Community Medicine and Health Education 
 Ad hoc reviewer, Independent Journal of Management and Production 
 Ad hoc reviewer, African Review of Economics and Finance 
 Ad hoc reviewer, Asian Journal of Agricultural Extension, Economics & Sociology 
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